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AUTHOR: 


SANKEY,  CHARLES 


TITLE: 


THE  SPARTAN  AND 
THEBAN  SUPREMACIES 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DATE: 


1899 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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Master  Negative  # 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


094.06 
Sa5l 


D920.8 
Sa5- 


Sankey,  Charles. 

...  The  Spartan  and  Tlioban  supremacies;  by  Charles 
bankey  ...    New  York,  C.  Scribner's  sons,  1899. 

xxi.  231  p.  incl.  plans.    2  fold,  maps  (incl.  front)     17J"-.     (Half'title: 
Epoclis  of  ancient  history  ...)  /  ^  \        ;         c. 

Scries  title  also  at  head  of  t.-p. 

Copy  in  Colloco   Gtuly. 

1.  Greece — Hist. 


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FILMED  BY:    RESEARCH  PUBLICATION.S.  INC  VVOODHRinnF  rr  "~ 


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i&NCIEIVT  HISTORY 


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EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 


THE 


SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN 


i 
i 


SUPREMACIES 


BY 


CHARLES  SANKEY,  M.A. 

JOINT-EDITOR   OF  THE   SERIES 
ASSISTANT-MASTER   IN   MARLBOROUGH   COLLEGE 


WITH   FIVE  MAPS 


L 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1899 


PREFACE. 


The  period  of  history  covered  by  this  httle  book  is 
full  both  of  interest  and  of  importance.  Athens  yet 
numbered  among  her  sons  Sokrates,  Xenophon,  and 
Thrasyboulos :  Si)arta  at  no  time  in  her  history  had 
l)roduced  more  notable  citizens  than  Lysandros  and 
Agesilaos  ;  and  Thebes  was  lifted  for  a  moment  above 
her  Boiotian  provincialism  by  the  military  genius  and 
broad  statesmanship  of  Epameinondas.  But,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  interest  which  must  be  felt  in  the  careers 
of  men  like  these,  this  epoch  has  an  importance  of  its 
own.  It  was  the  transition  period  from  the  glories  of 
the  Athenian  empire  to  the  degradation  of  the  Mace- 
donian conquest ;  Athens  had  attempted  in  vain  to 
weld  into  something  like  national  unity  the  exclusive 
and  intolerant  city  communities  of  the  Hellenic  world  ; 
and  the  epoc  h  which  followed  her  downfall  exhibits 
the  disastrous  results  involved  in  the  success  of  the 
selfish  policy  of  Sparta  and  the  partial  failure  of  the 
jKitriotic  policy  of  Thebes. 


VI 


Preface, 


Accordingly,  in  treating  this  period,  I  have  tried 
to  bring  out  clearly  the  characters  of  the  leading  men 
and  the  causes  of  the  chief  events;  and  I  have 
omitted  most  of  the  infinitely  small  details  with  which 
Xenophon  has  filled  the  pages  of  his  '  Hellenika.'  I 
have,  of  course,  derived  the  greatest  assistance  from 
the  works  of  Thirlwall,  Grote,  Prof.  E.  Curtius,  and 
lastly  from  my  co-editor  Mr.  Cox ;  but  the  narrative 
is  based  mainly  on  Xenophon  and  Plutarch,  and  I 
have  attempted  to  lighten  to  some  extent  the  charge 
of  dullness  so  often  brought  against  the  *  Hellenika  ' 
by  borrowing  many  of  the  graphic  touches  of  humour 
and  description  which  frequently  redeem  its  general 
dreariness. 

C.  S. 


CONTENTS. 


B.C. 

404. 


V 


CHAPTER  I. 
THE   SPARTAN   SUPREMACY. 

Capture  of  Athens 

Conditions  imposed  upon  her 

Distress  to  which  she  had  been  reduced 
Destruction  of  the  Long  Walls         .... 
The  system  of  Sparta  a  total  falsification  of  her  promises 

She  had  promised  liberty 

But  set  up  a  crushing  tyranny 

Influence  and  character  of  Lysandros 

Lysandros  indispensable  to  Sparta  in  managing  the 

allies 

The  Harmosts 

The  Dekarchies         ....... 

The  process  of  setting  up  these  governments 
Great  opportunity  lost  to  Sparta     .... 

CHAPTER  H. 

ATHENS   UNDER   THE  THIRTY 

Return  of  the  Athenian  e.viles 

Kritias :  his  character 

Theramenes  :  his  character     . 

Political  clubs  at  Athens     . 

Measures  of  the  oligarchical  party 

Board  of  five  Ephors 

Arrest  of  democratic  leaders  . 

Appointment  of  the  Thirty 

Measures  of  the  Thirty   . 

New  Senate.     Board  of  Eleven 

Dekarchy  in  Peiraieus     . 

Professions  of  the  Thirty,  made  to  gain  the  '  moderates 


PAGE 

I 
I 

2 

2 

3 
3 
4 
5 

5-6 

7 
8 

9 
lo 


10 
II 
12 
12 

13 
13 
13 
14 
15 
15 
IS 
15 


4- 


Vlll 

B.C. 
404. 


Contents. 


Condemnation  of  the  sycophants    . 

K.xecution  of  prominent  democrats     . 

A  ISpartan  garrison  introduced  into  the  Akropolis 

Story  of  Autolykos      .... 

Further  e.xcesses  of  the  Thirty 

I*rotests  of  Iheramenes 

Institution  of  the  Three  Thousand 

Plunder  of  the  '  Metoikoi ' 

Accusation  of  Theramcncs 

Speech  of  Kritias         .... 

Answer  of  'Theramenes  .... 

Kritias  condemns  Theramenes  to  death 

Theramenes  is  seized  by  the  Eleven 

And  dies  by  the  hemlock  draught 

Keign  of  Terror  imder  the  'Thirty  . 

Reasons  for  the  oligarcliical  excesses 

i.  Grievances  of  the  rich  at  Athens 

ii.  Rancour  of  political  feeling  in  Greece 

iii.  Character  of  Kritias  .... 

Internal  policy  of  the  Thirty 

CHAPTKR    III. 

THF  '   '        ORATION  OF  THE  Al  IllMAN  DKMOCRACY. 

Change  in  Greek  feeling     ...... 

Conduct  of  Lysandros     ...... 

Samos  subdued 

Lysandros  returns  in  triumph  t"  *^>^irta 

His  power 

His  arrogance 

Other  causes  of  the  growing  unpopularity  of  Sparta. 

i.     Rejection  of  the  claims  of  Thebes,    ii.  Tribute. 

iii.  Oligarchical  enormities,     iv.    Broken  promises 
Thebes  gives  shelter  and  support  to  Athenian  exiles 

Thrasyl)oulos 

Anytos,  Archinos . 

Position  of  Phyle 

Phvle  is  seized  bv  Thrasvboulos         .... 


PAGB 

•       • 

16 

• 

16 

}olis  . 

17 

• 

17 

18 

• 

19 

19 

• 

20 

20 

• 

21 

21 

• 

22 

23 

• 

23 

24 

• 

25 

25 

• 

26 

26 

• 

27 

\ 


28 
28 

29 
29 

29 
30 


3^^ 
31 
31 
32 
32 
32 


B.C. 
404. 

403- 


r 


Y 


Contents. 


Assault  of  the  troops  of  the  Thirty  repulsed 
Night  attack  by  Thrasyboulos  successful 
'The  Thirty  seize  Eleusis  and  Salamis 
'Thrasyboulos  occupies  the  Peiraieus 

Battle  of  Mounychia 

Address  of  Thrasyboulos 

His  victory 

Speech  of  Kleokritos       .... 

Effects  of  the  successes  of  Thrasyboulos    . 

Board  of  Ten  appointed,  vice  the  'Thirty,  most  of  whom 

retire  to  Eleusis       ..... 
'The  army  of  'Thrasyboulos  gains  strength 
Spartan  aid  urgently  requested  . 

Lysandros  starts  with  a  strong  force  to  the  rescue  of 
the  oligarchs    ...... 

jealousy  against  Lysandros  at  Sparta     . 

Pausanias,  one  of  the  kings,  sets  out  with  a  second 
army    ....... 

Takes  the  chief  command  ;  hears  complaints  against 
the  oligarchs         ..... 

His  operations  against  Thrasyboulos 

He  accepts  overtures  for  an  armistice     . 

Embassies  are  sent  to  Sparta 

'Teritis  of  peace  finally  arranged 

Entry  of  Thrasyboulos  into  Athens    . 

Speech  of 'Thrasyboulos 

Restoration  of  the  democracy     .... 

The  remnants  of  the  Thirty  driven  out  of  Eleusis  . 

Moderation  of  the  democrats  beyond  all  praise 

Limitation  of  citizenship  to  Athenians  of  pure  blood 

Legislation  after  the  re-establishment  of  the  democracy 

CHAPTER    IV. 
SOK  RATES. 
Appearance  and  character  of  Sokrates 


IX 


PAOB 


34 
34 
35 
36 
36 
37 
37 
38 
38 

39 
40 

40 

41 
41 

42 

43 

43 

44 

44 

45 

45 
46 

46 

46 

47 
48 

49 


His  eloquence 

His  temperance  and  courage 


50 
51 

51 


B.C. 

403- 


399- 


403- 


40I. 


Contents. 


His  early  life 

He  studies  physical  science         ..... 

But  being  dissatisfied  turns  to  ethics 

His  religious  mission  and  supernatural  warnings 

His  method  ; — a  rigorous  cross-examination 

His  contributions  to  logic  ; — inductive  arguments  and 

definitions 

His  doctrine; — virtue  is  knowledge,  and  vice  is  igno- 
rance   .....,.,. 

Positive  side  of  his  teaching 

His  conversations  were  public  and  unpaid 

His  band  of  companions 

The  Uelphic  oracle  pronounces  Sokrates  the  wisest 
of  men  ;  he  proves  the  oracle  true  by  exposing  the 
ignorance  of  the  so-called  wise    .... 
Sokrates  was  unpopular  with  the  i.  lower  orders  ;  ii. 

higher  classes  ;  iii.  priests 

iv.  Sophists,     v.  Old-fashioned  Athenians 
His  life  is  a  proof  of  Athenian  toleration  and  liberality 
He  is  accused  by  Meletos.  Anytos.  and  Lykon 
The  arguments  of  his  accusers,  and  his  defence 
His  condemnation  and  speech  after  sentence  was  pro- 
nounced   

His  imprisonment  and  death 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  TEN   TIIOUS.AND. 

Interest  and  importance  of  the  Anabasis    . 

Cyrus  fails  to  obtain  the  throne,  and  collects  Greek 

troops  at  Sardeis 

March  of  Cyrus  from  Sardeis  .         .         .         , 

Review  of  Greek  troops       .... 
Advance  of  the  army  from  Tarsos  to  Babylonia     . 
Preparations  of  A  rtaxer.xes         .... 

March  through  Babylonia 

Arrangements  for  battle 

Battle  of  Kunaxa    . 


1 


PAGE 

53 
53 

54 

55 
55 
56 
56 


57 

58 
59 

59 
60 
61 

63 
63 


65 

66-67 

67 
68 
68 
69 
70 
70 
70 


B.C. 
401. 


400. 


yP 


403- 


401. 


Contents, 


Victory  of  the  Greeks  and  death  of  Cyrus 

The  Greeks  refuse  to  submit  to  Artaxerxes,  and  follow 

the  army  of  Tissaphernes 

Treachery  of  Tissaphernes,  and  death  of  the  generals 

Dangers  and  despondency  of  the  Greeks 

Energy  of  Xenophon,  who  is  chosen  one  of  the  new 

generals    . 
Character  of  Xenophon.  a  true  .Athenian 
Retreat  from  the  Zabatos  to  Trapezous 

Sight  of  the  Sea 

Reception  of  the  Cyreians  by  the  Greeks,  and  its  causes 
Futile  endeavour  to  get  ships  from  Byzantion 

March  to  Kotyora 

Difficulties  of  Xenophon 

Advance  to  Chr\'sopolis 

Dangerous  tumult  at  Byzantion,  produced  by  the 

treachery  of  Anaxibios  ; 

Admirably  repressed  by  Xenophon  .... 
Abominable  treatment  of  the  Cyreians  by  the  Spartans 
They  take  service  under  Seuthes,  and  then  on  the  side 

of  Sparta  against  Persia  . 
Xenophon"s  success  in  Asia     . 

•  •  •  • 

He  perhaps  goes  to  Athens,  and  returns  to  Asia 
CHAPTER  VI. 

SPARTA:     HER   ALLIES   AND   SUBJECTS. 

Contrast   between  grievances  under  Athenian   and 

Spartan  rule 

Power  of  Lysandros  weakened  by— 

i.  The  repudiation  of  his  conduct  at  Sestos 
ii.  The  condemnation  of  Thorax 
iii.  His  recall  in  consequence  of  the  complaints  of 
Pharnabazos       .... 
Lysandros  is  tricked  by  Pharnabazos,  and  leaves  Sparta 
Fall  of  the  dekarchies 
Growmg  discontent  of  the  allies      . 

•  •  • 

War  with  Elis.     Its  causes 


XI 

FAGS 

71 

71-72 
72 

73 

74 
75 
76 
76 

77 
77 
78 
78 
79 

79 
80 

80 

81 
82 
83 


82 

83 
84 

84 

85 

85 
86 

86 


XII 


Contents, 


B.C. 

401. 
400. 


399 


Agis  invades  Elis,  and  retires  .... 

Agis  invades  Elis  a  second  time,  and  mercilessly  rav- 
ages the  country  ....... 

Unsuccessful  rising  of  the  oligarchs  m  the  capital 

The  Eleians  submit  to  Sparta  .... 

Death  of  Agis 

Schemes  of  Lysandros,  as  tukl  by  Plutarch    . 

Their  failure 

Lysandros  supports  the  cl.i.....  v.f  Agesilaos  to  the 
throne 

Character  of  Agesilaos 

Conflicting  claims  of  Agesilaos  and  Leotychides    . 

Decided  in  favour  of  Agesilaos  .... 

Position  of  kings  at  JSparta 

Agesilaos  conciliates  the  cpliors 

Discontent  of  all  the  lower  strata  of  Spartan  society 

Change  in  the  character  of  the  governing  class 

Conspiracy  of  Kinadon 

Its  discovery  and  repression       .... 


FACB 

87 

87 

88 

88 

89 

89 
90 

90 

91 
92 

93 
93 

94 

94 
96 

97 
97-98 


S98. 
396. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OPER.VTIONS   IN   ASI.\    MINOR. 
The  glory  of  Sparta  tarnished  by  Persian  aid     . 
Cau.ses  of  war  between  Sparta  and  Persia 
i.  Spartan  support  of  Cyru 

ii.  Appeal  of  .Asiatic  Greeks  again>st  Tissaphemes 
iii.  Weakness  of  Persia  recently  exposed   . 
iv.  Vahie  to  Spirta  of  a  Hellenic  policy 
Expedition  of  Thimbron     . 
His  incapacity  and  punishni*  nt 
Derkyllidas  attacks  Pharn,il).i/<)^ 

Conquest  of  Aiolian  cities 

Winter  quarters  in  Hithynia        .... 
(  onfidence  of  the  ephors  in  Derkyllidas 
Rebuilding  of  the  Thrakian  Wall 

Reduction  of  At;irneus 

His  march  into  Karia;  truce  with  Tissaphernes       104- 


99 

99 
100 

100 

100 

loi 

lOI 
lOI 

102 
102 
102 

103 

104 
104 

105 


Cofititits. 


XIII 


B  C. 


396.      Causes  of  the  expedition  of  Agesilaos     . 

i.  Dangerous  condition  of  lower  classes 

ii.  News  of  the  form.ition  of  a  Persian  fleet  under 

Konon 

••■•••... 

ill.  Ambition  of  Lysandros  and  Agesilaos 

Expedition  of  Agesilaos 

His  sacrifice  at  Aulis,  and  arrival  in  Asia 

Truce  with  Tissaphernes 

Devotion  of  Asiatics  to  Lysandros,  and  his  humili- 

''^^'O"         •••'....        107 
Truce  broken  by  Tissaphernes,  followed  by  the  plun- 
der of  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazos  ...        108 
Military  preparations  at  Ephesos    .... 

395.      Devastation  of  Lydia 

Defeat  of  Persian  cavalry  near  Sardeis   . 
Disgrace  and  death  of  Tissaphernes  .... 
Truce  between  his  successor  Tithraustcs  and  Agesilaos 
Agesilaos  raises  a  fleet  and  appoints  Peisandros  ad- 
miral          

March  of  Agesilaos  into  Paphlagonia  and  Phrygia 

Camp  of  Pharnabazos  taken 

Interview  between  Agesilaos  and  Pharnabazos       . 
Agesilaos    retires    into    Mysia:    is  recalled   by  the 

^P^^o'"^ 113- 

Fleet  of  Konon  blockaded  at  Kaunos 
Revolt  of  Rhodes.     Execution  of  Dorieus 
Konon "s  journey  to  the  Court 
394.      Pharnabazos  joint  admiral  . 

^  •  •  •  •  « 

Defeat  and  death  of  Peisandros  at  Knidos     . 


CFIAPTER    VHL 

THE  CORINTHIAN   WAR. 

Increasing  discontent  of  Allies,  and  unpopularity  of 

Sparta      .... 
Tithraustes  sends  money  to  the  Greek  states 
Special  hostility  of  Thebes  ;  its  causes 
Outbreak  of  Boiotian  war 


395. 


PAGB 
lOS 

106 
106 
107 
107 

-108 

-109 
109 

no 
no 
III 
III 

III 
112 
112 

1X2 

114 
114 

116 

1x6 


117 
X18 
119 
xxg 


V 


XIV 

B.C. 

395- 


394- 


393- 


392. 
391. 


Contents, 


Spartan  plan  of  operations 

Theban  embassy  to  Athens 

The  Athenians  promise  help 

Death  of  Lysandros  before  Haliartos,  and  dispersion 

of  his  army 

Pausanias  asks  for  a  burial-truce,  and  evacuates  Boi- 

otia 

He  is  accused  and  condemned  ;  ends  his  life  at  Tegea 
Formation  of  a  confederacy  against  Sparta     . 

Theban  successes  in  the  north 

Council  of  war  at  Corinth 

March  of  the  Spartans  under  A ristodemos 
Battle  of  Corinth.     Defeat  of  the  Allies 
Agesilaos  at  Amphipolis,  in  Thessaly,  at  Chaironeia 
Battle  of  Koroneia  ....... 

Tremendous  struggle  between  Theban  and  Spartan 

hoplites 

Agesilaos  goes  to  Delphoi ;  and  returns  to  Sparta     . 
Konon  and  Pharnabazos  receive  the  submission  of 

the  Greek  cities  in  Asia 

Abydos  and  Sestos  hold  out  under  Derkyllidas 
Pharnabazos  and  Konon  ravage  the  coasts  of  Lakonia 

and  garrison  Kythera 

Pharnabazos  returns  to  Asia 

Konon  rebuilds  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens 
Military  operations  near  Corinth    .... 

Dissensions  in  Corinth 

Admission  of  the  Spartans  within  her  Long  Walls 
Iphikrates  becomes  noted  as  a  leader  of  peltasts,  and 

spreads  terror  among  the  Peloponnesian  allies    . 
Operations  of  Agesilaos  and  Teleutias  near  Corinth 

Overtures  for  peace 

Agesilaos.  after  being  present  at  the  Isthmian  games, 

captures  Peiraion 

Destruction  of  a  Spartan  mora  by  Iphikrates     . 

Prodigious  moral  effects  of  this  exploit  . 

Recall  of  Iphikrates  from  Corinth       .... 


Contents. 


XV 


PAGI 

119 
120 
120 

121 

122 

123 
123 
124 
124 
124 

126 
127 

127 
128 

128 
129 

130 

130 

131 

131 
132 

133 

133 
134 
135 

13s 
136 

137 
138 


AC. 
391. 


391. 
389- 
388. 


387. 


386. 


385- 


CHAPTER   IX. 
THE  PEACE  OF  ANTALKIDAS. 

PAGB 

Agesilaos  in  Akarnania 138 

Agesipolis  in  Argolis 138 

Antalkidas  is  sent  to  Asia  and  gains  over  Tiribazos  .  139 
Counter  embassies  from  Argos,  Athens,  Corinth,  and 

Thebes i^q 

Arrest  of  Konon 1x0 

Strouthas  supersedes  Tiribazos  and  defeats  Thimbron  141 

Expedition,  successes,  and  death  of  Thrasyboulos  141 

Anaxibios  surprised  and  slain  by  Iphikrates       .         .  142 

Piracy  in  Aigina ij^3 

Teleutias  surprises  the  Peiraicus         ....  144 

Second  mission  of  Antalkidas  is  successful     .         .  144 

Causes  of  the  general  acceptance  of  terms  of  peace  .  145 

Proclamation  of  the  conditions       ....  146 

Theban  and  .Argive  objections  overruled  by  Agesilaos  146 
The  Peace  of  Antalkidas  disgraceful  in  its  form,  in  all 

its  articles,  and  in  the  spirit  of  its  execution    .         .  147 

Mantineia  punished  by  being  split  up  into  hamlets  149 

Real  weakness  of  Persia 150 

Effect  of  the  peace  on  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  on 

Euagoras 150 

CHAPTER   X. 

THE  SUPPRESSION  OF  OLYNTHOS,   AND  THE 
LIBERATION   OF  THEBES. 

Miserable  results  of  the  war 151 

i.  Mercenaries,    ii.  Pitiless  plunder,    iii.  Embittered 

party  feelings,     iv.  Blunted  patriotism         .         .  151-152 

Sparta  as  executor  of  the  peace 152 

Results  to  Athens ,  152 

Results  to  Thebes 153 

Spartan  measures  in  Boiotia 153 

Restoration  of  Plataia 153 


xvr 

I.e. 

384. 
383- 

382. 


381. 
380. 

379. 


II 


Contents. 


Growth  of  the  Olynthian  confederacy 
Appeal  of  the  Akanthians  against  Olynthos 
Objections  of  Akanthos  and  Apollonia 
Spartan  expeditions  against  OI\  nthos 
Political  state  of  Thebes     ... 

Ismenias 

Plot  arranged  by  Leontiades 
Kadmeia  seized  by  Phoibidas 
Arrest  of  Ismenias      ..... 
I'tTect  of  this  news  al  Sparta  . 
Sentence  on  Phoibidas 
Morality  of  the  act  of  Phoiljidas  discussed 
Trial  and  execution  of  Ismenias 
Spartan  oi)erations  against  Olynthos 
Death  of  leleutias       ..... 
Death  of  Agesipolis  ... 

Submission  of  Olynt;... 
The  moment  of  Sparta's  great  wcr 

Theban  exiles  at  Athens     .... 
Plot  against  Theban  oligarchs 
Pelopidas  and  his  companions  enter  Thebes 
Assassination  of  Archias  and  others 
Assassination  of  Leontiades 
Muster  of  the  democrats.     General  assembly 
Pelopidas  and  his  friends  made  Boiotarchs 
The  Spartans  evacuate  the  Kadmeia 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE   RISE  OF   THERES. 

Character  of  Pelopidas 

Character  of  Epameinondas 

Difficulties  in  the  way  of  Thebes         .         .         .         , 

The  Sacred  Band 

Spartan   expedition   against   Boiotia  under  Kleom- 

brotos      .         .         

Sphodrias  attempts  to  surprise  the  Peiraieus  . 

Is  tried,  and  acquitted 


Contents. 


XVII 


PAG  8 

IS4 
154 
155 

155 
156 
156 

15^ 
157 

157 
157 

158 

158 

159 
160 
160 
161 
161 
161 
162 
163 
163 
164 
165 
166 
166 
166 


167 
168 
170 
170 

171 
172 
17-I 


B.C. 

379- 


378. 


377-6 
376. 


375- 
374- 


373- 


372. 


371. 


Formation  of  a  new  Athenian  Confederacy 

Its  early  enthusiasm  and  real  weakness 

Thebes,  pressed  by  difficulties,  joins  the  new  lea-ue    ' 

Agesilaos  takes  the  field  against  Thebes,  but  effects 

little  ;  not  daring  to  engage  the  united  Theban  and 

Athenian  armies      ... 

The  campaigns  of  377  and  376  w.  c. 

Illness  of  Agesilaos     ... 

The  Spartans   raise   a   fleet,  but   are  defeated  near 
Naxos  . 



Athens  mcreases  her  naval  power 

Thebes  strengthens  her  authoritv  in  Boiotia  . 
Especially  by  the  defeat  of  the  Spartans  near  Tegyra 
The  Spartans  send  an  army  under  Kleombrotos  to 

help  the  Phokians  against  Thebes 
But  refuse  help  to  Pharsalos  against  Jason  of  Pherai 
Athens  makes  peace  with  Sparta 
Which  is  broken  by  Timotheos  at  Zakynthos 
Mnasippos  lays  siege  to  Korkvra ;    but  is  defeated 
and  killed     . 

Operations  of  Iphikrates  in  command  of  the  Athenian 
fleet 

Timotheos  tried  .uid  acquitted;  ente'rs  the  service  of 
the  Great  King    . 

The  Thebans  dismantle  Thespiai.  and  destroy  Plataia 
Athens  and  Sparta  inclined  to  peace 
Antalkidas  obtains  a  rescript  from  the  Great  King 
Peace  Congress  at  Sparta.     The  Peace  of  Kallias 
Sparta  and  Athens  swear  to  the  terms  of  the  peace- 
but  with  the  Thebans  a  hitch  arises ;  and  they  are 
excluded  from  the  treaty  18-8 

Kleombrotos    invades    Boiotia.  'and 'encamps 'near  ^"  ^ 
Leuktra        .         .         _ 

Numbers  of  the  armies 

Discouragement  in  the  Theban  "camp,  alleviated  by 

the  spirit  of   Epameinondas.   and   by  favourable 

portents 

186 


TAG  E 
173 
173 


174-175 
175 
175 

176 
176 
176 

177 

178 
178 
179 
179 

179 

180 

181 

181 
182 
182 
183 


185 
186 


'  t  ym  Tki^'wfvw 


XVIII  Contents. 

B.C.  PAGR 

371.      Tactirs  of  Fpameinondas 187 

The  Spartans  eager  to  engage  .  188 

The  Spartan  right  wing  defeated;  Kleombrotos  slain, 

and  the  whole  army  driven  back  to  the  camp        189-190 
The  Spartans  acknowledge  their  defeat  by  asking  for 
the  burial  truce    ....... 

Reception  of  the  news  at  Spart.i         .... 

And  at  Athens 

Jason  of  Pherai  arranges  an  armistice  ;  and  the  Spar- 
tans depart  by  night 


370- 


369- 


190 
191 
191 


192 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  THEBAN   SLTREM.\CY. 

General  tendencies  of  Theban  policy 

Immediate  effects  of  Leuktra     ..... 

The  Thebans  destroy  Thespiai       .... 

And  obtain  an  Amphiktyonic  condemnation  of  Sparta 

Athens  becomes  the  head  of  a  new  league 

At  Sparta  the  penalties  of  the  law  are  remitted  in  the 

case  of  the  survivors  of  Leuktra      .... 
Disturbances  in  the  Peloponnesos  .... 

•  Skytalism  '  at  Argos 

Rebuilding  of  Mantineia 

Movement  for  Arkadian  union 

Influence  of  Lykomedes  at  Mantineia    . 
Difficulties  from  the  opposition  of  Orchomenos  and 

Tf*gea      ......... 

Expedition  of  Agesilaos  against  Mantineia     . 

First  expedition  of  Epameinondas  to  the  Peloponnese 

His  designs      ........ 

He  marches  on  Sparta 

But  the  energy  of  Agesilaos  saves  the  city 
Megalopolis  is  founded  as  the  capital  of  Arkadia 
Messene  built,  and  the  Messenians  restored  . 
Futile  charge  brought  against  Epameinondas  on  his 

return      

Alliance  between  Sparta  and  Athens 


192 

194 
194 

194 
194 

195 
195 
195 
196 

196 
196 

197 
197 
198 
198 
198 
199 
200 
200 

201 
201 


B.C. 

368. 


370. 
368. 


367. 


366. 


365. 
364- 


4 


363. 


362. 


Contents. 


Chabrias  occupies  the  Isthmus  . 

But  Epameinondas  forces  his  way  through    . 

Epameinondas  dismissed  from  office  , 

Assiissination  of  Jason  of  Pherai     . 

Alexandros  becomes  Tagos 

Seizure  and  imprisonment  of  Pelopidas 

The  first  expedition  sent  to  rescue  him  fails 

The  second,  under  Epameinondas,  is  successful 

Messenian  victory  at  Olympic  games 

Energy  and  success  of  Arkadians  .... 

An  expedition  under  Archidamos  into  Arkadia  results 

in  the  Spartan  victory  of  '  The  Tearless  Battle  ' 
Third  expedition  of  Epameinondas  to  the  Peloponnese 
His   treatment   of  the   Achaian   cities   reversed   by 

Thebes 

Embassies  despatched  by  the  Greek  states  to  the 
Persian  court 

Success  of  Pelopidas  in  obtaining  a  decree  in  favour 
of  Thebes  ;  but  not  a  single  state  accepts  it   . 

Alliance  between  Arkadia  and  Athens 

Peace  made  by  Corinth  and  Phlious  with  Thebes 

War  between  Arkadia  and  Elis 

•  •  •  • 

Defeat  of  Archidamos  by  the  Arkadians 
Battle  of  Olympia,  and  bravery  of  the  Eleians 
Dissensions  among  the  Arkadians  lead  to  peace  with 
Elis 

Seizure  of  Arkadian  oligarchs  at  Tegea  . 
Mantineian  envoys  seek  redress  at  Thebes 

Reply  of  Epameinondas 

Alliance  between  Sparta  and  Mantineia 

Death  of  Pelopidas  in   Thessaly,  when   victorious 

over  Alexandros  of  Pherai 

Fleet  raised  by  Thebes 
Destruction  of  Orchomenos    . 

*  *  *  • 

Position  of  the  Greek  states  with  reference  to  the  war 
Fourth  expedition  of  Epameinondas  to  the  Pelopon- 
nese 


XIX 

PACK 
202 
202 
203 
203 
204 
204 
204 
205 
205 
205 

206 
207 

207 

208 

209 
209 
210 
210 
211 
211 

211 
212 
212 
213 
213 

214 

215 

2IS 
216 

216 


B.C. 

362. 


361. 


Contents, 


PAGS 


Xenophon's  testimony  to  the  r^rif-r  ilship  of  Epamci- 

nondas     .........       216 

Epameinondas  attempts  to  surprise  Sparta ;  but   is 

hafficd      .         .  .         .217 

He  attempts  to  surprise  Mantineia ;  but  is  thwarted 

by  the  Athenian  cavalry  ......       218 

Enthusiasm  of  Thebans  and  Arkadians  for  Epamei- 

nond.is     .........       219 

The   Spartans  and  their  alHes  take   up   a   position 

south  of  Mantineia 219 

Tactics  of  Epameinondas        .....  220 

Success  of  the  Thebans,  stopped  suddenly  by  the  fiill 

of  Epameinondas      ......       220-221 

His  last  moments  222 

His  death    .........       222 

Results  of  the  battle         ......  222 

Death  of  .\gesilaos  in  Egypt       .....       223 

Summary 223-224 


Index  . 


325 


■r 


Contents. 


XXI 


MAPS. 

M.AP  OF  roNTINKMAL  GkkkcK    .  To  face  title-page 

Mat  of  Nkiciiuolrhood  of  Athens 
Map  of  Wkstekv   \<;ia    . 

•  •  •  •  . 

I'l.AN  OF  Battle  of  Leuktra    . 
IM  \\  (H-  Hatti.k  (.F  Ma.ntineia    . 


PAGE 


33 

To  face        63 

187 

231 


k 


THE 


SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN  SUPREMACIES. 


CHAPTER   I. 


THE   SPARTAN   SUPREMACY. 

The  long  struggle  was  over,  and  the  triumph  of  Sparta 
was  complete.  After  a  resistance  protracted  through 
twenty-seven  years  of  almost  superhuman 
effort  imperial  Athens  lay  at  the  mercy  of  her  Athens. 
foes.  The  Spartans  had  rejected  the  vin- 
dictive demand  of  their  allies  that  no  treaty  should  be 
made  with  the  enslavers  of  Hellas,  but  that  their  very 
name  should  be  blotted  out,  or,  as  a  Theban  envoy 
had  phrased  it,  that  the  city  should  be  razed,  the  inhab- 
itants sold  into  slavery,  and  the  country  turned  into  a 
sheep-walk  ;  for  they  knew  well  enough  that  the  glorious 
memory  of  Athens,  if  destroyed,  might  some  day  be  cast 
in  their  teeth  as  a  bitter  reproach,  while  Athens,  if  kept 
by  the  oligarchic  faction  subservient  to  Spartan  policy, 
might  be  the  most  valuable  instrument  in  their  hands. 
Accordingly  with  a  parade  of  magnanimous  sentiments, 
which  they  had  forgotten  readily  enough  in 
the  case  of  Plataia,  they  declared  that  they 
could  not  consent  to  enslave  a  city  which 
had  served  Greece  so  nobly  in  her  darkest  hour  of  danger; 
and  the  fiat  went  forth  that  the  Long  Walls  and  the  forti- 


Conditions 
imposed 
upon  her. 


The  Spartan  Supremacy. 


B.C.  404. 


ficatioiib  of  the  Peiraieus  were  to  be  destroyed  ;  that  the 
Athenians  should  surrender  all  their  fleet  except  twelve 
ships  ;  that  they  should  receive  back  into  the  city  their 
exiles— men  who  had  no  sympathy  with  their  cherished 
traditions  of  past  glory,  and  were  openly  hostile  to  that 
constitution  which  had  made  that  glory  possible  ;   that 
they  should  recognise  as  allies  or  enemies  those  whom 
the  Spartans  regarded  as  such;    and  that  they  should 
serve  with  the  Spartans  wherever  they  should  lead  them 
by  sea  or  land.     Hard  as  these  terms  must  have  seemed 
to  those  who  still  clung  fondly  to  some  slight  hope  that 
Athens  would  be  allowed  to  retain  either  her  navy  or  her 
fortifications,  they  were  readily  accepted  by  the  majority 
of  the  citizens.     Not  only  had  the  fleet  of  Athens  been 
ruined  and  the  flower  of  her  seamen  been 
slain,  for  from  blows  almost  as  crushing:  as 
these   she   had   previously    recovered ;    nor 
was  it  that  the  lingering  agonies  of  a  pro- 
tracted siege  had  slowly  destroyed  alike  the  power  and 
the  will  to  resist ;  but  the  more  f;\tal  evils  of  treachery 
and  disunion  had  been  doing  their  work.     As  there  had 
been  an  Adeimantos  at  Aigospotamoi,  so  there  was  a 
Theramenes  at  Athens;    and   the   city  divided   against 
itself  could  not  stand.    The  few  who  still  protested  against 
surrender,  and  preferred  death  to  dishonour,  could  not 
make  their  voices  heard.     Lysandros  sailed  in  triumph 
through  the  narrow  entrance  of  the  harbour  of  Peiraieus; 
Kritias,  Charikles,  and  a  crowd  of  exiles,  returned  to  make 
their  own  gain  out  of  their  country's  loss  ;  and  the  work 
Destruction       ^^  destruction,  sad  enough  to  the  Athenian 
Wall^  ^"^"8       hands  which    had  to   complete   it,  at    once 
began.      Enlivened  by  the  glad  strains  of 
female  flute-players  and  the  joyous  measures  of  garlanded 
dancing-women,  the  Spartans  began  to  demolish  the  Long 


Distress  to 
which  she 
had  been 
reduced. 


] 


) 
i 


The  system 
of  Sparta  a 
total  falsifi- 
cation of 
her  pro- 
mises. 


CH.  I.  Falsification  of  Spartan  Promises.  3 

Walls,  the  most  solid  and  magnificent  of  the  external 
evidences  of  Athenian  supremacy  ;  while  the  allies  lent 
willing  assistance,  thinking  in  their  short-sighted  enthu- 
siasm that  this  was  the  first  day  of  liberty  for  Hellas. 

But  never  have  highly-wrought  hopes  been  doomed 
to  be  more  cruelly  falsified.     If  the  promises  of  Sparta, 
which  had  been  reiterated  repeatedly  during 
the  whole  course  of  the  war,  could  have  been 
trusted,  the  allies  had  indeed  good  reason 
to    be    confident.       The    Corinthians    had 
originally  urged  her  to  stand  forward  as  the 
liberator  of  (^.reece  from  the  thraldom  of  the  despot-city. 
The  ultimatum  forwarded  from  Sparta  to  Athens  before 
the  declaration  of  war  had  insisted  on  the  independence 
of   the  Greek  cities.     Archidamos  had  called  upon  the 
Plataians  to  fight  in  the  same  cause.     Still  more  explic- 
itly had  Brasidas  assured  the   Akanthians  that  the  lib- 
erty of  Greece  was  his  sole  object ;  that  the  Lake-daimo- 
nians  had  sworn  most  solemnly  to  allow  full  independ- 
ence to  those  who  joined  their  alliance ;  that  he  did  not 
come  to  support  any  local  faction,  neither  to  strengthen 
the  hands  of  the  few  against  the  many  nor  of  the  many 
against  the  few;   that  the  end  of  Sparta  was  only  the 
destruction  of  the  empire  of  others,  and  not  the  establish- 
ment of  empire  for  herself.     But  the  twenty  years  which 
had  passed  since  these  promises  were  uttered 
had  brought  great  changes  with  them.     Not       pro^mised 
only  had  the  disasters  in  Sicily  inflicted  a       ^''^^''^y' 
heavy  blow  on  the  power  and  prestige  of  Athens ;  not 
only  had  the  temporary  ascendency  of  the  Four  Hundred 
shewn  the  strength  of  faction  in  her  midst ;  but  Persian 
influence  and  Persian  gold  had  rendered  Sparta  more 
independent  of  the  good  opinion  of  her  Greek  allies. 
These  promises  indeed  were  never  formally  withdrawn, 


The  Spartan  Supremacy. 


B.  C.  404. 


and  were  even  renewed  from  time  to  time  on  suitable 
occasions ;  but  the  protestations  grew  ever  less  vehement 
and  emphatic.  At  last  when  a  catastrophe,  more  complete 
in  its  results  and  more  stunning  in  its  suddenness  than 
even  Lysandros  could  have  looked  for,  laid  the  whole 
Grecian  world  prostrate  before  the  conquering  city,  all 
previous  pledges  and  promises  were  forgotten.  The 
sentimental  complaints  against  Athenian  supremacy  were 
changed  for  the  positive  injuries  of  Spartan  tyranny;  and 
the  tardy,  and  sometimes  partial,  justice  of 
a  crushing  the  dilcasterics  for  the  heartless  indifference 
tyranny.  ^^  ^^^  ephoVs.     If  thc  fulc  of  the  culturcd, 

civilised,  and  philosophic  State  was  like  the  chastisement 
of  whips,  the  oppression  of  the  rough,  military  power  was 
like  the  stinging  of  scorpions ;  and  the  little  finger  of  the 
Spartan  harmost  was  thicker  than  the  loins  of  the  Athe- 
nian tax-collector.  Perhaps  it  was  that  the  Spartan, 
always  drilled  and  never  educated,  and  consequently 
narrow  and  intolerant,  could  never  grasp  the  Greek 
notion  of  political  liberty.  The  citizen,  in  the  general 
idea  of  Greeks,  as  in  the  formal  definition  of  Aristotle, 
was  one  who  had  a  right  to  share  in  the  work  of  govern- 
ment, to  speak  and  vote  in  his  assembly,  and  to  act  as 
juryman  in  his  law-courts.  But  in  the  mouth  of  a  Spar- 
tan liberty  was  a  fair-sounding  pretence  under  which  the 
oligarchs  could  lord  it  over  the  people ;  and,  if  they  had 
been  upbraided  with  their  perfidious  violations  of  all  their 
promises,  they  would  perhaps  have  replied  that  in  sup- 
porting a  governing  class  and  saving  the  people  from 
their  sad  errors  of  democracy,  they  were  really  securing 
the  highest  liberty  to  their  subject  states.  For  it  was 
the  rivalry  of  democrat  and  oligarch,  no  less  than 
the  principle  of  autonomy,  which  embittered  the  strug- 
gle of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  made  every  single 


I 
1 


^1? 
i 
I 


en.  I.         Pcnuvr  and  Character  of  Lysandros. 


5 


state  and  city   of   Hellas  feel  the  keenest  interest  in 
its  result. 

It  was  indeed  a  great  calamity  for  Greece  that  her 
destinies  at  this  time  were  in  the  hands  of  a  man  like 
Lysandros.     Had  the  war  been  concluded  by  the  mag- 
nanimous and  high-principled  Kallikratidas,  he  might 
possibly  have  seen  that  with  all  its  faults  the  Athenian 
confederacy  was  not  only  a  step  in  the  right 
direction,  but  the  highest  point  to  which  the       Lysandros^' 
political  development  of   the   Greeks  had 
attained  ;  and,  correcting  its  faults,  he  might  have  made 
an  effort  to  work  on  the  same  principle.     Had  Brasidas, 
with  his  broader  views  and  wider  sympathies,  been  at  this 
crisis  supreme  in  the  councils  of  Sparta,  he  might  perhaps 
have  prevented  her  great  name  from  being  degraded  by 
the  support  of  oligarchic  faction  and  tyranny.     It  would 
have  been  better  had  even  a  mere  soldier  like  Gylippos 
been  at  the  head  of  the  Spartan  forces,  for  he  might  have 
contented  himself  with  military  results,  and  have  refrained 
from  intermeddling  with  the  political  life  of  the  cities. 
But  Lysandros  was  utterly  incapable  of  even  conceiving 
the  idea  of  patriotism  towards  Hellas,  and  was  also  con- 
summately able  and  absolutely  unscrupulous  in  carrying 
out  his  own  designs. 

Of  noble,  even  of  Herakleid,  descent  on  his  father's 
side,  he  was  a  man  of  boundless  ambition  and  aspired 
to  the  highest  offices  in  the  State ;  born  of  a 
mother  of  plebeian,  if  not  of  servile  origin,  he  L^slndros"^ 
stooped  to  unworthy  means  to  gain  his  ends. 
From  the  more  vulgar  vices  he  was  free.  Though  reared 
in  the  strictest  school  of  Spartan  discipline,  his  character 
was  not  stained  by  those  outbursts  of  sensual  passion  to 
which  too  many  of  the  Spartan  governors  at  this  time 
gave  way.      Though   brought  up   in   poverty,   he   was 


The  Spartan  Supremacy. 


B.C.  404. 


superior  to  avarice,  a  vice  which  suUicd  the  reputation 
of  many  of  the  greatest  of  his  fellow-citizens.  Indeed 
Plutarch  tells  us  that  though  he  filled  his  country  with 
riches  and  with  the  love  of  riches,  by  the  vast  amount  of 
gold  and  silver  which  he  sent  home  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  he  kept  not  one  drachma  for  himself.  It  was  this 
very  quality  which  made  Cyrus  his  firm  friend  ;  for  at  a 
banquet  given  to  Lysandros  before  his  departure  from 
Sardeis,  Cyrus,  pledging  his  guest  in  the  wine  cup,  desired 
him  to  ask  some  favour  from  him,  promising  to  refuse 
nothing  which  would  gratify  him  ;  and  he  heard  with 
astonishment  and  admiration  the  request  that  an  obol 
should  be  added  to  the  daily  pay  of  the  seamen.  Lysandros 
possessed  pre-eminently  another  quality  which  was  very 
rare  among  his  countrymen,  and  which  was  especially 
useful  in  dealing  with  Asiatic  Greeks  and  Persian  grandees 
— a  suppleness,  tact,  and  pliancy,  which  enabled  him  to 
accommodate  his  manners  and  conversation  to  any  com- 
pany, and  contrasted  favourably  with  the  arrogance  and 
harshness  which  was  too  common  a  result  of  Spartan 
training.  Nor  was  he  ashamed  of  the  craft  or  cunning 
by  which  he  gained  success,  openly  declaring  as  a  Hcra- 
kleid,  that  where  the  lion's  skin  of  Herakles  would  not 
reach,  it  must  be  patched  with  that  of  the  fox ;  and,  far 
from  respecting  the  sanctity  of  a  promise,  he  advised  that 
men  should  be  cheated  with  oaths,  as  boys  with  dice. 

Such  was  the  character  of  the  man  who  at  this  juncture 

was  absolutely  indispensable  to  Sparta.     Lysandros  had 

made  himself  useful  to  his  countrv,  and  now 

Lysandros  ^  '         ^ 

indispensable     uas  ncccssary  to  licr.     While  Other  Spartan 
^^^  ^  leaders  had  been  content  merely  with  win- 

ning their  battles  or  conducting  their  campaigns  to  a 
successful  close,  Lysandros,  with  far-sighted  prudence,  had 
prepared  beforehand  all  his  plans  for  establishing  the 


\ 


C  H.  I. 


The  Spartan  Harnunt. 


power  of  Sparta  and  of  himself;  he  had  gathered  into  his 
own  hand  all  the  threads  of  political  influence,  and  had 
secured  to  himself  a  position  in  which  neither 
rival  nor  colleague  was  possible.     To  effect      ;Ke"!dHef.'"^ 
this,  he  had  made  good  use  of  the  office  of 
admiral,  which  he  had  held  ten  years  before.    Fixing  his 
headquarters  at  Kphesos,  he  had  gained  all  possible  infor- 
mation   about   the    state  of  political    parties   in    all   the 
principal  towns  in  insular  and  Asiatic  Greece.     He  had 
even  invited  to  Ephesos  the  chief  party-leaders  and  the 
bolder  and  more  ambitious  citizens,  promoting  some  to 
high  office  and  honour,  and  exhorting  others  to  combine 
more  closely  in  political  clubs  ;  and  he  had  held  out  to  all 
tlie  prospect  of  absolute  authority  in  their  own  cities  after 
the  downfall  of  Athens  and  the  close  of  the  war.     Hence 
Lysandros   was  regarded   by  the   oligarchic  frictions   in 
every  State  as  their  patron  ;  their  advancement  was  de- 
pendent on  his  influence ;  he  was  not  merely  the  only 
Spartan  who  knew  the  right  men  in  every  city,  but  he  was 
the  only  Spartan  whom  these  men  could  fully  trust.     It 
was  of  course  certain  that  the  defeat  of  Athens  was  the 
defeat  of  democracy,  and    the   triumph    of  Sparta   the 
triumph  of  oligarchy  ;  such  a  result  was  clear  from  the  tra- 
ditional policy  of  both  States.     But  it  was  left  for  Lysan- 
dros to  strike  out  a  new  type  of  oligarchy  in  the  double 
government  of  the  Spartan  governor  and  the  native  Coun- 
cil of  Ten,  by  which  he  could  at  once  gratify  all  his  parti- 
sans, secure  his  own  personal  ascendency,  and  yet  not  di- 
verge too  widely  from  the  ancient  traditions  of  his  country. 
The  title  of   Harmost  ('ordcrer'  or  'governor')  was 
not  new.     It  had  been  the  official  name  of 
the  governors  sent  to  manage  the  rural  dis- 
tricts of  the  Perioikoi,  or  subject  tribes  who 
inhabited  Lakonia  and  Messenia ;  nor  was  there  anything 


The  Har- 

most. 


■fi.. 


h 


The  Spartan  Supremacy. 


B.  C.  404. 


offensive  in  the  term,  except  so  far  as  it  implied  that  the 
allied  cities  were  placed  in  the  same  position  of  inferiority 
as  the  conquered  tribes  of  the  Peloponncse.  The  au- 
thority of  the  harmost  was  supported  by  a  body  of  Spartan 
soldiers;  and  his  duties  and  his  term  of  office  were  alike 
undefined.  Directly  dependent  upon  and  responsible  to 
the  ephors,  the  harmosts  had  authority  in  civil  as  well  as 
military  affairs,  and  were,  in  short,  the  confidential  servants 
of  the  Spartan  government  in  the  towns  in  which  they  were 
placed.  Though  they  were  originally  men  of  advanced 
age  and  proved  competence,  the  large  number  required  at 
this  time  made  it  impossible  that  all  should  possess  high 
rank  or  tried  prudence ;  and  the  allies  were  soon  heard 
complaining  that  even  helots  were  thought  good  enough 
to  be  placed  over  them  as  harmosts.  History  tells  us 
little  about  them;  but  that  little  is  to  their  discredit. 
Kallibios,  at  Athens,  supported  the  Thirty  Tyrants  in  their 
worst  enormities ;  Aristodemos,  at  Oreos,  a  town  distin- 
guished beyond  the  rest  of  the  Euboian  cities  for  devo- 
tion to  Athens,  was  guilty  of  the  most  brutal  violence 
towards  the  son  of  a  free  citizen  ;  Aristarchos  at  Byzan- 
tion,  where  his  predecessor  Klearchos  had  made  himself 
execrated  for  his  cruelty,  sold  into  slavery  400  of  the 
Cyreian  Greeks,  most  of  whom  had  been  left  disabled  by 
wounds  or  sickness;  Herippidas  at  Herakleia  massacred 
by  hundreds  the  citizens  who  opposed  him.  In  short, 
they  were,  as  Diodoros  says,  governors  in  name,  but 
tyrants  in  deed ;  and  it  was  vain  to  appeal  to  Sparta 
against  their  crimes.  \j 

Nor  was  the  character  of  the  Dekarchies,  or  Commis- 
sions of  Ten,  such  as  to  temper  with  modera- 
chics.  tion  the  brutal  and  unscrupulous  regime  of 

the  harmost.     A   blind  devotion  to  the  in- 
terests of  Sparta  and  Lysandros,  or,  in  other  words,  to 


i 


CH.  I. 


The  Dekarchies. 


I 


.1 


oligarchy,  had  been  rewarded  by  a  position  in  which  the 
lives  and  property  of  all  their  fellow-citizens,  and  especi- 
ally of  their  old  political  rivals,  were  at  their  mercy.  Of 
the  internal  history  of  the  towns  under  their  rule  little  is 
known ;  but  from  the  ruthless  rancour  of  Greek  political 
life  generally,  and  from  the  analogy  of  the  Thirty  at 
Athens,  it  may  be  judged  that  their  members  used  their 
absolute  liberty  of  action  to  satiate  with  blood  their  lust 
for  vengeance,  and  to  glut  with  plunder  their  rapacious 
cupidity.  Isokrates,  the  orator,  concludes  a  burst  of  strong 
denunciation  against  the  Dekarchies  with  these  indignant 
words  :  '  Exile  and  faction,  the  subversion  of  laws,  and 
the  overthrow  of  constitutions ;  nay,  more,  outrages  on 
boys,  the  shame  of  women,  and  the  plunder  of  property, 
who  can  recount  all  these  ?  I  can  only  aver  that  while 
one  edict  would  easily  have  set  aright  all  that  went  wrong 
under  us,  the  massacres  and  illegalities  committed  under 
them  are  beyond  the  power  of  anyone  to  cure.' 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  such  governments  could 
be  quietly  established  in  all  the  cities  of  Greece  without 
considerable  resistance  and  bloodshed. 
Everywhere,  according  to  Plutarch,  many 
were  murdered,  and  many  driven  into  exile. 
Friend  and  foe  fared  alike.  All,  whether  old 
allies  of  Sparta  or  recent  conquests  from  Athens,  were 
equally  obliged  to  submit  to  a  dekarchy  and  to  receive 
a  harmost.  Lysandros  himself  superintended  the  change 
of  government  in  many  cities,  and  by  personally  appear- 
ing on  many  scenes  of  bloodshed,  says  Plutarch,  did  not 
give  the  Greeks  a  favourable  impression  of  Spartan  rule. 
So  on  his  voyage  to  Athens,  after  the  catastrophe  of 
Aigospotamoi,  he  arranged  the  internal  politics  of  Chalke- 
don  and  Byzantion,  of  Mitylene  and  other  Lesbian  towns, 
and  treacherously  massacred  a  large  number  of  citizens 


The  process 
of  setting 
up  these 
govern- 
ments. 


tfi  J3t» '^^.i.^  .A' ■  «  ^ 


FO 


The  Spartan  Supremacy. 


B.C.  404. 


at  Thasos,  I  n  short,  he  showed  conchisivcl y  that  the  prom- 
ise of  freedom  under  Sparta  was  a  deUision  and  a  snare. 
Never  before  had  any  single  state  wielded  such  power 
in  Hellas  as  Sparta  at  this  time  ;  never  had  any  one  man 
possessed  the  influence  of  Lysandros.  Strong  in  the 
friendship  of  the  (}reat  King,  stronger  in  the  prestige 
which  for  generations  had  been  gathering  round  her 
name,  strongest  in  the  gratitude  of  a  newly-liberated 
Greece,  Sparta  had  a  great  op[)()rtunity  of  conferring 
lasting  benefits  on  Hellas;  but  narrow  in  all  her  views 
and  stunted  in  her  development,  devoid  alike  of  broad 
culture   or    far-sighted    statesmanship,   she 


f)ort 
ost  to 
Sparta. 


>o7ninh^  abused  her  power  to  the  worst  purposes.     It 

is  true  that  she  performed  isolated  acts  of 
justice,  dictated  by  political  expediency, 
such  as  the  restoration  of  the  surviving  Aiginctans  and 
Melians,  and  the  expulsion  of  Athenian  and  Messcnian 
colonists  from  various  places ;  but  the  prevailing  charac- 
teristics of  her  rule  were  violence  and  injustice,  and  in 
bitter  jest  the  Spartans  were  compared  to  cheating  tavern- 
women,  who  trick  their  customers  by  the  promise  of  a 
delicious  draught,  and  then  fill  the  cup  with  the  most  bit- 
ter and  repulsive  mixtures. 


CHAPTER    11. 


/ 


ATHENS  UNDER  THE  THIRTY. 

Though  to  the  vast  majority  of  Athenian  citizens  who 
saw  the  triumphant  entrance  of  their  dreaded  foe,  the 
sixteenth  day  of  the  month  Mounychion  had 
been  a  day  of  heaviness  and  despair,  when 
the  sun  of  Athenian  glory  set  amid  clouds 
and  gloom,  there  was  yet  a  party,  calling  itself  Athenian, 


Return  of 
the  Athe- 
nian exiles. 


CM.  II. 


Characters  of  Kritias  and  Theramenes. 


1 1 


which  saw  in  the  same  circumstances  a  cause  for  the 
highest  exultation.     Many  of  them   had   been   serving 
agamst   their  country  with   Agis,  the   Spartan    king    at 
Dckeleia,  and  had  waited,  the  most  eager  and  anxious  of 
all  the  blockading  force,  for  the  moment  of  surrender. 
Others  had  remained  within  the  beleaguered  city   frus- 
trating the  efforts  of  the  patriots  to  infuse  harmony  and 
coafidence  into  the  famished  multitude,  accusing  before 
the  compliant  Senate  those  who  were  most  energetic  in 
animating  the  citizens  to  resistance,  and  securing  their 
arrest  and,  if  necessary,  their  execution.     Now  the  hour 
had  come  which  crowned  their  efforts  with  success  and 
realised  their  hopes  to  the  full,  assuring  to  them  revenge 
for  the  past  and  ascendency  in  the  future. 

Foremost  among  the  exiles  was  Kritias.     In  him,  if  in 
any,  might  have  been  found  the  ideal  of  oligarchic  per- 
fection.    Born    of  ancient  and  honourable 
lineage,  and  possessed  of  hereditary  wealth        kritias:  his 

K«    U^^    1     ij  .  ^       v-tiiiii,         character. 

ne  nad  held  a  conspicuous  position  in  the 
leading  circles  of  Athens.     The  uncle  of  Plato  and  the 
pupil  of  Sokrates,  he  had  listened  to  the  noblest  teachings 
in  ethics  and  politics.      He  had  cultivated  poetry  with 
success :   and  his  eloquence,  celebrated  even  in  a  city 
which  was  the  nurse  of  orators,  had.  we  may  well  believe 
a  peculiar  charm  as  contrasted  with  the  rhetorical  vul' 
garities    of   debating    leather-sellers    and    candlestick- 
makers.     It  could  not,  indeed,  be  forgotten  that  he  had 
been  m  his  younger  days  an  associate  of  the  arch-traitor 
Alk.biades.  and  had  been  suspected,  like  so  many  other 
young  bloods,   of  complicity   in  that  mysterious  act  of 
sacrilege,  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermai ;    but  men  might 
hope  that  years  of  exile  had  taught  him  a  wholesome  les- 
son of  self-restraint,  and  would  remember  that  recently 
he  had  shown  himself  capable  of  sympathy  with  the  op- 

C 


12 


Athens  under  the   Thirty. 


B.C.  404. 


pressed  by  supporting  against  their  masters  the  Penestai, 
or  serfs  of  Thcssaly.  But  such  hopes,  if  they  were  en- 
tertained, were  doomed  to  disappointment. 

The  past  Hfe  of  Theramenes.  the  leader  of  the  ohgarch- 
ical  party  within  the  walls,  had  been  very  different.     He 
had   risen   into   public  notice    seven   years 
mcncs'.  his       before  during  the  government  of  the   Four 
character.  Hundred,  and  had  gained  the  reputation  of 

a  friend  to  liberty  by  deserting  his  party  and  caballing 
against  the  oligarchy.  This  reputation  he  confirmed  by 
hunting  to  death  the  generals  after  the  battle  of  Arginou- 
sai;  and  during  the  late  siege  he  had  been  the  envoy 
chosen  to  conduct  the  negotiations  with  Sparta.  While 
absent  on  this  mission  he  had  spent  three  months  with 
Lysandros— months  of  the  most  intense  misery  to  the 
starving  population  of  Athens,  but  months  which  had 
been  used  to  the  best  advantage  by  the  aristocratic  party 
in  strengthening  their  own  position,  and  weakening  all 
idea  of  resistance  among  the  citizens. 

The  most  powerful  engine  for  establishing  and  extend- 
ing oligarchic  principles  was  found  in  the  system  of  Het- 
airiai,  or  political  clubs.     These  were  no  new 
inventions,   neither  were   they   peculiar    to 
Athens.     It  has  been  seen  that  Lysandros 
recommended  the  chief  oligarchs  in  Asia  Minor  to  com- 
bine in  this  manner  ;  and  such  clubs  had  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  previous  history'  of  Athens.  The  mem- 
bers of  them  either  devoted  themselves  to  the  service  of 
some  individual  leader,   or  more  commonly  wished  to 
secure  certain  definite  objects,   which  were  either  posi- 
tively illegal  or,  at  any  rate,  unrecognised  by  law.   Thus 
some  would  combine  to  gain   influence  in  the  elections, 
others  for  purposes  of  common  defence  before  the  dikas- 
teries.     Indeed  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  system 


Political 
clubs  at 
Athens. 


CH.  II. 


Arrest  of  Democratic  Leaders. 


n 


of  bril)ing  these  bodies  of  jurors  was  first  introduced  by 
the  political  clubs.  But  whatever  was  the  immediate 
ol)ject  which  the  association  was  intended  to  promote^  its 
members  were  bound  together  by  a  tie  stronger  than  that 
of  citizenship  or  even  of  blood,  and  by  a  law  of  honour 
which  required  that,  if  it  was  demanded  by  the  general 
interests  of  the  society,  no  crime  was  too  heinous  to  be 
committed,  no  sacrifice  too  grievous  to  be  endured.  They 
formed,  in  fiict,  throughout  Hellas  an  organised  con- 
spiracy against  constitutional  law  and  freedom. 

Hence  as  soon  as  the  city  surrendered,  the  oligar- 
chical party  had  their  plans  matured  and  their  means 
ready  to  hand.  A  board  of  five  was  nominated  by  the 
members  of  the  clubs,  with  the  title  of  ephors :  Kritias 
was  one  of  them,  and  Theramenes  probably  another. 
Their  duties  were  of  course  not  those  of  gov- 
ernment, for  the  democracy  still  existed,  but 
rather  to  look  after  the  interests  of  their  party 
generally,  and  especially  to  direct  the  action 
of  the  clubs.  They  had  everything  their  own 
way.  Their  faction  was  exultant  and  well-organised ; 
their  opponents  were  despised  and  demoralised.  The 
Senate  was  a  mere  tool  in  their  hands ;  and  Agis  was  still 
garrisoning  the  town.  Yet,  conscious  that  their  measures 
would  cause  not  only  dissatisfaction  but  the  deepest 
abhorrence  among  the  majority  of  their  fellow-citizens, 
they  dared  not  act  at  once.     They  thought 

J  ^  Arrest  of 

It  necessary'  previously  to  arrest  most  of  the  democratic 
prominent  democratic  leaders,  and  to  sum- 
mon Lysandros  himself  from  the  siege  of  Samos,  the 
only  city  which  had  not  yet  surrendered  to  Sparta. 
On  his  arrival  an  assembly  was  called  together  for  the 
special  purpose  of  remodelling  the  constitution,  and  Lysan- 
dros was  invited  to  attend  the  discussion.     A  board  of 


Measures  of 
the  oligar- 
chical 
party. 

Board  of 
five  ephors. 


14 


Athens  under  the   Thirty. 


B.C.  404. 


Thirty  was  appointed,  not  indeed  to  undertake  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  city,  but  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of 
codifying  the  ancient  laws  by  which  the  future  constitution 
of  the  city  should  be  reguhitcd.  But  though  the  powers 
of  the  Thirty  were  so  strictly  limited,  the  proposal  was 
received  with  sounds  of  disapprobation  if  not  with  open 
opposition.     All   the   names  were   those   of 

Appoint- 

merit  of  the  men  who  were  either  hated  or  suspected  by 
'""^y'  the  main  body  of  citizens;  and  it  was  under- 

stood that,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the  work  of  codification 
included  the  alteration  of  the  old  laws  and  the  addition 
of  new  ones  to  an  unlimited  extent.  There  was  also 
something  suspicious  and  repugnant  in  the  very  number 
selected;  for  that,  like  the  number  and  title  of  the  five 
cphors  recently  appointed,  had  been  adopted  in  humble 
imitation  of  Spartan  institutions,  thirty  being  the  number 
of  members  in  the  Spartan  Gerousia,  or  Senate.  Lysan- 
dros,  however,  brought  cogent  arguments  to  bear  upon 
the  swelling  murmurs  of  repugnance,  which  Theramenes, 
conscious  of  Spartan  support,  heard  with  a  careless  scorn. 
The  victorious  general  reminded  the  assembly  that  the 

city  was  at  his  mercy  ;  for  they  had  failed  to 
Lyandro"^        demolish  their  fortifications  within  the  stated 

time,  and  consequently  they  could  not  claim 
the  protection  of  the  treaty ;  let  them  look  to  themselves, 
and  preserve  their  lives,  not  their  institutions.  Hearin<^ 
these  threats,  the  majority  of  the  citizens  left  the  assem- 
bly; and  a  few — whose  character,  as  Lysias  says,  was  as 
inconsiderable  as  their  number — remained  to  give  a 
formal  assent  to  the  proposal,  and  so  to  afford  Xeno- 
phon  some  shadow  of  justification  in  passing  over  this 
memorable  scene,  equally  discrcdital>le  to  his  aristocratic 
friends  and  his  Spartan  patrons,  with  the  few  words:  'the 
people  resolved  to  choose  thirty  men." 


CH.  II. 


First  Measures  of  the  Thirty. 


15 


In  what  manner  the  Thirty  were  selected  is  very  doubtful. 
It  is  said  that  ten  were  nominated  bv  Theramenes.     It  is 
said  also  that  ten  were  left  ostensibly  to  the 
choice  of  the  assembly.     But  it  is  most  likely      ^J^'^^V':^^  °*" 

■'  ^         tlic  thirty. 

that  the  whole  list  was  prepared  beforehand, 
probably  by   Lysandros  himself.     However  when   once 
appointed,  they  showed  little  readiness  to  perform  their 
stated  task  of  legislation  or  codification,  but 
proceeded   at   once   to    remodel   the   whole      ^^''^ 
machinery  of  government.     A  new  Senate 
was  appointed,  consisting  of  me^i  whom  they  knew  to 
be  compliant   and  trustworthy;    and  to  this   body  was 
transferred   from   the   less   manageable   di- 
kasteries  the  important  duty  of  deciding  all      El?ven°^ 
state  trials.     The  board  of   Eleven,  which 
managed  the  police   of  the  city,  was   reorganised,  and 
Satyros,    one  of    the    most   violent    and    unscrupulous 
adherents    of   the    Thirty,   was   placed  at   its    head    as 
chief  executioner  of   their  victims.     But  it  was  above 
all    necessary    that    the    Peiraieus    should 
be  kept  well  under  control ;  for  that  suburb,       Fetrakus^  '" 
being  inhabited  by  the  mercantile  and  sea- 
faring classes,  was  the  very  focus  of  democratic  senti- 
ment ;    and  for  this   purpose   a  special    Dckarchy  was 
established. 

As  in  every  community,  and  in  every  age,  so  there 
existed  at  Athens,  at  this  time,  a  considerable  body  of 
well-to-do  citizens  who  had  never  taken  any 
enthusiastic  interest  in  politics,  but  who  were      r^ihT'""* 
greatly  impressed  with  the  evils  of  democracv.       thirty 

,  •'  '         made  to 

Since  that  was  the  form  of  government  most      gain  the 
fiimiliar  to  tlicm  ;  who  wished  to  enjoy  peace       ''"^^^'■^^"•' 
and  tranquillity,  and  thought  that  in  what  their  modern 
representatives  would  term  a  '  strong  government '  they 


i6 


Athens  under  the   Thirty. 


B.C.  404. 


would  find  a  panacea  for  all  their  troubles  and  vexations. 
The  Thirty  lost  no  time  in  making  a  bid  for  the  support 
of  this  class ;  and  professed  that  it  was  their  object  to 
purify  the  city  from  evil-doers,  and  direct  the  rest  of  the 
citizens  into  the  paths  of  virtue  and  justice. 

Accordinj^ly,  to  make  good  the  first  part  of  their 
professed  design,  Xenophon  tells  us  that  they  arrested 
^     .  and  tried  for  their  lives  those  who  had  gained 

Condemna-  1      •       i-     • 

tionofthe         their   livmg   under   the   democracy  by   the 
ycop  ants.       practice  of  sycophancy,  and  those  who  were 
troublesome  to  the  upper  classes.     These,  he  says,  the 
Senate  was  only  too  glad  to  condemn,  and  they  died 
unpitied  by  any  except  those  of  evil  character  like  them- 
selves.    As  to  the  first  class,  the  historian  is  probably  tell- 
ing the  truth.  The  practice  of  sycophancy  was  closely  con- 
nected with  the  worst  abuses  of  the  democracy.   Long  ago, 
it  is  said,  a  law  had  been  passed  prohibiting  the  exportation 
of  figs  from  Attica ;  and  it  had  become  practically  obso- 
lete, though  formally  unrepealed.  Hence  to  accuse  a  citizen 
under  this  statute  was  regarded  as  malicious  and  vexatious ; 
and  the  name  vSycophant,  or  a  man  who  accused  another 
of  exporting  figs,  was  applied  to  anyone  who  brought  a 
frivolous  charge  against  another.     Such  accusations  had, 
however,  become  very  common  under  the  democracy, 
since  the  citizens  were  paid  for  every  day  which  they 
spent  as  dikasts  in  the  law-courts :  and  they  had  been  a 
chief  cause  of  the  dissatisfaction   which  many  of  the 
wealthier  citizens  had  felt  against  the  constitution  under 
which  they  lived.  That  the  second  class  equally  deserved 
,,  their  fate  is  by  no  means  probable.     It  is 

Execution  •      •      1  v,.       *i.    u 

of  prom-  certam  mdeed  that  it  included  a  distinguished 

inent  demo-  „  1  •  1 

crats.  general,  agamst  whom   no  cnme  could  be 

alleged  except  the  unpardonable  sin  of  dem- 
ocratic sympathies  ;  and  even  if  the  verdict  in  every  case 


CH.  II. 


Story  of  Auto/ykos. 


17 


had  been  just,  the  means  by  which  it  was  secured  would 
have  been  sufficient  to  cause  the  gravest  discontent.  The 
Thirty  could  not  fully  trust  even  their  own  creatures  in 
the  Senate,  and  accordingly  abolished  the  custom  of  secret 
voting.    They  presided  in  person  over  the  trials  ;  and  on 
one  of  two  tables  in  front  of  them  each  senator  was  re- 
quired to  place  openly  his  voting  pebble.     One  table  was 
for  acquittal,  the  other  for  condemnation  ;  and— with  but 
one  infamous  exception,  when  a  perfidious  informer  was 
at  the  bar— the  verdict  always  went  against  the  prisoner. 
No  sooner  was  the  slightest  whisper  of  popular  dis- 
affection  audible   than    Kritias  had   his   remedy  ready. 
Lysandros,  he  thought,  had  left  his  work  at 
Athens  half  completed  ;  the  oligarchic  board       garmonTn- 
had  been  established ;  but  the  crowning  inflic-       lo^tlli"^"! 
tion  of  a  Spartan  harmost  and  garrison  had       ^'^- 
been  spared.     Now,   however,  two  of  the  Thirty  were 
despatched  to  Sparta  to  ask  him  to  persuade  the  ephors 
to  send  a  body  of  troops  to  their  assistance,  who  might 
remain   until  the  disaffected   had  been  put  out  of  the 
way.  and  their  government  placed  on  a  secure  footing : 
and  during  this  time  they  engaged  to  find  them  pay  and 
maintenance.    The  required  auxiliaries  were  sent  without 
delay,  with   Kallibios,  a  rough   and   brutal   Spartan,  in 
command.     Every  Athenian,  with  a  spark  of  patriotism, 
must  have  been  disgusted  with  the  selfish  and  unworthy 
policy   which   had   introduced   a   foreign    lord   into   the 
Akropolis,  the  very  sanctuary  of  Athenian  glory,  and  still 
more  when  he  observed  with  what  persistent  obsequious- 
ness he  was  courted  by  those  who  prided  themselves  on 
being    the    best    and    finest    gentlemen    of 
Athens.      One  instance  of  this   subservient       Story  of 
spirit   must   be    mentioned.     Autolvkos.  an  "^°^>''os- 

Athenian  of  good  family,  distinguished  from  his  boyhood 


1 8  Athens  under  the   Thirty.  B.C.  404. 

for  athletic  prowess,  had,  in  some  way,  given  offence  to 
Kallibios.  The  hitter,  hasty  and  arrogant,  after  the  Spartan 
fashion,  raised  his  truncheon  to  strike  him.  The  atlilete, 
stooping  to  avoid  the  blow,  seized  Kallibios  by  the  legs 
and  threw  him  to  the  ground.  But  though  the  harmost  got 
little  sympathy  from  Lysandros,  who  curtly  told  him  that 
he  did  not  know  how  to  govern  freemen,  the  Thirty,  wish- 
ing to  gain  his  favour,  soon  after  put  Autolykos  to  death. 
Having  secured,  by  conduct  like  this,  the  active  sup- 
port and  assistance  of  the  Spartan  garrison,  the  Thirty 
Further  proceeded  to  clear  all  obstacles  from  their 

rhTxhTrty^        P""^^'  ^y  P""'"^  ^^  ^^'^^^'  of^en  without  even 
the  form  of  trial,  all  those  whom,  as  Xeno- 
phon  says,  they  thought  least  likely  to  endure  to  be  quietly 
elbowed  aside,  or  capable  of  attracting  the  most  adherents 
in  case  of  an  insurrection.    Among  these  were  many  who 
were  conspicuous  solely  for  wealth,  courage,  or  virtue.    A 
new  race  of  sycophants  had   sprung  up,  more  audacious 
and  unscrupulous  than  those  of  the  democracy,  because 
they  could  calculate  more  confidently  on  the  condemna- 
tion of  their   victims.      Accordingly  many  citizens,  not 
knowing  on  whom  the  blow  might  next  fall,  made  their 
escape  from  the  city,  leaving  their  estates  to  be  confis- 
cated by  the  Thirty ;  and  among  these  may  be  mentioned 
Anytos  and  Thrasyboulos.     Others  again  became  impli- 
cated against  their  will  in  the  atrocities  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  so  were  forced  to  make  common  cause  with 
them.      For  instance.   Sokrates  and  four  other   citizens 
were  ordered  to  cross  over  to  Salamis.  and  bring  before 
the  Thirty,  for  certain  condemnation,  a  man  whose  inno- 
cence was  beyond  all  question.     Sokrates  went  home  : 
the  others  executed  the  orders  which  they  had  received, 
and  thus  made  themselves  accomplices,  however  unwil- 
lingly, in  the  crime. 


CH.  II. 


The  Three  Thousand. 


19 


I 


But  it  was  impossible  that  a  body  of  men  so  numerous, 
and  with  functions  so  loosely  defined,  could  long  remain 
united  ;  and  signs  of  disagreement  had  very 
soon  shewn  themselves.     Thcramcnes  had.      Thera''  ""^ 
at  first,  gone  in  heart  and  soul  for  the  work       '"^"^'■ 
of  vengeance  and  spoliation  ;  but  he  was  too  astute  and 
sagacious  not  to  appreciate  the  force  of  public  opinion, 
and  see  the  necessary  conclusion  to  which  this  policy  of 
terrorism  was  hurrying  his  colleagues ;    and  he  thought 
that  he  might  again  be  able  to  head  the  reaction,  and  to 
keep  his  position,  when  his  rival  Kritias  fell.     He  had 
protested  in  vain,  first  against  the  introduction  of  the 
Spartan  garrison,  and  then  against  the  execution  of  inno- 
cent victims  ;  and  now  he  broke  out  into  open  opposition, 
warning    Kritias   that  if  men   were  to  be  executed   for 
having  gained,  or  having  tried  to  gain,  popularity,  they 
themselves  might  not  escape.      To  this    Kritias  replied 
that  he  must  be  a  fool  if  he  could  not  understand  that  the 
rule  of  the  Thirty  was  as  thorough  a  despotism  as  if  it 
were  the  rule  of  one  man,  and  required  the  same  uncom- 
promising   policy.      A   little    later,    perceiving  that,    as 
executions  and  confiscations  became  more  frequent,'  the 
discontent  and  indignation  in  the  city  grew  more  serious, 
Theramenes  urged  his  colleagues  to  place  their  govern- 
ment  on  a  broader  basis;    and   Kritias   and   the  rest, 
their   fears   being   now  thoroughly  roused,   produced   a 
list  of  three  thousand  persons  to  whom  the 
privileges  of  citizenship  should  be  granted.      i?the  Three 
But  Theramenes,  whose  ends  could  not  be      '^'^^^^^^'i- 
advanced  by  the  addition  of  a  limited  number  of  oligar- 
chical partisans,  found  fiiult  with  the  scheme  altogether; 
the  number  was  too  small,  for  they  were  still  in  a  minor- 
ity :  and  it  was  absurd  to  draw  a  hard  and  fast  line  at 
three  thousand,  as  if  that  number  necessarily  included 


«j»t  M*  iJAisi..-ie-  • 


20 


Athens  under  the   Thirty. 


B.C.  404. 


Plunder  cf 
the  Metoi- 
koi. 


all  the  good  and  excluded  all  the  bad.  Yet,  in  spite  of 
his  opposition,  the  Three  Thousand  were  called  out  and 
armed ;  while  the  arms  of  the  rest  of  the  citizens  were 
taken  away  by  a  stratagem,  and  safely  deposited  under 
Spartan  care  in  the  Akropolis. 

There  was  no  longer  any  possibility  of  a  revolt.  All 
those  who  could  have  headed  such  a  movement  had  been 
murdered  or  exiled,  and  the  mass  of  the  citi- 
zens were  now  defenceless.  Fresh  victims 
were  eagerly  demanded.  Kallibios  and  his 
gang  of  hired  bravoes  could  be  maintained  and  kept  in 
good  humour  only  at  a  great  cost,  and  the  Thirty  them- 
selves became  daily  more  rapacious.  A  scheme  for  the 
plunder  of  the  temples  gave  only  partial  satisfaction,  while 
they  had  left  a  whole  class  of  possible  victims  hitherto 
untouched.  It  was  known  that  among  the  Metoikoi,  or 
aliens  resident  in  Athens,  there  were  many  men  of  great 
wealth,  and  some  who  had  little  sympathy  with  an  oli- 
garchical regime.  It  was  therefore  proposed  that  each 
of  the  Thirty  should  single  out  from  this  class  some  indi- 
vidual, that  he  should  have  him  put  to  death,  and  should 
then  take  possession  of  his  property.  The  proposal  was 
adopted  with  only  one  dissentient  voice.  Theramenes 
declared  boldly  that  the  sycophants  themselves  had  never 
committed  crimes  so  flagrant  as  these  which  men.  who 
called  themselves  the  worthiest  gentlemen,  designed.  But 
the  bloody  work  went  merrily  on,  and  it  was  resolved  that 
the  one  voice  of  censure  should  be  silenced. 

Kritias  prepared  his  measures  for  his  rival's  overthrow 

with  the  utmost  care,  for  failure  meant  destruction.    Fully 

aware  that  many  of  the  senators,  who  were 

Accusation  ^    ,  .        ,       '    .  ,  .        ,  ^ 

of  Thera-  partakers  m  the  crimes  and  not  m  the  profits 

menes.  ^^  ^j^^  Thirty,  sympathised  strongly  with  the 

views  of  Theramenes,  he  tried  to  gain  over  some  by  pri- 


CH.  II. 


Answer  of  Theramenes, 


31 


\ 


vately  representing  to  them  that  his  opponent  was  no  true 
friend  to  the  oligarchy,  and  resolved  to  overawe  the  rest 
by  introducing  into  the  council-chamber  an  armed  band 
of  his  most  unscrupulous  satellites.  On  the  appointed  day, 
the  Senate  assembled  ;  the  band  of  bravoes  was  in  wait- 
ing, with  daggers  concealed  under  their  garments ;  and 
when  Theramenes  appeared,  Kritias  rose  to 
accuse  him.     'No  revolution,'  said  he,  'can      Speech  of 

Kntias. 

be  accomplished  without  some  sacrifice  of  life, 
and  least  of  all  a  revolution  in  a  city  as  populous  and  as 
devoted  to  liberty  as  Athens.  Yet  it  was  necessary,  if  only 
to  please  our  preservers  the  Spartans,  that  an  oligarchy 
should  be  established.  But  here  among  us  stands  Thera- 
menes, a  foe  to  oligarchy ;  yea,  and  worse  than  a  foe,  a  trai- 
tor. Nor  is  treachery  a  new  game  for  him  to  play  ;  but  he 
is  a  traitor  by  nature,  and  is  rightly  nicknamed  a  Buskin, 
which  can  be  worn  on  either  foot.  He  was  treacherous 
towards  the  Four  Hundred,  treacherous  again  towards  the 
generals  after  Arginousai :  but  we  know  his  double  dealing, 
and  must  not  spare  him  now.  We  all,  of  course,  acknow- 
ledge the  constitution  of  Sparta  to  be  the  best  in  the 
world :  would  such  conduct  be  tolerated  there  in  one  of 
the  ephors?  Destroy  the  traitor;  and  with  him  the  hopes 
of  your  enemies  both  within  the  city  and  beyond  its  walls.' 
Kritias  resumed  his  seat,  and  Theramenes,  possibly  not 
wholly  unprepared  for  the  attack,  sprang  up  at  once  to 
reply.  After  a  few  prefatory  remarks,  in  which  he  de- 
fended his  conduct  after  Arginousai,  he  turned  fiercely  on 
his  accuser,     '  I  do  not  wonder  at  the  un- 

Answer   of 

scrupulous  misrepresentations  of  Kritias;  for      Thera- 
he  was  not  at  that  time  present  in  Athens,  but      ™^""- 
was  doing  a  demagogue's  work  in  Thessaly.     Rightly 
indeed  he  condemns  the  enemies  of  your  government ; 
but  am  I  your  enemy,  or  is  he  ?    Hear,  and  decide  for 


\ 


22 


Athens  under  the   Thirty,  B.C.  404. 


yourselves.     Until  your  authority  was  firmly  established, 

and  as  long  as  sycophants  were  beinj^r  punished,  we  were 

all  of  one  mind:  but  when   Kritias  chose  as  his  victims 

honourable  j^entlemen  and  distinguished  patriots,  I   at 

once  remonstrated,  even  as  I  have  opposed  the  spoliation 

of  the  resident  aliens,  the  disarming  of  the  citizens,  and 

the  introduction  of  a  garrison  of  hired  mercenaries.    Such 

outrages  weaken  you.  but  strengthen  your  enemies ;  and 

in  opposing  them   1   showed  myself  your  friend,  while 

Kritias  by  his  policy  is  fostering  the  interest  of  Thrasy- 

boulos  and  the  exiled  democrats.     Nor  am  I  a  turn-coat. 

I  supported  the  Four  Hundred  till  they  proved  traitors 

to  their  country.    And.  even  if  I  deserved  my  nickname. 

surely  it  is  better  to  try  to  suit  both  parties  than  to  suit 

neither :  Kritias  spares  the  upper  classes  as  little  as  the 

lower.      But   I   myself  have  always  been  consistent,  an 

opponent  alike  of  the  licence  of  the  many  and  the  tyranny 

of  the  few.     Prove  me  wrong,  and  I  shall  die  justly." 

At  the  close  of  this  able  and  spirited  defence  a  shout 
of  applause  burst  forth.  Hut  Kritias,  who  knew  that  with 
Kritias  himself,  at  any  rate,  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and 

The't*"'"^  death,  was  not  to  be  baulked  of  his  prey.  The 

menes  to  scnators  evidently  could  not  be  relied  on  ; 

left  to  themselves  they  would  let  the  accused 
escape.  Accordingly,  after  a  hurried  consultation  with  his 
colleagues,  he  left  the  council-chamber,  and  ordered  his 
gang  of  assassins  to  come  up  close  to  the  railings  within 
which  the  senators  sat.  On  his  return  he  came  forward 
again,  and  told  them,  that  a  president  worthy  of  his 
position  would  take  care  to  shield  his  friends  from  impos- 
ture :  and.  further,  that  the  gentlemen  standing  by  the 
railmgs  would  not  allow  them  to  acquit  so  notorious  an 
offender.  Therefore,  with  the  consent  of  all  his  colleagues, 
he  would  strike  out  the  name  of  Theramenes  fronT  the 


CH.  II. 


Death  of  Theramenes. 


23 

list  of  enfranchised  citizens,  that  he  might  be  legally  con- 
victed by  the  vote  of  the  Thirty  alone.     '  And  this  man  ' 
he  added,  'we   condemn   to   death.'     At  these   words. 
Theramenes  leaped  for  protection  upon  the  altar,  which 
stood  in  the  council-chamber,  and  entreated  the  scnators 
as  a  suppliant  to   see  that  formal  justice,  at  any  rate 
should  be  meted  out  to  him.  '  By  the  gods  1 '  cried  he    '  I 
know  full  well  that  this  altar  will  not  suffice  to  protect  me 
but  you  shall  see  that  these  men  shrink  from  sacrilc-e  as 
httlc  as  from  injustice;  and  I  marvel,  worthv  gentlemen 
that  ye  will  not  strike  a  blow  in  your  own  defence,  for  the 
name  of  any  one  of  you  can  be  struck  out  as  easily  as  mine  ' 
He  spoke  no  more,  for  the  herald  of  the  Thirty  had  sum- 
moned the  Eleven   executioners.     Thev  entered,  headed 
by  Satyros,  the  most  reckless  and  brazen-f^iced  among 
them,  and  accompanied  by  their  attendants. 
Kritias  pointed  out  Theramenes  as  a  criminal      ^hera- 

1  11  ,  "wimi         menes  is 

legally  condemned,  and  bade  them  carry  him      "^'^^^  by 
off  and  do  their  duty  by  him.    Intimidated  by       '^'  '^'""' 
the  armed  gang  within  the  room,  and  by  the  troops  which 
had  assembled  outside,  the  senators  looked  on  inactive 
while  Satyros  and  his  myrmidons  dragged  the  wretched 
man  from  the  altar  and  into  the  market-place  beyond 
Then  as  with  a  loud  voicehe  kepton  callinggods  and  men 
to  behold  h.s  shameful  treatment  and  testify  to  its  injustice 
the  brutal  Satyros  threatened  him  that  he  should  rue  it  if 
he  did  not  hold  his  peace ;  '  Shall  I  not  rue  it  all  the  same 
If  I  do?    replied  Theramenes.     At  the  last,  when  the  in- 
evitable hour  arrived,  and  the  hemlock  draught  had  to  be 
drunk,  he  threw  the  heeltap  to  the  ground,  like 
one  who  jests  at  a  wine-party,  with  the  partinn-      \"^  dies  by 
toast.  •  Here's  to  the  charming  Kritias.'    The      iod'^"- 
fearlessness  of  Theramenes  in  his  last  mo-      ^""^^'• 
ments  has  called  forth  the  warmest  praise.     Xenophon 


I 


24 


Athens  under  the   Thirty, 


B.C.  404. 


mentions  \\  with  admiration,  Cicero  with  enthusiasm  :  but 
history  cannot  reverse  her  verdict  on  a  hfe  of  unscrupu- 
lous self-seckin*;,  nor  can  we  fori^^ct  that  the  man  now  un- 
justly slaughtered  had  hounded  on  his  countrymen  to  the 
murder  of  men  who  had  charged  him  to  carry  out  an  or- 
der which  he  had  failed  to  execute.  Justice,  though  her 
vengeance  tarried,  at  last  secured  her  due. 

The  last  spark  of  open  opposition  hrd  thus  been  trampled 
out;  and  the  Thirty,  to  use  the  words  of  Xenophon,  'think- 
ing that  they  might  now  play  the  tyrant  with- 
Terfor°  ^"^  fear,'  surpassed  themselves  in  excess  of 

under  the  licence.     It  is  said  that  during  the  short  time 

Thirty. 

for  which  their  reign  was  yet  to  last  they  exe- 
cuted 1,500  victims  without  trial.  Tiiough  this  number 
may  not  be  strictly  accurate,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Satyros,  who  had  probably  taken  the  place  vacated  by 
Theramenes  among  the  Thirty,  had  his  hands  full  of 
work.  But,  just  as  if  the  plunder  of  individuals,  however 
numerous,  was  insufficient  to  satiate  the  greed  of  the  ty- 
rants, a  wholesale  scheme  of  confiscation  was  resolved 
upon.  A  proclamation  was  issued  that  all  those  whose 
names  were  not  in  the  list  of  the  Three  Thousand  should 
leave  the  city  and  be  forbidden  to  enter  it  again  ;  that 
thus  the  oligarchs  might  see  about  them  the  faces  of  none 
whom  they  could  suspect  of  even  wishing  to  subvert  their 
rule.  Nor  was  this  all.  Not  content  with  having  seized 
all  the  houses  inside  the  citv,  thev  drove  the  fugitives  out 
of  the  rural  districts  also,  and  divided  the  farms  among 
themselves  and  their  more  favoured  adherents.  This  act 
may  have  been  prompted  by  mere  rapacity ;  or  perhaps 
Kritias  may  have  wished  to  establish  a  new  class  of 
landed  proprietors,  and  so  to  put  the  oligarchy  on  a  more 
solid  basis. 

Terrorism  and  tyranny  could  go  no  farther;  and  it  is 


I.  Griev- 
ances of  the 
rich  at 
Athens. 


CH.  II.  Causes  of  Oligarehieal  Excesses.  25 

perhaps  worth  while  to  try  and  find  the  reasons  why  they 
had  gone  so  far.    For  it  must  not  be  supposed 
that  the  Thirty  themselves  were  exceptionally      1^^01*5"*  ^°'' 
bad  representativesof  the  Athenian  oli'^archs       chica/ex- 

*        cesses 

or  promment  among  them  for  cruelty  and  ra- 
pacity.   It  may  fairly  be  believed  that  many  others  as  un- 
scrupulous, if  not  as  able,  might  have  been  found  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Knights  or  wealthiest  class  of  citizens,  for  they 
supported  the  Thirty  enthusiastically  throughout' all  their 
discreditable  career,  and  fought  for  them  vigorously  to  the 
last.     The  grievances  of  the  rich  under  the 
democracy  had,  in  their  own  estimation,  been 
very  serious.     In  peace  they  were  taxed  for 
the  amusement  of  the  people.     Athens  was 
noted  among  the  cities  of  Greece  for  the  number  of  relig- 
ious festivals  which  were  observed  by  its  inhabitants,  just 
as  m  later  times  they  are  complimented  by  St.  Paul  for 
their  scrupulous  reverence  for  the  gods.     But  every  fes- 
tival had  its  theatrical  or  gymnastic  exhibitions  •  and  the 
opulent  citizens,  each  according  to  a  stated  proportion 
were  obliged  to  defray  the  expense  and  undertake  the  su- 
perintendence of  their  production.     Of  course  the  wealth- 
ier classes,  when  they  undertook  such  duties,  were  fully 
aware  that  the  pecuniary  loss  was  more  than  compen- 
sated by  the  gam  in    public  esteem  and  political  influ- 
cnce ;    but   they  preferred   to   make   light  of  such   col- 
lateral advantages,  and  exaggerated  the  hardship  of  hav- 
ing to  entertain  a  lazy  mob.     Again,  in  time  of  war  the 
cost  of  equipping   both  army  and   navy  pressed  very 
heavily  upon  them;  and  if  the  war  was  protracted  longer 
than  the  ordinary  resources  of  the  state  lasted,  they  were 
again  called  upon  to  contribute  to  special  taxes  ;  while 
to  make  their  condition  worse,  they  lost  almost  all  the 
income  which  they  drew  from  their  landed  estates  in 


■\ 


itM  lO.Mjg'-Tfy^afwKt.S 


JSM..-'-'w>liaB-aji 


36  Athens  under  the   Thirty.  b.  c.  404. 

Attica,  which  suffered  alternately  from  the  ravages  of 
their  enemies  and  the  requisitions  of  their  allies.  But  at 
this  they  would  not  have  grumbled  so  much,  if  they  had 
felt  that  it  lay  only  with  them  to  decide  the  question  of 
peace  or  war.  The  sober  arguments  of  the  wealthiest 
among  them,  they  would  say,  might  have  but  little  weight 
in  the  assembly  compared  with  the  passionate  clap-trap 
of  some  demagogue  who  had  no  stake  in  the  country, 
and  who  gained  popularity  or  notoriety  by  a  parade  of 
patriotism.  Lastly,  the  rich  man  was  perpetually  exposed 
to  the  accusations  of  sycophants  ;  and  whether  he  stood 
his  trial  and  defended  himself  on  some  frivolous  charge 
before  a  jury  of  his  inferiors,  or  whether  he  bought  off 
the  insolent  informer  before  the  case  was  tried,  the 
nuisance  was  equally  galling.  But  not  only  was  there  so 
much  to  provoke  the  discontent  and  ill-fecl- 

2.  Rancour  r   .1         •    i     i  n  -r  1 

of  political        ing  ot  the  rich,  but  all  party  strife  among  the 
f^^lL"ii'"  Greeks  was  characterised  bv  the  extremest 

orecce.  * 

rancour  and  violence.  Changes  which  with 
us  would  require  little  more  than  the  expulsion  of  one 
ministry  from  office  and  the  appointment  of  another,  could 
not  be  accomplished  there  without  the  banishment,  if  not 
the  massacre,  of  a  large  fraction  of  the  citizens.  The  fury 
of  political  passion  was  intensified  by  the  smallness  of  the 
^,  area  within  which  its  action  was  confined. 

3.  Charac- 
ter of  Some  weight  must  also  be  ascribed  to  the 

Kritias.  '  .   .,   .  .  , 

personal  character  of  Kritias, — a  compound 
of  brilliant  ability,  boundless  ambition,  and  unprin- 
cipled selfishness.  Doubtless  he  urged  on  his  col- 
leagues to  the  commission  of  excesses  of  which  they 
might  not  otherwise  have  been  guilty.  But  every 
Greek  state  was  exposed  at  some  period  or  other  to 
similar  paroxysms  of  civil  dissension,  and  there  are  few 
among  the  atrocities  of  the  Thirty  which  could  not  be 


CH.  ir 


Internal  Pohey  of  the   Thirty. 


\ 


The  Athenian  oligarchs  liad.  however,  other  objects 
besides  mere  vengeance  and  spohation  ,hey  Zdt 
hoped  to  undo  for  ever  the  unrl-  ^r  i-i  t  'onaiy 
Pcrikles  inHtn.i.  ^""^  ""'•^  o*^  Kleisthenes  and 

t  eriklts,  and  to  change  the  current  of  their  conntrv's  his 
tory.     Just  as  the  Athens  which  had  defied 

state  strong  m  her  navy,  rich  in  colonics  and       "'">'• 
ot   great  commercial   enterprise,   the  citv  whirl,  cK     m 

ScV.  t:;::; '"  -^^-^''^  -^  conit::'idt"a' 

trnT/r     >         .?       "  "'"^  provincial  town,  without  fleet 

Sa  re  r.,rr'.^;';f '"™-  -^.^  -•  -^  -pp--^' 

.     >  a^ncuituie.    lo  carry  out  this  policy  the  Thirfv 

aT'enaT  T^Tl.  ^°"""'^^>'  — ''--ntled  '  e  g  e.^ 
arsena    which  had  been  built  at  the  cost  of  ,  ooo  talents 
and  sold  the  materials  for  three,  ,o  a  contractor'The  p,un 

same  wM/r  r"'  "•*^"^^^-  •^'^  P--P'ed  parUv  b?  he 
same  w,sh  to  dnve  away  commerce  from  Athens  •'  for  th! 

seafarmg  mob  who  inhabited  Peiraieus  had  ahvayLen 

em^c'c;    '  r  °  '"I"^'  =*""  "'^  -^>-  -^-k-'on    of  h 

.1  re  m^Vin 'Sro^fhe  :  '""^'^  '"''"'  «-'  <^'^-^- 

probably  no  lon-cr  i.^oH  •  f     !u  ^"^'^^^  Pnyx  were 


28 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Democracy,    b.  c.  404. 


CH.  III. 


Athens :  logic,  rhetoric,  ethics,  politics,  all  were  alike  pro- 
hibited. The  culture,  which  had  led  every  man  to  think 
himself  capable  not  only  of  holding  his  own  opinion  on 
political  questions  but  of  giving  it  too,  was  to  be  stamped 
out  for  ever,  and  the  tree  of  knowledge  was  henceforth 
to  bring  forth  fruit  for  the  governing  class  alone. 


CHAPTER  ITT. 


THE   RESTORATION   OF   THE   ATHENIAN    DEMOCRACY. 

For  about  eight  months  the  Thirty  had  tyrannised  over 

the  miserable  city.      In  April   Lysandros  had   entered 

Peiraieus  in  triumph,  and  the  eventful  year 

Change  in  ,  .  1  t%  1 

Greek  was    now  drawing  to   a  close.      But   these 

fee  mg.  ^^^^  months  had  seen  a  marked  change  in 

Greek  feeling.  The  hatred,  which  had  outrun  even 
the  Spartan  desire  for  vengeance,  and  had  demanded 
that  the  place  of  Athens  should  henceforth  be  a  blank 
on  the  map  of  Hellas,  had  gradually  died  away,  or 
rather  had  been  transformed  into  a  deep  pity  for 
the  unfortunate  city,  whose  glorious  past  stood  out  in 
so  marked  a  contrast  to  its  wretched  present;  while 
the  unpopularity  which  always  attaches  to  supremacy, 
the  jealousy  which  is  inseparable  from  success,  had 
been  transferred  from  Athens  to  her  conqueror,  who 
could  now  be  stigmatized  with  far  greater  justice  as  the 
despot  city. 

Chief  among  the  causes  which  weakened  the  influence 
of  Sparta  was  the  conduct  of  Lysandros  himself.     After 

a  siege  of  some  months'  duration,  he  forced 
L°sandros^        the  Samians  to  surrender,  on  condition  that 

all  the  free  inhabitants  should  depart  from 
the  town,  and  leave  behind  them  all  their  property  except 


The  Power  of  Lysandros. 


29 


Samos 
subdued. 


Lysandros 
returns  in 
triumph  to 
Sparta. 


a  single  garment  for  each  man.      He  next  reinstated  the 
oligarchical  party,  and  placed   the   government  in  the 
hands  of   a  dckarchv  selected  bv  himself 
under   the  supervision  of  one    of   his  own 
creatures  named  Thorax,  whom  he  left   as 
harmost ;  and  in  humble  recognition  of  these  favours  the 
restored  citizens  decreed  that  the  national  festival  of  Here 
should  henceforth  be  called  the  Lysandria.    Having  thus 
stamped  out  the  last  spark  of  opposition,  the 
victorious  general  '  sent  away  the  ships  of  the 
allies  to  their  respective  cities,  and  with  the 
Lakedaimonian  fleet  sailed  back  to  Sparta, 
bringing  with  him  the  prow-ornaments  of  the  ships  which 
he  had  captured,  and  all  the  triremes  from  the  Peiraieus 
except  twelve,  and  the  crowns  which  he  had  received 
from   city  after  city  as  presents  to  himself  personally, 
and  470  talents  which  yet  remained  of  the  contribution 
which  Cyrus  had  given  him  to  defray  the  expenses  of 
the  war,  and  all  the  other  spoils  which  he  had  accumu- 
lated during  the  war.'     By  this  simple  enumeration  of 
the  actual  trophies,  which  gave  an  importance  hitherto 
unequalled  in  Spartan  history  to  the  return  of  Lysandros, 
Xenophon    gratified    the    pride   of    Sparta   without   too 
deeply  wounding  Athenian  sentiment;    but,  great  as  it 
was,  the  pomp  of  the  ovation  was  scarcely  equal  to  the 
real  power  of  Lysandros.    For  he  no  longer  held  the  posi- 
tion of  a  mere  servant  of  the  state  however 
successful,  but  rather  'imperial  Sparta  was,      "'"  p^^'^''- 
as  it  were,  personified  in  '  him.    And  yet  Plutarch  tells  us 
that  Lysandros,  though  more  powerful  at  that  time  than 
any  Greek  before,  was  yet  thought  to  display  a  pride, 
and  affect  a  superiority,  greater  even  than  his  power  war- 
ranted.   It  was  said  of  him,  as  it  had  been  said  previously 
of  Alkibiades,  that  all  Hellas  was  not  big  enough  to  hold 


30 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Demoeraey.    B.C.  404,. 


r« 


His  arro- 
gance. 


Thebes. 
Tribute 


two  Lysanders.  To  gratify  his  vanity,  cities  raised  altars 
in  his  honour,  and  sacrificed  to  him  as  thouijh  to  a  god. 
Poets  vied  with  one  another  in  singing  his  praise  in 
strains  of  fulsome  flattery  ;  and  he  even  kept 
one  of  the  most  eminent  always  in  his  train, 
that  none  of  his  achievements  might  sink  into 
the  night  of  oblivion  for  lack  of  an  inspired  bard. 

Accordingly  when  the  Thebans,  after  the  return  of 
Lysandros,  put  in  a  claim,  in  which  they  were  probably 
Other  backed  up  by  the  Corinthians,  that  the  allies 

causes  of  should  be  allowed  some  share  in  the  spoils 

the  growing  ^  ' 

unpopu-  and  profits  of  the  war,  Lysandros  persuaded 

Sparta.  his  countrvmen  to  reject  a  demand  which  was 

Rejection  obviously  founded  in  equity ;  so  far  were  the 

of^cjanns  of  Spartans  from  seeing  the  value  or  the  justice 
of  the  principle  to  which,  above  all  others, 
Rome  owed  her  own  greatness  and  the  fidelity 
of  her  allies.  Nor  was  there  any  abatement  of  the  tribute 
which  had  been  levied  previously  on  the  subject  cities  by 
the  Athenians ;  but  the  latter  had  at  any  rate  performed 
the  duty  for  which  the  money  was  raised,  while  the 
Spartans  pocketed  the  thousand  talents,  and  at  the  same 
time  delivered  up  the  sea  and  the  whole  coast-line  of  the 
Archipelago  to  the  dominion  of  Persia.  Thus  the  minds 
of  the  Greeks  were  well  prepared  to  hear  with  sympathis- 
ing pity  the  stories  which  were  soon  current 
chicaf  about  the  enormities  of  the  dekarchies  in 

enormities.  general,  and  especially  about  the  atrocities 
of  the  Thirty ;  for  the  sufferings  of  Athens  naturally  at- 
tracted a  peculiar  interest.  They  saw  clearly  that  the  spe- 
cious promises  of  Sparta  had  been  mere  lies, 
Broken  ^^<^  though  she  had  spoken  them  f;iir  to  serve 

promises.  "  ' 

her  purposes,  her  deeds  were  immeasurably 
harsher  than  those  of  Athens  ;  and  the  deepening  indig- 


CH.  III.        Thebes  supports  Athenian  Exiles. 


3J 


nation  against  Sparta  was  naturally  accompanied  by  a 
growing  compassion  for  her  humbled  rival. 

The  change  in  the  position  of  Thebes  will  now  be 
understood.  In  April  the  Thebans  were  the  most  ran- 
corous and  implacable  foes  to  Athens  and  her  constitu- 
tion ;  in  December  their  city  is  the  very  centre  of  the  plots 
for  its  restoration.  The  Spartans  had  issued  a  decree  that 
the  refugees  from  Athens  might  be  arrested      „ .  , 

1  hebes 

wherever  they  were  found,  and  at  the  same  gives  shelter 
time  they  threatened  heavy  penalties  against  ?" Athenian 
any  who  should  attempt  to  protect  them.  But  "''es. 
in  spite  of  the  power  of  Sparta,  none  but  the  most  insig- 
nificant states  obeyed.  At  Chalkis,  Megara,  and  Elis, 
the  exiles  were  hospitably  received.  The  Argives  in- 
dignantly bade  the  heralds  quit  their  city  before  sunset ; 
while,  as  Plutarch  informs  us  with  the  proud  enthusiasm 
of  a  Boiotian  patriot,  the  Thebans,  acting  in  the  spirit  and 
temper  of  their  ancient  heroes,  issued  counter-decrees, 
declaring  that  every  house  and  town  in  Boiotia  should  be 
open  to  any  Athenian  who  required  it,  that  those  who 
refused  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  an  Athenian  should  be 
fined,  and  that  if  anyone  should  bear  arms  through  Boiotia 
to  Attica  against  the  tyrants,  they  should  close  their  eyes 
and  ears  to  what  was  going  on.  Thebes  therefore  became 
the  natural  resort  of  the  most  active  and  prominent 
among  the  exiles :  of  Thrasyboulos,  Anytos,  Archinos, 
and  many  others.  Thrasyboulos  had  previously  distin- 
guished himself  by  the  energy  with  which  he 
had  kept  up  the  spirits  of  the  Athenian  sea-  3^7^^" 
men  at  Samos  during  the  reign  of  the  Four 
Hundred  at  Athens;  and  he  had  then  been  greatly 
instrumental  in  bringing  about  the  restoration  of  the 
democracy.  An  effective  orator,  an  able  general,  and  a 
sincere  patriot,  he  wins  even  from  'Xenophon  a  grudging 


32 


Restoration  of  Athcuidn  DiJiiocracy.    B.C.  404. 


Anytos. 


Archinos. 


testimony  to  his  virtue.  Anytos,  whose  name  had  been 
slurred  by  an  imputation  of  wholesale  bribery,  and  has 
since  become  notorious  by  his  share  in  the 
prosecution  of  Sokratcs,  was  a  rough,  plain- 
spoken  democrat;  like  Kleon,  the  proprietor  of  a  tan- 
yard  ;  and,  although  wealthy,  priding  himself  on  his  want 
of  culture  and  refinement.  Archinos,  to  whom,  next  to 
the  gods  at  any  rate,  Demosthenes  ascribes  the  greatest 
share  in  restoring  the  democratical  regime, 
was  a  man  of  fine  intellect,  unselfish  dispo- 
sition, and  some  military  experience.  These  three  men 
stood  out  as  the  natural  leaders  of  the  exiles,  who  swarmed 
not  only  in  Thebes  but  in  all  the  towns  on  the  frontiers 
of  Attica ;  while  in  Thebes  itself  the  native  democrats 
formed  a  powerful  party,  though  still  a  minority,  and  were 
prepared  to  furnish  to  the  Athenians  more  solid  assistance 
than  mere  sympathy. 

Near  the  frontiers  of  Attica  and  Boiotia  stood,  or  rather 
stands,  the  fortress  of  Phyle,  commanding  a  narrow  de- 
file formed  by  Mount  Aigaleos,  on  the  south. 
Position  of        2LTiA  Mount  Pamcs  on  the  north.     Through 

Phyle.  *=» 

this  pass  ran  the  mountain-path  that  formed 
the  direct  road  between  Thebes  and  Athens ;  and  from 
the  summit  of  the  lofty  crag  on  which  the  castle  was  built, 
was  visible  the  whole  Athenian  plain,  the  heights  of  the 
Akropolis,  10  miles  distant,  and  the  blue  waters  of  the 
Saronic  gulf  beyond.  Revelling  in  a  fool's  paradise  of 
apparent  tranquillity,  the  Thirty  had  left  this  fortress  un- 
garrisoned ;  or,  more  probably,  since  they  had  ordered 

all  the  frontier  fortresses  to  be  destroyed,  it 
Phyle  IS  i^^^j  been  partially  dismantled.     Thrasvbou- 

seized  by  »  - 

Thrasy.  los  saw  the  advantages  of  its  situation,  and, 

crossing  the  border  in  the  depth  of  winter, 

seized  it  with  a  small  band  of  exiles,  numbering,  accord- 


CH.  III. 


Thmsyhoiilos  occupies  Phyle. 


33 


ing  to  Xenophon,  seventy  men.  Probably  this  number 
soon  increased ;  and  the  willing  hands  of  exiles,  inspired 
by  the  distant  view  of  their  beloved  city,  would  soon  put 
the  ruined  castle  in  a  state  of  defence.     Regarding  the 


i. 


Achamal 


ATHENS 


Balamis 


expedition  as  too  unimportant  to  require  the  presence  of 
the  Spartan  garrison,  the  Thirty  marched  out  at  the  head 
of  the  Three  Thousand  and  the  Knights  to  dislodge  the  in- 
truders. A  body  of  the  younger  troops  attempted  at  once  to 


t 


34 


Rt'storatioH  of  Athenian  Democracy,   b.  c.  404. 


carry  the  fort  by  storm ;  but,  as  it  was  accessible  only  by 
a  narrov  path  on  the  east  side,  the  strenj,nh  of  the  situation 
and  the  courage  of  the  defenders  were  sufficient  to  repel 
them  with  no  slight  loss.  Still,  as  the  exiles  must  have  been 
Init  scantily  provisioned,  the  Thirty  resolved  to  reduce 
them  by  a  blockade ;  but,  though  the  weather  had  been  re- 
Assault  of  niarkably  fine  when  they  set  out,  this  project 
the  troops  was  frustrated  by  a  heavy  fall  of  snow,  which 

Thirty  re-  occurrcd  during  the  night,  and  which  Thrasy- 

pused.  boulos  regarded  as  a  distinct  intervention  of 

the  gods  in  his  behalf.  The  subsequent  retreat  was  im- 
peded by  the  snow ;  and,  descending  from  their  rocky 
fortress,  the  exiles  intlicted  further  hisses  on  their  oppo- 
nents, and  captured  probably  a  large  portion  of  the  bag- 
gage. After  this  the  garrison  became  more  numerous 
every  day ;  and  the  depredations  committed  by  Thrasy- 
boulos  on  the  farms  in  the  neighbourhood  were  so  exten- 
sive as  to  call  for  immediate  repression.  Accordingly 
the  Thirty  despatched  almost  all  the  Spartan  garrison 
and  a  large  body  of  cavalry,  with  orders  to 
tack  by  encamp  about   two   miles  from  I'hyle,  and 

watch  the  operations  of  the  enemy.  But 
the  band  of  Thrasyboulos  had  by  this  time 
increased  to  700;  and  he  felt  himself  strong  enough  to 
assume  the  offensive.  With  his  full  force  he  came  down 
by  night,  and  took  up  a  position  at  a  distance  of  less 
than  half  a  mile  from  the  enemy.  Here,  covered  by  the 
broken  nature  of  the  ground,  his  men  remained,  and 
watched  for  the  dawn.  Just  as  day  was  breaking,  and 
the  camp  was  in  confusion,  the  night-watch  going  off 
duty,  and  the  grooms  noisily  currying  their  horses,  the 
exiles  swept  down  on  them  at  a  run.  There  was  no  re- 
sistance ;  and  during  the  pursuit,  which  lasted  for  near'y 
a  mile,  120  of  the  heavy-armed  troops  were  slain,  and  a 


by 
1  hrasy- 
boulos 
successful 


) 


i 


t 


The  Thirty 
seize 

Eleusis  and 
Salamis. 


CH.  III.     Eleusis  and  Saianiis  seized  by  the   Thirty.     35 

few  of  the  cavalry.  The  exiles  then  returned ;  and,  having 
set  up  a  trophy  and  collected  their  spoil,  made  their  way 
back  to  their  fortress,  before  the  cavalry,  who  had  set  out 
from  Athens  to  the  rescue,  could  arrive  upon  the  scene 
of  action. 

Matters  now  began  to  look  serious.  The  Thirty  were 
fairly  roused  from  their  false  security.  The  prowess  even 
of  their  Spartan  mercenaries  had  been  shown  to  be  by  no 
means  invincible ;  and  they  resolved  to  secure,  while  it 
was  yet  possible,  some  refuge,  of  which  they  might  avail 
themselves,  if  things  came  to  the  worst.  Several  circum- 
stances combined  to  make  Eleusis  a  suitable 
spot  for  the  purpose.  It  was  at  a  conveni- 
ent distance,  12  miles,  from  Athens;  it  was 
near  the  sea,  and  so  afforded  an  opportunity 
of  escape ;  it  would  be  an  advantageous  position  for  the 
reception  of  Spartan  reinforcements,  which  could  reach 
it  either  by  land  or  sea ;  and,  lastly,  it  was  not  far  from 
Salamis,  which  they  determined  to  seize  as  a  last  retreat. 
The  crowning  act  of  spoliation  and  massacre  was  then 
committed.  Kritias  and  his  colleagues,  having  gone  to 
Eleusis  with  the  Knights  or  wealthiest  Athenians,  as- 
sembled the  citizens  of  the  town  under  pretence  of  re- 
viewing them.  Each  man  had  to  enter  his  name  for 
military  service,  and  was  then  obliged  to  pass  out  by  a 
postern  gate  which  opened  on  the  beach.  Here  the 
cavalry  were  posted ;  and  every  man  was  at  once 
pinioned  by  attendants  who  stood  ready.  Three  hun- 
dred citizens  were  thus  seized,  dragged  off  to  Athens, 
and  handed  over  to  the  custody  of  the  Eleven.  On  the 
morrow  Kritias  summoned  the  Three  Thousand  and  the 
Knights,  and  told  them  that  the  oligarchy  was  kept  up 
as  much  for  their  advantage  as  for  that  of  the  Thirty ; 
that  there  must  be  a  community  of  peril  as  well  as  of 


*[ 


36  Restoration  of  Athenian  Democracy.   B.C.  404. 

privilege ;  that  they  must  condemn  the  captive  Eleusi- 
mans  and  so  identify  themselves  with  the  Thirty  in  all 
their  hopes  and  all  their  fears.  The  Spartan  garrison 
was  drawn  t,p  under  arms  close  at  hand ;  and  tht  voting 

TnV"  .  .  T'"  °f  '""''''  "-^  E'eusinians  werf 
condemned  to  death,  and  Xenophon  adds  that  some  of 
the  cmzens  were  so  unscrupulous  in  their  rapacity  as  to 
be  gratified  by  cnmes  like  these.  In  what  manner  the 
Thirty  obtained  possession  of  Salamis  is  not  distinctly 

employed  in  both  cases. 

Four  days  after  his  recent  victory  Thrasyboulos,  who 
had  now  ,,000  men  under  his  command,  marched  down 
Thrasy.  ^^m  ''bvle  by  night  along  the  road  to  Athens 

occupies  ^'  ^^  P^'^^^d  Acharnai.  the  largest  and  most 

.hj:  Pci-  hberty-loving  of  all  the  townships  of  Attica, 

some  of  Its  sturdy  yeomen  may  have  joined 
hi.  force  ;  and  morning  found  him  in  possession  of  the 
Pciraieus.    Though  the  walls  of  the  great  sea-port  had 
been  partially  destroyed,  i,  had  not  suffered  from  depop- 
ulation,  but  had  become  the  refuge  of  5,000  citizens  who 
had  been  e.xpelled  from  Athens.     Among  these  Thrasy! 
boulos   found    numerous   supporters ;   but,  as  all   their 
weapons  were  still  safe  in  the  Akropolis.  their  fighting 
power  was  not  as  considerable  as  their  numerical  strength 
Thrasyboulos,  therefore,  saw  himself  compelled  to  aban: 
don  Peiraieus  as  a  position  too  extensive  for  his  handful 
Baui.  of  °f  troops  to  defend,  and,  having  retired  to  the 

Mou„ychia.       adjacent  suburb  of  Mounychia,  he  drew  up 

h  11  .u  v"  ^"'"^  '"  "'"'^  °"^"  °"  the  slope  of  the 
hill,  so  that  they  entirely  blocked  up  the  road.  He  placed 
his  heavy-armed  troops  in  front,  the  files  being  ten  deep  • 

or  rather'S?  '™"h'  ''"'"'  "•"  ^  "^^^  °'  light-armed; 
or  rather  half-armed,  troops,  who  were  to  hurl  javelins  o^ 


1 


CH.  III. 


Victory  of  Thrasyboulos. 


37 


sling  stones  over  the  heads  of  the  hopHtes,  or  heavy- 
armed  troops,  below.  The  Thirty  advanced  to  the  attack 
with  all  the  force  at  their  command,  but  the  position 
chosen  by  Thrasyboulos  did  not  allow  them  to  reap  the 
full  advantage  of  their  great  superiority  in  numbers. 
Their  files  were  fifty  deep,  but  their  rear  ranks  were  of 
little  use,  except  as  targets  for  the  missiles  of  their 
opponents  ;  nor  could  their  cavalry  render  them  any 
assistance.  As  the  enemy  advanced  up  the  hill  to  the 
attack,  Thrasyboulos,  in  soul-stirring  words,  reminded 
his  troops  of  the  injustice  and  outrage  which  they  had 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  oligarchs,  assured  them  of 
the  favour  of  the  gods,  pointed  out  the  advan-  Address  of 
tages  of  their  position,  and  exhorted  them  to      Thrasy- 

^    ,      ,     ,  ,,      .  ,  ,  .  boulos. 

fight  boldly  m  a  contest  where  the  survivors 
would  be  happy  in  the  greatness  of  the  benefits  achieved 
by  victory,  while  the  dead,  if  any  were  doomed  to  fall, 
would  be  no  less  blessed  in  the  glory  of  their  monument. 
After  this  harangue,  the  exiles  stood  patiently  in  their 
ranks,  awaiting  the  attack  of  their  enemies.  For  the 
soothsayer — without  whose  advice  and  consent  a  battle 
was  rarely,  if  ever,  begun — had  warned  them  not  to 
commence  the  attack  before  one  of  their  comrades  had 
been  slain,  and  he  further  assured  them  that  the  day 
would  bring  victory  to  them  as  certainly  as  death  to  him  ; 
and  now  to  fulfil  his  own  prediction,  like  a  man  carried 
away  by  a  supernatural  impulse,  he  sprang 
forth  from  the  ranks  against  the  advancing 
foe.  As  he  fell,  the  battle  began ;  the  conflict  was  short 
and  sharp.  So  closely  packed  was  the  phalanx  of  the 
oligarchical  troops,  that  every  shot  told.  Of  the  stones 
and  javelins  which  fell  in  showers  not  one  missed  its 
mark  ;  while  the  steepness  of  the  hill  added  weight  to 
the  thrust  of  the  heavy-armed  troops.     The  supporters  of 


His  victory. 


ET^ijn 


.I'l&tf  ■  tbri^-fwynbiudbiMj 


i 


I 


38  Rt'storatum  of  Athenian  Democracy,   n.c.  403. 

the  Thirty  broke  and  fled  down  the  hill,  and  the  pursuit 
was  continued  till  they  reached  the  level  ground.  Only 
seventy  were  killed.  This  small  loss  of  life  was  probably 
due  to  the  humanity  of  the  conquerors,  who  were  loth 
to  shed  Athenian  blood  without  good  cause  :  but  among 
the  slain  was  Kritias  himself,  with  two  other  leading 
oligarchs. 

After  the  battle  the  dead  were  stripped  of  their  arms, 
but    no   further   indignity  was   offered   to  them,  for   the 
exiles  felt  that  the  corpses  were  those  of  Athenians  like 
themselves.      During   the   truce  which  was 
Ki"kritl.        granted  for  the  burial  of  the  dead  the  oppos- 
ing forces,  mingling  for  a  common  object, 
were  drawn  into  conversation.     Suddenly  the  clear  and 
powerful  tones  of  Kleokritos,  the  sacred   herald  of  the 
initiated  worshippers  at  the    Eleusinian  mysteries,  rang 
through  the  crowd.     'Why,'  cried  he.  'do  you  drive  us 
into  exile?    Why  do  you  wish  to  slay  us.?    We  are  bound 
to  you  by  every  bond  of  religion  and  of  honour,  by  old 
associations,  by  companionship  on  flood  and  held.    Throw 
off  your  allegiance  to  these  iniquitous  Thirty,  who.  merely 
to  fill  their  own   purses,  have  slain  more  Athenians  in 
eight  months  than   all  the   Peloponnesians  slew  in   ten 
years.     They  are  forcing  us  into  this  detestable  and  un- 
natural contest ;  and  assuredly  our  sorrow  for  those  who 
have  fallen  to-day  by  our  own  hands  is  as  heartfelt  as 
yours.'     So  powerful  was  this  appeal  to  the  good  feeling 
and  common  sense  of  the  more  moderate  section  of  the 
Effects  of         oligarchical   army,    and   so   respectable  the 
cesses^of  position  of  the   speaker,  that  the  surviving 

Thrasy-  gcncrals  gave  orders  for  an  instant   retreat 

*^'^"'°^-  to  Athens. 

The  immediate  results  of  this  day's  success,  as  Xeno- 
phon  describes   them,   were   sufficiently   striking.     'On 


1 

1 

\ 


'J 


CH.  III. 


Board  of  Trn  Appointed. 


39 


the  following  day  the  Thirty  were,  as  may  be  imagined, 
very  dejected  and  solitary  when  they  took  their  seats 
in  the  Senate-house  ;  while,  wherever  the  various  detach- 
ments of  the  Three  Thousand  were  on  guard,  they  were 
engaged  in  earnest  discussion  among  themselves.  For 
all  those  who  had  been  guilty  of  extreme  violence,  and 
who  were  consequently  alarmed  for  their  own  safety,  were 
vehement  in  their  assertion  that  they  ought  not  to  sub- 
mit to  the  captors  of  the  Peiraieus ;  on  the  other  hand, 
those  who  were  conscious  that  they  had  not  been  guilty 
of  injustice  not  only  began  to  reflect,  but  tried  to  per- 
suade the  rest,  that  this  miserable  state  of  things  need 
not  continue ;  and  that  they  ought  no  longer  to  do  the 
bidding  of  the  Thirty,  nor  allow  them  to  bring  the  State 
to  utter  ruin.  So  they  determined  at  last  to  depose 
their  present  rulers,  and  appoint  others.'  A  Board  of 
Ten  was  accordingly  elected,  one  from  each 
tribe  ;  two  of  the  Thirty  were  reappointed  ; 
and  the  rest,  no  longer  inspirited  by  the  bril- 
liant eloquence  of  Kritias  or  nerved  by  his 
unscrupulous  audacity,  retired  crest-fallen  to 
Eleusis,  probably  accompanied  by  many  of 
their  more  extreme  adherents,  and  guarded  by  the  Spar- 
tan garrison.  The  new  board  had  been  established  as  a 
compromise  by  a  temporary  coalition  of  two  conflicting 
parties — those  who  having  seen  the  evils  of  oligarchy 
wished  to  restore  the  democracy,  and  those  who  wished 
to  retain  the  oligarchy  purified  of  its  violence  and  excess. 
The  latter  of  these  two  policies  was  followed  by  the  new 
government ;  a  peace  with  the  exiles  in  Peiraieus  seemed 
as  far  away  as  ever,  though  it  is  probable  that  clandes- 
tine negotiations  were  opened  with  Thrasyboulos  and  thr 
other  leaders,  by  which  a  seat  among  the  governing  body 
was  offered  them  if  they  would  consent  to  betray  their 


Board  of 
Ten  ap- 
pointed, 
7'ice  the 
Thirty, 
most  of 
whom  retire 
to  Eleusis. 


\\\ 


1 


1* 


40  Restoration  of  Athenian  Dcnwcracy.    B.C.  403. 

friends.  These  overtures  were  of  course  rejected.  Dis- 
trust and  confusion  were  rife  in  the  city ;  an  attack  from 
the  Peiraieus  was  hourly  expected;  and  the  Ten,  con- 
scious that  a  large  section,  if  not  a  positive  majority,  of 
the  Three  Thousand  were  opposed  to  their  policy,  placed 
all  their  hopes  in  the  fidelity  of  the  Knights,  who  accord- 
ingly had  to  perform  double  service,  patrolling  as  cavalry 
by  day,  and  keeping  guard  on  the  walls  as  hoplites  by 
night. 

Meanwhile  the  forces  of  Thrasyboulos  were  becoming 
more  formidable.  Their  numbers  were  swelled  partly  by 
genuine  Athenian  citizens,  especially  from  the  rural  demo- 
^.  crats,  partly  by  a  motley  crowd  attracted  by 

The  army  ,  r     j  i       , 

of  Thrasy-  love  ot  adventure,  by  hope  of  gain,  or  by  the 
streiTgtif.^'"*  promise  of  a  specially  privileged  position  as 
settlers  in  the  renovated  Athens,  if  the  enter- 
prise should  be  successful.  But  arms  were  wanted  more 
than  men  ;  shields  of  wood  or  even  of  wicker-work  had  to 
serve  the  purpose  of  more  solid  armour.  Liberal  contri- 
butions, however,  flowed  in  from  various  quarters.  Elis 
and  Boiotia  sent  money ;  and  Lysias,  the  professional 
rhetorician,  in  whose  speeches  much  incidental  inform.i- 
tion  of  great  value  has  been  handed  down,  and  who  had 
been  himself  the  victim  of  one  of  the  most  outrageous 
crimes  committed  by  the  Thirty,  supplied  200  shields, 
2,000  drachmai,  and  also,  it  is  said,  300  mercenaries.  In 
the  course  of  ten  days  the  exiles  had  become  strong 
enough  to  take  the  field,  with  a  large  force  both  of  heavy- 
and  light-armed  troops,  who  were  supported  by  a  small 
squadron  of  seventy  horse.  The  operations  which  ensued 
are  of  little  importance.  The  foraging  parties  from 
Peiraieus  were  harassed  by  the  cavalry  from  the  city; 
and  although  the  oligarchic  infantry,  being  either  too  few 
or  not  sufficiently  trustworthy,  were  kept  carefully  within 


CH.  III. 


Jealousy  against  Lysandros, 


41 


the  walls,  the  siege-works  of  the  exiles  were  soon  checked 
by  the  ingenuity  of  an  Athenian  engineer. 

The   position  of   the  oligarchs   was    becoming    daily 
more   critical ;    their  only   chance   lay   in   foreign    aid. 
Envoys  were  sent  simultaneously  from  the      g  ^^^^^  ^.^ 
Ten  at  Athens,  and  from  the  Thirty  (as  they      urgently 
were  stilled  called)  at  Eleusis,  to  bid  the  Spar-      "^^"^"^ 
tans  haste  to  the  rescue,  as  the  democracy  had  broken 
loose  from  Spartan  rule.     Lysandros  earnestly  supported 
their  request.     If  he  suffered  his  own  government  to  be 
overthrown   at   Athens,  similar  revolutions  might  take 
place  elsewhere,  his    personal  credit  would  be  shaken, 
and  his  ascendency  would  be  gone ;  while  nothing  would 
confirm  his  power  more  than  the  suppression 
of  a  revolt  in  the  very  hot-bed  of  democracy,      startTwith  a 
and  on  the  very  eve  of  success.     His  influ-      toThf  reTc"e 
ence  was  strong  enough  to  obtain  a  loan  of      of  the 

°  oligarchs. 

a  hundred  talents  for  the  envoys  and  his  own 
appointment  to  the  command  of  the  land  forces,  while  a 
fleet  of  forty  ships  was  entrusted  to  his  brother.     In  a  few 
days  the  position  of  affairs  in  Attica  was  entirely  changed. 
Lysandros,  with  a  large  Peloponnesian  army,  blockaded 
Peiraieus  by  land,  while  his  brother  prevented  the  intro- 
duction of  supplies  by  sea.     The  oligarchs  in  the  city  were 
once  again  exultant.    Thrasyboulos  and  the  exiles  were  in 
the  direst  straits  and  the  deepest  despair ;  their  surrender 
was  imminent;  and  the  cause  of  liberty  seemed  hopeless. 
But  help  came  to  the  beleaguered  band  from  a  most  un- 
expected quarter.     The  supremacy  of  Lysandros,  though 
his  forethought  and  craft  had  made  it  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  a  time,  was  none  the  less      against 
viewed  with  extreme  dislike  and  jealousy  by      at^sparta.* 
those  who  thought  that  the  guidance  of  Spar- 
tan policy  ought  naturally  to  be  in  their  own  hands.     The 


42 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Dtmocracy.    B.C.  403. 


CH.  III.         Operations  against  Thrasyboulos. 


43 


kings  and  the  ephors,  the  nominal  and  the  real  rulers 
of  the  state,  thrown  into  the  background  by  the  power 
of  Lysandros  and  galled  by  his  arrogance,  were  ready  to 
seize   the    tirst   opportunity  of  humbling   him;  and  the 
more  generous  among  the  Spartan  citizens,  those  in  whom 
the  spirit  of  Kallikratidas  still  breathed,  had  no  sympathy 
with  the  Lysandrian  element  in  the  national  policy,  and 
perceived  with  deepening  indignation  that  the  name  of 
Sparta  was  becoming  throughout  all  Hellas  a  byword  for 
broken  faith  and  high-handed  tyranny.     Men  whispered 
also  that  Lysandros,  if  again  successful,  would  no  longer 
be  content  with  a  subordinate  position,  but  that  he  was 
scheming  to  bring  about  a  revolution  which  might  end  in 
placing  him  as  sole  king  on  the  throne  of  Sparta,  while. 
if  this  attempt  should  fail,  he  would  still  be  able  to  fall 
back   upon   Athens,  which  might  be    made  the   capital 
of  an  independent  state  and  become  a  dangerous  rival. 
Pausanias,  the  colleague  of  Agis  in  the  kingship,  natur- 
ally placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  anti-Lysandrian 
movement.      Not   only    was    he   personally    tolerant   of 
democracies,  but  the  traditional  policy  of  his 
house  was,   perhaps,  in  its  wider  sympathy 
and  pan-Hellenic  sentiment,  considerably  in 
advance  of  the  narrow  and  scltish  aims  be- 
yond which  the  average  Spailan  could  see 
nothing  and   understand    nothing.     Having  gained  the 
consent  of  three  out  of  the  five  ephors,  he  issued  a  pro- 
clamation summoning  the  full  force  of  the  Spartan  con- 
federacy.    A  large   army   was   soon  collected;   but  the 
Corinthians  and  Thebans,  so  lately  the  bitterest  foes  of 
Athens,  refused  to  take  any  part  in  the  expedition,  alleg- 
ing that  Athens  had  not  violated  the  treaty,  and  suspect- 
ing that  the  Spartans  were  intending  to  appropriate  her 
territory. 


Pausanias, 
one  of  the 
kings, sets 
out  with  a 
second 
army  ; 


On  his  arrival  in  Attica  Pausanias  at  once  effected  a 
junction  with  the  forces  of  Lysandros,  and  assumed  the 
chief  command.     This  done,  he  took  up  a         ,      . 
position    in    the  neighbourhood   of  Athens,      chief 
which  would  enable  him  effectually  to  control      '^^'"'"^"^• 
the  movements  of  all  the  belligerent  parties;  the  right 
wing,  which  was  stationed  nearest  the  Peiraieus,  he  kept 
under  his  own  orders,  and  Lysandros  was  in  command  of 
the  left.  The  royal  tent  seems  to  have  very  soon  become  the 
centre  of  complaints  against  the  oppression 
of  the  Thirty  ;  nor  could  the  presence  even  of      complaints 
Lysandros  check  the  freedom  with  which  their      against  the 

.,   J       J  oligarchs. 

evil  deeds  were  exposed.  Pausanias  at  once 
shewed  that  he  was  not  come  as  the  partisan  of  either  sec- 
tion of  the  oligarchy  by  refusing  the  presents  of  welcome 
and  friendship  which  were  sent  both  from  Athens  and 
Eleusis;on  the  other  hand,  the  Athenians  in  Peiraieus 
were  undoubtedly  rebels  to  the  government  which  Sparta 
had  sanctioned,  and  he  sent  at  once  to  summon  them  to 
disperse.  The  summons  was  disobeyed,  and,  in  the  fight- 
ing which  followed,  Thrasyboulos  succeeded  in  driving  out, 
with  considerable  loss,  the  Spartan  troops  who  had  made 
their  way  into  Peiraieus  as  far  as  the  theatre.       „ 

,-,,  Mis  opera- 

1  he  Spartans  rallied  on  a  hill  about  half  a      *'o"s 
mile  outside  the  town  ;  and  having  received      ThrTsy- 
strong  reinforcements,  renewed  the  combat.      ^°"'°'' 
The  troops  of  Thrasyboulos,  who  were  only  eight  deep, 
could  not  stand  the  charge  of  the  heavy  phalanx  of  their 
opponents,  and   were   beaten   back   within   their   walls, 
leaving  150  dead  upon  the  field.    Having  raised  a  trophy 
—  the    indispensable   token   of   a    Greek  victory  — and 
having  duly  impressed  the  democrats  with  a  sense  of  his 
military  power,  the  king  could  afford  to  be  generous; 
and  he  lost  no  time  in  shewing  that  he  came  not  as  an 


i 


i 


I 


* 


44 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Democracy.  B.C.  403. 


enemy  or  as  a  conqueror,  but  as  a  peacemaker.    Instead 

of  following  up  his  victory,  he  secretly  encouraged  the 

democrats  to  send  an  embassy  to  represent 

He  accepts  .     .  ,      .         ,  .  ,  ' 

overtures  their  case  before  himself  and  the  two  ephors 

Smisticc.  ^'^^  accompanied  him,  and  who  were  advo- 

cates of  his  policy  rather  than  that  of  Lysan- 
dros.  He  is  said  even  to  have  dictated  to  them  the  terms 
in  which  their  proposals  would  be  most  advantageously 
expressed.  At  the  same  time  he  encouraged  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  Ten  within  the  city  to  come  out  to  him  in  a 
body,  bringing  assurances  of  their  pacific  wishes  towards 
the  occupants  of  Peiraicus  and  their  continued  friendli- 
ness towards  Sparta.  An  armistice  was  concluded ;  but 
Pausanias  did  not  think  it  wise  to  act  any  longer  on  his 
own  authority,  and  preferred  that  the  home  government 
should  take  on  itself  the  responsibility  of  the  final  settle- 
Embassies  "^^"^'  I*-"^'oys  were  sent  at  once  to  Sparta 
are  sent  to  not  Only  from  the  party  of  Thrasyboulos,  but 
from  the  opponents  of  the  Ten  in  Athens, 
while,  making  a  despairing  bid  for  Spartan  sympathy,  a 
counter-embassy  from  the  Ten  themselves  was  instructed 
to  surrender  the  fortifications  of  Athens  and  all  its  in- 
habitants to  the  Spartans,  to  be  dealt  with  just  as  they 
might  please,  and  to  insinuate  that  the  democrats,  if 
equally  sincere  in  their  professions  of  friendship,  ought 
to  make  a  similar  surrender  of  Peiraieus  and  Mounychia. 
But  this  skilful  artifice  failed  in  its  object.  The  influence 
of  Pausanias  seems  to  have  guided  the  decision  of  the 
assembly.  The  complications  of  Athenian  politics  were 
thought  too  great  to  be  settled  anywhere  but  at  Athens ; 
and  fifteen  commissioners  were  dispatched  to  co-operate 
with  Pausanias  in  arranging  the  final  conditions  of  peace. 
During  the  protracted  negotiations  which  followed,  the 
cnances  of  a  renewal  of  actual  hostilities  became  every 


CH.  III. 


Thrasyboulos  enters  Athens. 


45 


t" 


day  more  remote ;  and  the  sentiments  of  the  majority  of 
the  citizens  had  time  to  shape   and  declare   themselves 


with    greater    clearness.     At  length    it  was 


Terms  of 


settled  that  all  parties  should  keep  the  peace      peace 
towards  one  another ;  that  all,  including  the      ♦i'l-tiiy 

'  '  o  arranged. 

exiles,  should  be  restored  to  the  possession 
of  their  own  property  ;  and  that  those  who  felt  themselves 
insecure  in  Athens  should  retire  to  Eleusis.  By  way  of 
inflicting  a  decisive  blow  on  the  influence  of  Lysandros, 
the  chief  exceptions  to  the  general  amnesty  were  the 
officials  whose  appointment  he  had  himself  sanctioned, 
the  Thirty,  and  the  Ten  governors  of  Peiraieus.  With 
them  were  mentioned  the  Eleven  who  had,  with  such 
zeal  and  fidelity,  executed  their  most  unscrupulous  com- 
mands ;  but  even  these  might  resume  their  rights  of  citi- 
zenship if  they  thought  that  they  could  justify  their  official 
conduct  before  the  assembly,  according  to  the  universal 
custom  of  retiring  magistrates.  On  the  conclusion  of 
peace  Pausanias  at  once  evacuated  Attica  and  disbanded 
his  army. 

Without  delay  Thrasyboulos  marched  in  at  the  head 
of  his  troops.  Along  the  streets  and  through  the  market- 
place the  armed  procession  swept ;  and  the  feet  of  free 
Athenians  trod  once  more  the  long  slope  that  led  up  to 
the  Akropolis.  Through  the  spacious  portico  and  the 
great  bronze  gates  of  the  Propylaia,  beneath 
the  colossal  shadow  of  the  champion  god-  ThrSy-^ 
dess,  the  exultant  exiles  passed  on  to  the      ^^V'"**  '"'° 

.  Athens. 

matchless  Parthenon  itself;  and  there,  amid 
the  master-pieces  of  Pheidias  and  Polygnotos,  on  which 
the  dull  eyes  of  the  Spartan  garrison  had  so  lately  gazed 
with  blank  indifference  or  boorish  contempt,  they  offered 
the  sacrifice  of  thanksgiving  for  their  safe  return.  After 
this,  they  descended  to  the  Pnyx,  where  ThrasybouWc 


46 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Democracy.   B.  c.  403. 


addressed  the  assembled  citizens.     Turning  first  to  the 

adherents  of  the  oligarchy,  he  reminded  them  that  they 

L    ,         were  neither  more  just  nor  more  courageous 

Speech  of  ■'  "     . 

'ihrasy-  than    the   democrats;    though  blessed  with 

hereditary  wealth,  they  had  shewn  them- 
selves monsters  of  selfishness  and  rapacity ;  and,  in  spite 
of  superior  advantages  of  position,  resources,  and  Spartan 
aid,  they  had  been  unable  to  hold  their  own  in  battle. 
He  told  them  plainly  that  they  could  no  longer  plume 
themselves  on  their  connexion  with  Sparta,  for  the  Spar- 
tans had  chained  them  up  like  snappish  curs,  and  had 
left  them  to  the  mercy  of  their  injured  fx:llow-citizens. 
At  the  same  time  he  exhorted  his  own  followers  to  crown 
their  glorious  exploits,  by  shewing  that  even  in  the  hour  of 
triumph  they  could  curb  their  passions  and  respect  their 
oaths.  The  restoration  of  the  democracy  was  now  an 
accomplished  fact ;  and  probably  the  Senate  of  the  Five 
Hundred,  the  assembly,  and  the  dikasteries  at  once  re- 
sumed the  exercise  of  their  ancient  functions,  though  it 
seems  likely  that  the  citizens  were  no  longer 

Restoration  ^  ^ 

paid  for  their  attendance.  After  the  year 
of  Anarchy,  as  the  time  during  which  the 
Thirty  wcie  m  power  was  always  called,  the  First  Archon 
again  gave  his  name  to  his  term  of  office ;  and  the  year 
of  Eukleides  became  memorable  for  ever  in  Athenian 
history. 

But  if  Athens  was  united,  Attica  was  not.  Though 
the  popular  party  was  ready  to  forget  and  forgive,  the 
The  rem-  Thirty  at  Eleusis  could  not  cease  their  plots 

nantsofthe       ajrainst  the  rcstorcd  dcmocracv.     The  Athe- 

Thirty  ^  '  i  •    • 

driven  out         nians  soon  heard  that  the  Thirty  were  hmng 

a  force  of  mercenaries  against  them.     Their 

indignation   knew  no   bounds,   and,   if  the   account   of 

Xsnophon    may  be   accepted,   hurried    them   into   the 


of  the 
democracy 


CH.  III. 


Democratic  Moderation, 


47 


only  act  which  sullies  the  story  of  their  triumph.  They 
marched  out  in  full  force  along  the  Sacred  Way ;  and 
when  the  generals  of  the  oligarchic  army  advanced  to 
demand  a  conference,  they  seized  them  and  put  them 
to  death.  Upon  this  most  of  their  adherents  were  per- 
suaded by  their  kinsfolk  and  acquaintance  to  come  to 
terms ;  and  the  Thirty  themselves,  with  their  most  un- 
popular supporters,  made  good  their  escape  from  Attica. 
Thus  Eleusis,  the  chosen  home  of  the  great  goddess — 
the  Earth-mother — and  the  awful  shrine  of  her  mysterious 
worship,  was  reunited  to  Athens ;  and  the  great  schism 
came  entirely  to  an  end. 

So  heinous  had  been  the  crimes  of  the  oligarchy,  and  so 
deep  the  provocation  which  the  popular  party 

11  lit-  •    ,       ,  r         \         Moderation 

had  received,  that  history  might  have  found  ofthedemo- 
a  ready  excuse  for  the  restored  democrats  yo^ij  afi 
if  they  had  for  a  short  time  indulged  their  P'■a^^*e. 
revenge,  and  used  stringent  means  to  recover  the  vast 
amount  of  spoil  and  plunder  which  their  opponents  had 
accumulated  at  their  expense.  But  the  noble  moderation 
and  self-command  which  had  been  conspicuous  after  the 
fall  of  the  Four  Hundred  was  even  more  remarkable  at 
the  present  crisis.  The  landed  property  which  had  been 
seized  by  the  Thirty  themselves  was  either  restored  to 
its  rightful  owners  or  confiscated  for  the  service  of  the 
State ;  but  their  adherents  among  the  Three  Thousand, 
and  the  Knights  whose  avarice  had  been  gratified  by 
lavish  gifts  of  money  and  movable  goods,  were  allowed 
to  remain  in  the  possession  of  their  ill-gotten  wealth. 
Many  of  the  exiles  had  lost  their  all ;  yet  no  distinction 
was  made  between  those  citizens  who  had  jeoparded 
their  lives  in  the  daring  enterprise  of  Thrasyboulos  and 
those  who  had  purchased  security  at  Athens  by  complicity 
in  the  atrocities  of  the  oligarchy.     A  thousand  drachmas 


48 


Restoration  of  Athenian  Detnocracy.   B.C.  403. 


was  the  paltry  sum  allotted  from  the  public  funds  to  the 
saviours  of  their  country.  This  special  grant  was  made 
to  defray  the  expense  of  sacrifices  and  votive  offerings, 
and  especially  of  a  work  of  art  which  was  presented  to 
Thebes  as  a  token  of  gratitude  and  good-will ;  and  a  debt 
too  large  for  any  money  to  repay  was  discharged  by  the 
bestowal  of  wreaths  of  olive. 

The  contrast  between  such  unselfish  integrity  and  the 
self-seeking  greed  of  the  oligarchs  must  have  taught  a 
valuable  political  lesson  to  all  C^reece.  Those  who  had 
arrogated  to  themselves  the  title  of  the  '  best,'  and  the 
right  to  govern  their  fellow-citizens  on  the  score  of  supe- 
riority in  virtue,  wealth,  and  education,  had  not  only 
been  proved  more  vicious  than  the  worst  demagogues, 
but  had  been  succeeded  bv  democrats  who  were  con- 
spicuous  for  all  good  qualities.  So  scrupulous  was  their 
good  faith,  that  the  hundred  talents  which  had  been 
borrowed  from  Sparta  by  the  expiring  oligarchy  was  made 
a  public  debt,  though  it  might  fairly  have  been  exacted 
from  the  private  wealth  of  the  Knights.  Nor  can  there 
be  a  greater  injustice  than  to  describe  the  strict  observ- 
ance of  the  amnesty  as  due  solely  to  fear  of  Spartan 
intervention.  For  the  fear  of  offending  Sparta  was  not 
found  sufficient  to  induce  the  Athenians  to  adopt  a  pro- 
posal for  limiting  the  franchise  to  those  who  possessed 
landed  property  in  Attica.  The  seamen,  the  traders,  and 
all  the  poorer  citizens,  5,000  in  all,  would  thus  have  been 
excluded.     The  scheme  was  put  forward  as 

Limitation  •       i^    *.  i-  u  j   j 

of  citizen-         ^  comprouiise  between  oligarchy  and  demo- 
Athenians  cracy,  which  would  be  especially  pleasing  to 

of  pure  the  Spartans  ;  but  it  was  thought  that  Athens 

at  this  time  had  need  of  the  services  of  all 
her  sons,  and  the  motion  was  rejected.  A  little  later, 
however,  an  important  limitation  was  introduced.     The 


CH.  III.  Legislation  of  the  Democracy. 


49 


spread  of  Athenian  commerce  and  the  establishment  of 
Klerouchies,  or  settlements  of  Athenian  citizens  in  for- 
eign countries,  had  caused  the  custom  of  inter-marriage 
with  the  women  of  other  states  to  become  very  preva- 
lent ;  and  as  long  as  Athens  remained  an  imperial  city, 
and  adhered  to  her  policy  of  pan-Hellenic  union,  the 
citizenship  of  the  father  had  been  sufficient  to  legiti- 
mise the  children.  Now,  however,  the  sentiment  of 
autonomy  was  supreme;  and  it  was  resolved  to  purify 
the  city  from  its  foreign  element.  Accordingly  the  law  of 
Perikles  was  re-enacted,  by  which  the  rights  of  citizenship 
were  restricted  to  those  who  were  of  Athenian  birth  on 
both  sides  ;  but,  to  avoid  ill-feeling  and  discontent,  it  was 
not  made  retrospective  in  its  action. 

The  work  of  conciliation  was  not  found  to  be  com- 
plete unless  measures  were  taken  to  stop  the      Le^j^i^jj^n 
endless  litigation  which  the  recent  changes      after  the 

^  /^         V  •  re-€stabhsh- 

would  naturally  occasion.  On  the  motion  ment  of  the 
of  Archinos,  the  people— the  majority  of  democracy 
whom  would  be  losers  by  the  proposal — passed  a  self- 
denying  ordinance  that  no  prosecutions  for  damages 
should  be  allowed  if  the  injury  had  been  committed  prior 
to  the  archonship  of  Eukleides ;  and  a  heavy  penalty, 
amounting  to  one-sixth  of  the  sum  claimed,  was  fixed 
against  any  prosecutor  who  thus  violated  the  terms  of 
the  amnesty.  But  though  many  of  the  illegalities  of  the 
Thirty  remained  unredressed,  all  the  legislation  of  the 
oligarchy  was  declared  null  and  void.  It  was  also  found 
very  hard  to  reconcile  the  amnesty  with  the  terms  of  the 
existing  laws  of  Solon  and  Drakon  :  and  the  opportunity 
seemed  suitable  for  a  general  revision  of  their  text.  In 
these  laws  there  was  much  that  was  obsolete  in  language, 
much  that  was  altered  in  usage,  much  that  was  con- 
tradicted by   later   statutes.      Four  hundred   legislators 


so 


Sokrates. 


CH.  IV. 


CH.  IV. 


Character  of  Sokrates. 


51 


(Nomothetai)  were  accordingly  appointed  to  bring  the 
old  codes  into  harmony  with  the  existing  state  of  thing's. 
Another  change,  more  interesting  than  important,  took 
place  in  the  laws  at  this  time.  Archinos  proposed  that 
they  should  be  no  longer  written  in  the  old  alphabet  of 
eighteen  (or  sixteen)  letters,  but  in  the  new  Ionic  alphabet 
of  twenty-four  letters,  which  had  been  for  many  years 
in  general  use  in  Athens ;  and  hence  the  archonship  of 
Eukleides  marks  an  era  as  interesting  to  the  philologist 
as  to  the  historian,  since  the  Atheni.m  inscriptions  fall 
naturally  into  two  great  classes.  pre-Eukleidic  and  post- 
Eukleidic. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


SOKRATES. 


The  brilliant  and  unscrupulous  Kritias  or  the  bold  and 
patriotic  Thrasyboulos  might  well  have  fancied  that 
his  would  be  the  name  among  Athenian  citizens  to 
which  posterity  would  attach  most  importance.  Even 
more  surely  the  arrogant  Lysandros  would  have  scouted 
with  indignant  contempt  the  notion  that  there  was  any 
man  in  Greece  whose  life  would  be  studied  with  a  keener 
interest  than  his  own.  Yet  there  was  daily  to  be  seen  at 
Athens,  in  the  market-place,  in  the  gymnasium,  in  the 
public  walks,  in  short,  wherever  men  most  congregated, 
the  well-known  figure  of  one  whose  life  and  death  have 

kindled  a  far  profounder  sympathy,  whose 
arrcTcha^'r-'^^  thoughts  and  words  have  exercised  an  in- 
Sokra?Is.  comparably  deeper  influence.     Ungainly  in 

movement,  mean  in  attire,  petulant  in  man- 
ner, unattractive  in  appearance,  he  was  usually  sur- 
rounded by  a  small  group  of  eager  listeners.     In  outward 


t, 


I 


form  the  talker  was  likened  even  by  those  who  most  ad- 
mired him  to  the  sensual  old  god  Seilenos,  or  the  satyr 
Marsyas.  His  broad,  flat  nose,  with  wide  open  nostrils, 
his  thick  lips,  his  prominent  eyes,  his  squat  figure,  were  a 
standing  protest  against  the  theory  which  underlies  so 
much  of  Greek  thought,  Greek  custom,  and  Greek  art,  that 
physical  and  mental  perfection  must  necessarily  coexist. 
But  the  heaven-taught  music  made  by  the  lips  of  the  satyr 
Marsyas  was  not  a  whit  more  bewitching  than  the  elo- 
quence which  fell  from  the  speaker's  tongue. 
His  conversation,  when  it  first  began,  would       ^''^ 

1  1  J-      1  •        I  eloquence, 

seem  to  a  casual  passer-by  ridiculous  in  the 
extreme ;  but  ere  long  he  would  touch  the  hearts  of  his 
hearers,  so  that  the  tears  streamed  from  their  eyes,  and 
their  pulses  leapt  quicker  than  in  the  fanatical  enthusiasm 
of  the  Korybantic  orgies.  He  would  fire  their  imagination 
by  setting  forth  images  supremely  beautiful,  divine,  and 
wonderful :  he  would  enchain  their  reason  by  arguments 
so  irresistible  and  so  persuasive,  that  they  must  stop  their 
ears  as  if  against  the  strains  of  the  Seirens  if  they  did  not 
wish  to  grow  old  in  listening  to  his  talk.  He  surpassed 
all  men  in  physical  endurance  ;  he  could  bear  the  longest 
fasts  ;  and  the  soldier's  plain  fare  was  a  feast  to  him.  He 
rarely  drank  much  wine ;  but  at  those  jovial 

u  1-    •  J  .   .        -        temperance, 

seasons  when  religious    duty  or   a  spirit  of 

good  fellowship  called  for  conviviality,  he  more  than  held 

his  own  with  the  strongest  heads.     Cold  and  heat  were 

alike   to   him ;    against  the  extremes  of  both  the   same 

clothing  was    sufficient   defence,  and  with  bare   feet  he 

trod   the  ice  of  Thrace  more  firmly  than  his  sandalled 

comrades.     In  battle  he  quitted  himself  as  a 

true  Athenian   should,  and  even   amid   the      ^"   courage. 

wreck  of  a  routed  army  he  bore  himself  so  nobly  that  the 

pursuers  did  not  venture  to  attack  him. 


52 


Sokrates. 


CH.  IV. 


Such  are  the  chief  traits  in  the  description  of  Sokrates 
which  is  put  by  Plato  into  the  mouth  of  Alkibiades,  one 
of  the  most   gifted  and  least  worthy  of  his 
His  early  life,     p^^jj^      Sokrates  was  born  somewhat  before 
469  B.  c,  the  son  of  a  sculptor.     For  some  time  he  followed 
the  practice  of  his  father's  art ;  and  a  draped  group  of  the 
Graces  was  long  preserved  in  the  Akropolis  as  a  proof  of 
the  proficiency  to  which  he  attained.     Hut  Kriton,  a  rich 
Athenian  and  one  of  his  most  devoted  friends,  is  said  to 
have  discerned  the  intellectual  promise  of  the  young  artist, 
and  to  have  taken  him  from  the  chisel  and  the  workshop 
to  educate  him  in  philosophy.     At  first,  he  turned  his  at- 
tention to  physical  science,  and  learnt  all  that 
"Vsicfl"         ^^^  greatest  teachers  of  the  day  could  tell  him 
science,  about  the  nature  of  the  universe,  the  motions 

of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  One  and  the  Many,  the  Real 
and  the  Phenomenal,  and  all  the  vast  and  shadowy  prob- 
lems to  which  philosophy  had  directed  its  earliest  attention. 
But  a  mind  so  powerful  and  independent  could  not 
long  remain  satisfied  with  the  baseless  speculations  and 
half-proved  conjectures  which  then  passed  for  physical 
science.  Many  others  like  him  had  seen  the  insufficiency 
of  these  reasonings ;  but  capable  only  of  the  work  of 
criticism  and  not  of  construction,  they  had  rashly  con- 
cluded that  Truth  was  unknowable,  and  had 
taken  refuge  in  doubt  or  unbelief.  Sokrates, 
on  the  other  hand,  whose  whole  life  was  one 
lon<7  effort  to  attain  to  the  nerfert  knowlod-'C 
of  Truth,  when  baffled  in  one  direction,  struck  out  for 
himself  an  entirely  new  line.  Though  Truth  might  not 
be  found  by  searching  out  the  works  of  external  nature, 
the  world  of  Human  Action  was  as  yet  unexplored ;  and 
there  in  great  moral  ideas  he  felt  that  he  could  find  a  cer- 
tainty of  truth  in  which  his  soul  could  rest. 


but  being 
dissatisfied 
turns  to 
Ethics, 


I 


CH.  IV. 


Method  of  Sokrates. 


53 


His  reli- 
gious mis- 
sion, and 
super- 
natural 
warnings. 


It  was  probably  at  this  period  of  his  life  that  the  con- 
viction of  a  religious  mission  obtained  in  his  mind  an 
overmastering  power.     Yxom  his  childhood 
upwards,   he   had   been    guided   in   all   his 
actions,  and  often  in  his  very  words,  by  a 
supernatural  something  {iSatiioviov  ti),  which 
exercised  a  restraining  influence  over  him. 
He  did  not  conceive  this  to  be  something  personal,  a 
familiar  spirit  or  a  guardian  angel,  but  rather  a  divine 
voice  or  sign,  preventing  his  feet  from  erring  from  the 
path  which  had  been  marked  out  for  him.    It  had  always 
thwarted  any  inclination  which  he  might  ever  have  cher- 
ished for  a  political  career ;  and  now  he  could  no  longer 
doubt  that  to  discover  truth  and  to  unmask  error  was  the 
one  object  to  which  his  life  was  henceforth  to  be  devoted. 
As  he  pondered  more  deeply  over  the  nature  of  man, 
the   moral   laws   which   he   must   obey,  his   social   and 
political  relations  with  his  fellow-men,  and  other  kindred 
topics,  he  became  convinced  (i)  that  there  was  a  great 
deal  of  professed  knowledge  which  was  nothing  better 
than  plausible  ignorance ;  (2)  that  this  sham  knowledge 
and  real   ignorance   was   due   largely  to  loose   notions 
about  the  meaning  of  abstract  terms— duty,  justice,  piety, 
and  the  like ;  and  (3)  that  from  such  ignorance  sprang 
the  greater  part  of  moral  errors.     The  first  of  these  con- 
victions gave  him  his  method,  which  was  a 
riL^orous  svstem  of  cross-examination.      At 
first,  probably  with  an  unaffected  modesty, 
but  afterwards  with  an  increasing  confidence, 
he  would  accost  some  man  of  high  repute  for  his  know- 
ledge and  wisdom.     Confessing  in  the  frankest  manner 
his  own  absolute  ignorance  and  his  absorbing  thirst  for 
knowledge,  Sokrates  would  \Nith  deep  humility  request 
instruction.    He  would  begin  by  asking  some  very  simple 


His 

method :  a 
rigorous 
cross-ex- 
amination. 


4 


54 


Sokratt's. 


CH.  IV. 


His  contri- 
butions to 
Logic,  In- 
ductive Dis- 
courses, and 
Definitions. 


question,  which  led  up  to  an  ahnost  self-apparent  answer. 
This  being  granted,  another  followed,  and  then  another, 
till,  lost  in  a  maze  of  logical  subtlety  and  bewildered  by 
the  dexterity  of  his  interrogator,  the  reputed  sage  was 
found  to  have  admitted  premisses  which  led  irrefragably 
to  the  most  monstrous  and  contradictory  conclusions, 
and  was  proved,  to  the  complete  satisfaction  of  amused 
bystanders,  if  not  of  himself,  to  have  a  mere  semblance 
of  knowledge  without  the  reality. 

The  second  of  his  convictions  prompted  his  most  per- 
manent contributions  to  formal  logic,  inductive  argu- 
ments, and  the  definitions  of  general  terms. 
That  Sokrates,  partly  by  his  personal  charac- 
ter, and  partly  by  these  two  notions,  created 
a  revolution  in  ancient  philosophy  is  quite 
certain  ;  but  it  is  difficult  for  us  nowadays  to 
understand  how  instruments,  seemingly  so  simple  as  the 
latter,  could  produce  a  change  so  great.  Sokrates  in- 
sisted on  his  hearers  having  clear  ideas  about  terms 
which  they  had  been  in  the  habit  of  using  vaguely;  and, 
to  gain  these  clear  ideas,  he  was  perpetually  applying 
the  test  of  analogy.  Such  words  as  law,  democracy,  ex- 
pediency, were  ever  in  the  mouths  of  statesmen  in  the 
assembly,  of  orators  in  the  law-courts,  of  actors  on  the 
stage ;  but  no  one  could  give  a  definition  of  them  which 
was  not  defective  or  redundant,  too  narrow  or  too  broad. 
A  jumble  of  ideas,  more  or  less  precise,  had  synthetically 
grown  round  some  single  word;  but  this  process  was 
purely  unconscious ;  Sokrates  by  a  conscious  effort  took 
the  word  and  enquired  analytically  what  its  essential 
meaning  might  be.  To  aid  in  this  task  he  took  direct  or 
analogous  instances,  often  trivial,  sometimes  fanciful  and 
quibbling,  by  which  to  test  his  definition  and  form  his 
general  conception.     Thus  he  was  the  first  to  use,  as  a 


I 


\ 


«« 


CH.  IV. 


Philosophy  of  Sokrates. 


55 


His 

doctrine  : 
virtue  is 
knowledge, 
and  vice 
ignorance. 


logical  instrument,  a  rough  sort  of  induction,  not  resting 
indeed,  as  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  on  an  elabo- 
rate series  of  exhaustive  observations  and  crucial  experi- 
ments, but  starting  from  the  commonest  opinions  and 
examples,  and  gradually  correcting  and  completing  ideas 
which  were  based  on  imperfect  experience  and  careless 
generalisations. 

Thirdly,  vice,  he  said,  was  ignorance ;  and  virtue, 
knowled'^c.  Is  a  man  a  coward  ?  He  knows  not  the 
real  nature  of  death ;  he  thinks  it  is  an  evil, 
and  so  flees  from  it.  Is  he  intemperate? 
He  cannot  estimate  the  consequences  and  is 
blinded  by  the  present  pleasure.  If  a  man 
could  see  the  real  nature  and  all  the  results 
of  vice,  he  would  never  choose  it.  Further,  how  can  a 
man  be  virtuous  who  knows  not  the  way  ?  Is  it  easier  to 
live  virtuously  than  to  make  shoes  ? 

From  this  theory  naturally  sprang  the  positive  side  of 
his  philosophy.  Plato  has  left  us  many  dialogues,  in 
which  the  destructive  power  of  the  negative  .  . 

Positive 

dialectic  of  Sokrates  is  admirably  exempli-  side  of  his 
fied  ;  but  thev  advance  no  further  than  criti-  teaching. 
cism,  and  lead  to  no  positive  conclusion.  Xcnophon,  on 
the  other  hand,  who  wrote  to  defend  his  great  master's 
memory  from  the  accusations  which  brought  him  to  the 
hemlock-cup,  and  from  which  he  had  scorned  to  defend 
himself,  insists  repeatedly  on  his  conception  of  the  great 
end  of  morals — not  only  to  secure  happiness  for  one's 
self  and  righdy  to  order  one's  own  household,  but  that 
each  should  do  his  utmost  to  further  the  happiness  of  all 
others,  whether  as  men  or  as  citizens.  Hence  Xenophon 
proves  to  his  readers  that,  though  those  who  knew  Sokrates 
least  might  well  regard  him  as  merely  an  ironical  quibbling 
questioner,  this  was  but  half  his  character,  and  those  who 


56 


So/craf.'s. 


CH.  IV. 


CH.  IV. 


Sokratcs  the   Wisest  of  Men. 


57 


knew  him  best  could  testify  to  the  frequency  and  the  ear- 
nestness with  which,  in  plain  and  direct  language,  he  en- 
forced temperance  and  courage,  diligence  and  charity, 
obedience  to  parents  and  fidelity  to  friends. 

Such,  in  brief  outline,  were  the  doctrines  which  Sokrates 

gave  up  his  life  to  teach.     In  contented  poverty  he  stood. 

day  after  day,  year  after  year,  in  the  streets 

sailmrweVe      of  Athcns  or  on  the  road  to  Teiraieus,  con- 

puhiic  and  un-    yersiniT  with  anvonc  who  chose  to  address 

paid.  **  '  1-   •    • 

him,  young  or  old,  rich  or  poor,  politician, 
sophist,  or  artisan.  Anyone  might  draw  near  to  listen  to 
his  talk.  His  teaching  was  public  and  indiscriminate,  for 
he  took  no  fees,  like  other  teachers  of  philosophy,  who,  as 
professed  Sophists,  gained  their  living  by  the  work  of  edu- 
cation. It  was  exclusively  oral,  for  he  held  that  books 
could  not  teach,  being  unable  to  answer  their  questioners. 
Of  all  those  who  heard  him  talking  as  they  passed,  some 
kindred  spirits  would  return  again  and  again  to  his  society  ; 

and  these  formed  a  band  of  disciples,  or,  as  he 
His  kind  of       preferred  to  call  them,  companions.    Among 

companions.         «  ,.  ,    ,  •  i  c     \ 

them  were  found  the  widest  contrasts  ot  char- 
acter and  of  rank ;  youths,  high-born,  high-spirited,  of  keen 
and  active  intellect,  such  as  Alkibiadcs ;  aspiring  politi- 
cians, like  Kritias,  anxious  to  learn  something  of  the  art 
by  which  they  too  might  discomfit  their  most  confident  op- 
ponents; brave  men  of  action,  like  Xenophon,  mellowing 
with  literature  and  philosophy  the  rougher  life  of  camps ; 
discontented  eccentrics,  such  as  Apollodoros,  who  found 
at  last  in  Sokrates  the  satisfaction  of  all  his  longings. 

Chairephon,  one  of  the  most  enthusiastic  and  im- 
petuous of  these  followers,  went  to  Delphoi  to  ask  the 
Pythian  priestess  whether  there  was  any  man  wiser  than 
Sokrates ;  and  the  oracle  returned  answer  that  of  all 
men  he  was  the  wisest.     Sokrates  himself  was  beyond 


i 


The  Delphic 
oracle  pro- 
nounces 
Sokrates 
the  wisest 
of  men ; 


the  oracle 
true  by  ex- 
posing the 
ignorance  of 
the  so-called 
wise. 


measure  astonished  at  this  reply ;  for  he  felt  that  on  no 
subject  could  he  boast  of  wisdom,  being  conscious  rather 
of  utter  ignorance.     lUit  he  knew  that  oracles  spoke  in 
riddles,  and  he  set  to  work  to  find  the  solu- 
tion.    He  went  first  to  a  statesman,  eminent 
for  wisdom ;  but  after  a  few  questions  he  saw 
that  his  wisdom  was  but  a  sham.     Then  he 
tried  to  convince  the  politician  of  his  ignor- 
ance;   but  in  this  he  fiiiled  altogether,  and  only  gave 
great  offence  to  the  man  himself,  and  to  many  of  his 
friends  who  were  standing  by.     The  result  he  thus  sums 
up:  '  I  am  wiser  than  this  man ;  for  neither  of  us  has  any 
knowledge  of  what  is  good  or  beautiful;  but      i^^  proves 
he,  though  ignorant,  thinks  that  he  has  know- 
ledge ;  I  neither  know  nor  think  that  I  know ; 
and  so  in  one  point  I  have  an  advantage  over 
him.'     He  continued  his  experiments  among 
the  statesmen  and  orators,  but  always  with  the  same  re- 
sult, and  with  increasing  unpopularity.     Next  he  betook 
himself  to  the  poets ;  but  they  could  not  tell  him  the  mean- 
ing of  their  poems  or  analyse  the  method  of  their  compo- 
sition ;  so  he  concluded  that  their  fine  passages  were  writ- 
ten not  by  wisdom,  but  in  a  sort  of  inspired  enthusiasm. 
Passing  on  last  of  all  to  the  artisans,  he  found  that  they  at 
any  rate  knew  many  curious  things  of  which  he  was  ignor- 
ant, and  were  so  far  wiser  than  he.     But  they,  not  satis- 
fied with  being  wise  in  their  own  handicrafts,  thought  that 
they  were  therefore  wise  in  other  and  higher  matters,  an 
error  which  more  than  outweighed  their  modicum  of  real 
wisdom.     Thus,  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  mission  imposed 
upon  him,  he  had  proved  that  the  god  had  spoken  the 
truth,  and  that  the  wisdom  of  the  wisest  of  men  was  only 
a  thorough  conviction  of  ignorance. 

The  causes  of  the  unpopularity  of  Sokrates  are  not  far 


-^«&':^V,'"'.    II --"--' r^^-T^i'^fiir'-.^rt-S'y^iaf.raiaWfff 


58 


Sokrahs. 


CII.  IV. 


CII.  IV. 


Causes  of  his  Unpopidarify. 


59 


to  seek.  To  the  vulgar  crowd  he  appeared  merely  as  an 
eccentric  mass  of  contradictions.  They  saw  him,  thoir^di 
poor,  ill-fed,  and  ill  clothed,  yet  the  centre  of  an  admiring 
group  of  respectable  citizens ;  they  knew  him  as  one  who 
perpetually  talked  of  philosophy,  and  yet 
wat"n"  opposed   all  those  whom  they  imagined  to 

popular  J3g  jjg  professors;  they  heard  that  he  blamed 

with  the  '^  ■' 

lower  many  points  in  those  democratic  institutions 

of  which,  since  their  experience  of  oligarchic 
anarchy,  they  were  more  than  ever  proud ;  and  it  had 
been  rumoured  among  them  that,  in  spite  of  all  his  fre- 
quent offerings  and  sacrifices  to  the  gods,  he  was  not  quite 
sound  in  the  faith  of  their  ancestors,  as  they  understood 
it.  Hence  the  lower  classes  of  the  city  had  no  sympathy 
with  him,  and  would  join  readily  in  the  jeers  and  derision 
of  his  enemies  in  the  street,  or  laugh  loudly  when  the 
ugly  face  and  odd  figure  appeared  caricatured  upon  the 
comic  stage.  Amongst  the  higher  classes  his  mode  of 
questioning  made  of  necessity  many  enemies.  No  man 
likes  to  be  convicted  of  ignorance  and  folly,  and  to  be 

proved  incapable  even  in  his  own  line.  The 
thehiRher         process  bccomcs  still  more  galling  when  it 

takes  place  in  public,  and  when  a  man's  own 
admissions  are  made  the  instruments  of  his  refutation.  The 
mortification  must  further  have  been  infinitely  heightened 
by  the  humility  and  ingenuous  manner  of  the  questioner, 
who  '  spoke  as  a  fool,'  putting  forward  no  claim  to  know- 
ledge on  his  own  account ;  nor  would  it  be  diminished  when 
he  left  his  discomfited  opponent  with  an  air  not  of  triumph 
but  of  deep  disappointment,  as  of  one  who  had  hoped  at 
last  to  find  some  truth,  and  yet  again  was  baffled  in  the 

search.     Many  powerful  sections  of   society 
e  pries  s.        ^y^^^e  also  opposcd  to  him.    Sacerdotal  intol- 
erance had   during  the  recent  reaction  gathered  great 


strength  among  the  '  god-fearing  '  population  of  Athens; 
and  the  priests  looked  with  suspicion  on  all  free  thought, 
and  especially  on  the  great  exponent  of  a  reforming  philo- 
sophy, who  was  himself  said  to  be  a  setter-forth  of  strange 
gods.     The  Sophists  could  not  but  use  the  great  influence 
which  they  naturally  possessed,  as  the  edu- 
cators of  the  more  thoughtful   among  the      Sophists; 
Athenian  youth,  to  decry  a  rival  who  was  a 
standing  reproach  to  all  their  class,  making  a  parade  of 
his  poverty,  and  refusing  all  pay  as  degrading  to  truth, 
and  as  hampering  his  own  freedom.     The  Athenians  of 
the  old  school  would  sternly  discountenance  the  demor- 
alising   spirit    of    enquiry    which    shook    to    their   very 
foundations  the  old  ideas  of  morals  and  of       ,      , . 

the  old- 
politics,  and  they  lamented  the  degeneracy       fashioned 

-..,         .  ,  ,  I'lii-  •  Athenians. 

of  Athenian  youth,  who  stood  idly  listening 
to  the  prosing  of  a  babbler  in  the  market-place  instead  of 
strengthening  their  limbs  in  the  pakestra  for  the  service 
of  the  State. 

Wlicn  we  consider  the  force  of  all  these  elements  of 
opposition,  we  cannot  join  in  the  indignant  astonishment 
of   Xenophon    that   arguments   could   ever 
have  been  found  to  sustain  a  capital  charge      proof  of*^* 
against  his   master  and   friend  ;    we   rather      Athenian 

°  toleration 

wonder  that  he  was  allowed  to  pursue  his      and 

,  ...  T-  liberality. 

mission  so  long  without  interruption.  For  a 
period  of  at  least  twenty-five  or  thirty  years  he  had  never 
spent  an  idle  day.  Very  soon  after  he  had  begun  his 
public  conversations,  Aristophanes  had  found  that  he 
could  raise  a  cheap  laugh  by  misrepresenting  him  as  a 
star-gazing  and  unj^raclical  theoriser.  Nothing  indeed 
could  have  protected  for  so  long  a  time  so  intrepid  a 
critic  of  his  age  and  society  but  that  liberality  of  senti- 
ment of  which  among  Greeks  none  but  the  Athenians 


6o 


Sokratrs. 


B.C.  399. 


could  boast,  and  which  was  indirectly  the  result  of  their 
education  in  the  law-courts  and  in  the  theatre,  where  they 
saw  habitually  that  there  were  two  sides  to  every  case. 
A  Sokrates  in  Sparta  is  absolutely  inconceivable ;  were 
he  to  appear  even  in  the  England  of  our  own  day, 
society  would  not  perhaps  put  him  to  death,  but  would 
hint  to  him  in  a  thousand  ways  that  it  were  better  for  him 
to  hold  his  peace  or  be  gone. 

In   399  B.C..  this   opposition  was  brought  to  a  head, 
partly  by  the  intensity  of  the  hatred  which  was  felt  for 
Kritias,  and  which  extended  to  all  who  had 
Jfaccused"'     bccn  known  as  his  associates,  partly  by  a 
aIi\*o1^^°*'        private  grudge  which  the  inthiential  but  un- 
am?  L^'kon.       cultured  Auytos  had  conceived  against  him. 
Anytos  wished  his  son  to  follow  his  own  business;  Sok- 
rates had.  it  seems,  told  the  youth  that  it  was  a  shame 
for  a  young  fellow  of  such  promise  to  be  doomed  to  a 
tanner's  life.      Angry   at   such   interference,   the   plain 
citizen  associated  himself  with  a  poet.  Meletos.  and  a 
rhetorician.  Lykon.  and  the  trio,  of  whom  the  poet  took 
the  lead,  issued  a  joint  indictment  in  the  following  terms : 
Sokrates  breaks  the  law.  firstly,  by  not  accepting  the  gods 
whom  the  slate  accepts,  but  introducing  other  new  divin- 
ities;  and,  secondly,  by  corrupting  the  youth.     Sokrates 
had  throughout  his  life  been  rigidly  scrupulous  in  per- 
forming his  duties  as  a  citizen  ;  he  had  served  with  dis- 
tinguished valour  in  the  ranks  of  the  hoplitcs  at  Delion. 
Poddaia,  and  Ami)hipolis;    he  had  shewn  that  in  the 
cause  of  law  he  dared  to  defy  equally  the  tyranny  of  the 
democracy  and  the  tyranny  of  the  oligarchy.     And  now, 
when  he  had  passed  the  threescore  years  and  ten  of  man's 
life,  he   heard  himself  arraigned  on   a  charge  of  law- 
breaking,  and  must  plead  against  the  penaUy  of  death 
What  defence   must  he   make   consistent  at  once  with 


CH.  IV. 


Trill/  of  Sokrates. 


61 


the  gravity  of  the  charge  and  with  the  dignity  of  his 
apostlcship  ? 

Each  of  the  three  counts  in  the  indictment  was  plau- 
sible enough.  The  first  and  second  were  craftily  joined ; 
and  in  support  of  them  the  accusers  asserted 

,.,_,...  11  The  areii- 

that  in  the  Daimonion.  or  supernatural  guide,  nicms  of  his 
of  whose  warnings  Sokrates  had  never  made  accusers, 
any  secret  or  mystery,  he  had  invented  a  new  deity. 
The  third  was  backed  by  several  arguments;  that  he  had 
undermined  the  love  and  respect  due  from  children  to 
their  parents ;  that  Kritias  had  imbibed  from  him  his 
pernicious  principles ;  that  he  had  perpetually  satirised 
Athenian  institutions,  and  especially  the  appointment  of 
officials  by  lot.  Against  these  charges  the 
accused  made  virtually  no  defence.     Calm.      and  his 

^  deience. 

grave,  and  dignified,  he  told  his  judges  that 
he  would  not  stoop  to  work  upon  their  feelings  by  the 
piteous  appeals,  the  tears  and  lamentations,  to  which  they 
were  accustomed,  or  to  buy  their  favour  by  promises  to 
change  his  way  of  living ;  the  best  refutation  of  his 
accusers  was  the  long  and  unsullied  life  which  he  had 
led  among  them ;  further  defence  the  divine  voice  had 
forbidden  him  to  make.  If.  indeed,  they  should  acquit 
him.  he  could  only  live  as  he  had  always  lived,  searching 
for  truth  and  questioning  all  whom  he  met — a  sort  of 
moral  gadfly  or  stimulator  to  the  state ;  for  a  necessity 
was  laid  upon  him,  and  he  must  obey  God  rather  than 
them.  As  to  the  sentence,  whatever  it  might  be,  he  did  not 
fear  it.  About  the  unseen  world  he  knew  nothing ;  but 
to  disobey  God  he  knew  full  well  to  be  wicked  and 
shameful ;  and  he  would  not  choose  a  certain  evil  to 
escape  a  fancied  evil,  which  might  turn  out  a  blessing. 

By  such  a  defence  Sokrates  voluntarily  gave  up  all 
chance  of  acquittal ;  yet  we  may  well  marvel  that  out  of 


62 


Sokratt'S. 


B.C.  399. 


more  than  500  judges  a  majority  of  only  five  or  six  was 
found  to  condemn  him.      It  is  even  more  certain,  that 
when  once  found  guilty,  he  wished  for  no 
His  con-  other  verdict  than  that  of  death.     By  Athe- 

nian   law  the  accuser  named  his  own  pen- 
alty ;  and  the  condemned   person  might  propose,  as  an 
alternative,  any  other  which  he  thought  more  suitable : 
the  judges  then  selected  one  of  the  two.     Meletos  asked 
for  death.     Sokrates  told  them  that  the  recompense  which 
he  thought  he  deserved  at  their  hands  was  that  he  should 
be  supported  as  a  public  benefactor  at  the  public  cost. 
Exile  or  imprisonment  would  be  insupportable  :  he  would 
therefore  submit  a   tine  as  an  alternative.     His  worldly 
goods  were  barely  worth  a  mina,  and  he  would  have  pro- 
posed that  sum,  had   not  Plato  and  his  friends  near  him 
promised  to  raise  thirty.     The  counter-proposal  therefore 
was  a  fine  of  thirty  minai ;  and  had   this  proposal  been 
made  without  comment,  we  cannot  doubt  that  it  would 
have  been  accepted.    As  it  was,  the  claim  to  maintenance 
in  the   Prytaneion   made   the   fatal   decision   inevitable. 
Sentence  of  death  was  pronounced,  and  Sokrates  once 
again   addressed  his   judges.      He  did   not 
and  speech        re<^ret  the  tone  of  his  defence  or  the  result 

aftey^ej^tence      J ^^^   ^^.^^^        .  ^^  .^  ^^^  ^,^^^^  ,  ^^  ^^^^^  .  ^^^  ^ 

nounced.  ^^^  ^^  escapc  death,  if  he  has  no  scruple 

about  what  he  says  or  does ;  but  it  is  hard  to  escape  un- 
righteousness, for  unrighteousness  is  swifter  than  death. 
Now  I,  being  old  and  slow  of  foot,  have  been  overtaken 
by  death,  the  slower  of  the  two ;  but  my  active  accusers, 
by  wickedness,  which  is  the  swifter."  After  warning 
them  that  they  would  not  get  rid  of  his  doctrines  by  get- 
ting rid  of  him,  and  dilating  on  the  pleasures  which  h  • 
anticipated  from  the  society  of  the  heroes  of  old  time  in 
the  world  to  come,  he  thus  commended  his  three  sons 


40 


\ 


r    r     .v 


■  ».  —  _> 


\     \ 


vN.»<l 


J»A       ^  SA.. 


^.^"•^ 


CH.  IV. 


Death  of  Sokrates. 


63 


It  is  im- 
prisonment 
and  death. 


to  their  char-e :  '  When  my  sons  grow  up.  if  they  shall 
seem  to  care  about  riches  or  any  other  object  in   pre- 
ference to  virtue,  torment  them  as!  have  tormented  you. 
And  if  they  think  themselves  to  be  something  when  they 
are  really  nothing,  reproach  them  as  I  have  reproached 
you.  for  not  attending  to  their  duty,  and  you   will  then 
have  done  what  is  just  both  to  me  and  to  my  sons.     It  is 
now  time  th  it  we  go  hence.  I  to  die,  you  to  live  ;  which  of 
us  has  the  better  fate  no  man  can  say :  God  onl v  knows ! ' 
The  condemnation  of  Sokrates  took  place  on  the  tirst 
day  after  the  Sacred  Ship  had  started  on  its  yearly  pil- 
grnnage  to  Delos ;    and   until  its  return  no 
capital  sentence  could  be  executed.  Generally 
the  hemlock  juice  was  drunk  on  the  dav  after 
the  verdict  was  pronounced;  but  Sokrates  now  had  thirty 
days  to  spend  in  prison,  and  even  in  chains.  Durin-  this 
time  his  hrm  soul  never  wavered,  nor  did  he  ever  n^ourn 
the  doom  which  awaited  him.      His  friends,  who  were 
allowed  to  have  free  access  to  him,  cheered  and  com- 
forted him  by  their  presence;  and  when  Kriton  devised 
a  plan   for   his  escape  by  bribing  the  gaoler.  Sokrates 
refused  to  avail  himself  of  it.  asking  indignantlv  if  Kriton 
wished  him  now  to  turn    law-breaker.     During  all  this 
month  he  conversed  with  his  companions  just  as  usual 
with  no  less  serenity  and  cheerfulness  than  was  his  wont.' 
1  he  last  day  was  spent  in  a  discussion  of  the  immortal- 
ity  of  the  soul,  which   is  given,  though  probably  with  a 
colouring  and  additions  which  are  purelv  Platonic,  in  the 
dialogue   named   after    Phaidon.      As  the   dav  drew  to 
Its  close,  while  the  sun   still   shone  upon   the  hill-tons 
with  a  calm  soul  elevated  and  strengthened  bv  thou^^hts 
so  heavenly,  he  cheerfully  drained  the  poisoned  cup  ''aH 
his  friends  wept  sadly,  not  indeed,  as  Plato  assures  us 
for  Sokrates.  but  for  themselves  ;  and  Apollodoros  gave 


64 


Sokrate^. 


B.C.  399. 


way  to  so  bitter  a  storm  of  grief  that  Sokrates.  who  alone 
refrained  from  tears,  rebuked  them  in  kindly  tones  and 
bade  them  cease  their  womanly  laments.  As  the  rismg 
numbness  neared  his  heart,  he  spake  his  last  words: 
•  Kriton  we  owe  a  cock  to  Asklcpios  ;  dischar-e  the  debt, 
and  bv  no  means  neglect  it/  The  bird  which  heralds  the 
dawn 'must  be  offered  to  the  great  god  of  heahng  in 
thanksgiving  for  that  perfect  cure  of  all  life's  woes  which 
death  had  wrought  for  him. 

So  lived  and  so  died  the  man  whose  disciples  called 
him  the  most  just  and  excellent  of  all  the  men  of  their 
own  time ;  whose  virtues  have  forced  posterity  to  repeat 
with  a  fuller  emphasis  the  praises  of  his  bereaved  com- 
panions  •  whom  we.  with  an  even  higher  ideal  of  moral 
perfection  before  our  eyes,  may  pronounce  the  greatest  of 
all  Christians  before  Christ. 

Let  us  not  be  too  severe  on  those  who  condemned  him. 
If  thev  could  have  seen  his  character  as  we  see  it  now, 
they  would  not  have  bade  him  die ;  but  in  his  own  age 
and  in  his  own  country  the  prophet  has  no  honour. 

Did  the  Athenians  repent  their  conduct  ?  We  cannot 
be  sure  ;  but  the  storv  goes  that  during  a  performance  of 
the  Pa/anu'des  of  Euripides  they  were  cut  to  the  heart 
and  shed  bitter  tears  of  remorse,  when  the  sad  plaint  fell 
upon  their  ears.  '  Ye  have  slain  the  truly  wise  and  inno- 
cent nightingale  of  the  Muses,  the  best  of  the  Hellenes. 


CH.  V. 


Interest  of  the  Anabasis. 


65 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  TEX   THOUSAND. 

The  episode  which  forms  the  subject  of  Xenophon's 
Anabasis  has  little  importance  as  a  period  of  Greek 
political  history,  to  which  indeed  it  can  scarcely  be  said 
to  belong  at  all.  Perhaps  its  chief  results  were  seen 
in  the  influence  which  it  had  on  the  minds  of  the  more 
ambitious  of  Greek  potentates.  Any  intelligent  observer 
could  not  fail  to  perceive  that  though  the 
Persian  Empire  was  strong  in  extent  of  terri-      Interest  and 

1  t  /-  •    1     ,  •  importance 

tory  and  number  of  inhabitants,  yet  the  dis-  of  the 
tances  were  so  great  and  its  forces  so  scattered  ^"^^^^'^• 
that  a  sudden  invasion  would  find  but  a  feeble  opposition. 
This  remark,  thus  stated  by  Xenophon,  was  probably  the 
general  impression  of  all  the  Greeks  in  the  Cyreian  army; 
and  when  repeated  experience  had  established  the  fact 
that  the  countless  hosts  of  Oriental  slaves  were  powerless 
against  the  disciplined  battalions  of  Greek  freemen,  it 
was  no  longer  a  chimerical  scheme,  beyond  all  hope  of  - 
realisation,  that  an  army  of  Greeks  should  carry  devasta- 
tion and  terror  to  the  heart  of  Persia,  that  the  burning  of 
>^thens  should  be  avenged  in  the  flames  of  Persepolis, 
and  the  rotten  fabric  of  luxurious  despotism  be  utterly 
overthrown.  Such  was  the  ambition  that  prompted  the 
expedition  of  Agesilaos,  that  fired  the  imagination  of  Ja- 
son of  Pherai,  and  that  found  its  ultimate  accomplishment 
by  the  ardent  genius  of  the  youthful  Alexander.  But 
whatever  may  be  the  historical  importance  of  the  expedi- 


66 


The  Ten    Thoitsanif. 


B.  c.  403. 


tion  of  the  Ten  Thousand,  it  possesses  many  features  of 
deep  interest.  Firstly,  it  is  the  subject  of  that  work  of 
Xenophon  which  is  the  most  read  and  the  most  readable. 
It  is  also  invaluable  as  an  authentic  picture  of  the  state 
of  Asia  under  the  Persian  rule,  and  as  a  contribution  to 
the  ancient  geography  of  that  country.  For  our  present 
purpose  it  is  above  all  interesting  as  an  illustration  of  the 
Oreek  character,  of  its  heroic  courage  and  firm  self-de- 
pendence, fertile  in  resource  and  ready  in  obedience. 

Darius  Nothos,  King  of  Persia,  had  died  b.  c.  404,  and, 
since  there  was  no  fixed  rule  of  succession,  Cyrus,  his 
younger  son,  had  hoped  that  through  the  influence  of 
his  mother  the  queen  Parysatis  he  might  have  supi)lanted 
his  elder  brother  Artaxerxes,  surnamcd  by  the  (ireeks 
..       ,  .,  Mnemon,  and  have  obtained  the  throne  on 

Cyrus  f-iils  to         ,  , 

obtain  the         tlic  plea  that  he  was  the  eldest  son  born  dur- 
''''"^'  ing  his  father's  reign,  a  pretext  for  which  the 

accession  of  Xerxes  furnished  a  recent  precedent.  An-Mv 
at  the  failure  of  his  hopes,  he  grew  still  more  wroth  when 
Tissaphernes  charged  him  with  a  plot  for  his  brother's 
assassination,  which  nearly  cost  him  his  life.  The  inter- 
cession of  Parysatis  not  only  saved  him  from  an  ignomi- 
nious death,  but  also  obtained  for  him  his  former  satrapy ; 
yet  his  brother's  clemency  entirely  failed  to  conciliate 
him.  On  his  return  to  Sardeis  he  declared  war  against 
Tissaphernes.  and  detached  from  him  the  Creek  cities 
of  Ionia,  all  of  which  came  over  to  his  side,  except  Mile- 
tos,  where,  after  an  unsuccessful  revolt,  Tissaphernes  re- 
established his  authority.  Having  thus  avenged  himself 
on  his  deceitful  neighbour,  the  young  prince  devoted 
himself  to  the  more  arduous  task  of  dethroning  his  bro- 
ther. Under  the  pretence  of  prosecuting  the  war  against 
Tissaphernes,  reducin-;  Milctos,  and  punishing  the  out- 
rages of  some  border  tribes,  he  enlisted  large  numbers 


CH.  V. 


March  of  Cyrus. 


67 


of  Greeks,  whose  pre-eminent  superiority  over  his  own 
countrymen  he  had  early  recognised.  There  were  many 
just  at  this  time  who  had  grown  up  to  man- 
hood in  an  epoch  of  perpetual  warfare,  whose  f"'^  collects 
tastes  and  habits  led  them  to  a  life  of  mili-  troops  at 
tary  adventure,  and  who  were  thrown  out  of 
employment  by  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  or  driven 
from  their  homes  by  the  establishment  of  oligarchical 
rule.  Cyrus  was  munificent  and  courteous,  scrupulously 
faithful  in  fulfilling  his  engagements,  and  most  compli- 
mentary in  his  treatment  of  all  Greeks.  These  qualities 
attracted  to  his  standard  not  only  an  inferior  class  of 
military  adventurers,  but  many  youths  of  good  position 
from  almost  every  state  of  Greece.  Klearchos,  who  at 
Byzantion  had  made  himself  notorious  for  atrocities 
beyond  even  the  wonted  cruelties  of  Spartan  harmosts, 
and  had  been  dismissed  from  his  post  by  order  of  the 
ephors.  was  the  most  noted  leader  of  these  mercenary 
bands.  In  command  of  other  troops  were  Menon,  the 
treacherous  Thessalian,  and  Proxenos,  a  young  and 
ambitious  Boiotian  ;  while  several  other  companies  kept 
themselves  under  the  immediate  orders  of  their  own 
captains,  and  acknowledged  Cyrus  himself  only  as  their 
superior  officer. 

In  the  spring  of  401  B.C.  the  prince  regarded  his  prep- 
arations as  complete.     Around  him  at  Sardeis  were  gath- 
ered no  less  than    100,000  Asiatic  troops,  backed  by  a 
Greek  force— which,   as  he  well   knew,   was  worth   f^ir 
more  than  all  these— of  7,700  hoplites  and  500  peltasts. 
With  this  great  army  he  began  his  march, 
giving  out  that  the  expedition  was  directed      c>TusVrom 
against  the  mountain  tribes  of  Pisidia  who       ^^'■^^'^• 
defied  the  king's  authority.    On  his  route  the  numbers  of 
his  Greek  allies  were  increased  by  successive  reinforce- 


68 


The  Ten   Thousand, 


B.C.  401. 


ments,  while  the  supply  of  money  with  which  he  had 
started  as  rapidly  diminished.  His  tent  was  repeatedly 
besieged  by  gangs  of  clamorous  creditors,  who  had  as 
often  to  be  put  off  with  fair  words  and  promises,  till  at 
last  he  owed  them  arrears  for  a  full  three  months.  Just 
when  things  were  beginning  to  look  serious,  the  wife  of 
the  prince  of  Kilikia  came  to  meet  him  with  a  large 
present  of  money — enough  to  furnish  the  (keeks  with 
four  months'  pay — and  they  in  return  equipped  them- 
^    .       ,         selves  in   all  their  best,  with    purple  tunics 

Review  of 

Greek  and  burnished  shields,  and  held  a  grand  re- 

roops.  view.     To  wind  up  the  performance,  Cyrus 

lequested  the  Greeks  to  charge.  The  trumpets  sounded; 
the  Greeks  presented  their  pikes,  raised  a  shout,  and 
advanced  at  the  double.  Straightway  the  barbarians 
fled  in  panic  terror,  and  among  them  the  Kilikian  prin- 
cess, who  sprang  in  dismay  from  her  palanquin,  while 
the  Greeks  retired  with  peals  of  laughter  to  their  tents, 
and  Cyrus  rejoiced  to  see  the  abject  dread  which  they 
inspired  in  Asiatic  breasts.  Soon  after  this  the  army 
passed  without  opposition  through  the  impregnable  pass 
of  the  Kilikian  Gates,  which  becomes  in  one  place  so 
narrow  as  barely  to  leave  room  for  the  passage  of  a  single 
chariot.  The  defence  of  this  pass  had  been  entrusted  by 
the  king  to  the  prince  of  Kilikia;  but  he.  wishing  to  keep 
in  with  both  sides,  fell  back  as  soon  as  Menon  and  a 
body  of  Greeks  had  crossed  the  mountains  by  another 
pass  and  were  threatening  his  rear.  On  their  arrival  at 
Tarsos,  the  Greeks  perceived  that  Pisidia  was  not  their 
real  destination,  and  began  to  suspect  that 
Cyrus  was  leading  them  against  his  brother. 
Unwilling  to  be  absent  so  long  from  their 
homes  and  families,  and  shrinking  from  the 
unknown  difficulties  of  the  march,  they  refused  to  ad- 


Advance  of 

the  army 
from  Tarsos 
to  Baby- 
lonia. 


CH.  V. 


P^'epanxtions  for  Battle. 


69 


vance.  The  stern  threats  and  sterner  discipline  of  Klear- 
chos  failed  to  move  his  own  division ;  but  when  the 
Greeks  reflected  that  to  return  against  the  will  of  Cyrus 
was  a  task  even  more  difficult  than  to  go  forward,  and 
also  received  the  promise  of  a  large  increase  of  pay,  they 
were  at  last  induced  to  accompany  the  prince  for  an 
onward  march  of  twelve  days  farther  to  the  Euphrates. 
When  they  reached  Thapsakos  the  whole  truth  was  at 
last  told  them ;  and,  although  they  must  have  been  fully 
prepared  to  hear  it,  murmurs  and  discontent  again  broke 
forth.  But  again  a  promise  of  further  reward  was  suc- 
cessful in  tempting  them  forward.  The  Euphrates  was 
successfully  forded  ;  and,  after  thirteen  days  of  desolate 
and  difficult  marching  through  the  desert,  the  army  reached 
the  fertile  plains  of  Babylonia,  about  six  months  after  its 
departure  from  Sardeis. 

Tissaphernes,  however,  had  guessed  at  once  the  real 
object  of  Cyrus  in  mustering  so  large  a  force  ;  and  he 
had  hastened  in  person  to  warn  Artaxerxes 
of  the  danger  which  threatened  him.     The      tionro?' 
king  began  his  preparations  without  delav  •       ^"^*«''*es. 
yet  so  mcompetent  and  infatuated  were  the  Persian  gen- 
erals that  every  position  where  the  onward  march  of  the 
pretender  might  have  been  indefinitely  delayed,  if  not 
ahogcther  arrested,  had  been  given  up  without  a  struggle. 
First  the  Kilikian  Gates,  next  the  passes  through  Mount 
Amanos,  and  lastly  the  line  of  the  Euphrates  had  been 
surrendered  ;  and  now  Cyrus  found  the  last  of  all  his 
obstacles  abandoned   in  like  manner.     After  a  review, 
in  which  Cyrus  exhorted  his  13,000  Greeks  not  to  fear 
the  numbers  and  the  noise  of  their  worthless  foes,  but  to 
act  worthily  of  that  freedom  which  he  esteemed  more 
precious  than  his  own  possessions  a  thousand  times  mul- 
tiplied, he  marched  warily  onward,  expecting  to  meet  the 


70 


The  Ten   Thousand. 


B.C.  401. 


March 

thrmiuh 


vast  army  which  his  brother  had  collected.  But  when 
ten  days  of  cautious  progress  had  passed,  he  came  upon 
a  newly-duj^  trench,  40  miles  lonj^,  30  feet 
broad,  and  18  feet  deep,  with  a  passage  of 
Babylonia.  ^^^^,  ^o  fcct  in  breadth  l)ct\veen  it  and  the 
Euphrates.  Not  a  man  was  left  to  defend  so  impregnable 
a  position,  and  Cyrus  began  now  to  think  that  he  would 
win  the  throne  without  a  battle.  Discipline  w.is  conse- 
quently somewhat  relaxed,  and  the  careful  array  which 
had  been  previously  preserved  was  suffered  to  fall  more 
or  less  into  disorder. 

Suddenly  on  the  second  day  news  came  that  the  royal 
army  was  marching  straight  upon  them.  Ample  time 
was  given  for  Cyrus  to  form  his  order  of  battle.  The 
Greeks  were  on  the  right  wing,  Ariaios  with  some  of  the 
Asiatics  on  the  left,  and  Cyrus  himself  in  the  centre. 
As  the  afternoon  wore  on,  a  white  cloud  of  dust  was  seen 
.  in  the  far  distance.  It  soon  grew  darker  and 

Arrange-  ^  ^ 

ments  for  more  defined  ;  and  then  the  flashing  of  the 

the  battle.  ,       ,  ,     . 

sun  on  tiie  brazen  armour  left  no  more  room 
for  doubt.  Cyrus,  in  his  last  orders  to  Klearchos,  wished 
the  Greeks  to  charge  direct  on  the  Persian  centre,  where 
Artaxerxes  would  himself  be  found,  knowing  well  that  to 
break  the  centre  would  be  to  win  the  day  ;  but  Klearchos, 
clinging  with  Spartan  obstinacy  to  his  old-fashioned  no- 
tions, feared  to  expose  his  right  flank,  and  held  for  safety 
to  the  river.  He,  however,  assured  Cyrus  that  all  should 
go  well ;  and  the  Greek  leaders  in  their  turn  besought 
the  prince  not  to  expose  his  own  life  to  unnecessary  risk. 

Had  each  taken  the  other's  advice,  the  result 

of  the  fight  would  have  been  wholly  different. 

The  Greeks  were  entirely  successful  in  anni- 
hilating the  Persian  troops  opposed  to  them ;  but  every 
step  which  they  made  in  pursuit  rendered  it  less  possible 


Battle  of 
Kunaxa. 


CH.  V. 


neginmug  of  the  Retreat. 


71 

for  them   to  assist   Cyrus   in   his   attack  on  the  centre. 
Cyrus   himself,  by  a   furious  ca\alry  charge,  broke  the 
ranks  of  the  royal  troops,  killing,  as  is  said, 
their  commander  with  his  own  hand      But      Y'^'l"'^'?^ 

.1  •         ,  •    ,      ^  ^"^  Greeks. 

m   the   pursuit  which  followed,   when  very 
few  were  left  to  guard  his  person,  he  saw  his  royal  brother, 
and,  giving  way  to  a  transport  of  rage,  cried,  '  I  see  the 
man  ! '  and  rushed  on  to  slay  him.  His  spear 
penetrated  the  corsletof  the  king,  and  slightly       Death  of 
wounded  him,  but  Cyrus  himself  was  pie'rced       ^*'"'' 
beneath  the  eye  by  the  javelin  of  a  Karian  soldier,  and, 
falling  from  his  horse,  was  quickly  despatched  with  his 
few  companions.  'Thus  died  Cyrus,' savs  Xcnophon.  'a 
man  acknowledged  by  all  who  had  any  acquaintance  with 
him  to  have  been  of  all  Persians  the  most   kingly  and 
most  worthy  of  empire  since  the  days  of  Cyrus  the  elder." 
When    their   leader    fell,  the  Asiatic   soldiers  on  the 
centre  and  the  left  broke  and  fled,  and  the  roval  troops 
plundered   their  camp;    so   that   when   the 
victorious  Greeks  returned  to  it    thcv  were      '^"J?eOreek« 
ofjliged   to   go   supperless  to   sleep,  though      ^"''""'^  ^o 
they  had  been  forced  to  go  dinnerless  to  bat-      '^''''''^'■"'' 
tie.     On  the  morrow  they  heard  of  the  death  of  Cyrus, 
and  at  once,  as  conquerors,  offered  the  crown  to  Ariaios' 
but.  before  his  answer  could  arrive,  Artaxerxes  sent  to 
summon  them  to  lay  down  their  arms.     After  some  con- 
sultation Klearchos  replied  that,  if  the  Greeks  were  to  be 
friends  with  the  king,  they  would  be  of  more  use  to  him 
with  their  arms  than  without  them  ;    if  thev  were  to  be 
enemies,  they  should  equally  require  their 'weapons  for 
their  own   use.     Ariaios  was  however  so  fearful  of  the 
opposition  of  the  Persian  nobles  that  he  dared  not  accept 
the  dangerous  offer  of  the  Greeks,  and  he  announced  his 
mtention  of  retreat.     Artaxerxes  next  sent  a  messa-e  in 


i 


72 


TAc  Ten   Thousand. 


B.C.  401. 


t 


CH.  V. 


Despondency  of  the  Greeks. 


73 


which  he  proposed  to  treat  on  equal  terms  ;  but  Klcarchos 
replied  again  that  they  had  nothing  to  eat,  and  no  man 
should  presume  to  talk  to  Greeks  about  a  peace  without 
first  furnishing  them  with  a  dinner.  Upon  this  they  were 
conducted  to  some  villages,  where  they  obtained  abun- 
dance of  supplies  ;  and  Tissaphernes  soon  after  made  his 
appearance  as  a  friendly  negotiator.  Artaxerxes  was 
probably  genuinely  anxious  to  get  the  Greeks  out  of 
Babylonia,  where  their  presence  was  a  standing  invi- 
tation to  his  subjects  to  revolt,  and  where  it  may  have 
been  in  his  opinion  by  no  means  unlikely  that  they  might 
wish  to  establish  a  permanent  settlement.      After  three 

weeks'  delay  Tissaphernes  returned  with 
the  army^of  the  announcement  that  the  king  had  re- 
"^hernes  luctantly  given  him  permission  to  save  the 

Greek  armv,  and  that  he  would  conduct  them 
home  in  person.  Although  the  Greeks  were  far  from  im- 
plicitly trusting  the  good  faith  of  the  satrap,  yet  they,  and 
Klearchos  especially,  were  so  profoundly  (dnvinrcd  that 
their  only  chance  of  escape  was  to  keep  on  good  terms 
with  the  Persians,  that  they  put  themselves  under  his 
guidance,  and  began  the  march.  An  interval  of  three 
miles  separated  them  from  the  troops  of  Tissaphernes, 
with  whom  the  army  of  Ariaios  was  now  united ;  and  in 
this  order  they  passed  the  Wall  of  Media  and  the  Tigris, 
and  advanced  as  far  on  their  northward  journey  as  the 
Zabatos,  or  Greater  Zab. 

Here  the  mutual  mistrust  of  the  two  armies,  which  had 
been  gradually  on  the  increase,  became  so  serious  that 
^      ,  Klearchos  held  an  interview  with  Tissapher- 

Treachery  -    ,       .    . 

of  I'issa-  nes  for  the  purpose  of  devismg  measures  to 

deat^hoVthe  remedy  SO  Unpleasant  a  State  of  things.  The 
generals.  satrap,  drawing  an  over-coloured  picture  of 

the  dirticulties  which  enct)mpassed  the  Greeks,  and  of 


his  own  power  to  destroy  them  utterly  if  he  thought  fit, 
assured  Klearchos  that  he  would  much  rather  bind  them 
by  ties  of  gratitude,  and   invited  him   to   bring  all   the 
generals  to  a  conference  on  the  morrow.     Accordingly 
Klearchos,  accompanied  by  Menon,  Proxenos,  and  two 
other  generals,  and  escorted  by  only  200  men,  repaired 
to  the  satrap's  tent  to  keep  his  appointment.     The  gen- 
erals were  immediately  admitted ;   the  escort   remained 
outside.     At  a  given  signal,  and  at  the  same  moment, 
those  within  the  tent  were  seized  and  bound,  and  those 
outside  were  slain.     One  man  alone,  wounded  and  in  a 
ghastly  plight,  escaped  to  tell  the  news.      In   the  mo- 
mentary confusion  and  dismay  of  the  Greeks,  a  sudden 
attack  by  the  whole  Persian  army  would  probably  have 
been  entirely  successful.     But  nothing  in  the  campaign 
is   more   striking   than   the   folly  with   which   the   royal 
generals  threw  away  their  opportunities.     Ariaios  with  a 
squadron  of  horse  came  to  summon  the  Greeks  to  sur- 
render, but  was  driven  away  with  indignant  reproaches. 
Klearchos  and  the  other  generals  were  beheaded  after  a 
short  imprisonment,  except  Menon,  who,  after  a  year  of 
insuh  and  torture,  ended  a  life  of  perpetual  perjury,  de- 
ceit, and  treachery,  by  a  malefactor's  death. 

Bad  as  the  prospects  of  the  Greeks  had  been  imme- 
diately after  the  battle,  they  were  now  infinitely  worse. 
To  borrow  the  words  of  one  who  himself  felt 
what  he  describes,  they  were  conscious  that      Dangers 
•  they  were  still  at  the  very  gates  of  the  Great      pomWy  of 
King.   They  were  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  by      '''^  ^'■^^'''• 
many  tribes  and  cities,  all  hostile  to  them.     No  one  would 
any  longer  supply  them  with  provisions.     They  were  not 
less  than   10,000  stadia  distant  from  their  own  country; 
they  had  no  guide  to  show  them  the  way,  and  impassable 
rivers   intercepted   their  homeward   course.     Nay,  even 


74 


The    Ten    Thousand. 


R.r.  40T. 


the  Asiatics,  who  had  served  with  them  under  Cyrus,  had 
betrayed  them ;  and  they  were  left  all  alone,  without  any 
cavalry  to  assist  them,  so  that  it  was  quite  obvious  that 
if  they  won  a  victory  they  could  not  follow  it  up,  while 
if  they  lost  a  battle  not  a  man  of  them  would  escape. 
As  they  pondered  over  these  thouj^hts  in  deep  dejection, 
few  of  them  tasted  a  bit  of  food  at  ^upper-time,  and  few 
hghted  fires.  Many  never  even  came  to  their  quarters,  but 
lay  down,  just  where  they  hajjpened  to  be.  unable  to  sleep 
through  sorrow,  and  for  longing  after  homes  and  parents, 
and  wives  and  children,  whom  they  never  thought  to  see 
again.  Such  were  then  the  feelings  of  all,  as  they  lay 
down  to  rest.  Hut  there  was  in  the  army  a  man  named 
Xenophon,  who  joined  the  expedition  not  as  general, 
captain,  or  common  soldier;  but  Proxenos,  an  old  friend 
of  his,  had  sent  for  him  from  home,  pro!ni^ing  him  that, 
if  he  would  come,  he  would  place  him  high  in  the  favour 
of  Cyrus,  whom,  as  he  said,  he  considered  to  be  more  to 
him  than  his  own  country.' 

In  these  words  Xenophon  introduces  himself  to  his 
readers,  fully  conscious  of  the  im|)orlance  of  the  crisis, 
yet  feeling  also  that  it  needed  some  more  than  human 
stimulus  to  induce  him,  a  mere  volunteer,  to  take  the  lead 
among  his  10,000  despairing  countrymen.  This  heaven- 
sent impulse  came  to  him  in  a  vision  of  the 
Xenophon,  "i.i^'ht;  for  he  dreamed  that  a  thunderbolt  fell 
*;*^"  '"^  upon  his  father's  house  and  set  it  all  ablaze. 

chosen  one  ' 

of  the  new  Waking  at  once  from  his  brief,  uneasv  slum- 
ber.  he  thought.  '  Why  lie  I  here,  while  the 
night  wears  away,  and  the  dawn  may  see  our  foes  upon 
us?'  He  roused  without  delay  those  captains  who  had 
served  under  Proxenos,  and  whom  of  course  he  knew  in- 
timately ;  and,  taking  as  bright  a  view  of  their  position  as 
circumstances  would  permit,  urged  them  to  collect  the 


CH.  V. 


Character  of  Xenophon, 


75 


other  officers.  At  a  council  of  war,  called  in  accordance 
with  this  advice,  Xenophon  again  becomes  the  chief 
speaker,  and,  amongst  other  new  appointments,  he  is 
nominated  general  in  the  place  of  his  hapless  young 
friend  Proxenos.  Finally,  in  an  assembly  of  the  whole 
army,  the  new  generals  were  approved;  and  Xenophon, 
by  a  stirring  harangue,  raised  the  soldiers  from  their  dull 
dejection,  rekindled  hope  and  energy  in  their  despairing 
breasts,  so  that  no  thought  of  submission  was  any  longer 
entertained,  and  all  attempt  at  parley  with  the  enemy  was 
forbidden. 

In  this  rapid  rise  of  Xenophon,  at  sunset  an  unknown 
volunteer,  and  at  dawn  of  day  the  most  influential  gen- 
eral of  10,000  men,  is  seen  firstly  the  power 
of  oratory,  and   secondly  the  value   of  an      Chamcter 

*  .1         ■  J  .  ^^  ,  ,  of  Xeno- 

Athenian  education.  Others  probably  among  phon,  a  true 
them  were  his  equals  in  daring  courage,  in  ^^h*^"'^"- 
readiness  of  action,  in  military  skill ;  but  no  one  possessed 
that  gift  of  persuasive  eloquence  which  here,  and  on  many 
subsequent  occasions,  gave  to  Xenoplion  the  first  place 
among  his  colleagues.  Though  most  of  the  soldiers  were 
Peloponnesians,  and  though  Athens  had  not  yet  lost  her 
unj)opularity,  no  one  but  an  Athenian  was  found  with 
enough  readiness,  spirit,  and  superior  cuhure  to  give 
order  and  coherence  to  this  ill-cemented  host.  Nor  do 
the  genuinely  Athenian  qualities  of  Xenophon  show 
themselves  more  strikingly  in  his  personal  gifts  than  in 
the  means  which  he  employed  to  inspire  unity  into  the 
motley  mass,  and  to  establish  a  rough  public  opinion  and 
a  citizen's  respect  for  self-imposed  law,  as  a  valuable  sup- 
plement to  the  soldier's  mechanical  discipline.  The 
general  assembly  and  the  binding  vote  of  the  majority 
henceforward  become  important  elements  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  army. 

G 


76 


The   Ten    TJioitmncf. 


B.C.  401. 


With  renewed  spirits  the  Greeks  recommenced  their 

marvellous  retreat.     Up  the  lonj^  valley  of  the  Tigris, 

throuj^h  the  strong  mountain  passes  of  the 

Retrcit  Kardouchoi,  over  the  snow-spread  uplands 

from  the  .  '     ,  ' 

Zabatos  to         of  Armenia,  defying  Persian  perfidy  and  bar- 
banan  valour,  fordmg  river  after  river,  and 
facing  the  freezing  blasts  of  the  December  north-wind, 
for  five  months  the  indomitable  band  pressed  on.    At  last, 
led  by  a  friendly  guide,  the  vanguard  gained  the  summit 
of  the  holy  mountain  Theches.     With  a  great  shout  of  joy 
they  welcomed  the  sight  of  the  dark  waters  of  the  Kuxine, 
till  the  cries  swelled  with  the  numbers  who  had  reached 
the  top,  and  Xenophon,  in  his  usual  position,  commanding 
the  rearguard,  thought  that  it  was  the  din  of  battle  that  he 
heard.     As  he  hurried  on,  the  shouts  grew  more  distinct, 
and  then  the  words  '  The  Sea  I  The  Sea  I '  fell 
Sight  of  the       plainly  on  his  ears.     With   sobs  and  tears 
the  soldiers  fell  into  each  other's  arms,  gen- 
erals and  officers  weeping  like  the  rest ;  for  they  felt  that 
they  saw  before  them  a  pledge  that  their  long  toil  would 
be  crowned  with  success.     A  huge  cairn  rose  to  mark  the 
auspicious  spot ;  and  their  guide  was  sent  home  with  rich 
rewards.     A  few  days'  march  brought  them  to  a  Greek 
colony,  Trapezous  (Trebizond) ;  and  being  received  with 
hospitality,  they  rested  for  a  month  in  some  villages  out- 
side the  town.     Solemn  sacrifices  and  games  testified  in 
true  Hellenic  fashion  their  gratitude  and  joy.    Eight  thou- 
sand hoplites  with  light-armed  troops  of  various  kinds 
raised  the  total  of  survivors  to  more  than  10,000;  and  we 
read,  with  astonishment,  that  many  women  accompanied 
the  army  through  all  its  hardships. 

When  they  had  once  again  arrived  at  the  sea-coast, 
and  reached  the  limits  of  Hellenic  civilisation,  the  march- 
worn  soldiers  might  well  have  thought  that  a  prosperous 


L'H.  V.  Endcavourinc!^  to  procure  Ships, 


77 


close  to  all  their  sufferings  could  not  be  far  distant.  Rut 
the  space  which  still  separated  them  from  their  homes 
was  as  great  as  from  Sardeis  to  Kunaxa  ;  and 
they  had  yet  to  learn  that  the  intrigues  of  Jt!lnT\^' 
Spartan  harmosts  could  be  as  dangerous  and  causes. 
as  pertinacious  as  had  been  the  onslaughts  of  barba-ian 
foes.  The  welcome  which  they  received  from  the  Greek 
colonists  on  the  Euxinc  was  not  unmixed  with  suspicion 
and  alarm ;  for,  since  the  Cyreians  owned  no  law  but  their 
own  consciences,  and  knew  no  government  but  that  of 
their  own  elected  generals,  the  inhabitants  could  not  feel 
secure  against  the  possible  actions  of  a  force  so  numerous 
and  so  well-disciplined  that  not  even  Sinope  herself,  the 
queen  of  the  whole  district,  could  stand  against  it.  The 
Spartans  also^  who  had  compromised  themselves  by  sup- 
porting with  their  fleet  the  attempt  of  Cyrus,  wished  after 
the  news  of  his  death  only  to  regain  the  favour  of  the 
Great  King,  and  consequently  refused  all  assistance  to  the 
Cyreians. 

After  a  month's  rest  at  Trapezous,  a  council  was  held 
to  consider  the  means  of  accomplishing  the  rest  of  their 
journey.  First  of  all  a  Thourian  soldier  rose  to  speak. 
'  Comrades,'  said  he,  '  I  have  had  enough  bv  this  time  of 
quick  march  and  doul)lc  quick,  of  shouldering  arms  and 
marching  in  rank,  of  sentry  duty  and  of  hard  fi'ditino-. 
Since  we  have  the  sea  before  us,  I  want  to  have  done 
with  these  fatigues,  to  sail  the  rest  of  the  way, 

J     1  11.1  •     ,        •  Futile  en- 

and,  lying  on  my  back,  to  be  carried  asleep      deavour  to 
to  Hellas,  like  Odysseus.'     The  enthusiastic      from*"'^" 
applause   which   greeted  this   pithy  speech       '^y^-intion. 
shewed  that  the  feeling  of  the  army  was  unanimous;  and 
the  general  of  the  Lakedaimonian  contingent,  declaring 
that  Anaxibios,  the  Spartan  admiral  at  Byzantion,  was 
his  personal  friend,  was  commissioned  to  go  thither  to 


73 


The  Ten   Thousand. 


B.C.  400. 


get  ships  for  their  transport.  During  his  absence  they 
detained  for  their  service  all  merchant  vessels  which 
passed  along  the  coast ;  and  when  at  last,  in  spite  of 
marauding  excursions,  want  of  provisions  compelled 
them  to  leave  Trapezous,  the  women,  children,  invalids, 
and  older  soldiers,  were  put  with  the  baggage  on  board 
the  fleet  which  they  had  collected,  while  the 
March  to  ^cst  of  the  army  were  compelled  to  resume 

Koiyora.  ^^^  labour  of  marching,  of  which  they  were 

so  weary.  Three  days'  march  brought  them  to  Kerasous; 
and,  as  there  was  no  road— a  want  not  yet  supplied— ten 
days  more  were  consumed  in  the  journey  to  Kotyora. 
Here  the  position  of  Xenophon  became  very  difficult  and 
disagreeable.  The  expected  transports  from  Hyzantion  still 
tarried  ;  outrages  committed  by  the  disorganised  soldiery 
were  gaining  them  an  evil  name;  meddlesome  and  ill- 
natured  calumniators  undermined  the  inthience  of  Xeno- 
phon, by  declaring  that  he  wished  to  entrap 
of  Xeno-  the  troops  mto  remammg  on  the  huxinc.  and 

P^°""  founding  there  a  great  colony— a  thoroughly 

sagacious  scheme  which  Xenophon  had  really  entertained, 
but  which  he  neither  would  n(K  could  have  carried  out 
against  the  will  of  the  army.  The  envoys  from  Sinope 
came  with  a  message,  not  of  welcome  but  of  ill-will;  and 
the  poverty  of  the  soldiers  caused  a  continual  increase  of 
discontent  and  a  corresponding  decrease  of  discipline. 
But  from  all  these  difficulties  Xenophon,  by  his  ready 
wit  and  winning  tongue,  and  by  his  frank  appeal  to 
public  opinion  freely  expressed  in  the  general  assembly, 
emerged  not  only  \mhurt,  but  triumphant  in  the  dis- 
comfiture of  his  malicious  enemies,  the  conciliation  of 
the  Sinopean  envoys,  and  the  increase  of  his  own   in- 

tluenre. 

After  this  the  army,  whose  heavy  marching  was  now 


CH.  V.        Repression  of  Mutiny  at  Byzantion, 


79 


really  at  an  end,  proceeded  by  sea  to  Sinope,  and  was 
met  there  by  the  Spartan  general,  who  had  returned  with 
nothing  more  substantial  than  empty  promises  from  the 
selfish  Anaxibios.    Grievously  disappointed,        .  , 

■'  *  *\  Advance  to 

they  were    transported    to    Herakleia,  and      chryso- 
thence  to  Kalpe.     Here  they  remained  for      ^"^  *^' 
some  time  in  comfortable  quarters;  and  after  the  concili- 
atory eloquence  of  Xenophon  had  again  been  called  into 
play,  to  prevent  a  grave  breach  between  the  troops  and 
the  Spartan  authorities,  they  marched  on  to  Chrysopolis 
(Scutari),  on  the   Bosporos.     But  Tharnabazos,  the  Per- 
sian satrap,  was  anxious  that  so  formidable  a  force  should 
not  linger  in  his  province  ;    and  Anaxibios,  induced  by 
the  offer  of  a  splendid  reward,  persuaded  the  army  by 
specious  promises  to  cross  over  to  Byzantion.    No  sooner 
had  they  been  admitted  within  the  town,  than  Anaxibios, 
who  had  neither  the  wish  nor  the  power  to      Dangerous 
keep  his  word,  ordered  them  to  muster  out-      tumult  at 

'  liyzantion, 

side  the  walls.  But  before  all  the  army  had  produced 
passed  the  gates  it  became  known  that  they  treachery  of 
were  to  be  despatched  on  a  long  march  and  Anaxibios, 
to  difficult  service  in  the  Chersonese.  Thus  they  saw 
themselves  deluded  by  promises  of  pay  into  leaving  the 
rich  plundering-grounds  of  Asia,  and  then  deceived  in  all 
their  expectations,  and  expelled  at  once  from  the  first 
European  city  in  which  they  had  set  foot.  Was  this,  they 
asked,  the  welcome  which  their  heroism  deserved,  and  to 
which  they  had  looked  forward  through  all  their  trials  ? 
Stung  to  fury  by  such  treatment,  in  tumultuous  mutiny 
they  rushed  against  the  gates,  which  had  been  hurriedly 
closed  against  them  ;  and  those  of  their  comrades  who 
were  still  inside  hewed  down  the  bars.  In  guilty  terror 
Anaxibios  fled  to  the  citadel ;  and  the  town  and  all  its 
panic-stricken  inhabitants  were  left  at  the  mercy  of  the 


8o 


The   Ten   Thousand. 


B.C.  400. 


Cyreians.  The  soldiers  flocked  round  Xenophon,  and 
cried,  '  Now,  Xenophon,  you  can  make  yourself  a  man. 
You  have  a  city,  ycni  liave  a  fleet,  you  have  money,  you 
have  men  hkc  us.  Now,  if  you  will,  you  can  help  us, 
and  we  can  make  you  great.'  The  danger 
fci'"i'^ecri.y      was  critical,  but  his  presence  of  mind  never 

Xenophon.  ^_^.j^^j    j^j^^^        .  j  j-  ^j^^.^^,    .^^^    ^.^^^^    wisllCS.'    he 

replied.  '  fall  into  rank  as  quickly  as  you  can.'  With 
instinctive  discipline  the  army  formed  itself  on  the  nearest 
open  space,  with  the  hoplites  eight  deep,  and  the  light- 
armed  troops  on  either  flank.  lUit  Xenophon,  in  a 
speech  of  consummate  skill,  bade  them  reflect  for  a 
moment  on  the  consequences  that  would  ensue  if  they 
were  to  punish  the  Lakedaimonians,  and  to  plunder 
Byzantion.  All  (Greece  would  be  against  them.  The 
Athenians  themselves,  great  as  they  were,  could  not 
stand  against  Sparta :  how  then  could  the  Cyreians 
withstand  the  combined  forces  of  Greece,  Tissaphcrnes, 
and  the  Great  King  ?  He  would  himself  rather  be  buried 
ten  thousand  fathoms  beneath  the  earth  than  see  them 
sack  the  first  Greek  city  into  which  they  were  admitted. 
Such  was  the  force  of  his  eloquence  that  the  violence  of 
their  anger  subsided,  and  they  were  content  to  come  to 
terms  with  the  detestable  trickster  Anaxibios. 

But  the  admirable  discipline  and  self-restraint  which 
the  troops  had  shewn,  and  the  extraordinary  readiness 
and  tact  with  which  Xenophon  had  averted  a  frightful 
catastrophe,  failed  to  win  the  slightest  grati- 
freutlliciu'^  tude  from  the  Spartan  authorities,  who  saw 
of  the  ^vith  pleasure  the  Cvreian  army  sink  into  the 

Cyreians  '  ',  ]     <  ^ 

by  the  Utmost  distress   and    poverty,   and    become 

Spartans.  gradually  weaker  from  repeated  dispersions. 

Anaxibios,   on    giving   up   the    command    of    the   fleet, 
specially  enjoined  Aristarchos,  the  new  harmost  of  By- 


CH.  V. 


Treachery  of  the  Persian  Satrap. 


81 


zantion.  to  sell  into  slavery  all  the  Cyreians  who  remained 
invalided  in  the  city,  and  who  had  been  sheltered  by  his 
more  humane  predecessor.  With  callous  brutality  the 
new  governor  executed  these  injunctions.  Nor  did  even 
this  outrage  satiate  his  Spartan  spite.  Anaxibios  had 
been  cruel  and  perfidious  ;  Aristarchos  was  at  least  his 
match  in  both.  He  next  laid  a  trap  to  get  Xenophon 
into  hi:»  power,  by  inviting  him  to  a  conference  ;  but  the 
vile  treachery  of  the  Persian  satrap  had  taught  the 
Cyreian  general  to  avoid  the  clumsy  imitations  of  a 
Spartan  harmost.  and  he  escaped  the  snare. 

Soon  after  this  the  army  entered  the  service  of  a 
Thrakian  prince,  who  promised  them  liberal  pay  for  a 
winter  campaign  against  some  tribes  which  had  revolted 
from  his  rule.     The  expedition  was  success- 

.  1  hey  take 

ful.  but   the   pavment  of   their  wages  was      service 

A 

delayed.     Once  again  the  suspicions  of  the      seuthes, 
soldiers  were  roused  by  insidious  slanders 
against  the  honesty  of  Xenophon  ;  and  once  again  by  an 
address  to  the  assembled  troops  he  reinstated  himself 
completely  in  their  confidence. 

But  when  the  policy  of  Sparta  towards  Persia  changed, 
it  was  seen  that  no  more  powerful  allies  could  be  found 
than  the  Cyreian  army,  now  reduced  in  num- 
ber to  6,000  men.  Accordingly,  underthecom-      f^/sp^arta 
mand  of  Xenophon,  they  crossed  to  Lampsa-      against 

'  "^  Persia. 

kos,  and  marched  thence  to  Pergamos.  At 
Lampsakos  Xenophon  fell  in  with  an  old  acquaintance, 
who  heard  with  amazement  that  he  was  as  poor  as  when 
he  started ;  and  his  friend  being  a  prophet  advised  him 
to  sacrifice  to  Zeus  the  Kindly,  whose  service  Xenophon 
had  neglected  for  that  of  Zeus  the  King.  At  once  his 
fortunes  changed.  A  freebooting  expedition  which  he 
undertook  against  the  castle  of  a  wealthy  Persian   was 


82 


Sparta  :  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      B.C.  403. 


CH.  VI.  Decline  in  Power  of  Lysandros. 


83 


Xenophon's 
success  in 
Asia. 


crowned  with  success.  The  grateful  soldiers  pressed  their 
general  to  choose  the  best  of  the  spoil ;  and  he  returned 
to  Athens,  if  he  went  thither  at  all,  a  famous 
and  a  wealthy  man.  lUit  he  had  never 
really  appreciated  the  debt  which  he  owed 
to  his  native  city  and  to  its  institutions;  he  had  never 
been  conscious  how  entirely  he  was  himself  Atlienian 
„        ,  in  character  and  education,  if  not  Athenian 

He  perhaps 

goes  to  in    sentiment:    and    now,  when    the    name 

Athens,  -    .,  ,  1  1    1        1  • 

of  Sparta  was  more  than  ever  hated  by  his 
countrymen  (could  even  Xenophon  have  loved  it  then  ?), 
and  the  restored  democracy  more  than  ever  popular — 
when  again  they  had  within  a  few  week?*  judicially  mur- 
dered the  man  whom  for  hi^  piety,  justice,  temperance, 
and  wisdom  he  regarded  as  the  most  virtuous  and  happy 
of  all  mankind — lie  may  have  felt  that  Athens 
could  be  no  i\\.  home  for  him,  and  he  returned 
to  Asia  to  take  service  in  the  cause  of  Sparta 


and  returns 
to  Asia. 


against  the  Great  King. 


CHAI'TKR  VI. 

SPARTA  :     HER    ALLIHS   AND   SUBJECTS. 

A  VERY  few  months  had  sufficed  to  convince  the  Hellenic 
world  that  the  era  of  freedom  was  vet  far  off.  Thev  had 
hoped  that  its  commencement  would  date  from  the  day 
Contrast  ^"^  which  the  demolition  of  the  Long  Walls 

between  began  ;  but  a  bitter  experience  proved  that 

grievances  °  '  ' 

under  Athe-       that  day  of  rejoicing  was  only  the  beginning 

nian  and  f        c  t  •    i 

Spartan  of  a  tar  morc  Oppressive  tyranny.     Imperial 

'^"'*^'  Athens   had   doubtless   made  her  authority 

respected  and  her  will  obeyed;  but  her  subordinate  offi- 
cials, her  inspectors,  and  her  ta.\-gatherers,  had  always 


\ 


been  forced  to  keep  their  personal  caprices  within  legal 
bounds ;  and  the  dependent  states  were  sure  that  their  com- 
plaints would  obtain  from  the  Athenian  dikasteries  a  re- 
dress which  was  in  the  main  just,  even  though  sometimes 
tardy.  But  now  the  steady  rule  of  one  supreme  state  had 
been  changed  for  the  capricious  tyranny  of  innumerable 
oppressors.  In  almost  every  town  tliere  was  a  Spartan 
harmost  ready  to  support  the  dekarchs  in  all  their  worst 
deeds  of  revenge  and  rapacity,  while  the  dekarchs  were 
an.xious,  in  their  turn,  to  gratify  the  whims  and  glut  the 
cupidity  of  the  harmost,  to  remove  out  of  his  way  his  per- 
sonal enemies,  and  to  make  it  worth  his  while  to  connive 
at  their  enormities.  Nor  was  the  oppression  confined  to 
those  who  held  official  power.  Xenophon  tells  us,  and 
repeats  the  assertion  elsewhere,  that  in  all  Greek  cities — 
even  in  a  town  so  remote  as  Kalpe  in  Bithynia — the  will 
of  a  single  Spartan  was  law. 

Though  the  designs  of  Lysandros  at  Athens  had  been 
thwarted  by  the  joint  action  of  the  kings  and  the  ephors, 
his  influence  was   still    i)owerful  enough  to 
obtain  for  him  a  fresh  command  in  Asia  and       Lysa^ndms 
the  Hellespont.     Here  for  a  time  he  could      weakened 
forget  the  serious  check  which  his  personal  authority  had 
received  in  continental  Greece,  and  could  enjoy  to  the 
full  the  pleasures  of  absolute  power.     He  strengthened 
the  oligarchical  governments  in  the  cities,  in  defiance  of 
reiterated   complaints   against   their   tyranny.     All   sup- 
pliants thronged  to  him  as  the  sole  fountain  of  honour 
and  the  distributor  of  favours.     All  remon- 
strances against  his  wanton  arroirance  and  un-      ^7  ^^^  '"'T"* 

°  '^  diation  of 

scrupulous  support  of  his  own  creatures  were      his  conduct 
systematically  disregarded  by  the  home  gov- 
ernment.   But  the  end  was  at  hand.    To  attach  the  sailors 
of  the  fleet  more  devotedly  to  his  service,  and  to  secure 


84  Sparta  :  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      B.  C.  4CX). 

to  his  own  uses  a  naval  station  of  prime  importance,  Ly- 
sandros  had  expelled  from  Sestos  not  only  the  Athenians, 
but  the  Sestians  themselves,  and  had  parcelled  out  the 
city  and  its  territory  amon;^  the  subordinate  officers  of  his 
fleet.  But  this  measure  was  so  clearly  desij^ned  to  further 
the  private  ends  of  the  admiral  rather  than  the  national 
interests  of  Sparta  that  the  ephors  annulled  the  deed  of 
Lysandros,  and  restored  the  citizens  to  their  possessions. 
Nor  was  the  great  man  any  Iouj^^t  allowed  to  be  omni- 
potent in  screenin;^^  his  creatures  from  the  consequences 
of  their  misconduct ;  rather  it  may  be  fairly  supposed 
that  the  harmost  of  Samos,  Thorax,  was  singled  out  for 
punishment,  not  so  much  for  any  special  enormities  or 
excessive  rapacitv,  but  on  account  of  his  per- 

by  the  con-  ,,'•,»  i  <•  i 

detmuition  soual  friendship  With  Lysandros.  Some  silver, 
of  ihorax,  ^^^^^  Plutarch,  was  found  in  his  possession.  In 
other  words,  he  had  used  the  opportunities  which  his  posi- 
tion gave  him,  to  acquire  for  himself  money  and  property, 
in  contravention  of  the  old  law  of  Lykourgos,  which  prohi- 
bited a  Spartan  from  holding  private  property  or  accumu- 
lating money  in  any  other  shape  than  the  unwieldy  iron 
bars  which  formed  the  only  legal  coinage  of  Sparta.  Tho- 
rax was  summoned  home  by  the  ephors,  and  put  to  death. 
The  remonstrances  of  the  (ireek  cities  were  now 
seconded  by  the  more  influential  complaints  of  Pharna- 
bazos,  the  Persian  satrap  to  whose  charge  the  district 
of  the  Hellespont  had  been  committed  by  the  (ireat 
King.     The  enemies  of  Lvsandros  at  home 

and  by  his  '^  ' 

recall  in  were  ready  enough  to  urge  upon  the  govern- 

quence  of  mcnt  that  iujudes  inflicted  on  so  faithful  an 

^  bint's'^of  ^'^^b'  ^"^^  so  potent  a  prince  as  Pharnabazos 

rharna-  could   uot   safcly    or   honourably  be   disre- 

garded ;    and   an    order   was    sent  for    his 
recall.     Though   he  could    not   disobey   this   summons, 


CH.  VI. 


Fall  of  the  Dekarchies. 


85 


he  yet  hoped  to  mitigate  its  consequences.     Accordingly, 
having  asked  and  obtained  an  interview  with  Pharnaba- 
zos, he  begged  the  satrap  to  write  another  despatch  to  the 
ephors.  modifving,  or  altogether  withdrawing,  the  com- 
plaints which  he  had  previously  made.  The  Persian  con- 
sented ;  and  wrote  a  second  letter,  which  gave  Lysandros 
full  satisfaction.     But.  according  to  the  Greek  proverb,  he 
played  Kretan  against  Kretan,  and  substituted  another 
letter  which  he  had  written  secredy,  and  in  which  he 
reiterated,  more  strongly  than  before,  the  grounds  of  his 
dissatisfaction.     This  was  sealed  and  given       ^^^^^^^^^ 
to  Lvsandros,  who,  on  his  arrival  at  Sparta,      is  tricked  by 

1  •         11,         r.-.^         Pharna- 

procured  his  own  condemnation  by  handing      ^^^os, 
to  the  ephors,  with  an  air  of  the  fullest  con- 
fidence, a  despatch,  which,  as  he  heard  it  read  aloud, 
proved  to  be  a  bitter  denunciation  of  the  bearer.     Out- 
witted, confused,  humiliated,  Lysandros  left  the  presence 
of  the  ephors.  But  the  rigid  discipline  and  narrow  routine 
of  the  life  of  a  private  citizen  at  Sparta  proved  unutterably 
wearisome  after  the  uncontrolled  licence  to  which  he  had 
recently  grown  accustomed  ;  and,  availing  himself  of  the 
pretext  of  an  ancient  vow,  and  probably  in- 
tending to  win  support  for  ambitious  designs,      spars'"" 
which  were  as  yet  undeveloped,  he  obtained 
leave  to  make  a  pilgrimage  to  the  oracle  of  the  Lib- 
van  Amoun. 

With  the  recall  of  Lysandros,  in  most  cases  the  rule  of 
the  dekarchies  came  to  an  end.     The  complaints  against 
these  governments  had  been  so  serious  that, 
as  soon  as  their  chief  supporter  was  removed      J^^lrchies. 
from  power,  the  ephors  gave  permission  to 
the  subject    cities  to  re-establish  their  ancient  constitu- 
tions.    But   the   harmost  and  the  Spartan  garrison  still 
retained  their  hold  on   their  Akropoleis,  or  citadels,  as 


86 


Sparta:  /ur  Alius  and  Subjects,      B.C.  401. 


a  guarantee  that  Spartan  interests  should  suffer  no  seri 
ous  injury. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  the  continental  allies 
of  Sparta  had  not  much  more  reason  to  be  graiitied  with 
.•  the  results  of  their  triumph  than  the  cities  of 

tlix-ontei.t         the    Egean    Islaiuls   and   the   coasts  of  the 

ol  the  allies. 

Ikllcspont.  Sparta  had  allowed  them  to 
participate  in  all  the  dangers  of  the  war  and  in  the  b.irren 
honours  of  the  victory ;  but  she  had  carefully  monopolised 
the  profits,  and  had  resented,  as  an  insult,  any  claim  to 
share  the  spoil  (p.  30).  The  disaffection  thus  produced 
had  become  so  serious  at  Thebes  and  Corinth,  that  these 
states  had  already  openly  refused  to  send  their  con- 
tingents to  the  Spartan  army  ;  and  it  was  probably 
thought  desirable  that  Sparta  should  at  once  display  her 
real  power,  and  shew,  by  a  salutary  e.xample,  the  natural 
fate  of  recalcitrant  allies. 

Elis  was  the  chosen  victim,  a  state  insignificant  in  ex- 
tent of  territory  or  j)olitical   imj)()rtance,  but  influential 

through  the  whole  of  Hellas,  and  the  I'elo- 
Elis.  ponnese  especially,  because  the  great  shrine 

of  the  01ymj)ian  Zeus  was  situated  in  IHeian 
territory,  and  gave  to  the  Kleians  the  right  to  preside 
over  the  Olympic  festival.  Many  grievances  were  now 
remembered  against  her.  There  was  a  long-standin**- 
quarrel  about  a  border  town.  Lcpreon  :  and  the  Kleians 

had  joined   the    ranks   of    the    enemies    of 

Sparta  at  Mantineia.  They  had  dared  to 
inflict  a  fine  on  their  powerful  neighbours,  to  e.xclude 
them  from  participation  in  the  great  national  festival, 
and  even  to  scourge  a  .Spartan  who  by  entering  under 
false  pretences  had  secured  a  prize  in  the  chariot-race. 
They  had  refused  to  allow  a  Spartan  king  to  offer  prayer 
and  sacrifice  in  the  temple.     And  even  now.  when,  in 


Its  causes. 


CH.  VI. 


Agis  im'adrs  Elis. 


87 


compliance  with  the  demands  or  in  deference  to  the 
known  wishes  of  Sparta,  oligarchical  governments  had 
been  set  up  in  every  (ireek  state,  the  Kleians  on  her  very 
borders  persisted  in  retaining  their  democracy,  and  had 
been  prominent  in  sending  assistance  to,  and  showing 
sympathy  with,  the  Athenian  exiles  in  Peiraieus.  Kor  all 
these  things  the  littb  state  was  to  be  brought  to  iudimient. 
A  herald  was  sent,  requiring  ih.U  she  should  grant 
liberty  to  her  dependent  townsliips,  who  stood  in  the 
same  relation  to  her  as  the  Perioikoi  to  Sparta ;  and,  on 
her  refusal,  King  Agis  invaded  her  northern 
borders.  Scarcely  had  he  1)egun  the  work  i,uades 
of  ravaging  her  fields,  which  were  celebrated       ^'''.'^'  ^^^ 

,  retires. 

for  their  fertility,  when  a  shock  of  earthquake 
warned   the   Spartans  to  evacuate   the  territory  of   the 
sacred   state.     The   Kleians,  conscious   that   they  were 
enjoying  only  a  temporary  reprieve,  employed  the  winter 
in  sending  round  to  ask  help  from  all  the  cities  whom 
they   knew  to  be    ill-disposed  to  the    Spartans.      Their 
embassies  were  all  in  vain  ;  and  the  next  year  saw  Agis 
again  on  the   march,  with  the  full   force  of       .   . 
the    Lakcdaimonian   confederacy.      Thebes       invafles 
and   Corintii  stood  aloof  from  Sparta;   but        • '^  iR""* 
even  Athens,  in  spite  of  her  gratitude  for  recent  assist- 
ance, was  reluctantly  compelled  to  furnish  her  contingent 
to  the  invading  army.     Agis  this  year  selected  the  south- 
ern  frontier  as  the  point  of    attack.     Town  after  town 
revolted  to  him.     He  made  his  way  unopposed,  accord- 
ing to  the  account  of  Xenophon,  to  the  temple  at  Olympia, 
and   did  sacrifice  there;    and,  laying  waste 
the  land  with  fire  and  sword,  j)ushed  on  to      ?e"sLy  ^'^'"" 
the  capital.     The    fruitful    fields   had    been       ravages  the 

'  country. 

carefully  tilled  and  had  long  enjoyed  a  free- 
dom from  the  ravages  of  war  ;  hence  the  booty,  consisting 


88 


Sparta:  her  Allien  and  Subjects.      v,a\  401. 


CH.  VI. 


Schcjnrs  of  Lysandros. 


89 


to  a  great  extent  in  cattle  and  slaves,  was  so  abundant  that 
crowds  of  Arkadians  and  Achaians  flocked  to  join  the 
invading  army,  and  to  share  the  spoil.  In  short,  says 
Xenophon,  the  exj)edition  was  turned  into  a  sort  of 
foraj^ing  party  for  all  the  IVloponncsc.  Tlie  beautiful 
suburbs  of  the  capital  were  then  given  over  to  plunder; 
but,  although  the  town  was  unforlitied.  Agis,  knowing  that 
he  would  meet  with  resolute  resistance,  and  conlidentlv 
expecting  that  intern.d  treachery  would  do  the  work  for 
him,  left  Klis  itself  unassailed.  and  parsed  on  with  his 
army  into  the  neighbourhood  of  Kyllene,  the  chief  sea- 
port of  the  district.  The  presence  of  a  Sp.irtan  army 
had  emboklened  the  oligarchic  party  to  at- 
fill  rising  of  tempt  a  <<'///  ^/ <A//.  l)Ut  though  tliey  suc- 
oligarchs  in        cecdcd  in  massacring  manv  of  the  leading 

the  capital.  .->  ,  o 

democrats,  their  opponents  rallied,  and,  de- 
feating the  oligarchs  in  a  tight,  forced  them  to  leave  the 
city  and  join  the  ranks  of  the  Lakedaimonian  army. 
Disappointed  in  his  hope  of  gaining  possession  of  the  city 
without  a  struggle,  Agis  drew  off  his  main  body,  and  left 
a  force,  including  the  Kleian  exiles,  to  occupy  the  valley 
of  the  Alpheios  and  harass  the  inhabit. mts  by  perpetual 
depredations.  The  precedent  of  Dekeleia  had  taught 
the  Spartans  how  effective  was  the  annoyance  of  such 
a  hostile  occupation.     Wearied  out,  the   Kleians  in  the 

following   summer   sent  to   offer  surrender, 

The  Eleians  ^  ,   ^  ..    »u  1.    u         -i-    »• 

submit  to  were  forced  to  accept  the  most  humiliating 

Sparta  terms,    and    were   deprived    of   every    right 

which  they  valued,  except  the  presidency  of  the  games. 
Even  this  thev  were  allowed  to  retain  onlv  because  the 
other  towns  in  the  neighbourhood,  such  as  i'isa,  were  too 
rustic  to  support  the  office  with  becoming  dignity. 

After  having  thus  chastised  the  presumptuous  audacity 
of  Elis,  and  shewn  the  rest  of  the  allies  what  they  might 


expect  if  they  dared  to  slight  or   oppose  the  sovereign 
state,  Agis  travelled  to  Delphoi  and   there  dedicated  to 
the  god  a  tenth  of  the  spoil.     On  his  return 
journev,  he  had  reached  Heraia,  a  town  on       r>eath  of 

.  Agis. 

the  Alpheios  near  the  frontier  of  Arkadia, 
when  he  fell  ill.     He  was  carried  home  to  Sparta,  but  soon 
died,  far  advanced  in  age.     He  had  enjoyed  the  kingly 
dignity  for  twenty-seven  years,  and  now  was  buried  with 
the  burial  of  a  hero,  not  of  a  man. 

But  scarcely  had  the  days  of  mourning  for  the  late 
king  been  accomplished,  when  a  bitter  contest  arose 
about  the  succession.  Lysandros  had  visited  the  oracle 
in  Libya,  and  had  been  seen  both  at  Delphoi  and  at 
Dodona.  Probably  at  all  these  places  he  had  hoped  and 
tried  to  win  over  the  officials  of  the  sanctuary,  and  to 
obtain  responses  which  might  helj)  him  to  gain  the  royal 
power  for  himself.  Indeed,  if  the  story,  repeated  by 
Plutarch,  on  the  authority  of  Ephoros,  deserves  credit,  his 
design  was  to  persuade  his  countrymen  to  throw  open  the 
royal  dignity  to  all  the  descendants  of  Herakles,  as  there 
was  little  doubt  in  his  mind  that,  if  this  could 
be  done,  no  Spartan  would  be  held  fitter  than  Lysandros, 
himself  to  wear  the  crown.  With  this  object  ?f, '°'^,^y 
he  engaged  an  eminent  rhetorician  to  com- 
pose an  oration,  to  be  delivered  before  the  people,  in 
which  the  advantages  of  such  a  change  were  detailed. 
But  in  dealing  with  a  nation  so  superstitious  as  the  Spar- 
tans, he  was  well  aware  that  a  line  of  oracle  was  worth  a  page 
of  rhetoric;  and  he  wished  to  prepare  their  minds  for  his 
arguments  by  removing  their  religious  prejudices  against 
innovation  through  the  intervention  of  a  'deusex  machina.' 
In  one  of  the  cities  of  Pontus  there  lived  a  youth,  whose 
mother  declared  that  he  was  born  of  no  mortal  father,  but 
of  the  god  Apollo  himself.  Oracles  were  prepared  at  Del- 


t 


PAtjimi^ai'.JtM'.  ■  .i 


go 


Their 
f.iilure 


Sparta:  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      B.C.  399. 

phoi  declaring  that  it  would  be  better  for  the  Spartans  to 
choose  their  kings  out  of  the  best  citizens  ;  and  these  were 
hidden  awav  by  the  pnc«,ts.  who  gave  out  that  they  had 
discovered  writings  of  untoUl  antiquity,  which  none  might 
read   till   one  came  bor4i  of  Apollo.     When  the  air  of 
Sparta  was  full  of  mysterious  rumours,  industriously  cir- 
culated by  the  friends  of  Lysandros.  the  youth  of  Pontus 
was  to  present  himself  at  Delj.hoi.  be  acknowledged  by 
the  priests  as  a  genuine  son  of  the  god.  and  publicly  pro- 
mulgate  the  oracles  composed  in  favour  of  the  change. 
But  when  the  vacancy  in  the  succession  oc- 
curred.  Lysandros  was   unable  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  it.     Kither  his  plans  were  not  yet 
ripe,  or  the  heart  of  some  accomplice  failed  at  the  critical 
moment.     The  scheme  fell  to  the  ground,  and  remained 
undiscovered  till  after  his  death. 

But,  though  the  position  of  king  was  thus  found  to  be 
bevoml  hisV^^P.  l^ysandros   might   fairly  soothe   him- 
self with  the  thought.  th;vt  the  trade  of  king- 
s^rpporirrhe       maker  was  one  of  equal,  or  even  superior. 
claims  of  di>mitv      He  had  returned  to  his  native  city. 

Agesuaos  to         vtij^n^v/- 

the  throne.  ^^^\  \y^^^  remained  in  comparative  obscurity. 
No  office  had  been  offered  to  him.  1  lis  countrymen  were 
no  longer  anxious  to  evade,  as  once  before,  even  their  own 
express  enactments  to  give  him  a  ccmimand ;  his  partisans 
had  been  disestablished  and  discredited ;  and  his  special 
patron.  Cyrus,  had  fallen  at  Kunaxa.  Still  his  restless 
and  unbounded  ambition  urged  him  to  action  ;  and  his 
splendid  abilities  forbade  him  to  despair.  If  he  could 
place  on  the  twin  throne  of  Sparta  his  ancient  comrade 
and  intimate  friend  Agcsilaos.  he  might  yet  be  king  in  all 
but  name,  and  wield,  directly  or  indirectly,  an  authority 
more  than  regal.  With  this  view  he  at  once  prompted 
Agesilaos.  the  younger  brother  of  the  late  king,  to  put 


CH.  VI, 


Character  of  Agesilaos, 


91 


for^vard  his  claims  to  the  throne  in  opposition  to  those  of 
Leotychides.  the  son.     Agesilaos  was  now  of  mature  age, 
probably  about   forty  years  old  ;    and  it    seems   strange 
that   the  man  who  was  to  prove  himself  the  ablest  of 
Spartan    kings  should,  up  to   this  time,  in    spite  of  the 
advantage  of  royal  lineage,  have  done  no  notable  deed 
nor   held    any  distinguished    office  in   the  stirring  times 
through  which  he  had  lived.     His  character 
is  painted  by  his  companion  and  pane^'-vrist      Character  of 
Xenophon  in  colours  which  are  perhaps  too      '^«•''''^•''• 
bright  for  strict  fidelity  ;  but,  even  when  we  have  made 
allowance  for  the  partiality  of  friendship,  Agesilaos  remains 
one  of  the  most  striking  of  (Jreek  celebrities.     His  youth 
and  manhood  were  spent  in  the  utmost  rigours  of  Spartan 
training,  and  for  all  the  virtues  which  the  Spartan  loved 
he  was  distinguished.    Skilled  in  martial  exercises,  he  had 
learnt  to  obey  and  to  endure.     His  bravery  was  beyond 
suspicion;  his  energy  was  so  unwearied  as  to  carry  him, 
when  fourscore  years  of  age,  across  the  sea  to  Egypt  at 
the  head  of  a  Spartan  army.     His  simplicity  was  destined 
to  shame  by  contrast  the  womanish  luxuries  of  Persian 
grandees:  his  frugality  made  him,  like  Lysandros,  indif- 
ferent to  money-getting.    He  was  covetous  only  of  honour, 
and  always  keen  to  keep  the  first  place  among  his  rivals.' 
Yet  to  them,  as  to  all.  he  was  generous  :  and  his  successes 
were  borne  with  modesty  and  humility.     Hence  he  gained 
a  popularity  which  he  was  not  unwilling  to  increase.    His 
manners  charmed   all  with  whom    he  came  fn  contact. 
His  address  was  respectful  to  his  elders  and  his  official 
superiors,  and  aff  ible  to  all,  while  after  his  elevation  he 
won  the  hearts  of  his  soldiers,  not  merely  by  his  own 
endurance  of  hardship,  but  by  his  considerate  care  for 
their  personal  comforts.     His  firmness  in  friendship  led 
him  sometimes  into  grave  faults;  for,  to  protect  or  gratify 

H 


i 


92 


Sparta:  her  Allies  and  Suhjrits.      B.C.  399. 


CH.  VI. 


Position  of  Kings  at  Sparta. 


93 


a   friend,  he   would   do   actions   which   he  would   have 
scorned  to  do  on  his  own  behalf.     Yet  he  must  also  have 
possessed  great  skill  in  disguising  his  real  character  and 
sentiments,  and  have  schooled  himself  to  the  most  watch- 
ful self-restraint ;  for  Lysandros.  under  whose  eye  he  had 
grown  up,  who  had  trained  him  for  political  life,  and  who 
had  always  lived  with  him  in  the  closest  companionship, 
was  utterly  mistaken  in  him.     He  had  expected  to  find 
Agesilaos  amenable  and  submissive,  and  to  make  him 
the  mouth-piece  of  his  own  wishes ;  he  found  hmi  high- 
spirited  and  ambitious,  endowed  with  a  will  of  his  own, 
and  intolerant  of  a  rival  in  power.     Never  was  there  a 
truer  example  of  the  old  Greek  saying,  '  Rule  will  show 
the  man.'    Yet  his  ambition  was  unlike  that  of  Lysandros 
in  which  self  took  the  first  place.      He  was  a  sincere 
patriot,  and  the  public  interests  were  never  subordinated 
to  private  ends. 

The  title  of  Lcotychides  to  the  vacant  throne  was 
disputed  on  the  ground  that  his  mother  had  been  un- 
faithful to  king  Agis  before  his  birth.  It  was  asserted 
that  the  god  Poseidon  had  driven  Agis  from  his  wife's 
society,  and  that  she  had  allowed  the  charms  of  Alki- 
biades  to  prevail  over  her  conjugal  duties. 

Conflicting  .  /•.•!•  \e  *       *i 

ci.iimsof  The   testimony  of  Agis   himself  as  to   the 

fnTLeoYy-  legitimacy  of  Lcotychides  had  not  been  con- 
chides,  sistcnt.  He  had  at  first  disowned  the  parent- 
a<^e  of  the  child :  but  a  short  time  Ix-fore  his  death,  won 
over,  it  is  said,  by  the  urgent  entreaties  of  Lcotychides, 
he  had  acknowledged  him  to  be  his  son.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances  the  word  of  the  dying  king  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  decide  the  point;  but  the  popularity 
and  tried  virtue  of  Agesilaos  caused  some  hesitation. 
He  was  a  man  forty  years  old,  his  rival  was  a  lad  of 
fifteen ;  and  he  had  the  support  of  Lysandros,  skilled  in 


intrigue,  weighty  in  debate,  and  strong  in  the  prestige  of 
past  exploits  and  in  the  gratitude  which  Sparta  owed  for 
past  services.  But  when  the  arguments  seemed  evenly 
balanced,  and  the  vote  of  the  assembly  wavered,  Dio- 
peithes,  a  man  renowned  for  his  oracular  lore,  and  the 
head  of  the  priestly  party,  brought  forward  an  apt  oracle 
— and  such  oracles  were  never  wanting — which  bade 
Sparta  beware  of  a  lame  reign,  which  would  bring  on  her 
long  and  unexpected  troubles,  and  the  waves  of  deadly 
warfare.  This  seemed  decisive,  for  Agesilaos  was  lame 
of  one  foot ;  but  with  ready  wit  Lysandros  rose  with  a 
cunning  retort.  It  was  no  mere  physical  infirmity  against 
which  the  god  warned  them,  for  that  might  be  caused  by 
accident ;  but  the  kingdom  would  be  halt  and  maimed 
when  a  king  who  was  not  a  true  descendant  of  Herakles 
should  ascend  the  throne.  The  ingenious  reply  secured 
the  election  of  Agesilaos ;  and  many  who  j^^ided  in 
were  then  present  lived  to  see  the  clouds  of      favour  of 

*  Agesilaos. 

adversity  thicken  round  their  country,  doubt- 
less, as  they  thought,  in   fulfilment  of  the  oracle  which 
was  so  blindly  and  i)erversely  set  aside. 

The  first  object  of  Agesilaos  after  his  election  was  to 
add  the  reality  of  power  to  the  empty  dignity  of  his  posi- 
tion.    Whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in       position  of 
very  early  ages,  the  power  of  the  Spartan      kings  at 
kings  had  by  this  time  become  exceedingly 
limited.     As  they  were  traditionally  the  representatives 
of  the  whole  people,  and  appointed  to  see  that  equality 
in  property  and  in  rights  was  maintained,  they  had  no 
sympathy  with  the  ruling  caste,  whose  encroachments 
had  narrowed  the  royal  prerogatives,  till  their  nominal 
greatness  meant  actual  dependence.  Besides  the  right  of 
voting  in  the  Senate,  the  chief  privilege  of  the  kings  was 
that  of  commanding  the  forces  of  the  state  in  war.     But, 


94 


S/>arfii :  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      ii.c.  399. 


I 


CH.  VI. 


Discontent  at  Sparta. 


95 


on  the  one  hand,  the  establishment  of  the  nauarchy  (or 
the  office  of  Lord  High  Achniral)  which  Aristotle  called 
a  second  kingship,  had  wholly  taken  away  from  their 
control  an  increasingly  important  branch  of  warfare  ;  and 
also  since  it  became  the  custoin  for  the  ephors  to  despatc  h 
a  board  of  counsellors  to  advise  the  king  when  absent 
from  Sparta  on  active  service,  their  military  imj)ortancc 
had  been  vastly  diminished.  The  Spartan  kings  were 
now  dignit'ied  and  intluential  state  funi  tionarics,  but 
in  their  real  powers  the  ephors  had  entirely  supplanted 
them ;  and  the  election  of  these  officers  was  controlled 
by  the  Homoioi,  or  peers  of  Sparta,  in  whose  interest 
the  government  was  carried  on.  Accordingly  most  of 
the  Spartan  kings  had  been  on  unfriendly  terms  with 
the  ephors,  and  had  asserted  their  tradition. d  superiority 
by  an  arrogant  and  contemptuous  bearing.  lUit  Agesi- 
laos,   who   had  been    taught   bv   l.\sandro5 

Agesilaos  *^_ 

conciliates         that  the  wisc  man  must  often  stoop  to  con- 

the  ephors.  ,  ,  ,.^^  ^  ,.  ,  , 

quer,  adoptetl  a  dnferent  policy,  lie  was 
studiously  respectful  to  the  ephors,  rose  from  his  seat  at 
their  approach,  conciliated  them  with  presents,  and  was 
scrupulously  observant  of  their  orders  as  well  as  of  the 
laws  of  the  state.  As  simple  in  his  dress  and  diet  after 
his  elevation  as  he  was  before,  he  sacrificed  all  the  exter- 
nals of  rank,  and  was  rewarded  by  acquiring  more  real 
power  than  any  of  his  predecessors. 

But  the  kings  were  bv  no  means  the  onlv  class  in 

Sparta  who  had  long  felt  increasingly  dis<^ontented  with 

their  position.     The  Hypomeir»nes,  or  inferiors,  the  Peri- 

oikoi,  or  rural  tribes,  the   Helots — all   were 

Discontent  .    ,      ,         .  ,  ,  ,  •    ,        , 

of  .nil  the  dissatisfied   with   a   system   bv   which   thev 

lower  strat.i  •    i  .^     ^  ^-  \  11      i  ..         •        .1      • 

of  Spartan         might  at  any  time  be  called  upon  to  give  their 
society.  services  or  even  their  lives  for  the  State,  and 

yet  could  under  no  possible  circumstances  rise  to  an 


equality  with  the  governing  class.  This  class  of  Homoioi, 
or  peers,  had  become  of  late  years  much  smaller  than  it 
had  originally  been  ;  many  families  had  died  out  alto- 
gether, or  had  been  killed  off  in  the  ceaseless  wars  of  the 
last  generation.  Many  more  had  sunk  into  the  class  of 
inferiors  from  inability  to  contribute  their  share  to  the 
Syssitia,  or  public  messes,  to  which  it  was  necessary  for 
every  Spartan  citizen  to  belong.  This  last  cause  had 
been  particularly  active  during  the  last  few  years.  The 
vast  amount  of  money  which  had  been  brought  into 
Sparta  since  the  close  of  the  war  had  occasioned  a 
general  rise  in  prices,  while  private  fortunes  had  become 
more  unequal  froni  the  money-making  spirit  which  had 
infected  many  Spartans  on  foreign  service.  Hence  citi- 
zens, whose  only  crime  was  poverty  or  perhaps  the  old 
Spartan  virtue  of  contem})t  for  wealth,  had  found  them- 
selves disfranchised,  and  condemned  to  be  permanently 
ranked  as  inferiors,  unless  a  turn  of  fortune  or  the  favour  of 
some  wealthy  patron  should  enable  them  to  regain  their 
lost  position.  Again,  the  class  of  inferiors  had  been  re- 
cruited by  numerous  additions  from  below  as  well  as  from 
above.  The  bolder  spirits  among  the  Perioikoi  and  Helots, 
who  had  proved  their  value  to  Sparta  either  by  serving 
under  the  standards  of  a  Brasidas  in  distant  campaigns, 
or  even  by  acting  as  harmosts  in  subject  cities,  were 
rewarded  by  what  was  to  them  enfranchisement,  a  posi- 
tion among  the  *  inferior  '  citizens.  Thus  this  class  grew 
at  once  stronger  and  more  disaffected,  while  the  perma- 
nent discontent  of  the  lower  strata  was  aggravated  by  the 
fact  that  the  diminution  in  the  number  of  Spartan  citizens 
made  their  services  more  valuable  and  even  indispensable. 
This  state  of  things  would  have  been  far  more  toler- 
able but  for  the  feeling  that  the  rigid  conservatism  of 
the  highest  class  was  only  a  monstrous  sham.     Much 


96 


Sparta:  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      B.C.  399. 


that  was  good  and  noble  still  survived  as  a  matter  of 
habit  and  tradition.  A  Spartan  still  knew  how  to  command 
and  how  to  obey.  He  could  despise  physical 
thc^?£!rac-  pain,  and  meet  death  with  composure  ;  in  his 
gmern'ing  cycs  the  -rcv  head  was  a  crown  of  glory, 

ciii^^-  and  the  fear  of  the  gods  the  beginning  of 

wisdom.  But  there  was  much  hypocrisy  in  the  observance 
of  the  letter  of  the  ancient  institutions.      The  opulent 
citizens  who  partook  of  the  black  broth  and  coarse  bread 
at  the  public  mess  supplemented  this  meagre  fare  by 
luxurious  feasts  in  their  own  houses.     Men  like  Lysan- 
dros,  who  were  careful  to  wear  the  long  hair  and  the  sim- 
ple dress  prescribed  by  Lykourgos,  had  no  scruple  in  re- 
nouncing as  far  as  possible  the  Spartan  type  of  character. 
External  circumstances  had  forced  upon  Sparta  changes 
which  their  laws  were  not  only  incapable  of  recognising, 
but   were    intended   directly   to    repel.     They   were   no 
longer,  as  of  old,  a  Dorian  army  of  occupation   in  the 
midst  of  hostile  tribes  in  the  valley  of  the  Kurotas,  but 
had  become  a  nation  influenced  by  complicated  relations 
with  the  whole  of  Hellas  and  even  with  Asia ;  and  Spar- 
tans were  in  constant  communication  not  only  with  all 
the  cities  of  Greece,  but  even  with  that  distant  capital 
which  a  century  before  had  seemed  to  Kleomenes  almost 
unapproachable.     Persian    gold    and    silver  had   found 
their  way   to  Sparta  in  spite  of  the  vehement  protests 
of  old-fashioned   purists.     F'ormerly   the   public   money 
had   been  sent  away  to  Arkadia  or  to  Delphoi,  lest  the 
sight  of  the  forbidden  thing  should  make  the  Spartan  palm 
itch  to  feel  it.     Now  the  passion  f(^r  wealth,  which   had 
alwavs  been  a  weakness  even  among  eminent  Spartans, 
burst  out  more  strongly  from  its  long  repression,  and  cor- 
rupted not  only  Spartan  men,  but — always  a  most  influen- 
tial section  of  Spartan  society — Spartan  women  also. 


1 


1 


/ 


1 


CH.  VI. 


Conspiracy  of  Kinadon. 


97 


Conspiracy 
of  K.inadon. 


Such  being  the  internal  condition  of  Sparta,  it  is  not 
surprising  that,  before  the  first  year  of  the  reign  of  Agesi- 
laos  had  come  to  an  end,  an  alarming  con- 
spiracy should  have  been  betrayed  and  re- 
pressed.  Agesilaos  was  offering  a  public  sac- 
rifice, when  the  soothsayer,  on  inspecting  the  victim,  told 
him  that  the  gods  declared  the  existence  of  a  terrible  con- 
spiracy.    A  second  offering  produced  still  more  alarming 
omens;  and  at  the  third  the  prophet  exclaimed,  'Agesi- 
laos, the  signs  tell  me  that  we  are  in  the  very  midst  of  our 
enemies.'     After   performing    propitiatory  sacrifices,  the 
king  departed;    but  for  five  days  no  further  disclosure 
took  place.     At  length  the  ephors  were  informed  that  a 
conspiracy  existed,  and  that  Kinadon  was  the  arch-con- 
spirator.    This  young  man,  distinguished  for  his  powers 
both  of  body  and  of  mind,  was  one  of  the  class  of  'infe- 
riors.' and  had  been  employed  by  the  ephors  on  secret 
missions.     Thus  he  had  perhaps  obtained  an  insight  into 
the  rapid  and  mysterious  action  of  the  governing  body, 
which  enabled  him  to  defy  all  their  usual  precautions,  and 
elude  the  vigilance  even  of  their  'sbirri,'  or  secret  police. 
In  spite  both  of  the  jealousy  and  disunion  of  the  lower 
classes,  and  also  of  the  want  of  any  common  organ  of 
communication,  or  any  opportunities  of  common  action, 
he   had   succeeded   in   organising   a  conspiracy,  widely 
spread  among  both  the  urban  and  the  rural  population. 
The  evidence  of  the  informer,  as  given  by 
Xenophon,  is  highly  improbable,  since  it  rep-      J-scovery 
resents  Kinadon  as  confident  even  to  infatua- 
tion ;  but  it  adds  one  or  two  graphic  touches  to  the  picture 
of  Spartan  society  which  has  just  been  drawn.     We  are 
taken  to  the  crowded  market-place,  and  are  shewn  forty 
Spartan  citizens  surrounded  by  4,000  of  the  discontented 
classes ;  we  visit  the  estates  in  the  country,  and  find  on 


aaacar.-. 


98 


Sparta  :  her  Allies  and  Subjects.      B.  c.  399. 


V 


CH.  VII.  Causes  of  War  uit/i  Persia, 


99 


and  re- 
pression 


each  one  enemy,  the  master,  while  Kinadon  has  innumer- 
able alhes ;  we  see  the  sullen  faces  which  <;Iow  with  fury  at 
the  mere  mention  of  a  Spartan  citizen,  and  hear  the  fierce 
curse  that  they  would  gladly  eat  the  flesh  of  a  Sj)artan  raw. 
Convinced  of  their  peril  and  of  the  necessity 
for  prompt  action,  the  e[)hors  resolved  to  des- 
patch Kinadon  on  a  secret  mission  of  great 
importance  to  Aulon,  a  town  on  the  frontiers  of  Mcssene 
and  Elis;  for  his  arrest  would  be  effected  more  easily  in 
this  remote  district  than  at  Sparta  itself.  The  guards  who 
were  sent  with  him,  ostensibly  to  assist  him  in  the  execution 
of  his  mission,  received  orders  to  arrest  him  and  extort 
from  him  the  names  of  his  accomplices.  This  was  done; 
and  the  list  of  conspirators  being  sent  to  Sparta,  the  ring- 
leaders were  seized  at  once  before  the  news  of  Kinadon's 
arrest  could  reach  the  town.  When  he  was  brought 
back,  the  ephors  ended  the  examination  of  their  prisoner 
by  asking  his  object  in  forming  the  conspiracy.  *  That  I 
might  be  inferior  to  no  man  in  Lakedaimon,'  was  the 
reply.  After  this  Kinadon  and  his  accomplices  were  fet- 
tered ;  their  hands  and  necks  were  loaded  with  irons ; 
they  were  scourged  and  goaded  while  they  were  dragged 
round  the  streets  of  the  city ;  and  finally  they  were 
executed. 

Thus  the  danger  was  averted,  and  the  mass  of  the  people 
relapsed  into  their  chronic  state  of  sulky  discontent.  The 
ephors,  though  there  was  nothing  new  to  them  in  the  idea 
of  a  rising  of  the  Helots  and  Perioikoi,  must  have  been 
startled  by  the  discovery  of  the  fierce  hatred  felt  by  the 
Hypomeiones  to  the  class  above  them.  The  extent  of  the 
ill-feeling  was  too  great  to  be  adequately  met  by  ordinary 
precautions ;  and  the  best  safety-valve  for  disaffection  at 
home  was  to  be  found  in  active  employment  on  distant 
enterprises. 


CHAPTER  Vn. 

OPERATIONS    IN    ASIA    MINOR. 

As  far  as  completeness  went,  the  triumph  of  Sparta  left 
nothing  to  be  desired  ;  but  from  its  glory  there  was,  at  any 
rate,  one  important  drawback.  It  might  possi-      ^^^  ^^^^^^ 
bly  be  denied  that  the  catastrophe  of  Aigospo-      f^^^^^l^ 
tamoi  was  brought  about  through  the  treachery      by  Persian 
of  the  Athenian  commanders  :  it  could  not  be 
disputed  that  it  was  only  barbarian  aid,  lavishly  granted 
both  in  ships  and  money,  which  had  made  it  possible  for 
Lysandros  to  keep  the  sea  at  the  Hellespont.    And  if  the 
extent  to  which  she  profited  by  Persian  assistance  added 
little  to  her  glory,  the  price  at  which  she  purchased  it  re- 
flected even  less  credit  upon  her.     The  first  treaty  had 
been  so  worded  as  to  surrender  to  the  Great  King  a  large 
portion  of  Europe ;  for  it  declared  him  to  be  entitled  to  all 
the  territories  and  cities  which  he  or  his  ancestors  had 
ever  possessed  ;  and  though  in  a  later  treaty  his  European 
claims  were  renounced,  his  rights  were  confirmed  over 
the  Greek   colonies  in  Asia,  whose  independence   had 
been  protected  for  half  a  century  by  the  Delian  confed- 
eracy under  the  supremacy  of  Athens. 

Twelve  years  had  however  elapsed  since  the  last  treaty 
between    Sparta  and    Persia,   and  the   relative    position 
of  the  two  powers  had  been  entirely  changed.       ^^^^^^^  ^^ 
All  Greece  lay  prostrate  at  the  conqueror's      w'ar  with 

....  -^  11         Persia. 

feet;    and  to  a  Spartan   politician  it  would 

seem  most  improbable  that  the  supremacy  of  his  coun- 


ws^a-.v.-'t. 


lOO 


operations  in  Asia  Minor.  B.C.  399. 


2.  Appeal 
of  Asiatic 
Greeks 
against  Tis- 
saphernes. 


try  should  ever  be    so  seriously  endangered  as  to  re- 
quire further  support  from  the  barbarian.    Accordingly 
Sparta  had  declared  in  favour  of  Cyrus,  and  thus  thrown 
down   the    gauntlet   to    the   reigning    king. 

I.  Spartan  '^  r   i       i  i  j  l 

support  of         Had  Cyrus  been  successful,  she  would  have 
^^^^^'  had  the  strongest  claims  upon  his  gratitude  ; 

while,  if  he  failed,  she  feU  that  she  had  little  to  fear. 
The  hostility  of  Persia  was  formidable  only  when  the 
balance  of  parties  in  Greece  was  evenly  poised.  But 
the  return  of  Tissaphernes  with  augmented  powers  and 
extended  territories  brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  The 
Asiatic  Greeks  had  welcomed  Cyrus  as  their  ruler  in  the 
place  of  the  crafty  and  cruel  Tissaphernes  ; 
they  had  been  treated  by  him  with  marked 
leniency,  and  had  supported  his  cause  with 
enthusiasm.  Now  Tissaphernes  had  returned, 
intending  to  reconquer  the  rebels,  and  gratify  his  resent- 
ment by  due  chastisement.  K\  me  was  already  feeling 
the  force  of  his  hand ;  and  in  terror  the  maritime  cities 
sent  ambassadors  to  the  Spartans  to  beseech  them,  as 
they  were  the  champions  of  Hellas,  to  intervene  on 
behalf  of  the  Hellenes  in  Asia. 

It  is  possible  that  a  few  years  before  the  ephors  might 
have  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  this  request,  and  declared  that 
the  Asiatic  Greeks  had  been  handed  over  to  Persia  by  a 
definite  treaty,  that  they  had  brought  their  punishment 
upon  themselves,  and  must  bear  the  consequences  of 
their  Cyreian  sympathies.  But,  to  use  the  phrase  of  a 
modern  historian,  the  colossus  of  the  Persian 
emp're  had  suddenly  lost  the  nimbus  of 
greatness  by  which  it  had  hitherto  been  sur- 
rounded. It  had  been  proved  incapable  of 
conquering  a  band  of  Greeks,  who  were  without  resources, 
without  generals,  and  without  knowledge  of  the  country  ; 


3.  We.nk 
ness  of 
Persia 
recently 
exposed. 


.":»  -■•  •.-'—-*<-  Jisa 


CH.  VII.  Causes  of  War  with  Persia. 


loi 


and  the  flower  of  the  Persian  army,  in  spite  of  vast  superi- 
ority in  numbers,  had  been  unable  effectively  tc  cope  with 
them.     Spartan  troops  were  surely  superior  to  a  motley 
crew   of  adventurers,  and   could   ensure   victory'  where 
the  Cyreians  had  been  satisfied  with  avoiding  defeat. 
Hence  the  arrival  of  the  Asiatic  envoys  seemed  to  the 
Spartans  a  grand  opportunity  for  entering,       ^  value  to 
with  little  risk  to  themselves,  on  a  patriotic      Spanaofan 
policy,  which   might  raise  their   reputation       "tiiy"'*" 
among  their  wavering  and  half-hearted  allies, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  efface  the  reproach  of  having 
truckled  to  the  barbarian  in  their  hour  of  need. 

The  prayer  of  the  envoys  was  granted.     Thimbron  was 
despatched  to  Asia  with   1,000  Neodamodes,  or  newly- 
enfranchised  Helots,  and  4,000  other  Pelopon-       F^pedition 
nesians.   At  his  request  300  Athenian  cavalry      ^[  J^'""* 
joined  him.    Those  who  were  selected  for  the 
expedition  were  old  adherents  of  the  Thirty  ;  and  the  peo- 
ple, says  Xenophon,  felt  that  they  would  be  well  rid  of 
them  if  they  died  on  foreign   service.     On  his  arrival  in 
Asia,  Thimbron  collected  about  3,000  soldiers  from  the 
Greek  cities,  and  afterwards  strengthened  his  army  by 
the  addition  of  the  Cyreians.     Pergamos  and  some  other 
cities  threw  open  their  gates  to  him  ;  a  few  minor  towns 
were  taken  by  assauU.     Foiled  in  the  siege  of  Larissa,  he 
received  orders  from  the  ephors  to  march  to  Karia ;  but 
proving  himself  everywhere  a  timid  com-      His  inca- 
mander   and    a   lax   disciplinarian,  he   was      P^^^'j^^^^'^^^ 
superseded  by   Dcrkyllidas,   and   when   he 
returned  to  Greece  was  fined  and  banished  on  the  ground 
that  he  had  allowed  his  troops  to  plunder  the  allies  of 

Sparta. 

The  new  commander  was  a  man  of  the  Lysandrian 
type,  so  fertile  in  resources  that  he  had  received  the  nick- 


I02 


Operations  in  Asia  Minor.  B.C.  399. 


name  of  Sisyphos,     Having  acted  as  harmost  at  Abydos, 

he  was  no  stranger  to  the  men  with  whom  he  had  to  deal ; 

and  he  determined  at  once  to  take  advan- 

/ufas'^lttack       ti^i^e  of  the  jealousy  which  existed  between 

on  I'hariui-        ^|^g  ^^^q  satraps.     I'hamabazos  was  a  gen- 
bazos.  '  *; 

erous  friend  and  a  faithful    ally,  while    Tis- 

saphcrnes  was  perfidious,  cruel,  and  cowardly,  and 
was  moreover  the  direct  cause  of  the  war.  Ihit  to  wipe 
out  a  personal  affront,  Derkyllidas,  making  a  truce  with 
Tissapherncs,  turned  his  arms  againi>t  the  former.  Ad- 
vancinij  from  Kphesos  with  8,000  men,  he  attacked  a 
group  of  Aiolian  towns  lying  to  the  north  of  Mount  Ida, 
which  formed  a  subdivision  of  the  satrapy  of  I'harnabazos, 
and  which  were  weakened  by  internal  dissension.  In 
eight  days  he  captured  nine  towns,  of  which  Gcrgis, 
Kebren,  and  Skepsis  were  the  mcjst  important,  and  was 
able  to  compensate  his  troops  for  the  strict  discipline  which 
he  had  maintained  upon  his  march  by  the  cheering  an- 
nouncement that  he  had  secured  money  enough  to  pay 
his  8,000  men  for  a  whole  year.  On  the  approach  of 
winter,  Derkyllidas,  who  was  unwilling  either  to  burden 
his  allies  with  the  maintenance  of  his  army  all  through 
the  winter,  or  to  leave  them  exposed  to  the 

C«inqiiest  of  . 

AioiLin  raids  of  the  Persian  cavalry,  sent  to  Tharna- 

*^'^'*^^'  bazos  to  propose  an  armistice,  to  w  hich  the 

satrap  agreed,  as  he  felt  that  even  his  own  private  resi- 
dence at  Daskylcion  was  insecure  as  long  as  a  hostile 
force  was  occupying  his  Aiolian  cities.  The  Spartan 
commander  at  once  led  his  troops  into  wes- 
Ju!i"rt"rs  in  tcm  Bithynla,  a  proceeding  which  excited  no 
Bithynia.  opposition  on  the  part  of  Pharnabazos;  for 

the  inhabitants,  though  nominally  subject,  were  in  reality 
hostile  to  him.  The  plunder  of  this  country  was  suffi- 
cient to  afford  abundant  supplies  for  his  army  ;  and  the 


tt.A-t-'itMtiilSSk  a■'^^l^^^^^■^.^'1 


CH.  VII. 


DcrkvIIiihis  in  Asia. 


103 


Confidence 
of  the 
ephors  in 
1  Jerky  1- 
lidas. 


winter  passed  without  any  incident  more  important  than  the 
loss  of  nearly  200  men  by  an  attack  of  the  inhabitants  on 
an  isolated  camp,  in  which  the  ( aeeks  were  shot  dow n  by 
javelins,  pent  up,  as  Xenophon  says,  like  sheep  in  a  fold. 
In  the  spring  Derkyllidas  broke  up  his  winter  quarters 
and  marched  to   Lampsakos.      Here  he  found  Arakos 
and  two  other  commissioners,  sent  by  the  ephors  to  pro- 
long his  term  of  office  for  another  year,  and  to  report 
upon  the  condition  of  the  Greek  cities  in  Asia.     Nor  was 
the  extension  of  his  command  the  only  com- 
pliment which  they  were  instructed  to  confer 
upon  him.     They  had  been  specially  ordered 
to  congratulate  the  assembled  army  on  its 
improved  discipline,  and  to  express  a  hope  that  there 
would  be  no  recurrence  in  the  future  of  the  outrages 
which  they  had  felt  obliged  to  censure  in  the  past.    After 
this  message  had  been  delivered,  the  commander  of  the 
Cyreians  stood  forward,  and  assured  the  commissioners 
that  the  characters  of  the  soldiers  had  not  changed ;  the 
only  change  had  been  in  the  generals  who  were  appointed 
to  lead  them.     But  the  cause  of  the  change  must  not  be 
looked  for,  as  the  speaker  implied,  solely  in  the  char- 
acter of  Derkyllidas.     The  Spartan  general  had  been 
extremely  fortunate  in  procuring  at  once  abundance  of 
pay  for  his  army,  and  in  bringing  with  him  Xenophon — 
for  the  speaker  was  probal)ly  none  other — to  resume  his 
position  at  the  head  of  the  Cyreian  troops.     In  fulfilment 
of  the  other  part  of  their  commission,  Arakos  and  his 
companions  set  out  to  inspect  the  state  of  the   Greek 
cities;  and  Derkyllidas  started  them  on  their  road,  with 
the  pleasant  assurance  that  they  would  find  them  in  th 
enjoyment  of  the  peace  and   prosperity  which  he  h;.t 
secured  to  them  by  the  armistices  made  both  with  Phar- 
nabazos  and  Tissapherncs. 


I04 


Operations  in  Asia  Minor.  B.C.  y<)^. 


To   provide   employment   for   his    army,    Dcrkyllidas 
crossed  the  Hellespont,  and  undertook  the  work  of  build- 
ins  a  wall  across  the  Thrakian  Chersonese 
RebuUding        ^^  protect  the  Greek  cities  from  the  incur- 
Thrakian  sions  of  the  barbarian  tribes.     The  breadth 

wall.  .... 

of  the  penmsula  m  its  narrowest   part  is  a 
little  more  than  four  miles ;  and  the  soldiers  were  doubt- 
less able  to  avail  themselves  of  the  remains  of  the  walls 
which  had  been  previously  constructed  by  Miltiades  and 
by  Periklcs.     The  work  was  begun  in  the  spring  and  fin- 
ished before  the  autumn ;  and  eleven  cities,  with  a  vast 
amount  of  arable  land  and  splendid  pasturage,  were  thus 
protected  from  Thrakian  inroads.     On  his  return  to  Asia 
he  found  that  the  general  tranquillity  of  the  Greek  cities 
was  marred  by  a  band  of  Chian  exiles  who 
Reduction  of     ^^(^i  occupied  Atameus.    After  eight  months' 
siege  he  captured  the  town,  garrisoned  it  as 
a  depot  for  his  own  use,  and  returned  to  Kphesos. 

In  spite  of  these  successes,  the  Ionian  Greeks,  fiincy- 
ing  perhaps  that  their  interests  had  been  sacrificed  for 
the  advantage  of  their  northern  compatriots,  were   not 
satisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the  war.     Envoys  were  there- 
fore sent  to  represent  to  the  ephors  that  an  attack  upon 
Karia  would  probably  force  Tissapherncs  to  consent  to 
the  independence  of  the  Greek  cities.     Dcrkyllidas  con- 
sequently received  orders  to  march  across  the  Maiandros 
(Meander),  and  to  co-operate  with  the  admiral  Tharax  in 
an  invasion  of  Karia.     Here  he  unexpectedly 
His  march         found  himself  checked  by  the  united  forces 
of  Pharnabazos  and  Tissaphcrnes,  who  had 
composed  their  private  feud  for  the  sake  of  expelling  the 
public  enemy.   At  once  all  the  contingents  from  the  Greek 
cities  in  Asia  hid  their  arms  in  the  standing  corn,  and  took 
to  their  heels ;  but  in  spite  of  the  urgent  entreaties  of  Phar- 


CH.  VII.      Causes  of  Expedition  of  Ai^esihios.  105 

nabazos,  Tissaphernes,  remembering  the  prowess  of  the 
Cyreian  Greeks,  refused  to  attack,  and  sent  instead  to 
demand  a  conference.  Thus  the  timidity  of  the  satrap 
rescued  Uerkyllidas  from  a  position  of  imminent  peril. 
He  consented  to  the  conference,  without  betraying  the 
slightest  sign  of  alarm  or  uneasiness.  When  the  generals 
met.  the  Spartan  demanded  the  independence  of  the 
Greek  cities;  Tissaphernes  insisted  on  the  ^^^^^^-^^^ 
withdrawal   not  only  of  the   Peloponnesian      i^ssa- 

'  ,  .A  phernes. 

army,  but  of  all  Spartan  harmosts.     An  ar- 
mistice was  agreed  upon,  to  allow  time  to  refer  the  con- 
ditions to  the  decision  of  the  supreme  authorities  at  Sparta 

and  at  Sousa. 

During  the  truce  the  war  assumed  a  very  different  and 
much  more  important  character.     The  atti-      ^^^^^^^^ 
tude  of  the  lower  classes  at  Sparta  towards      expeSitron 
the  government  was  so  alarming,  that  the      of^Agesi- 
ephors  were  anxious  at  once  to  divert  the  at- 
tention of  the  people  from  their  grievances,  and  to  rid 
themselves  of  many  dangerous  subjects.    At      ^    Yi^^^^x- 
the  same  time  they  heard  almost  by  accident      ous^cun-^ 
that  the  sea-ports  of  Phoenicia  were  busied      lower^ 
with  the  preparations  for  a  great  armament, 
to  consist  of  not  less  than  300  ships  of  war.     Nor  were 
these  reports  without  good  foundation.    Pharnabazos  dur- 
ing the  truce  had  repaired  to  Sousa  to  remon- 
strate against  the  incapacity  of  Tissaphernes,      J^^  ^^^^ 
and  to   recommend    especially  that  a  war,      tion  of^a 
which  had  for  its  object  the  control  of  the      J.^^^.^;;"^" 
maritime  cities,  should  be  fought  out  upon 
the  sea.     He  even  suggested  the  admiral's  name;  it  was 
best  that  Greek  should  meet  Greek,  and  Konon  again  com- 
mand a  fleet  against  the  Spartans.    From  the  fatal  beach  of 
Aigospotamoi,  the  Athenian  admiral,  discomfited  but  not 


-"*.■ 


io6 


Operations  in  Asia  Minor.  n.c.  396. 


disgraced,  had  with  eight  ships  fled  for  refuge  to  Euagoras, 
lord  of  Salamis  in  Kypros  (Cyprus),  one  of  the  noblest 
men  and  most  enterprising  princes  of  his  time.  The 
advice  of  Tharnabazos  was  supported  both  by  Kuagoras 
and  Parysatis,  and  Artaxerxes  was  induced  to  grant  the 
satrap  500  talents  for  the  equipment  of  a  fleet,  and  to  ap- 
point Konon  to  the  command.  Amid  the  universal  ex- 
citement caused  at  Sparta  by  the  rumour  of 
3   Ambition       these  preparations,  Agesilaos,  instigated  by 

of  Lysandros  r      i  "  *-. 

and  Lysandros,  came  forward  and  proposed  that 

gesi  aos.  ^^  should  personally  assume  the  command  of 
an  expedition  against  Persia.  1  le  named  at  the  same  time 
the  troops  which  he  should  want.  Thirty  Spartans,  a  num- 
ber as  large  as  could  be  spared  in  the  present  condition  of 
Spartan  politics,  and  some  of  whom  would  hnvebeen  forced 
on  him  in  any  case,  were  required  to  act,  partly  as  a  staff, 
partly  as  a  board  of  control.  Two  thousand  Neodamodes 
were  to  form  the  backbone  of  his  army ;  and 
Expedition  of    ti^^j  ephors  would  take  care  that  they  were 

Agesilaos.  i-  •  i    i  i         i      '       i 

the  boldest  and  most  formidable  whom  they 
could  possibly  select.  These  troops  were  to  be  further 
supported  by  6,000  allies.  There  was  probably  little 
ditTicultv  in  raisini:  a  force  of  this  mai^nitude,  for  many 
would  be  attracted  by  the  hoi)c  of  plunder  in  a  country 
which  was  the  Kl  Dorado  of  Hellenic  imaginations;  but 
to  a  long-sighted  politician,  if  any  such  was  to  be  found 
at  Sparta,  the  refusal  of  the  principal  allies  must  have 
seemed  ominous  indeed.  The  Athenians  professed  them- 
selves too  weak ;  the  Corinthians  were  deterred  by  the 
inundation  of  a  temple;  Thebes  refused  outright. 

The  two  great  Spartans,  at  the  head  of  the  expedition, 
set  out  with  widely  ditlerent  intentions.  Lysandros,  who 
expected  to  control  everything,  hoped  to  re-establish  the 
detested  dekarchies,  and  with  them  his  personal  ascend- 


cn.  VII. 


Agesilaos  in  Asia. 


107 


ency.     Agesilaos  had  grander  notions  of  the  conquest  of 
Persia,  and  the  capture  of  Sousa  itself.     Since  the  era  of 
the  Trojan  war,  no  Spartan   king  had  led  an  army  in 
person  into  Asia  ;  he  must  therefore  recall  the  deeds  of 
Menelaos  and  Agamemnon,  and  do  sacrifice 
at  Aulis  on  his  wav.     In  doing  this  he  out-       His  sacrifice 
raged  either  Boiotian  sentiment  or  local  pre- 
cedent.    In  the  midst  of  the  ceremony  a  troop  of  horse, 
despatched  by  the  Boiotarchs,  rode  up  to  forbid  the  sacri- 
fice, and  even  seized  the  victims  and  flung 
them  from  the  altar.     In  high  dudgeon  the      and  arrival 

,  1"  Asia. 

would-be  King  of  Men  retired  to  his  ship,  and, 

after  touching  at  Geraistos  to  collect  contingents,  sailed 

across  to  Kphesos. 

The  first  act  of  Agesilaos,  after  his  arrival  in  Asia, 
was  to  conclude  a  truce  with  Tissaphernes.  Neither 
leader  felt  himself  strong  enough  for  really      ^ 

i^  ^  J         Truce  with 

vigorous  action  ;  and  both  were  fully  aware  Tissa- 
of  the  utter  hollowness  of  the  compact.  Ly-  ^ 
sandros  was  at  once  surrounded  by  crowds  of  devoted 
partisans,  and  many  more,  hearing  the  good  news  of  his 
coming,  flocked  to  Kphesos,  eagerly  solicitous  that  he 
should  use  his  influence  in  their  behalf,  and  replace  them 
in  the  governments  from  which  they  had  been  expelled. 
Once  before  Lysandros  had  been  sent  out  to  them  in  a 
position  nominally  subordinate,  but  really  supreme ;  and 
it  seemed  natural  to  them  to  treat  their  old       „  , 

Devotion  of 

patron  with  royal  honour,  and  the  unknown      Asiatics  to 

...  ,.  ...  Lysandros, 

Agesilaos  as  an  ordinary  personage.  Nor 
did  Lysandros,  trusting  fully  to  the  submissiveness  of  the 
king,  care  to  conceal  or  tone  down  their  adulation.  But 
to  the  ambitious  Agesilaos  and  the  jealous  peers  all  this 
was  quite  unbearable ;  and  the  king  systematically  refused 
every  request  which  had  the  support  of  Lysandros.    Still 

I 


T^W-" 


1 08 


Operations  in  Asia  Minor.  B.C.  396. 


the  gratitude  of  the  lonians  for  past  favours  was  so  great 
that^'they  shewed  him  the  greatest  attention  even  when 
they  knew  that  his  good  word  was  worse  than 
and  his  useless;  and  Agesihios,  more  angry  than  be- 

hum.ii:aion.       ^^^^   resolvcd  to  humiliate  I.ysandros  thor- 
oughly by  appointing  him  his  meat  carver,  with  the  sar- 
casm, •  Let  the  lonians  come  now  and  pay  court  to  my 
carver.'  Such,  at  least,  is  the  account  of  Tlutarch.  who  is 
here  unsupported  by  Xcnophon  ;  both  authors,  however, 
agree  in  their  version  of  the  ensuing  conversation.  Stung 
by  the  insult,  Lysandros  exclaimed.  'At  any  rate.  Agesi- 
laos.  you  know  well  how  to  degrade  your  friends.'     '  Of 
course  I  do.'  replied  the  king  ;  '  those  at  least  who  try  to 
appear  my  betters;  but  I  should  be  ashamed  if  I  did  not 
know  how  to  reward  my  faithful  servants.'     Lysandros, 
feeling  that  he  had  met  his  match,  requested  that  for  the 
sake  of  appearances  some  command  might  be  given  him. 
in  which  there  might  be  no  collision  between  them,  and 
where  he  could  do  good  work  for  his  country.     He  was 
despatched  to  the   Hellespont,  where  he  won  over  an 
important  ally,  Spithridates.  a  Persian  of  rank  and  wealth, 
and  useful  from  his  intimate  knowledge  of  Pharnabazos 
and  his  territory.     In  this  incident  the  conduct  of  Ly- 
sandros commands  our  sympathy  more  than  that  of  his 
rival.     He  had  the  strongest  claims  on  the  gratitude  of 
the  king.  and.  in  spite  of  studied  and  wholly  unnecessary' 
insult,  he  showed  no  unworthy  or  petty  resentment  in 
the  performance  of  the  duty  assigned  to  him. 

Agesilaos.  now.   at  any  rate,   commander-in-chief  in 
deed  as  well  as  in  name,  thought  that  he  had 
Truce  Vittlc  to  fear  from  the  disunited  satraps;  and 

Tilsu"  ^^         when  Tissaphernes  broke  the  truce  by  de- 
phernes,  niaudiug  that  he  should  quit  Asia  at  once,  he 

gladly  sent  back  the'detiant  answer  that  he  thanked  the 


CH.  VII. 


First  Campaign  of  Agesilaos. 


109 


satrap  for  his  perjury,  for  the  gods  would  consequently 
favour  the  Hellenic  cause.  He  was  well  aware  that 
Tissaphernes,  whose  army  had  been  strongly  reinforced, 
was  expecting  an  attack  on  Karia  ;  and  he  made  elaborate 
preparations  for  a  march  in  that  direction.  Having  thus 
confirmed  the  previous  expectations  of  the  satrap,  he  set 
out  at  once  for  Phrygia.  where  Pharnabazos 

,  ,  .  ,^y  and  plunder 

was  quite  unprepared  to  oppose  hnn.  1  he  of  ilie  saira- 
bootv   which   he   obtained,    almost   without      ^V5, 11*^''*^' 

^  nauazus. 

resistance,  from  the  cities  and  districts  on 
his  line  of  march  was  of  immense  value ;  and  he  had 
penetrated  nearly  as  far  as  Daskyleion  before  his  advance 
was  checked.  Here  a  cavalry  skirmish  took  place,  in 
which  the  superiority  of  the  Persians  was  incontestable ; 
and  Agesilaos  thought  it  prudent  to  retreat  to  Ephesos, 
having  gained  by  his  first  campaign  little  glory,  but 
plentiful  plunder.  Though,  however,  he  lost  no  oppor- 
tunities for  obtaining  money  for  the  expenses  of  the  war, 
and  for  the  gratification  of  his  friends,  his  clemency 
towards  the  conquered  and  his  humanity  to  his  captives 
were  qualities  so  novel  and  so  striking  as  to  win  for  him 
the  admiration  of  his  contemporaries. 

The  winter  at  Kj)hesos  was  spent  in  the  most  energetic 
preparations  for  the  ensuing  campaign  ;  and  Agesilaos 
himself  was  the  very  life  and  soul  of  the  work.  He  added 
to  the  confidence  of  his  men  by  stripping  the  bodies  of 
the  Asiatic  captives  at  the  time  of  their  sale,  that  the 
Greeks  might  contrast  their  white  and  delicate  skin  with 
their  own  hardy  frames,  and  regard  the  con- 

...  .1     •      /•  Military 

test  as  one  m  which  women  were  their  foes.      prepara- 
The  market-place  was  full,  not  as  usual  of       Ephesos 
merchants  and  their  peaceful  wares,  but  of 
horses  and  arms  ;  everywhere  and  always  drills,  athletic 
exercises,  riding-lessons,  occupied  the  troops ;  and  smiths, 


■-~-.  ifa'»m)^ia*!6'Ji 


no 


operations  in  Asia  Minor.  B.C.  396. 


CH.  vii. 


Death  of  Tissaphernes. 


Ill 


curriers,  painters,  carpenters,  drove  a  merry  trade.  Above 
all  Agcsihios  was  an.xious  to  raise  an  efficient  body  of 
cavalry  from  the  wealthier  class  of  the  Asiatic  ( ireeks ;  and 
the  substitutes  whom  their  money  procured  were  better 
soldiers  than  they  would  have  been  themselves.  'He 
made,'  says  Xenophon  enthusiastically,  'the  whole  town 
a  si|;ht  worth  lookinj,^  at.  Where  men  arc  worshipping' 
the  gods,  practising  the  art  of  war,  and  gainin;:^  the  habit 
of  obedience,  there  no  man  can  help  cherishing  the 
highest  hopes.' 

At  the  outset  of  his  second  campaign  Agesilaos  gave 
out  publicly  that  he  would  lead  his  army  straight  into  the 
richest   part   of   the   enemy's    country,   the 
Devastation       neighbourhood    of    Sardcis.       Tissaphernes 
oi  Lydia.  determined  not  to  be  tricked  a  second  time, 

and  was  convinced  that  the  attack  would  be  directed 
a<niinst  Karia.  This  time,  however,  Agesilaos  kept  his 
word.  He  marched  for  three  days  unopj)osed  over  the 
fertile,  and  hitherto  unpillaged.  plains  of 
Pefshm"^  Lydia.      (^n   the  fourth    day,   when  he  was 

c:\vairynear      ^p.^,-  ^\^^.  junction  of  the  rivers  Paktolos  and 

Sardeis.  -'  .  ,  , 

Hermos,  the  Persian  cavalry  appeared,  and 
drove  in  the  Greek  plunderers  with  some  loss.  The 
Gieek  cavalry  advanced  to  their  support,  and  a  skir- 
mish ensued,  which  Agesilaos,  who  had  all  his  forces 
present  on  the  fiekl,  converted  into  a  pitched  battle 
before  the  infantry  of  the  enemy  had  come  up.  Cavalry 
against  cavalry,  the  Persians  had  held  their  (nvn ;  but 
when  the  onset  of  the  Greek  horse  was  supported  by  a 
simultaneous  charge  of  hoplites  and  light-aimed  troops, 
they  broke  and  tied  ;  and  their  camp,  with  plunder  worth 
seventy  talents,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  conquerors. 

Tissaphernes  meanwhile  remained  inactive  at  Sardeis; 
and  though  the  mass  of  his  troops  had  not  been  in  action 


\ 


at  all,  he  made  no  attempt  to  avenge  this  disgraceful  de- 
feat.    This  was  at  any  rate  cowardice  ;  the  Persians  called 
it  treachery.     The  measure  of  the  iniquities 
of  the  crafty,  craven  satrap  was  now  full  •  the       Disgrace 

,         t  ,       ,,  .  ,  .  '  and  death 

implacable  Parysatis  at  last  obtained  ven-  of  Tissa- 
;eance  for  the  fall  of  her  favourite  son  ;  and  p^^'"^^- 
the  weak  king  was  persuaded  to  sacrifice  the  servant  to 
whom  he  owed  his  throne.  Tithraustes  received  orders 
to  procure  the  death  of  Tissaj)hernes  and  to  rule  his 
satrapy  in  his  stead.  The  wretched  victim  was  seized  in 
his  bath  at  Kolossai,  and  at  once  beheaded. 

The  new  satrap  immediately  opened  negotiations  with 
Agesilaos,  and  offered  to  grant  autonomy  to  the  Greek 
cities  on  condition  of  the  payment  of  a  fixed 
tribute  to  the  Great  King.  As  the  Spartan 
replied  that  to  settle  terms  of  peace  lay  not 
with  him,  but  with  the  authorities  at  home, 
an  armistice  for  six  months  was  agreed  upon, 
and  Agesilaos  consented,  in  consideration  of  a  subsidy 
of  thirty  talents,  to  turn  his  arms  against  the  satrapy  of 
Pharnabazos— an  arrangement  which  strikingly  illustrates 
the  want  of  cohesion  among  the  component  parts  of  the 
unwieldy  and  ill-cemented  Persian  empire. 

When  the  Spartan  king  had  arrived  at  Kyme  on  his 
northward  march,  he  received  a  despatch  from  the 
ephors,  authorising  him  to  undertake  the  management  of 
naval  affairs,  and  to  appoint  whom  he  would 
to  the  office  of  admiral.  Inspirited  by  this 
unprecedented  mark  of  confidence,  he  at 
once  raised  a  tleet  of  120  ships  from  the  cities 
of  the  islands  and  the  sea-coast,  partly  from 
the  public  revenues,  partly  from  the  liberality  of  private 
citizens.  The  admiral  selected  for  the  command  was 
Peisandros,    the    king's    brother-in-law,   a   young   man 


Truce  be- 
tween his 
successor 
'lithraustes 
and  Agesi- 
hios. 


Agesilaos 
raises  a  fleet 
and  ap- 
points Pei- 
sandros 
admiral. 


iAif»ri.Aaiig*i! 


iwatfi 


«!Mtfc!tMffi 


112 


Operations  ui  Asia  Minor 


B.C.  395. 


of  good  abilities,  hut  deficient  in  naval  exi)eiicnce.  This 
being  done,  Agesilaos  pushed  on  to  Phrygia,  but  had 
scarcely  begun  the  devastation  of  the  country,  when  he 
was  persuaded  by  Spithridates  to  digress  into  the  distant 
province  of  Taphlagonia,  where  he  found  a  valuable  ally 
for  himself  in  the  I'aphlagonian  prince  and 

March  of  ,  1     r  •     •  1     •  1 

AKcsiluos  an  advantageous  m.itch  for  Spithndates  in 

Lonia  and'"''      ^^^^  daughter.     On  his  return   into   l»hrygia, 
Phrygia.  Agesilaos  made   his  winter  quarters   in   the 

neighbourhood  of  Daskyleion,  and,  selecting  the  satrap's 
palace  for  his  own  residence,  amused  himself  with  hunt- 
ing in  the  well-stocked  park  and  preserves,  while  their 
owner  was  wandering,  a  homeless  fugitive,  from  place 
to  place.  The  soldiers,  well  provisioned  and  unmolested, 
grew  daily  more  careless,  till  Pharnabazos.  watching 
his  opportunity,  dashed  among  them  with  two  scythed 
chariots  and  a  body  of  cavalry,  and  left  a  hundred  dead 
upon   the    field.      To   avenge    this   exploit, 

Camp  of  •  1  I  I         1  1    ■ 

Phariia-  Herippidas,  formerly  harmost  at  Herakleia, 

a  man  fond  of  a  brilliant  achievement,  and 
one  of  the  most  influential  of  the  thirty  staff-officers,  act- 
ing on  the  information  of  Spithridates.  surj^rised  the  camp 
of  Pharnabazos,  killed  many  of  the  enemy,  and  captured 
a  large  amount  of  plate  and  other  plunder.  Put  a  quarrel 
about  the  booty  cost  the  (ireeks  the  valuable  alliance  of 
Spithridates  and  the  Paphlagonians,  much  to  the  chagrin 
of  the  Spartan  king. 

Soon  afterwards,  a  citizen  of  Kyzikos,  an  old  friend  of 
Pharnabazos,  and  a  recent  guest  of  Agesi- 

Interview  ,  ,  ,         1  •  •         1  i. 

between  laos,  brought  about  an  mterview  between  the 

ami  Pharna-      two  leaders.     The  satrap  coming  in  splendid 
***^°*-  raiment  to  the   place  of  meeting  found  the 

king  in  simple  attire,  seated  on  the  ground.      Shamed 
by  the  contrast,  he  discarded  the  luxurious  carpets  spread 


CH.  VII. 


Infrr7'ic7V  tvith  Phaniabazos. 


113 


for  his  comfort ;  and  sitting  down  by  Agesilaos,  in  virtue  of 
his  age  began  the  conference.     The  conversation  ^hich 
followed,  as  reported  by  Xenophon,  does  not  bear  the  im- 
press of  probability,  and  is  possibly  somewhat  garbled  to 
allow  Agesilaos  to  hold  his  own  in  the  argument.     Phar- 
nabazos, after  recapitulating  his  faithful  services  to  the 
Spartan  cause,  upbraided  Agesilaos  with  having  made 
him  a  houseless  and  even  a  dinnerless  vagabond,  saying 
that  he  could  not  reconcile  Spartan  ideas  of  gratitude  with 
his  own  notions  of  what  was  right  before  gods  and  men. 
Though,  however,  he  contrasted  his  own  fidelity  with  the 
duplicity  of  Tissaphernes,  he  omitted  to  point  the  contrast 
further  by  asking  why  the  Spartans  had  systematically 
spared  the  territory  of  the  latter  and  directed  their  ani- 
mosity especially  against  himself.    While  the  thirty  coun- 
sellors sat  dumb  with  shame,  Agesilaos  replied  that,  how- 
ever great  his  respect  for  Pharnabazos  personally  might 
be,  yet  inasmuch  as  he  was  by  his  official  capacity  a  ser- 
vant of  the  Great  King,  he  was  his  enemy,  and  he  had 
treated  him  as  such  ;  now  let  him  revolt  from  his  master, 
make  an  alliance  with  Sparta,  and  secure  at  once  wealth, 
independence,  and  happiness.     This  Pharnabazos  prom- 
ised to  do,  if  his  master  should  attempt  to  subordinate  him 
to   any   other   satrap;    and,  on   hearing   this,  Agesilaos 
promised  in  his  turn  to  evacuate  his  territory,  and,  as  far 
as  possible,  avoid  molesting  it  for  the  future.     With  this 
the  conference  broke  up,  Agesilaos  cementing  his  alliance 
with  the  father  by  an  interchange  of  presents  and  prom- 
ises of  friendship  with  the  son. 

The  Spartan  army  withdrew  at  once  into  Mysia,  where 
it  received  numerous  reinforcements ;  for  the      ^^^^.j^^^ 
Spartan  king  was  now  contemplating  imme-      retires  into 
diate   operations   upon   the   grandest  scale.      ^^^'^' 
These   desi^^ns,   however,  were  doomed   to  remain  un- 


■  .  -.^  *t.  \.\  iiii:L,jdb!Sl% 


■  *•*»■  •   »»■'■**>*  «WSE^SP^l^>?q^55^ 


114 


operations  in  Asia  Minor. 


B.C.  395. 


CH.  VII. 


Revolt  of  Rhodes. 


115 


accomplished.  A  message  was  brought  from  the  ephors, 
ordering  Agesilaos  instantly  to  return  to  (ireece,  as  his 
country  was  in  jeopardy.  Intense  was  the  disappoint- 
ment of  the  king  at  receiving  this  command ;  and  deep 
the  sorrow  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks  when  he  communicated 
it  to  them,  adding  the  promise  that  he  would  not  forget 
them,  but  would  return  as  soon  as  circum- 

and  is  re-  111  i.        i  •  1  i- 

called  by  Stances  should  permit.     Hut  his  soldiers  were 

the  ephors.  j^^j^  ^^  |^,,^^.^  ^j^^  ^-^^y^  ^^j  ^j^^^  ^^  ^^j.^   ^^^^  ^^^ 

little  inclination  to  face  the  resolute  onset  of  a  (ireek  pha- 
lanx after  experiencing  the  weak  resistance  of  Persian 
foes.  Four  thousand  men  were  left  to  garrison  the  Asiatic 
cities  ;  and  as  their  reluctance  was  lessened  and  their  ar- 
dour stimulated  by  the  promise  of  a  large  number  of  valu- 
able prizes,  a  strong  body  of  his  most  efficient  troops,  in- 
cluding many  Cyreians  under  the  command  of  Xenophon, 
were  induced  to  set  out  for  Europe.  These  prizes  were 
distributed  at  Sestos  when  the  troops  were  safe  on  the 
European  side  of  the  Hellespont;  after  which  Agesilaos 
continued  his  homeward  march. 

Though  the  alarming  rumours  which  had  so  deeply 
agitated  the  Spartan  government  had  been  indeed  well- 
Fleet  of  Ko-  founded,  the  progress  of  Konon  was,  at  first, 
non  blockaded    extremely  slow.    At  length  fortv  triremes  were 

at  Kaunos.  1       •  1      ,  1         .'   ,         ■  ,      . 

got  ready,  and  with  these  the  Athenian  admi- 
ral at  once  put  to  sea.  Advancing  cautiously  along  the 
southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  he  fell  in  with  Pharax,  the 
Lakedaimonian  admiral,  wiih  a  fleet  of  120  ships,  and 
was  compelled  to  seek  refuge  in  the  harbour  of  Kaunos. 
Here  he  remained  shut  in  for  many  months,  and,  after 
patient  waiting,  received  a  reinforcement  of  forty  ships; 
whereupon  Pharax  broke  up  the  blockade  and  retired  to 
Rhodes.  Rut  the  Rhodian  democrats,  emboldened  by 
the  near  neighbourhood  of    Konon,  eagerlv  seized  the 


first  opportunity  for  revolt,  overthrew  their  detested  oli- 
garchy, and  drove  Pharax  from  their  harbour.     In  point 
of  positive  loss,  their  successful  revolution 
was  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Spartan  cause  ;  for      ^hodes^^ 
Konon    immediately    made   the    island   his 
chief  station,  and  was  enabled  to  capture  an  Egyptian 
fleet,  which  sailed  unsuspectingly  into  the  harbour,  laden 
with  a  valuable  cargo   of  corn   and   marine  stores   for 
Spartan  use.     But,  as  a  sign  of  the  times,  it  was  still 
more  serious.     The  actual  presence  of  a  Spartan  force 
had  always  been  found  necessary  to  ensure  the  success 
of  an  oligarchical  revolution ;  but  it  was  now  proved  that 
the  mere  vicinitv  of  an  Athenian  fleet  was  sufficient  to 
cause  the  overthrow  of  an  oligarchical  government,  and 
the  actual  presence  of  a  Spartan  fleet  wholly  unable  to 
prevent  it.     So  violent  was  the  rage  excited  by  this  news 
at  Sparta,  that,  blindly  venting  their  fury  on  any  hap- 
less Rhodian  who  came  in  their  way,  the 
cj)hors  seized  and  put  to  death  Dorieus,  dis-      of  Uorieus. 
linguished  no  less  for  his  enthusiastic  sup- 
port of   Spartan  interests  than  for  the  splendour  of  his 
victories   in   the   public   games.     When   he   had   fallen 
twelve  years  before  into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians,  his 
captors  had  seen  in  him  the  brilliant  champion  rather 
than  the  inveterate  foe,  and  had  generously  spared  his  life. 
But,  in  spite  of  these  successes,  Konon  had  hard  work 
to    keep   his   fleet   together   at   all.     His   captains   were 
jealous  of  one  another,  as  well  as  of  their      ^ 

J  Konon  s 

Greek  commander ;  the  satraps  were  slow  in      journey  to 
furnishing,  and  the  officers  forward  in  em- 
bezzling, the  seamen's  pay ;  and  for  the  want  of  it  his 
men  were  almost  in  mutiny.     Konon  determined  to  apply 
in  person  to  the  fountain  head.     His  journey  to  the  court 
of   the   Great    King   was   entirely    successful.      Though 


-»**J-*fMLT«Wi»t,'»- 


ii6 


Operations  in  Asia  Minor,  B.C.  394. 


Pharnab;-- 
«os  joint- 
adiiiiral. 


Konon's  refusal  to  prostrate  himself  before  him  prevented 
a  personal  interview,  Artaxerxes  granted  him  everything 
he  asked,  and  especially  his  request  that  Tharnabazos 
miifht  share  with  him  the  command  of  the  tleet.  New 
Jife  and  vigour  was  at  once  infused  into  the  naval  opera- 
tions. A  powerful  tleet  was  collected  ;  the  IMuenician 
ships  were  under  the  orders  of  i'harnal)a/.os,  while  Konon 
commanded  the  (keek  contingent,  which  con- 
sisted partly  of  ships  brought  by  Kuagoras 
in  person,  partly  of  those  furnished  by  Athe- 
nian vuhmieers  and  exiles,  who  had  flocked  in  great 
numbers  to  the  hospitable  refuge  of  the  Kyprian  Salamis. 
Peisandros  had  fixed  his  station  at  Knidos.  at  the 
head  of  the  southern  peninsula  of  the  Keramic  (iulf, 
with  the  tleet  which  had  been  raised  by  Age- 

Pefeat  and  ••      i  i      •   ' 

death  of  silaos.     As  the  enemy  sailed  up,  their  supe- 

a^Knidur        riority  in  numl)ers  appeared  so  overwhelming 
(394  B  c.)  tj^.^   t]^^»   Asiatic  allies  on  the  Spartan   left 

immediately  took  to  flight.  What  this  superiority  was 
is  uncertain.  Diodoros  states  that  the  Spartans  had 
eighty-live  ships,  and  their  opponents  ninety.  Xeno- 
phon  says  that  the  whole  fleet  of  Peisandros  seemed  far 
lc3^  numerous  than  the  (ireek  contingent  under  Konon. 
The  battle  which  ensued  was  short  and  decisive.  The 
Spartan  fleet  was  forced  by  the  onset  of  the  enemy  to 
make  for  the  shore.  Most  of  the  vessels  as  they  grounded 
were  abandoned  by  their  crews,  who  thus  made  good  their 
escape  ;  Peisandros  himself,  scorning  to  desert  his  ship. 
was  slain,  like  a  true  Spartan,  sword  in  hand.  Fifty 
ships  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors,  Aigospotamoi 
was  avenged,  the  naval  power  of  Sparta  was  annihilated 
at  a  single  blow,  and  the  maritime  ascendency,  which 
she  had  enjoyed  for  ten  years,  was  wrested  from  her 
grasp. 


CH.  VIII. 


Unpopularity  of  Sparta. 


117 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Increasing 
di^content 
of  allies, 
and  un- 
popularity 
of  Sparta. 


THE  CORINTHIAN    WAR. 

Even  before  the  departure  of  Agesilaos  for  Asia,  there 
had  not  been  wanting  outward  signs  of  the  deep  discon- 
tent which  was  working  in  the  hearts  of  the 
allies  of  Sparta ;  and  during  the  two  years 
of  his  absence  these  feelings  had  gathered 
strength,  and  at  last  had  burst  ftjrth  into  an 
opposition  so  formidable  that  the  home  gov- 
ernment had  been  reluctantly  compelled  to  recall  their 
victorious  king  in  the  very  midst  of  his  career  of  con- 
quest. Very  soon  after  her  hour  of  triumph  the  clouds 
of  envy  and  hatred  had  begun  to  gather  round  Sparta 
more  darkly  even  and  far  more  rapidly  than  they  had 
gathered  round  imperial  Athens.  From  the  first,  Corinth 
and  Thebes  had  refused  to  ol3ey  her  summons,  a  sum- 
mons now  thrice  repeated  only  to  be  thrice  defied ;  and 
the  chastisement  of  Elis,  far  from  fixing  the  yoke  of  the 
sovereign  city  more  securely,  had  only  served  to  exhibit 
Sparta  in  the  unpopular  and  somewhat  despicable  char- 
acter of  a  big  bully  who  thrashes  smaller  offenders  un- 
mercifully, but  is  afraid  to  provoke  a  struggle  with  more 
capable  antagonists.  Nor  had  her  recent  parade  of  pa- 
triotism gained  her  either  popularity  or  prestige.  The  shame 
of  the  disgraceful  treaties  could  not  so  easily  be  blotted  out ; 
and,  since  the  exploits  of  the  Ten  Thousand,  Greeks  were 
not  disposed  to  accept  the  outwitting  of  a  satrap  or  the 
ravaging  of  a  province  as  a  great  military  achievement. 


ii8 


The  CorintJiian    War. 


B.C.  395. 


From  Asia  came  the  spark  which  was  to  fire  the  train. 
Tithraustcs,  after  spendini,^  thirty  talents  to  rid  his  own 
satrapy  of  Agcsilaos  temporarily,  thouj;ht  th.it  tifiy  tal- 
ents would  be  well  employed  if  by  their  means  he  could 
rid  the  whole  country  of  him  permanently.  This  sum 
,,..  ,  was  accordinjjlv  entrusted  to  Timokratcs,  a 

sends  Rliodian,  who  was  anxious  to  secure  to  his 

money  to  •   1         1      »        11  1  •    .      •      .       . 

the  Greek  own  island  the  liberty  which  it  had  so  re- 

states, cently  regained,  and  was   vehemently  hos- 

tile to  the  state  which  had  supported  the  hated  oligarchs. 
The  account  given  by  Xenophon  of  this  transaction  is 
distorted  even  beyond  his  wcmt  by  philo-Lakonian  bias. 
He  insinuates  that  the  money  was  accepted  by  the  lead- 
ing democrats  in  Argos,  Corinth,  and  'I'hebes  as  a  mere 
bribe,  in  return  for  which  they  industriously  circulated 
calumnies  against  Sparta,  and  so  created  a  feeling  of 
hatred  towards  her.  But  the  previous  attitude  of  the 
cities  renders  this  extremely  improbable ;  and  also  the 
negotiations  were  perfectly  open.  There  was  no  attempt 
at  concealment  as  in  a  case  of  personal  corruj>tion ;  the 
names  of  the  citizens  who  received  the  money  were  well 
known  and  are  recorded  by  Xenophon  ;  and  it  was  ac- 
cepted iDy  the  opponents  of  Sparta  not  in  the  way  of  per- 
sonal profit,  but  as  a  subsidy  to  be  spent  on  a  definite 
object,  and  in  furtherance  of  the  policy  to  which  they 
were  themselves  devoted.  It  is  especially  stated  that 
none  of  the  Persian  money  found  its  way  to  Athens. 
Either  it  was  thought  that  her  injuries  were  so  great  that 
her  support  was  certain,  or  perhaps  the  Athenians  felt 
themselves  defenceless,  and  wished  to  avoid  any  prema- 
ture acts  of  hostility. 

Nor  is  it  difficult  to  understand  why  the  Thebans, 
though  ten  years  previously  the  most  bitter  of  the  foes  of 
Athens,  had  now  become  eager  to  take  the  lead  in  a  war 


CH.  VIM. 


The  Boiotian    War. 


119 


with  Sparta.    Their  petition  for  a  share  in  the  spoils  of  the 
war  had  l)ecn  resented  as  an  insult ;  they  had  actively  assist- 
ed the  Athenian  exiles;  their  last  refusal  to 
join  the  Spartan  army  had  not  been  tempered       T*^^.*  l'\'     c 

J  I  '  I  Imstility  of 

by  even  the  flimsiest  excuse;  and  their  last  iiicbcs:  its 
act  had  been  a  public  outrage  on  a  Spar- 
tan king.  War  was  consequently  inevitable ;  it  would  be 
well  not  to  defer  it  till  that  king  returned  in  triumph. 
Again,  the  spread  of  Spartan  jiower  in  the  north  of 
Greece  towards  the  end  of  tlie  Peloponnesian  war  had 
been  very  striking;  and  after  its  close  the  unscrupulous 
rigour  of  Herippidas  had  made  Herakleia  and  its  vicinity 
a  valuable  base  of  Spartan  operations,  and  had  enabled 
them  to  push  their  dominion  as  far  as  Pharsalos  in  Thes- 
saly.  V>\  these  aggressive  movements,  Thebes  felt  that 
her  position  as  the  leading  state  in  northern  Hellas  was 
seriously  compromised. 

A   pretext   for  war  was   soon    found.      The   Thebans 
either  provoked,  or  availed  themselves  of,  a  quarrel  be- 
tween the  Phokians  and  the  Opountian  I.okrians,  about 
a  piece  of  borderland.     The  Thebans  took  the  side  of 
the  latter,  and  invaded  Phokis.     Without  delay  the  Pho- 
kians  applied   for  aid  to  Sparta,   representing  that  the 
invasion  of  their  territory  was  a  wanton  piece  of  aggres- 
sion.    The  Spartans  willingly  promised  assistance,  being, 
as  Xenophon  says,  glad  to  lay  hold  of  an      Outbreak  of 
excuse  for  making  war  on  the  Thebans,  and       I'.niotian 
so  putting  a  stop  to  their  insolence.      Not 
only   were   they   smarting   under   insult   and   eager    for 
revenge,  but  the  influence  of  Lysandros  was  once  again 
supreme  in  their  counsels.    Ever  foremost  in      c;p^rtan 
the  enslavement  of  his  fellow-Hellenes,  he      plan  of 

.        ,  .  ir     1  operations. 

managed  to  obtain  for  himself  the  supreme 

command ;  and  the  plan  of  the  campaign  was  arranged 


I20 


The  Cor  in  t  hi  AH    War. 


B.C.  395- 


at  once.  Making  Heraklci.i  the  base  of  operations,  Ly- 
sandros  was  to  collect  the  Malians  and  other  tril)es  in  that 
neighbourhood  and  to  advance  into  BoiiUia;  while  to 
I'ausanias,  the  ctilleague  of  .Agesilaos  in  the  roy.il  office, 
was  assigned  the  duty  of  mustering  the  l*eloponnesian 
contin<rents.  and  then  meeting  the  nortliern  armv  on  a 
given  day.     Haliartos  was  the  appointed  rende/Aous. 

The  Thebans,  perceiving  how  formidable  was  the  war 
which  the)  had  provoked,  and  fearing  to  be  cru-^hed 
^..   .  between  the  two  advancing  armies,  sent  an 

1  heban  em-  -11 

bassy  to  embassy  to  Athens  to  appeal  tor  help.     The 

orator  began  bv  disclaiming  the  vote  of  their 
envoy  in  the  congress  which  decided  the  fate  of  Athens, 
as  merely  the  i)roposal  of  a  private  individual  (p.  i);  he 
appealed  to  the  gratitude  of  the  democrats,  whom  Thebes 
had  treated  generously,  and  refused  to  attack  ;  he  re- 
minded the  oligarchical  partv  that  thev.  at  anv  rate,  had 
little  cause  to  feel  grateful  to  the  state  which  had  deserted 
them.  Athens  might  again,  he  said,  put  herself  at  the 
head  of  all  the  discontented  subjects  of  Sparta,  and  so 
regain  her  pre-eminence  in  Hellas;  all  the  allies  were 
alienated  by  the  twofold  oppression  of  Lysandrian  dekar- 
chies  and  Helot  harmosts.  'Nor,'  he  concluded,  'will 
the  dominion  of  Sparta  be  as  difficult  to  overthrow  as 
yours.  We  will  fight  for  you  more  vigorously.  You,  and 
no  one  else,  then  possessed  a  fieet ;  and  the  Spartans  are 
few,  while  we.  her  oppressed  allies,  are  many.  It  will 
be  as  much  to  your  advantage  as  to  ours  to  send  us 
help.*  The  Theban  petition  found  many  seconders; 
oligarchs  and  de^nocrats,  discarding  their  animosities, 
^^    ,  ^  united  to  vote  in  its  favour.     Tlirasvboulos, 

The  Athe-  j       •    • 

nians  pro-  whcn  informing  the  envoys  of  the  decision 

mi-^e  t  p.  ^^  ^^^  assembly,  reminded  them  of  the  de- 
fenceless state  of  his  city,  and  contrasted  the  active  assist- 


Ch.  VIII. 


Death  of  Lysandros. 


121 


Lysandros 

before 

Haliartos, 

and  dis- 
ersion  of 
is  army. 


I 


ance  now  afforded  by  Athens  with  the  merely  passive 
abstention  of  the  TheiDans ;  thus  hinting  that  the  readi- 
ness of  his  countrymen  to  send  the  required  forces  was 
not  due  to  their  incapacity  to  see  through  the  sophistries 

of  Theban  oratory. 

Meanwhile  Lysandros  had  performed  his  part  of  the 
plan  of  operations  with  characteristic  energy.     He  not 
only  raised  his  army  without  loss  of  time  ;  but  knowing 
that  Orchomenos,  on  account  of  her  present      ^^.^th  of 
imjwrtance    and    legendary    pre-eminence, 
chafed  at  the  yoke  of   Thebes,  he   induced 
this,  the  second  city  in  the  Boiotian  confed- 
eracy, to  revolt  and  send  a  contingent  to  his 
army.  On  his  arrival  at  Haliartos,  in  spite  of  the  absence 
of  Pausanias,  he  at  once  summoned  the  town  to  surren- 
der, probably  trusting  to  the  co-operation  of  his  own  par- 
tisans within  the  walls.     The  town,  however,  had  a  small 
Theban  garrison,  and  the  summons  was  rejected.  Lysan- 
dros ordered  an  instant  assault ;  but  a  strong  force  of 
Thebans  hurried  up  to  the  rescue.     Lysandros  was  prob- 
ably caught,  as  it  were,  between  two  fires ;  and  the  joint 
efforts  of  the  garrison  and  the  relieving  force  routed  the 
attacking  army,  which   fled  to  the  heights  or  spurs  of 
Mount  Helikon   near  the  town.     The  Thebans,  in  their 
turn,  pursuing  too  hotly  up  the  rocky  slopes,  were  driven 
off   with  the   loss  of   200  men.      But  the  Spartan  loss 
was  heavier  still.     Early  in  the  fight  Lysandros  himself 
had  fallen  by  the  hand  of  a  Haliartian  hoplite,  and  his 
army,  in  which  the  personal  influence  of  the  general  had 
been  the  sole  bond  of  union,   melted  away  during  the 
night.     Such  was  the  death  of  the  man  who  for  twelve 
years  had  been  the  foremost  of  the  Greeks.     The  power 
which  his  talents  won  for  Sparta  was  lost  through  the 
unpopularity  which  he  brought  upon  her  ;  his  victories 


122 


The   Corinthian    War. 


B.C.  395. 


asks  for  a 
burial 
truce  ; 
and  evacu 
ates 
Boiotia. 


had  jj^aincd  no  permanent  blessing  for  his  country,  and 
had  conferred  no  lasting  ghjry  on  himself.  If  he  had 
enjoyed  the  smiles  of  fortune,  he  had  also  experienced 
the  bitterness  of  insult  and  of  failure  ;  and.  l.istly,  his 
death  in  a  futile  attempt  uj)on  a  second-rate  Boiotian  town 
brought  no  fame  to  himself,  and  heavy  disaster  upon  his 
countrymen. 

On  the  following  day  Pausanias  marched  up  to  the 
appointed  rendezvous,  to  find  his  colleague  slain,  the 
P.^us.inias  army  dispersed,  and  the  dead  bodies  in  the 
possession  of  the  enemy.  These  it  was  his 
first  duty  to  obtain,  either  by  a  truce  or  by 
fighting  ;  and  Pausanias  in  a  position  of  such 
difficulty  thought  it  expedient  to  shield  him- 
self behind  the  decision  of  a  council  of  war.  A  few  voices 
were  raised  to  urge  a  battle.  The  chance  of  defeat,  it 
was  said,  was  preferable  to  the  certainty  of  disgrace  ;  fin- 
to  ask  a  truce  was  a  confession  of  defeat.  Hut  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  majority  and  (.f  the  king  himself  prevailed 
over  their  valour.  The  plan  of  the  campaign  had  been 
entirely  disarranged ;  the  bodies  lay  close  to  the  walls  in 
a  most  dangerous  position  ;  the  allies  were  half-hearted 
and  reluctant ;  the  Thebans  had  just  received  from  Athens 
a  strong  reinforcement  under  Thra>.yboulos,  and  now 
were  superior,  at  any  rate,  in  cavalry  ;  and  a  defeat  would 
be  disastrous  to  the  whole  dominion  of  Sparta.  These 
considerations  carried  the  day  ;  and  the  Thebans  granted 
the  truce,  appending,  contrary  to  Greek  usage,  a  condi- 
tion that  Pausanias  should  evacuate  Boiotia  without  delay. 
This  stipulation  the  allies  heard  with  undisguised  plea- 
sure ;  and,  after  the  burial  of  the  dead,  I'ausanias  led 
away  his  army,  while  the  Thebans  hung  on  their  line  of 
march,  and  did  not  shrink  from  using  blows  to  force  the 
stragglers  to  keep  to  the  beaten  tracks. 


.LJi^^ 


CH.  VIII. 


Confederacy  against  Sparta. 


123 


On  his  return  to  Sparta,  Pausanias  was  assailed  by 
vehement  accusations.     The  minority  in  the 

He  is  2ic- 

council  of  war  declared  that  he  had  sullied  the  cused  and 
honour  of  Sparta  :  the  friends  of  Lysandros  Sulfhu  life 
asserted  that  he  had  sacrificed  her  greatest  ^^  Tegca. 
citizen.  It  is  uncertain  whether  he  was  behind  the  ap- 
pointed time,  or  whether  Lysandros  had  anticipated  it, 
and  whether,  in  the  fi)rmer  case,  the  reluctance  of  the 
allies  might  not  have  been  sufficient  excuse  for  a  sliiiht 
delay.  But  the  angry  people  were  in  no  mood  to  be  told 
that  the  rash  impatience  of  Lysandros  had  caused  the 
disaster,  or  that  the  decision  of  Pausanias  was  ratified  by 
his  proper  advisers.  His  conduct  in  Attica  eight  years 
befi)re  was  raked  up  against  him  ;  and,  conscious  that  he 
could  not  expect  any  fair  trial,  he  allowed  a  sentence  of 
death  to  be  passed  against  him  in  his  absence,  and  fled 
to  Tegea,  where  he  remained  in  sanctuary  till  his  death  : 
a  signal  proof,  if  proof  were  needed,  that  it  is  not  a 
democracy  alone  which  treats  ill-success  as  a  crime,  and 
permits  justice  to  be  perverted  by  passion. 

The  etTects  of  this  Spartan  reverse  were  at  once  felt. 
The  two  great  states,  Argos  and  Corinth,  formed  a  close 
alliance  with  the  two  belligerents,  Athens  and 
Thebes;  and  the  anti-Spartan   confederacy       T/'I'^onfede. 
was  soon  joined  by  the  Euboians,  the  Akar-      ^^'^^'  •^k^'""* 

■V  T    1  ,  bparta. 

nanians,  Malians,  and  Lokrians,  by  Ambra- 
kia,  Leukas,  and  almost  all  Thessaly,  especially  the  im- 
portant towns  of  Larissa,  Krannon,  Skotoussa,  and  Phar- 
salos.  Corinth  became  the  head-quarters  of  the  confed- 
erates, and  the  contest  which  began  as  a  Boiotian  war  is 
henceforward  known  as  the  Corinthian  war. 

Active  operations  began  with  a  successful  campaign 
in  Thessaly  and  Phokis.  The  Theban  Ismenias,  a  man 
of  wealth  and  ability,  who  had  openly  sympathised  with 

K 


124 


The  Corinthian    War. 


B.C.  394. 


t 


CM.  VIII. 


Battle  of  Corinth. 


125 


Council  of 
war  at 
Corinth. 


Athens  in  her  troubles,  and  had  felt  no  scruple  in  accept- 
ing the  subsidy  of  Tithraustes,  was  in  command  of  the 
Boiotian  forces.  Aided  by  some  disaffected 
cesses  in  the  citizens  vvho  had  been  left  in  Hcrakleia  in 
"*^'''^-  spite  of  the  massacre  made  by  Herippidas, 

he  drove  out  the  Spartans  from  that  town,  the  great 
stronghold  of  their  power  in  the  north,  and  followed  up 
this  success  by  defeating  the  Phokians  and  their  Spartan 
harmost.  After  this,  he  marched  with  his  troops  to  join 
the  general  muster  of  the  allies  at  Corinth.  In  the  council 
which  was  summoned  to  settle  the  plan  of 
the  operations,  there  was  the  usual  disagree- 
ment of  states  unaccustomed  to  united  action. 
The  interests  of  Thebes  and  Athens  demanded  onlv  that 
the  three  passes  of  the  isthmus  should  be  strongly  guarded 
and  the  Spartans  blockaded  within  the  Teloponnese. 
Hut  this  would  not  satisfy  Argos  and  Corinth,  who  would 
be  thus  exposed  to  the  ravages  of  the  Spartan  army  ; 
and  the  voice  of  Argos  could  not  be  disregarded,  as  she 
contributed  the  largest  contingent  to  the  allied  force. 
Timolaos,  the  Corinthian,  expressed  the  policy  of  his  own 
city  in  the  most  telling  terms:  'The  Lakedaimonian 
power,'  said  he,  '  is  like  a  river,  insignificant  at  its  source, 
but  gathering  strength  as  it  flows  along.  Let  us  attack 
them,  as  men  take  a  nest  of  wasps :  if  they  wait  till  the 
wasps  fly  out,  the  task  is  both  difficult  and  dangerous  ; 
but  it  is  easy  enough  if  they  smother  the  wasps  in  their 
nest.'  The  boldness  of  this  language  prevailed,  and  the 
council  resolved  to  march  upon  Sparta  itself. 

The  determination  of  the  allies  was  wise, 
March  of  \^^^  -^  ^.^^^  unfortunatelv.  too  late.  The  wasps 

the  Spartans  '  » 

un.lcr  Aris-        were  alrcadv  out  of  their  nest ;  the  river  was 

todemos.  •      /■   n    -i  '    hm    1       i  1      • 

m  full  tlow.     \\  hilethev  were  losmtr  time  in 
debating   about   the   depth   of    their    phalanx    and  the 


order  of  command,  the  Spartans  had  raised  a  powerful 
army  under  Aristodemos,  the  guardian  of  Agesipolis,  the 
young  son  of  the  condemned  Pausanias,  and  had  pushed 
on  to  Sikyon  before  the  allies  had  proceeded  farther  than 
Nemea.     As  they  advanced  upon   Corinth,  their  oppo- 
nents fell  back,  inflicting  some  damage  upon  them  by 
means  of  their  light  troojis,  in  which  branch  the  Spartan's 
were  inferior.     The  two  armies  encamped  about  a  mile 
apart ;  the  allies  were  numerically  superior,  but  their  dis- 
united  generalship  compensated   for  the  lukewarmness 
of  the  Lakedaimonian  allies.     The  Thebans  began  the 
battle  by  a  furious  attack  on  the  Achaians. 
But  they  gave  way  to  the  usual  tendency  of      '••^"'^  of 
Greek  hoplites,  and  bore  off  more  and  more 
towards  the  right,  from  a  natural  WMsh  to  keep  under  the 
cover  of  the  shield  of  their  right-hand  neighbour,  and  to 
avoid  exposing  their  right  or  unprotected  side.     To  pre- 
vent the  line  of  battle  from  being  entirely  severed,  the 
Athenians  were  obliged  to  follow  their  movement,  and  thus 
gave  the  Spartans  an  opj)ortunity  of  turning  their  right 
flank.     The  Lakedaimonian  allies  were  beaten  along  the 
whole  line,  and  the  victors  broke  their  ranks  and  puri^ued 
the  fugitives:  but  the  Spartans  out-flanked 
and  overi)owered  the  Athenians,  and  defeated       ^'>^^^^\  of 

»i  -..L  1  I  r.,,  .  .  'he  allies. 

them  with  great  slaughter.  1  hen,  waiting  for 
each  of  the  allies  as  they  returned  disordered  from  the 
pursuit,  they  fell  on  their  right  flank,  and  so  defeated  them 
in  detail.  Some  of  the  fugitives  found  a  refuge  within  the 
walls  of  Corinth,  though  the  gates,  at  least  for  a  time,  were 
closed  against  them  by  the  Lakonian  party  in  the  town  ; 
the  majority  retiu-ned  to  the  strong  camp  which  they  had 
occupied  in  the  morning.  The  loss  of  the  anti-Spartan 
confederates  was  severe,  yet  the  results  of  the  battle  were 
not  very  decisive.     The  supremacy  of  Sparta  in  the  Frio- 


i- w'Miafojsa-ii^st'agji... .. « 


.■~  H^liAx^^:  ---■:■ 


126 


The  Corinthian    War. 


B.C.  394. 


in  Thes>;ily, 


ponnese  was  secure,  l)ut  the  temper  of  her  allies  was 
proved  to  be  untrustworthy.  The  confederates  still  occu- 
pied the  passes  of  the  isthmus,  and  Aristodemos  resolved 
to  commence  no  fresh  operations  until  AL;esilaos  should 
return. 

DerkvUidas  was  at  once  des|)atched  to  carrv  the  news 
of  the  victory  to  the  Spartan  kin«^,  and  he  met  the  ad- 
vancing^ army  at  Amphipolis.  lUit  the  heart  of  A^^esilaos 
was  still  in  the  work  which  he  had  so  reluctantly  aban- 
doned, and  hearinL,^  from  Derkyllidas  that  the  slaughter 
of  the  allies  on  both  sides  had  been  very 
a-cmI.ios  at       oR-at,  he  burst  into  louil  lamentations  over  the 

Atni)hif)()lis,         '^ 

deatli  (»f  so  many  ( ireeks,  who,  if  spared  to  so 
noble  a  service,  would  have  sufficed  to  concjuer  all  Asia. 
Sendin'T  on  DerkvUidas  to  tell  the  news  to  the  friends  from 
whom  he  had  recently  parted,  he  forced  his 
way  throuj^h  Thessaly  in  sj)itc  of  its  hostility, 
inflictin;^  as  he  passed  a  defeat  on  the  Thcssalian  squad- 
rons which  hunj;  upon  his  rear — a  success  which  was  spe- 
cially «;ratifyini^,  since  it  showed  that  the  troops  which  he 
had  himself  trained  could  cope  widi  the  most  celebrated 
cavalry  of  Greece.  On  the  lioiotian  border  his  army  was 
auijmented  bv  conlin-ents  from  I'hokis  and  ( )rchomcnos, 
and  especially  by  two  Lakcdaimonian  regiments  (or  niorai) 
and  tifty  Spartan  volunteers  as  a  body-guard. 
At  Chaironeia  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  filled  the 
armv  with  irloomv  forebodings.  The  inter- 
pretation  of  the  omen  was  not  long  delayed,  A  messenger 
came  to  tell  the  king  that  at  Knidos  his  brother-in-l;nv  was 
slain  and  his  tleet  annihilated.  Agesilaos  had  not  suffi- 
cient confidence  in  the  allies  to  tell  them  the  truth,  and 
announcing  that  Peisandros  had  lost  his  life,  but  had  won 
a  naval  victory,  he  hastened  to  fight  a  decisive  battle  be- 
fore the  real  state  of  the  case  could  be  known. 


at  Chairo 
neia. 


CH.  VIII. 


Battle  of  Koroneia. 


127 


Battle  of 
Kuroneia. 


The  Boiotians  and  their  allies— Argives,  Athenians,  Co- 
rinthians, and  others — were  advancing  from  Mount  Heli- 
kon,  and  Agesilaos  from  the  valley  of  the  Ke- 
phissos.  The  two  armies  met  near  Koroneia, 
and  approached  each  other  in  deep  silence. 
When  they  were  about  200  yards  apart,  the  Thebans 
and  their  allies  raised  a  shout  and  rushed  to  the  charge. 
The  brunt  of  the  onset  was  broken  by  an  advance  of  He- 
rippidas  and  the  mercenaries,  including  the  Cyreians 
and  Xenophon  himself,  and  the  battle  became  general. 
The  troops  of  Agesilaos  were  completely  successful,  ex- 
cept on  their  extreme  left,  where  the  Thebans  had  routed 
their  old  enemies,  the  Orchomenians.  The  Argives  had 
turned  their  backs  without  striking  a  blow,  and  the  vic- 
torious Thebans,  seeing  all  their  allies  in  full  flight  to 
Mount  Helikon,  resolved  to  cut  their  way  through  to  join 
them.  Agesilaos,  however,  determined  that  they  should 
expiate  their  insolence  at  Aulis  by  a  bloody  sacrifice,  and 
drew  up  all  his  forces  in  close  order  to  bar  their  progress. 
The  crash  of  the  opposing  masses  was  ter- 
rific ;  the  conflict  which  ensued  was  with- 
out a  parallel  in  all  the  experience  of  the 
veteran  Xenophon.  So  fearful  was  the  com- 
bat, that  the  wonted  battle-cries  were  hushed : 
no  sound  was  heard  but  the  push  of  arms  and  the  shatter- 
ing of  shields.  Agesilaos  himself  fell,  weakened  by  re- 
peated wounds,  and  was  rescued  onlv  bv  the  devotion  of 
his  body-guard.  At  length  the  mass  of  the  Spartan  hop- 
litcs  grew  looser,  and  the  Thebans  triumphantly  forced  a 
passage  through  the  wavering  ranks.  Agesilaos  had  won 
a  real  victory  ;  for  he  was  master  of  the  battle-field,  and 
of  the  bodies  of  the  slain ;  but  the  honours  of  the  day 
remained  with  the  Thebans.  The  ghasdy  spectacle  of 
grappling  corpses  and  broken  weapons  showed  how  reso- 


Tremen- 
dous  strug- 
gle between 
Theban 
and  Spartan 
hoplites. 


ttIgjA>  w'fc.,  --wfj?->:k&j'i 


128 


The  Corinthian    War, 


B.C.  394. 


'ues  to 
iJclphoi, 
uikI  returns 
to  bparta. 


lute  the  strugj^Mc  IkuI  been,  and  A«;esilaos  had  no  wish  to 
provoke  a  second  enc(jiinter.  His  position  in  IJoiotia  w^is 
obviously  unlenal)lc.  The  wounded  king  withdrew  to 
Delphoi,  where  he  dedicated  to  the  god  100  talents,  the 
Aijesiluos  tenth  of  his  Asiatic   spoil,  so  vast  was   the 

^' T  !"  bo(jty  which  he  had  accumulated.    The  pole- 

march  whom  he  left  behind  was  slain  by  the 
Lokrians  ;  but  Agesilaos  proceeded  to  Sparta 
by  sea,  and  disbanded  his  army.  He  was  welcomed 
home  with  an  enthusiasm  which  was  heightened  bv  his 
unaltered  simplicity  of  life  and  his  willing  conformity  to 
the  institutions  of  his  country.  After  two  years  of  un- 
broken success  in  Asia,  he  had  not  been  driven  out  with- 
out the  help  of  10,000  Persian  bowmen,  for  such  was  the 
witticism  suggested  by  the  figure  of  the  archer-king  on  the 
Persian  coins.  He  had  riv.dled  even  Lysandros  in  the 
magnificence  of  his  plunder,  which  had  been  won,  not 
from  Greeks,  but  from  barbarians;  and  in  Thessaly  and 
Boiotia  he  had  proved  that  he  was  able  not  merely  to 
face  the  weak  resistance  of  a  lazy  Oriental,  but  to  hold 
his  own  against  the  best  cavalry  and  hoplites  of  (ireece. 

The  prompt  obedience  of  Agesilaos  to  the  summons 
which  ruined  his  cherished  hopes  of  Asiatic  conquest  is 
extolled  by  Xenophon  and  other  ancient  writers  as  an 
example  of  singular  virtue.  But  even  if  his  career  had 
gone  on  unchecked  by  the  unwelcome  message,  the  de- 
feat of  Peisandros  at  Knldos  would  have  soon  forced  him 
to  abandon  his  more  amliitious  schemes. 
The  effects  of  Konon's  success  were  quickly 
felt.  The  victorious  admirals  sailed  from 
city  to  city  on  the  coast  and  islands  of  the 
Egean,  expelled  the  Spartan  harmosts,  and 
promised  to  leave  the  inhabitants  perfectly  independent, 
and  not  to  fortify  any  citadel  for  themselves  in  the  towns. 


Konon  and 
Pharnahazos 
receive  the 
submission 
of  the  Greek 
cities  in 
Asia. 


W^^^iJ^^^ZZ^ 


CH.  VIII. 


Derkyllidas  at  Abydos. 


129 


Everywhere  these  assurances  were  received  with  joyful 
acclamations,  and  a  warm  welcome  was  given  not  only  to 
the  Athenian  admiral,  but  to  Pharnabazos,  his  Persian  col- 
league. The  latter  had  indeed  been  carefully  schooled  by 
Konon  in  the  policy  which  he  was  to  adopt.  He  had  been 
warned  that  the  (ireek  cities,  if  treated  generously,  would 
be  one  and  all  his  friends,  while,  if  he  showed  any  wish  to 
make  himself  their  master,  each  one  of  them  was  strong 
enough  to  give  him  considerable  trouble,  and  he  would  very 
probably  rouse  a  coalition  of  all  Hellas  against  himself. 
Even  Ephcsos,  so  recently  the  head-quarters  of  the  Spar- 
tan king  and  previously  the  centre  of  Lysandrian  in- 
trigues, changed  with  the  rest.  To  a  city  of  merchants 
that  system  seemed  most  advantageous  which  best  guar- 
anteed the  privileges  of  commercial  intercourse  with  the 
Persian  empire. 

Thus,  without  the  trouble  of  a  single  siege  or  skirmish, 
the  Spartan  power  in  Asia  was  annihilated  and  the  work 
of  Agesilaos  undone.     The  onlv  opposition       ^,    , 

"  '  .  Abydos  and 

was  found  in  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazos  him-      Sestos  hold 
self.  Abydos  had  been  for  years  the  staunch-      Derkyiii- 
est  of  Spartan  allies,  and  her  sins  were  too      ^^^' 
great  to  be  easily  forgiven.     Dreading  the  vengeance  of 
Pharnabazos,  the  inhabitants  determined  to  resist.    They 
welcomed  hospitably  the  fugitive  harmosts,  and  invited 
to  the  shelter  of  their  walls  those  who  had  not  come  un- 
asked. Above  all,  Derkyllidas  was  in  the  town,  declaring 
that  the  defection  of  all  the  other  cities  would  only  make 
their  fidelity  the  more  conspicuous  and  the  gratitude  of 
Sparta  more  hearty,  and  assuring  them  that  Sparta  was 
still  quite  powerful  enough  to  reward  her  friends  and 
chastise  her  foes.     Sestos  was  also  secured  by  the  same 
skilful  and  energetic  diplomatist,  and,  like  Abydos,  it  be- 
came a  refuge  for  the  harmosts  who  were  expelled  from 


i-a'-ik.A'-iL-lr    '■•-.  v.     Va'.J 


I30 


The  Corinthian    VV\ir. 


B.C.  393. 


Europe.  Vainly  did  Pharnabazos  attempt  to  shake  their 
allegiance  by  threats.  Equally  ineffectual  were  the  joint 
efforts  of  both  admirals  to  reduce  the  towns  by  force,  and, 
with  angry  vows  of  vengeance,  the  foiled  satraj)  withdrew, 
urging  Konon  to  reinforce  his  tleet  during  the  winter  from 
the  towns  on  the  Hellespont. 

The  revenge  which  Pharnabazos  promised  himself  was 
the  delight  of  pure  retaliation.  He  longed  to  harry  and 
plunder  in  Lakonian  territorv,  like  Derkvllidas  and  Age- 
silaos  in  his  own  satrapy.  Willi  this  object  Piiarnabazos 
early  in  the  spring  determined  to  make  straight  for  the 
Peloponnese.  But  the  views  of  Konon,  wlio  accompanied 
him,  were  wider  and  higher.  Vox  fourteen  years  he  had 
been  absent  from  his  country,  and  he  resolved  to  mark  his 
Pharn.^-  retum  by  raising  Athens  again  to  a  position 

bazosand  not  wholly  unwDrthv  of  her  old  ijlorv.   From 

Konon  •    1         1  •    1         1  '  ^        ' 

ravage  isUind  to  ishmd,  as  it  hekl  on  its  south-west- 

ofVaTonl-i  crly  course,  the  allied  lleet  passed,  and  every- 
Kythera'"'"      ^vliere  the  work  of  liberation  went  on.     The 

coasts  of  Messenia  and  Lakonia  were  ruth- 
lessly ravaged,  and  the  vengeance  of  Pharnabazos  grati- 
fied. The  island  of  Kythera  was  captured,  and  garrisoned 
by  Athenian  troops.  Sailing  up  to  the  isthmus,  Pharna- 
bazos visited  Corinth  as  the  head-quarters  of  the  anti- 
Spartan  league,  and.  exhorting  the  allies  to  be  vigorous 

in  war  and  faithful  to  the  (ireat  King,  he  left 
ba^zoTr^e-  '^^'^^  ^^^^'"^  '^^  Vvc'^^Q.  a   subsidy  as  he  could 

turns  to  spare.     He  had  now  accomplished  his  ob- 

Asia.  -11 

ject,  and,  havmg  carried  a  Persian  fleet  into 
waters  where  such  a  sight  was  strange  indeed,  he  returned 
to  Asia. 

But  the  purposes  of  Konon  were  as  yet  unfultilled. 
He  had  confided  to  Pharnabazos  his  great  project  of  re- 
building the  Long  Walls  and  the  fortifications  of  the  Pei- 


CH.  VIII, 


Political  Feuds  at  Corinth. 


131 


raieus,  and  had  convinced  him  that  by  furthering  its  exe- 
cution he  would  at  the  same  time  inflict  the  heaviest  pun- 
ishment on  the  Spartans,  and  win  the  most 
lasting  gratitude  from  the  Athenians.      Phar-      j^""""  "■*■ 
nabazos  gave  a  ready  consent ;  and  Konon,       Lon'gNvalls 
with  a  fleet  of  eighty  ships,  dropped  anchor  in       °^  '^'''^"'* 
the  harbour  of  Peiraieus.  The  work  was  begun  without  de- 
lay.  The  crews  of  the  fleet  were  busily  employed,  and  funds 
furnished  by  Pharnabazos  hired  a  whole  army  of  carpen- 
ters and  masons.     The  Athenians  themselves  lent  willing 
assistance,  and  volunteers  from   Boiotia  and  elsewhere 
came  zealously  to  help.     The  Phaleric  Wall  was  not  re- 
stored, having  been  found  unnecessary ;  but  the  rest  of 
the  work  was  finished  by  the  autumn,  and  banquets  and 
sacrifices  celebrated  the  completion  of  Konon's  design 
while  statues  and  inscriptions  recorded  his  patriotism. 

It  was  strange  that  the  wrath  of  Pharnabazos  at  the 
resistance  of  Abydos  should  have  prompted  him  to  satiate 
his  revenge  by  retaliation  on  Lakonia  itself; 
and  stranger  still  that  the  presence  of  the      opemSns 
Persian  fleet  should  have  coincided  with  the      TPr  , 

r  ,  Corinth. 

tew  months  durmg  which  the  allies  were 
able  to  guard  the  lines  of  the  isthmus.  This  is  indeed 
the  most  important  fact  connected  with  the  military  opera- 
tions of  the  year  B.C.  393.  A  Spartan  force  lay  at  Sikyon 
ravaging  the  western  borders  of  Corinth,  and  keeping  up 
a  desultory  war  against  the  allies  in  that  town.  But  the 
Corinthians  had  carried  off  most  of  their  cattle  to  a  safe 
refuge  at  Peiraion.  in  the  extreme  north  of  their  territory, 
and  the  Si)artans  were  not  strong  enough  to  force  their 
way  through  the  lines  to  interrupt  the  great  work  of  res- 
toration which  was  going  on  at  Athens. 

But   Corinth  was  fated  to  suffer  more   from   discord 
within  than  from  war  without.      The  government  was 


>ft»Miiaft»fJiiiiMf:WBB^IS^aitjsietr'  tj 


132 


The  Corinthian    War. 


B.C.  392. 


CH.  VIII. 


Tactics  of  Iphikrates. 


133 


still,  as  it  loriL,^  liad  been,  oligarchic  in  form,  though  by  no 

means  philo-Lakonian  in  sentiment.  Rut  the  faction  which 

f'lvoured  Sparta,  and  which  had  closed  the 

Dissensions  .  »        r      •  • 

in  Corinth.        gatcs  agamst  the  fugitives  two  years  before, 
had  grown  lately  more  numerous  and  more 
discontented.     The  democrats  were  naturally  the  party 
of  war,  being  bitterly  opposed  to  Sparta  ;  the  ranks  of 
the    peace-party  were    recruited    from   the   landed   pro- 
prietors,   wliose   estates   were    ravaged   in    a    war   with 
which   they  had    no   sympathy,  and   from   the  extreme 
oligarchs,  who  had  no  hope  of  gaining  j)ower  except  by 
Spartan  intervention.     Again,  many  who  had  no  wish  to 
further  the  ascendency  of  Sparta  were  yet  jealous  of  the 
revival  of  Athens,  and  were  vexed  that  Corinth  sliould  be 
the  seat  of  war.  while  the  territories  of  her  allies  were 
spared.      To  anticipate  the  machinations  of  their  oj)po- 
nents,  the  government  planned  and  executed  a  massacre, 
which  can  only  be  characterised  as  ferocious,  perfidious, 
and  sacrilegious.     More  than  a  hundred  of  the  citizens 
were  slain  ;    the  rest  submitted  to   the  force  of  circum- 
stances.    Dut  the  position  of  Corinth  as  the  seat  of  war 
rendered  an  intimate  alliance  with  some  powerful  state  an 
absolute  necessity.     In  accordance  with  this  need  Corinth 
was  practically,  and  possibly  even  formally,  incorporated 
with   Argos.     But  to  the  oligarchs,  whose  position  and 
privileges  were  gone,  life  under  such  conditions  seemed 
Admission         ^"^    insupportable    degradation ;    and   their 
Tani'uUhiu"       l*-^^id^^rs opened  to  IVaxitas, the  Spartan  com- 
wLlu"""^'  "i^intler  who  lay  at  Sikyon,  one  of  the  gates 

in  the  western  Long  Wall  uniting  Corinth 
and  Lechaion.  In  vain  Argives,  Athenians,  and  Corinth- 
ians assaulted  the  Spartan  position— the  Lakedaimonian 
hoplites  were  everywhere  irresistible.  They  made  a  ter- 
rific slaughter  among  their  panic-stricken  opponents,  so 


Jf^ 


Iphikrates 
becomes 
noted  as  a 
leader  of 
peltasts. 

Foremost 


that,  to  use  the  simile  employed  by  Xenophon,  the  corpses 
lay  in  heaps  like  so  many  logs  or  stones.  Praxitas  fol- 
lowed uj)  his  victory  by  making  a  breach  in  the  Long 
Walls  wide  enough  to  allow  the  passage  of  an  army,  by 
cajjturing  Sidous  and  Krommyon,  and  by  fortifying  the 
position  of  Kpieikia  on  the  frontiers  of  Epidauros. 

*  After  this,'  says  Xenophon,  *  great  armies  were  dis- 
continued on  both  sides  ;  but  the  different  cities  sent 
garrisons — on  the  one  side  to  Sikyon,  on  the 
other  to  Corinth — and  were  guarding  the 
fortresses.  Mercenaries,  however,  were  em- 
j)loyed  by  both  parties,  and  the  war  was 
prosecuted  vigorously  by  means  of  them.' 
among  the  leaders  of  these  mercenaries — unless,  perhaps, 
Xenophon  himself  may  be  excepted — was  the  young 
Athenian  Iphikrates.  Having  distinguished  himself  in  the 
recent  naval  operations,  he  now  turned  his  attention  to  the 
light-armed  troops,  or  '  peltasts,'  improving  their  equip- 
ment, and  enlarging  their  sphere  of  action.  As  far  as  can 
be  gathered  from  the  confused  accounts  of  these  changes, 
he  seems  to  have  made  the  defensive  armour  lighter  and 
the  weapons  of  offence  more  formidable.  Thus  the  shield 
was  made  smaller,  a  linen  corselet  was  substituted  for 
the  coat  of  mail,  and  instead  of  the  heavy  bronze  greaves 
a  new  sort  of  gaiters  was  introduced,  called  after  the 
name  of  Iphikrates  himself.  On  the  other  hand,  the  spear 
and  the  sword  were  considerably  lengthened.  Whether 
he  introduced  these  changes  at  the  outset  of  his  career, 
or  whether  they  were  the  gradual  result  of         .         , 

•'  '^  and  spreads 

accumulated  experience,  is  uncertain  ;  at  any 

rate,  from  the  first  he  drilled  and  disciplined 

his  troops  with  the  utmost  care,  and  soon 

made  them  a  terror  to  the  neighbouring  states  of  the  Pelo- 

ponnese.     So  roughly  were  the  Phliasians  handled  that 


terror 
among  the 
Peloponne- 
sian  allies. 


134 


The  CorintJiiiin    War. 


B.C.  391 


CH.  VIII. 


Capture  of  Pciraion. 


they  were  forced  to  overcome  tlieir  political  objection 
to  Spartan  occuj)ation,  and  to  send  for  a  garrison  to  pro- 
tect their  city.  So  cowed  were  the  Arkadians,  a  people  of 
nr)  mean  military  repute,  that  they  allowed  their  country 
to  be  ravaged  before  their  eyes,  rather  than  take  the  field 
against  them.  Vet  the  peltasts  themselves  had  a  whole- 
some dread  (jf  the  prowess  of  Spartan  hoplites.  never  ap- 
proaching even  within  a  javelin  cast,  so  that  the  Spartans 
made  contemptuous  jokes  at  the  expense  of  their  allies, 
who  '  were  as  frightened  at  the  peltasts  as  children  at  hob- 
goblins.' 

But  the  Spartan  force  which  was  left  near  Corinth  was 
Operati,..,.  "''^  powerful  cnough  to  prevent  the  Atheni- 
an.riv^iiu'''  '^"^  ^'^'^"^  undoing  the  most  important  of  the 
tias  near  achievements  of  Traxitas.     As  long  as  the 

Lonnth.  breach  in  the  Long  Walls  of  Corinth  lay  open, 

Athens  could  not  feel  herself  secure.  Tu  remedy  this,  the 
people  set  out  in  full  force,  with  masons  and  carpenters, 
and  repaired  with  amazing  celerity  the  western  wall  to- 
wards Sikyon,  tilling  up  the  breach  in  the  eastern  wall 
more  at  their  leisure.  But  the  Sj)artans.  having  once  se- 
cured an  advantage  so  important,  were  not  going  to  lose 
it  without  a  struggle.  The  service  was  important  enough 
to  call  for  the  personal  attendance  of  the  king;  and  .A^^e- 
silaos  marched  out  with  a  full  muster  of  Spartan  troops 
and  Peloi)onnesian  allies,  while  his  brother  Teleutias.  a 
commander  of  great  ability  and  daring,  and  of  even 
greater  popularity,  supported  him  with  a  fleet  in  the  Cor- 
inthian gulf.  The  king  as  he  passed  took  care  to  give 
the  Argives  some  experience  of  the  evils  of  the  w.ir  which 
they  were  themselves  foremost  in  jiromoling.  and  then, 
advancing  to  the  isthmus,  demolished  the  newly-erected 
works  of  the  Athenians.  Teleutias  also  on  the  vcrv  same 
day  captured  Lechaion.  with  the  fleet  and  arsenal  of  the 


135 


T 


AKCsil.-ios, 
after  being 
present  at 
the  Isthmian 
games, 
captures 
Peiraion. 


Corinthians,  which  had  been  furnished  by  the  money  left 
by  rharnabazos.     The  importance   of  these   operations 
was  soon  proved  by  the  arrival  at  Sparta  of  embassies 
both  from  Athens  and  from  Thebes,  to  ne<:o- 
tiatc  terms  of  j)cace.     These  overtures  pro-      Overtures 

•  ,  ,     ,     .  lur  peace. 

duced  no  dehnite  result.      1  hough  protracted 
for  some  months,  they  were  at  last  broken  off  on  account 
of  a  brilliant  exploit  which  altered  the  whole  position  of 
the  belligerents. 

The  bitterest  foes  of  a  state  are  always  its  exiled  citi- 
zens. The  fugitives  from  Corinth,  whose  sole  aim  was 
the  overthrow  of  the  war-party  in  the  town, 
were  discontented  as  long  as  one  sinele 
acre  of  Corinthian  territory  remained  un- 
ravaged,  and  restlessly  urged  the  Spartans 
to  direct  an  expedition  against  the  small 
peninsula  in  the  centre  of  which  was  the  fort  of  Peiraion, 
the  sole  remaining  magazine  from  which  the  inhabitants 
of  the  town  could  draw  supj)lies.  Further,  since  they 
held  that  a  city  which  submitted  to  Argive  domination 
was  no  true  Corinth,  and  since  they  themselves  consti- 
tuted in  their  own  estimation  the  genuine  Corinthian 
people,  they  wished  to  have  the  honour  of  presiding  over 
the  Isthmian  games  which  were  held  that  vear.  Timinjr 
his  march  so  as  to  arrive  at  the  isthmus  precisely  at  the 
commencement  of  the  festival.  Agesilaos  by  his  mere  ap- 
pearance drove  the  competitors  and  spectators  in  terror 
to  the  town,  and  guarded  the  exiles  while  they  went 
through  the  programme  of  sacrifices  and  contests  with 
all  due  formalities ;  and  on  his  departure  for  Peiraion, 
the  Corinthians  came  out  under  Argive  protection  and 
celebrated  the  games  afresh.  Finding  the  fort  of  Peiraion 
strongly  garrisoned,  he  did  not  attack  it  at  once,  but  waited 
till  he  had  decoyed  away  most  of  its  defenders,  including 


■■-I    .-  ,-a^;r  fVV^^  . 


■  36 


The  CorintJiian   War. 


B.C.  391. 


CH.  VIII. 


Iphikratcs  at  Corinth, 


137 


Iphikratcs  and  his  pdtasts,  by  a  feint  upon  Corinth  itself. 
On  the  next  day,  the  occupants  of  Peiraion,  male  and 
female,  slaves  and  freemen,  tied  for  refu^^^e  to  the  temple 
of  Here  on  the  neiijhbourinj;  promontory.  Tenaion  and 
Oinoe,  with  abundance  of  booty,  were  captured  at  once, 
and  the  fuj^itives  in  the  Heraion  surrendered  uncondi- 
tionally. Those  who  had  been  concerned  in  the  massacre 
in  Corinth  were  <jiven  up  by  the  decision  of  A^^esilaos  to 
the  pitiless  ven^jeance  of  the  exiles ;  the  rest  were  sold 
into  slavery. 

The  position  of  the  Spartan  kin^;  was  indeed  trium- 
phant.    His  camp  was  thron;^^ed  with  deputations.     Kven 
Thebes,  alarmed  bv  the  proximitv  of  the  vic- 

Destniction  .  '  1         ,     '       ,       . 

of  a  Snartan  torious  army  to  her  own  borders,  had  sent 
Tphikrates.  ^''^^^  cnvoys  to  ask  for  terms  of  peace. 
A^esilaos  himself  was  sittin;^^  in  all  the  pride 
of  conquest,  watching;  the  lines  of  captives  and  piles 
of  booty  brought  out  for  his  inspection  by  the  Sj);irtan 
guards,  and  scornfully  refusin;^  even  to  look  at  the  Hoiotian 
ambassadors.  Such  is  the  picture  drawn  by  Xenophon,  to 
hei<:^hien  the  effect  of  the  sudden  contrast.  A  horseman 
galloped  up,  with  his  horse  covered  with  foam,  and,  refus- 
ing to  answer  other  inquirers,  told  his  news  with  all  signs 
of  the  deepest  dejection  to  the  king  himself.  A  Spartan 
mora,  600  in  number,  had  been  cut  to  pieces  by  Iphi- 
krates  near  Corinth.  Having  escorted  their  Amyklainn 
allies  on  their  homeward  march,  as  far  as  the  friendly 
neighbourhood  of  Sikyon,  the  regiment  was  returning  to 
Lechaion.  As  they  passed  the  walls  of  Corinth,  Iphi- 
kratcs with  his  peltasts  fell  upon  their  flanks  and  rear 
supported  by  Kallias,  the  commander  of  the  Athenian 
hoplites  in  the  town.  A  few  of  the  Spartans  fell  in  this 
first  onslaught;  and  as  the  peltasts  retired,  the  younger 
hoplites  were  ordered  by  the  Lakedaimonian  polemarch 


to  pursue  them.  They  failed  to  overtake  them,  and  had 
broken  their  ranks  in  the  pursuit.  Suddenly  the  peltasts 
faced  about  and  were  on  them  before  they  could  form 
into  order  ;  and  their  loss  was  considerable.  This  man- 
oeuvre was  repeated  several  times  ;  nor  did  the  arrival 
of  the  Spartan  cavalry  make  their  position  better.  The 
same  tactics  were  equally  fatal  to  them  ;  and  when  the 
ho|)lites  of  Kallias  came  up  to  support  Iphikratcs,  the 
Spartans  broke  and  ficd  to  the  beach,  where  some  of 
them  were  rescued  by  boats  from  Lechaion.  Agesilaos 
hearing  the  tidings  brought  by  the  messenger  immedi- 
ately started  up,  and  set  out  with  such  troops  as  were 
ready,  to  attempt  to  recover  the  bodies  of  the  slain.  But 
the  burial  truce  had  been  already  asked  and  granted ; 
and  the  king  returned  disappointed  to  the  Heraion. 

The  actual  loss  to  Sparta  was  severe,  for  the  dwindling 
number  of  her  citizens  could  ill  bear  thin- 
ning.    But  its  moral  effect  was  prodigious,       momP'°"^ 
and  scarcely  less  than  when  Kleon  and  De-      fleets  of 

^  this  exploit. 

mosthencs  captured  half  a  mora  of  Spartan 
hoplites  in  Sphakteria.  The  Theban  envoys  said  no 
more  about  conditions  of  peace;  the  negotiations  with 
Athens  came  to  an  abrupt  termination  ;  and  Iphikratcs 
recovered  Sidous,  Krommyon,  and  Oinoe.  So  profound 
was  the  grief  of  the  army  of  Agesilaos  that  signs  of 
mourning  were  universal  among  all  the  soldiers,  except 
the  near  kinsmen  of  the  dead.  These,  says  Xenophon, 
walked  about  with  the  cheerful  faces  of  victorious  athletes, 
and  exulting  in  their  private  sorrows.  Agesilaos,  however, 
had  been  successful  in  the  object  for  which  his  expedition 
had  been  sent  out,  and  he  determined  to  return  home ; 
but  he  took  the  greatest  care  to  expose  his  troops  as  little 
as  possible  to  the  taunts  of  the  disaffected  allies,  who  could 
cast  back  in  the  teeth  of  the  Spartans  the  jests  about  the 


^ 


s^snraH 


BS 


138 


The  Peace  of  Antalkidas.  B.C.  391 


pcltasts  which  had  been  so  contemptuously  showered 
upon  themselves.  Late  in  the  evening  he  took  up  his 
quarters  in  the  towns  which  lay  in  his  road ;  and  at  the 
earliest  dawn  he  resumed  his  march.  Mantineia  was 
passed  in  the  dead  of  nij^ht  ;  for  a  serious  collision  might 
have  occurred  between  the  sullen  Spartans  and  the  exult- 
ant Arkadians. 

This  daring  deed  was  long  remembered  not  only  as 

the   most  brilliant  of   the  exploits  of  Iphikrates,  but  as 

one  of  the  most  notable  achievements  in  the 

M^'IJies         annals  of  Creek  warfare.      The  successful 

treneral   was   however   soon    recalled.      He 

offended  the  Corinthians  by  his  high-handed 

interference  with  their  internal  politics,  and  Chabrias  was 

sent  from  Athens  to  take  his  place. 


frmn 
Corinth. 


CHAITKR  IX. 


THE   PI:A(  i:   OF   AMAI-KIDAS. 

Thoi'GH  the  Corinthian  war  did  not  come  actually  to  an 
end  after  the  exploit  of  Iphikrates,  it  ceased  to  have  any 
immediate  connexion  with  Corinth,  and  the  military 
operations  became  of  little  general  importance,  and  less 
historical  interest.  Agesilaos,  at  the  urgent 
Agesilaos  in       request  of  his  Achaian  allies,  conducted  an 

Akarnania.  '  ■,•,••  r   »  i 

expedition  mto  the  wild  district  of  Akarnania 
with  great  skill  and  energy.  Having  ravaged  the  country 
and  taken  abundant  plunder,  he  returned  to  Sparta,  and 

the  Akarnanians.  dreading  a  repetition  of  the 
AfzesiH.is         same  proceedings,  made  their  submission  in 

in  Argolis.  '  '^.  ,  n     i    i  i 

the  following  spring,  and  enrolled  themselves 
in  the  Lakedaimonian  confederacy.  Agesipolis  also  began 
his   military  career  by  an    invasion  of  Argolis.     It  was 


CH.  IX. 


Antiilkidas  in  Asia. 


139 


an  old  trick,  thoroughly  worthy  of  the  usual  policy  of 
Argos,  to  send  heralds  on  the  approach  of  Spartan  in- 
vaders, with  an  announcemenV  that  it  was  a  sacred  season 
and  that  they  were  bound  to  observe  the  truce.  But  now, 
having  previously  consulted  the  oracles  on  the  question, 
Agesipolis  disregarded  these  assertions,  and  marched  on 
to  the  very  walls  of  Argos,  spreading  terror  and  havoc 
round  him,  and  in  every  direction  going  just  farther  than 
Agesilaos  had  penetrated — in  the  words  of  Xenophon, 
like  a  rival  athlete  contending  for  a  prize. 

Nor  is  it  surprising  that  the  Spartans  began  to  prose- 
cute the  war  with  less  vigour,  for  they  had  good  hopes 
that  they  would  obtain  by  other  means  all  that  they  could 
desire.  As  Persian  gold  had  originally  stimulated  the 
allies  to  combine  against  them,  and  a  Persian  subsidy  had 
furnished  the  Corinthians  with  their  fleet  and  the  Athe- 
nians with  their  fortifications,  they  resolved  to  make  an 
earnest  effort  to  win  over  Persia  to  their  own  cause.  An- 
talkidas was  the  envoy  chosen  for  this  mis- 

Antalkidas 

sion,  a  craftv,  persuasive  politician,  cast  in       is  sent  to 
the   mould  of  Lysandros  and    Derkyllidas.      ga^nsover 
He  made  his  way  to  Sardeis,  where  Tiriba-      T'nbazos. 
zos,  who  had  succeeded  Tithraustes  as  satrap  of  Ionia,  was 
holding  his  court.     The  enmity  of  Pharnabazos  or  of  any 
Persian  who  had  been  deeply  injured  by  Spartan  hostili- 
ties would  have  been  too  inveterate  to  be  removed  by  the 
winning  eloquence  even  of  an  Antalkidas,  but  Tiribazos, 
being  a  new  comer,  lent  a  willing  ear  to  his  proposals,  that 
the  dreek  cities  in  Asia  should  be  surrendered  to  the  Great 
King,  on  condition  that  all  the  islands  and  the  other  cities 
of  Greece  should  be  absolutely  autonomous.    The  Spartan 
urged  that  the  old  policy  of  Persia  in  maintaining  a  bal- 
ance between  two  great  powers  was  erroneous,  for  it  en- 
tailed upon  her  perpetual  warfare  and  expense ;  whereas 


I40 


The  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 


B.C.  391 


the  complete  disintegration  of  the  Hellenic  race  and  the 
isolation  of  all  its  component  units  would  render  both 
Sparta  and  Athens  alike  incapable  of  causing  the  Great 
King  any  annoyance. 

The  news  of  the  mission  of  Antalkidas  created  profound 

uneasiness  among  the  other  states  of  Greece,  and  envoys 

hastened  from  Argos,  Athens,  Thebes,  and 

embasties  Corinth  to  countcract   his    schemes.     They 

from  Argos,       heard  his  proposals  with  the  utmost  alarm, 

Athens,  *        '^  i-     ,       •      i- 

Corinth,  and   probably  with  not  a  little  mdignation. 

For  a  Spartan  so  soon  to  cast  to  the  winds 
the  patriotic  professions  of  Agesilaos,  and  hand  over  the 
Asiatic  Greeks  to  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  barba- 
rian, was  an  act  of  perfidy  only  exceeded  by  the  cunning 
wording  of  the  conditions  of  the  surrender.  The  position 
of  Sparta  in  the  Peloponnese  would  remain  the  same: 
her  allies  already  enjoyed  a  nominal  independence,  and 
she  would  take  good  care  that  it  never  became  anything 
more.  But  she  would  compel  Argos  to  dissolve  her  in- 
timate alliance  with  Corinth,  and  thus  her  chief  oppo- 
nent near  home  would  be  crippled ;  Thebes  would  be  re- 
duced to  the  position  of  an  insignificant  Boiotian  town ; 
and  Athens  would  have  to  abandon  her  newly-formed 
hopes  of  re-establishing  her  maritime  confederacy,  and 
even  of  regaining  the  islands  which  had  so  long  belonged 
to  her — Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros.  For  the  present, 
the  necrotiations  could  advance  no  further;  Tiribazos  had 
heard  both  sides,  and  gave  his  unqualified  support  to  the 
Spartan  proposals,  but  he  could  do  nothing  more  on  his 
own  responsibility.  When,  however,  the  other  envoys  were 

departing  for  their  homeward  journey,  Tiri- 
Arrest  of  bazos  arrested  Konon,  who  had  come  to  plead 

Konon. 

the  cause  of  Athens,  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
injured  the  interests  of  the  king.    To  this  act  of  treachery 


CH.  IX. 


Death  of  Thrasyboulos. 


141 


he  had  been  urged  by  Antalkidas,  and  he  prolxibly  affected 
to  regard  Konon  rather  as  an  officer  holding  the  Great 
King's  commission  than  as  the  envoy  of  an  independent 
state.  Whether  Konon  died  in  prison,  or,  as  seems  more 
probable,  was  permitted  to  retire  to  the  court  of  his  old 
friend  Euagoras,  is  uncertain;  but  to  Athens  his  loss  was 
irreparable,  for  his  name  disappears  from  history  at  the 
moment  when  she  needed  most  sorely  a  politician  thor- 
oughly conversant  with  tlie  Persian  character. 

The  policy  of  Antalkidas  was  not  so  successful  at  Sousa 
as  at  Sardeis.     The  Persians  had  learnt  that  Sparta  could 
play  fast  and  loose  wiili  the  most  solemn  ob- 
ligations, and  they  were  still  smarting  from      .supersedes 
the   inroads  of  Derkyllidas   and  Agesilaos.      SdeS 
Tiribazos  was  detained  at  court  durin"^  the      ihimbron. 
royal  pleasure,  and  was  superseded  in  the  government 
of  Ionia   by  Strouthas,  a  vigorous   and   straightforward 
soldier,  who  made  no  secret  of  his  hostility  towards  the 
devastators  of  his  country.     To  counteract  his  influence, 
and  in  spite  of  his  previous  ill-success,  the  Spartan  gov- 
ernment again  sent  Thimbron  to  take  the  command  in 
Asia.     Why  this  appointment  was  made,  while  a  man 
like  Derkyllidas  was  still  in  the  neighbourhood,  is  not 
mentioned :  at  any  rate,  his  faikire  was  as  complete  as 
before,  and  more  disastrous.     Strouthas,  at  the  head  of 
the  Persian  cavalry,  fell  upon  the  disorderly  and  careless 
army  which  Thimbron  had  raised,  slew  the  general  him- 
self, and  entirely  dispersed  his  forces.     The 
subsequent  operations  in   Ionia  are  of  little      fuccefses"' 

moment.  and  death 

.  ^^  ^  hrasy- 

The  chief  efforts  of  Sparta  by  sea  were  now      <bouios. 
directed  to  supporting  the  oligarchical  party  in  Rhodes  in 
their  endeavour  to  overthrow  the  democracy.    Teleutias 
himself,  the  most  active  and  popular  of  her  admirals,  had 


142  The  Peace  of  Antalkidas.  B.C.  388. 

been  despatched  thither  from  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  and  had 
captured  a  small  squadron  of  Athenian  ships.  Thrasybou- 
los  was  consequently  sent  from  Athens  with  a  tleet  of  forty 
triremes  to  brin-  help  to  the  Khodian  democrats.    But  the 
affairs  of  the  island  did  not  seem  to  hnn  so  important  as 
those  of  the  Hellespont.    Sailing  thither,  he  entered  mto 
alliance  with  the  Ihrakian  chiefs,  won  over  Byzantion  and 
Chalkedon.  recovered  the  right  of  levying  a  toll  upon  ves- 
sels  sailing  from  the  Kuxine.  a  lucrative  source  of  revenue, 
slew  the  Spartan  commander  in  Lesbos,  and.  cxactmg 
money  from  the  maritime  cities  as  he  passed,  sailed  on 
as  far  as  Aspendos.  a  town  of  Tamphylia.     Here  some 
outrages  committed  by  his  men  so  enraged  the  mhabit- 
ants.  that  thev  surprised  hmi  by  night  and  killed  hmi  m 
his  tent.     Athens  could  ill  afford  so  soon  to  lose  the  ser- 
vices  of  another   of  her  foremost   citizens,  resolute   in 
counsel,  daring  in  action,  undismayed  in  adversity,  and 
generous  in  the  hour  of  triumph. 

The  achievements  of  Thrasyboulos  in  the  Hellesi.ont 
were  thought  bv  the  Spartan  government  serious  enough 
to  demand  the  recall  of  Derkyllidas  and  the  appomtment 
of  another   harmost.      Anaxibios.    having   considerable 
influence  with  the  ephors.  obtained  the  post.      On  his 
arrival  at  Abydos.  he  bestirred  himself  so  energetically 
both  by  land  and  by  sea.  that  the  satrapy  of  Pharnabazos 
suffered  severely.      The  tolls  of  the  Straits  were  again 
lost  to  Athens,  and  Iphikrates  was  sent  with  1 .2CX)  peUasts 
to  check  his  activity.     After  some  desultory  operations, 
Iphikrates  watched  his  opportunity,  and.  as  Anaxibios 
was  unsuspiciously  returning  from  Antandros 
Anaxibios  j  ^        |  f^j^ce  of  Spartans.   Abydenes, 

surprised  «">  ,       ,  r  U      V. 

ami  slain  by  ^^^  mercenaries,  he  rushed  out  trom  amousn 
Iphikrates.  ^^  ^.^  disordered  enemies.  The  death-scene 
of  Anaxibios  was  too  good  a  close  for  his  life  of  cruelty 


c 


CH.  IX. 


Piracy  in  Aigina. 


U3 


and  treachery.  '  And  perceiving.*  says  Xenophon.  '  that 
there  was  no' hope  of  safety,  he  said  to  the  soldiers  near 
him,  "  My  men.  my  honour  calls  me  to  die  where  I  now 
stand  :  but  1  bid  you  hasten  to  save  yourselves  before  the 
enemy  is  on  us."  With  these  words  he  seized  his  shield 
from  his  shield-bearer,  and  fell  fighting  where  he  stood. 
And  his  bov-favourite  forsook  him  not ;  and  of  the  Spar- 
tan harmosts  from  the  city,  twelve  died  fighting  by  his 
side,  and  the  rest  were  killed  as  they  fied.' 

But  the  war  was  destined  not  to  close  before  Athens  had 
herself  suffered  from  its  evils  :  and  the  saying  of  Perikles 
was  again  proved  true,  that  Aigina  was  the  ^ 

eye-sore  of  the  Peiraieus.     Bitter  experience      ^^^J^ 
had  taught  the  Athenians  how  important  it 
was  that  the  inhabitams  of  that  island  should  be  friendly 
to  them  •  and  they  had  driven  out  the  old  population  and 
filled  their  places  with  settlers  from  Attica.     These  in  their 
turn  had  been  expelled  by  Lysandros,  who  had  reinstated 
the  remnants  of  the  original  Aiginetans.     But  in  spite  of 
their  wrongs,  the  dangers  of  hostility  with  Athens  and 
the  advantages  of  commerce  had  kept  up  friendly  rela- 
tions  between   the   two    neighbours,    and    the    Spartan 
harmost  had  to   exert  all  his  influence   to   induce   the 
\i.rinetans  to  avail  themselves  of  the  letters  of  marque 
;.hich  he  issued  against  Athens.     After  some  months  of 
indecisive  fighting,  during  which  the  partial  destruction 
of  a   squadron   of   Athenian   ships   had   been    skilfully 
aven-ed  bv  Chabrias.  who  surprised  and  slew  the  Spartan 
commander,  Teleutias  came  to  take  the  command  of  the 
ill-paid,  ill-disciplined,   and   discontented  Spartan  fleet. 
Tust  as  the  departure  of  this  brilliant  officer  had  pre- 
viously been  marked  by  extravagant  signs  of  affection 
and  regret,  so  on  his  return  he  was  welcomed  with  enthu- 
siastic delight.     He  immediately  called  his  men  together. 


JMfliif- 


iL 


144 


The  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 


B.C.  387. 


and,  addressing  them  with  sympathetic  eloquence,  told 
them  that  thoui,di  he  had  broir^ht  no  money  for  them, 
yet  he  was  as  willing  to  share  their  hardships  and  labours 
as  he  would  be  to  share  the  success  and  pleasure  to  A'hich 
he  would  lead  them.  The  acclamations  of  the  sailors 
assured  him  that  they  would  follow  wherever  he  led  the 
way :  and  he  bade  them  be  ready  to  start  at  nightfall, 
taking  with  them  one  day's  provisions.  Whither  they 
were  sailing  in  the  darkness,  no  one  except  the  admiral 
knew ;  but  daybreak  found  them  lying  about  half  a  mile 
from  the  entrance  of  the  harbour  of  Peiraieus.  As  he 
sailed  in  at  the  head  of  his  twelve  shijis,  he  found  that 
the  expectations  which  had  suggested  his  daring  enter- 
prise were  perfectly  correct.  The  triremes  which  lay  in 
the  harbour  were  disabled  without  difficulty, 

Telcutias  ^  ,  .  ,  , 

surprises  ior  crews  and  captains  were  asleep  on  shore. 

rureus^*  The   merchant   vessels   fell   an    easy   prey. 

From  the  larger  ships  the  cargoes  and  the 
sailors  were  carried  off,  and  the  smaller  were  towed 
away  altogether ;  some  were  even  bold  enough  to  leap 
on  to  the  quay  and  kidnap  all  the  merchants  and 
skippers  on  whom  they  could  lay  hands.  With  the  ut- 
most haste  the  full  force  of  Athens,  inf;intry  and  cavalry, 
flocked  down  to  Peiraieus  to  the  rescue  :  but  Teleutias 
was  already  at  sea  with  his  prizes  and  plunder.  On 
his  return  voyage  he  captured  corn-ships,  merchant 
vessels,  fishing  smacks,  and  boats  full  of  passengers, 
and  was  able  by  this  adventure  to  gratify  his  delighted 
sailors  by  the  payment  of  a  month's  wages  in  advance, 
g  The  object  of  the  Spartans  in  these  and 

mission  of         similar  operations  was  not  so  much  the  con- 

Antulkidas  <-     1      •  11 

is  success-         quest  of  their  opponents  as  to  make  the  war 
while  it  still  lasted  self-supporting,  and  to  in- 
duce Athens  to  assent  to  terms  of  peace.     The  mission  of 


!^^^s^^"^!vrHr 


i  ^■!L'^-^&.££SZ.^.ss^^'*t^£:i^j^i,y'&^<-^m. 


CH.  IX. 


Peace  of  Antalkidas. 


145 


Antalkidas  had  been  renewed,  and  his  second  attempt  had 
been  more  successful.     The  events  of  the  last  two  years 
had  justified  the  advice  of  Tiribazos,  and  he  had  conse- 
quently regained  the  favour  of  the  Great  King,  who  now 
was  involved  in  war  with  his  rebel  subjects  in  Kypros  and 
Egypt,  and  wished  to  feel  that  the  affairs  of  Greece  were 
oft"  his  hands.    Again,  the  gratitude  of  Athens  had  obliged 
her  to  send  help  to  one  of  these  rebels,  Euagoras,  who 
had  been  her  most  fiiithful  and  unswerving  ally,  and  for 
whom   Chabrias   was   now   gaining   important   victories 
over  Persian  troops.     Hence  the  Great   King  had  now 
no  reason  to  consult  her  interests  or  wishes  further  than 
they  coincided  with  his  own.     Seconded  by  the  revived 
influence   of   Tiribazos,    Antalkidas   obtained    from   the 
king  marks  of  the  most  distinguished  favour,  and  easily 
persuaded  him  to  agree  to  the  proposals  which  he  had 
previously  made.     All  that  now  remained  to  be  done  was 
to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Athenians,  and  bribery  and 
intimidation  were  both  brought  to  bear  upon  them.     The 
terms  of  the  peace  were  to  be  so  modified  as  to  recog- 
nise the  right  of  the  Athenians  to  the  three  islands,  on 
condition  of  their  abandoning  the  cause  of   Euagoras. 
Antalkidas  also,  on  his  return  from  Sousa,  resumed  the 
command  of  the  Spartan  fleet  in  the  Hellespont,  and  by 
successive  reinforcements  and  a  series  of  skilful  opera- 
tions, raised  the  total  of  his  ships  to  the  large  number  of 
eighty,  and  thus  became  completely  master  of  the  sea. 

His  course  was  now  clear.     The  Spartans  were  heartily 
tired  of  the  protracted  war,  and  could  have  no  possible 
objection  to  a  peace  framed  solely  in  their      q^^^^^^^ 
interests.     The  Athenians,  whose  exchequer      the  general 

acceptance 

was  exhausted,  whose  corn-ships  were  inter-      of  terms  of 
cepted  by  Antalkidas,  and  whose  coasts  were      p^^" 
harassed   by  privateers,  began  seriously  to  anticipate  a 


146 


The  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 


n.c.  387. 


repetition  of  the  woes  and  agonies  w  hich  they  had  suffered 
seventeen  years  before.  The  Argives  also,  aware  that  they 
could  no  longer  protect  their  territory  from  the  inroads  of 
the  Spartans  by  the  convenient  invention  of  a  sacred  truce, 
were  as  desirous  of  peace  as  the  rest.  Tiribazos  conse- 
quently gave  notice  that  all  who  wished  to  hear  the  terms 
of  the  peace  which  the  king  sent  down  for  their  accept- 
ance should  come  to  him  at  Sardeis ;  and  the  summons 
„     ,  ^vas  quickly  obeved.     Before  the  assembled 

tion  of  the  envoys  I  iribazos  exhibited  the  royal  seal,  and 
conditions.  ^^^^  ^y^^  document  aloud.  '  King  Artaxer.\es 
thinks  it  just  that  the  cities  in  Asia  should  belong  to  him, 
and  of  the  islands  Klazomcnai  and  Kypros:  but  that  all 
the  other  Hellenic  cities,  small  and  great,  should  be  left 
independent,  except  Lcmnos,  Imbros,  and  Skyros ;  and 
that  these,  as  of  old,  should  belong  to  the  Athenians.  And 
upon  those  states  which  do  not  accept  this  peace  I  myself 
will  make  war,  in  conjunction  with  those  who  assent  to 
these  terms,  both  by  land  and  by  sea,  with  ships  and  with 
money.' 

Such  were  the  conditions  which  the  envoys  were  author- 
ised to  carry  back  to  their  respective  cities.  They  were 
accepted  without  opposition,  except  by  the  Thebans,  who 
wished  to  take  the  oath  in  the  name  of  the  Hoiotian  con- 
,.,,  .  federacy,  and   not   mcrclv  of  the   town   of 

Ihebanand         ,,,,     ,  a  -i  •'.... 

Argive  Ihebcs.     Agesilaos  angrily  bade  the  depu- 

ovimS  ^^^^^  '^^■^^  ^^'^'"c  returning  home  for  further  in- 
Ta^s^^"''  structions,  tell  their  countrymen  that  if  they 

did  not  comply  they  would  be  shut  out  from 
the  treaty.  Eager  for  an  opportunity  of  exacting  a  mer- 
ciless retribution  for  the  insult  of  Aulis  and  the  wounds 
of  Koroncia,  he  had  led  out  the  forces  of  Sparta  as  far  as 
Tegea,  and  was  busily  mustering  the  allies,  when  the  en- 
voys returned  to  announce  the  submission  of  the  The- 


CH.  IX.         Disgraceful  Nature  of  the  Peace, 


147 


bans.  Agesilaos  had  to  content  himself  with  the  hu- 
miliation of  the  haughty  city  instead  of  her  destruction, 
and  turned  round  on  Argos.  Corinth  had  joined  Argos 
of  her  own  accord,  and  an  Argivc  garrison  was  her  only 
means  of  protection  against  the  return  of  the  hated  ex- 
iles. But  when  the  interests  of  Sparta  pulled  in  the  op- 
posite direction,  it  was  vain  to  urge  that  a  voluntary  alli- 
ance could  not  be  a  \'iolation  of  the  principle  of  inde- 
pendence. The  Corinthians  were  forced  to  dismiss  the 
garrison  and  admit  their  exiles ;  and  these,  backed  by  the 
influence  of  Sparta,  expelled  their  opponents,  and  framed 
their  policy  as  governors  of  Corinth  and  keepers  of  the 
keys  of  the  Peloponnese  in  strict  conformity  with  Spartan 
interests. 

Plutarch  has  preserved  for  us  the  happy  retort  made 
by  Agesilaos  to  some  one  who  exclaimed  in  his  presence, 
'Alas   for  Hellas,  when  our  Lakonians   are 
Medising  1 '    *  Rather.'  replied  the  king,  '  it  is     '^^f^Sas°^ 
the  Medes  (or  I^ersians)  who  are  Lakonising.'       disgraceful 
Both  Agesilaos  and  his  friend  were  right :  each      form,  in  all 

.  ,       ,        ,,  .  .  c  c     ^\,      •  it^  articles, 

state,  with  the  hrmest  intention  of  furthering      .„,j  ;„  ^i.e 
its  own  advantage,  had  done  great  service  to      gJlecLtion!* 
the  other.    By  the  mere  form  of  the  treaty,  all 
Greece  was  dragged  down  to  a  depth  of  degradation  to 
which  she  had  never  sunk  before.     It  had  been  pitiful 
enough  for  the  states  who  were  rivals  for  the  leadership  of 
Hellas  to  be  rivals  also  in  cringing  for  barbarian  support; 
more  pitiful  still  that  the  hatred  of  kinsmen  should  be 
more  powerful  ih.m  the  ties  of  kinsmanship,  and  that  the 
enslavement  of  Circek  to  barbarian  in  Asia  should  be  the 
price  paid   for  the  enslavement  of  Greek  to  Cireck  in 
Europe :    but  this  open    acknowledgment  of    the  over- 
lordship  or  suzerainty  of  the  Great  King  was  infmitely 
worse.    The  Great  King  ordered  the  Greeks,  his  subjects, 


"I 


\i^«imf,'^&^S^^^i^^W^^^S^^iB^&i^i^  \d^<;i^'i''^£h!SiilBMB^^iSi*!meM'V.^i*.       n  'irMdfM 


148 


The  PtHice  of  Antalkidas, 


B.C.  386. 


CH.  IX. 


Mantineia  Punished. 


149 


to  come  to  hear  his  will :  they  came  as  they  were  com- 
manded. He  sent  down  his  proclamation,  and  his  envoy, 
having  shewn  the  royal  seal,  read  it  aloud  :  cowed  by 
threats  of  royal  displeasure,  the  Greeks  departed  and 
obeyed.  What  more  had  Mardonios  asked  a  century 
before  ?  The  first  article  of  the  convention  was  as  dis- 
graceful as  the  form  of  the  whole.  It  annihilated  the 
struggles  of  ninety  years,  and  abandoned  to  Persian  tyr- 
anny, in  spite  of  repeated  promises,  a  district  which  was 
as  thoroughly  Greek  as  Lakonia  itself,  and  had  been  the 
cradle  of  her  poetry,  her  philosophy,  in  a  word,  of  all  her 
culture.  The  second  article  at  any  rate  had  an  enticing 
sound.  An  announcement  of  universal  independence 
flattered  that  instinct  of  self-isolation  which  all  through 
their  history  had  prevented  the  Hellenic  cities  from 
coalescing  into  an  Hellenic  nation.  The  day  of  hope  for 
Hellas  had  dawned  when  Athens  had  tried  to  consolidate 
her  empire  in  opposition  to  this  tendency  ;  just  as  it  was 
a  fatal  hour  when  Sparta  succeeded  in  establishing  her 
supremacy  by  means  of  it.  It  was  so  ruinously  easy  for 
enemies  from  within  or  from  without  to  divide  and  con- 
quer. Nor  was  the  third  stipulation  more  satisfactory.  It 
meant  that  Athens  had  been  bribed  to  desert  Euagoras, 
her  ally,  who  had  recently  received  from  her,  as  he  well 
deserved,  the  highest  honours ;  and  the  bribe  took  the 
form  of  a  cession  to  which  Sparta  might  appeal  in  justi- 
fication of  her  retention  of  the  Lakonian  and  Messenian 
towns,  if  the  public  opinion  of  Greece  should  become 
dangerously  outspoken.  But,  in  their  proud  position  as 
executors  of  the  Great  King's  commands,  the  Spartans 
meant  to  appeal  to  no  argument  but  the  sword.  Their 
lust  of  dominion  was  unabated,  and  it  was  soon  evident 
that  universal  independence  meant,  not,  indeed,  the  right 
of  each  city  to  set  up  what  government  it  chose,  but  the 


right  of  Sparta  to  dissolve  all  alliances  and  confedera- 
tions which  she  thought  dangerous  to  her  interests. 

The  panegyrists  of  Sparta  may  perhaps  justify  her 
treatment  of  Thebes  and  Argos  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty ; 
not  even  Xenophon  can  pretend  that  the  attack  on  Man- 
tineia was  prompted  by  anv  motive  except      ,.     .    . 

'  '  ^  '  '  Mantineia 

a  wish  to  punish  the  Mantineians  for  their  punished 
slackness  in  the  Spartan  service,  and  to  warn  spiit^up^into 
other  allies  against  similar  lukewarmness.  hamlets. 
The  ostensible  pretext  was  that  they  had  sent  corn  to  the 
Argives  when  at  war  with  Sparta ;  the  real  cause  was  the 
undisguised  satisfaction  felt  by  the  Mantineians  at  Spartan 
reverses,  and  Spartan  soldiers  could  not  forget  how  they 
had  skulked  past  the  walls  of  Mantineia  by  night  to  avoid 
their  bitter  gibes.  Envoys  were  sent  to  demand  that  the 
walls  of  the  city  should  be  demolished ;  and  when  the 
citizens  refused,  Agesipolis  blockaded  the  town,  and  built 
a  wall  of  circumvallation.  (Growing  weary  of  the  siege, 
he  dammed  up  the  flooded  waters  of  the  river  below  the 
town.  As  the  stream  rose  higher,  the  walls,  which  were 
built  of  unbaked  clay,  began  to  totter,  and  the  citizens 
were  forced  to  surrender.  The  democrats  were  expelled 
and  an  oligarchical  government  established.  The  city 
was  split  up  into  the  five  rustic  hamlets  of  which  it  was 
originally  composed.  Xenophon  gravely  assures  us  that, 
when  once  the  expense  of  building  new  houses  was  past, 
the  Mantineians  gratefully  appreciated  their  rural  tran- 
quillity, and  the  unspeakable  advantage  of  living  so  near 
to  their  farms. 

Such  was  the  spirit  in  which  the  Spartans  carried  out 
the  treaty ;  and  if  to  promulgate  shams  and  get  them 
accepted  as  realities  be  a  masterpiece  of  diplomacy,  the 
convention  of  Antalkidas  well  deserves  that  distinction. 
Hollow  as  were  the  promises  of  Sparta,  the  assumption 


*»i!  *^'  .TS^-e^^lfX-z 


ISO 


The  Peace  of  Antixlkidas. 


B.C.  385. 


Effect  of 
the  peace 
on  the 
Asiatic 
Greeks  and 
on  Kua- 
goras. 


of  omnipotent  sovereii^nty  on  the  part  of  Persia  had  even 
less  foundation  in  fact.  The  internal  weakness 
^eSs'jf^''^         of  the  vast  empire  was  at  this  time  more 
Persia.  \\i,x.x\  ever  notorious.    Of  the  unwieldy  a<(gre- 

gate  of  nations  which  owed  allegiance  to  the  Great 
King,  two  of  the  most  powerful  were  in  open  revolt ;  and 
before  the  attack  of  united  Hellas,  the  whole  edifice 
would  have  collapsed  like  a  house  of  cards.  The  cession 
of  the  Asiatic  (ireeks  gave  to  Artaxerxes  an 
increase  of  resources  which  he  sorely  needed. 
The  condition  of  these  towns  became  pitiable. 
In  many  of  them  garrisons  were  i)laced  and 
citadels  l)uilt ;  some,  probably  after  an  at- 
tempted revolt,  were  destroyed  altogether.  The  exactions 
of  the  tax-gatherers  were  almost  intolerable  ;  the  most 
beautiful  boys  and  girls  were  transferred  to  the  harems  of 
Persian  nobles ;  their  men  were  forced  to  serve  against 
their  own  countrymen  in  Kypros.  Indeed,  the  effects  of 
the  Peace  of  Antalkidas  on  the  prospects  of  Kuagoras, 
who  had  been  for  some  years  in  full  revolt  against  Persia, 
were  alto<j:ether  disastrous.  Forced  to  rebel  in  order  to 
defend  himself  against  the  jealous  intrigues  of  Artaxerxes, 
he  had  extended  his  power  over  almost  the  whole  of  the 
island,  and  spread  everywhere  the  blessings  of  good 
government  and  Hellenic  civilisation.  As  he  gained 
strength  he  assumed  the  offensive,  and.  crossing  over  to 
Asia,  he  took  by  storm  even  the  great  city  of  Tyre,  and 
fomented  an  insurrection  in  Kilikia.  The  chief  allies  of 
the  heroic  prince  had  been  the  native  king  of  revolted 
Egypt  and  the  Athenians;  Chabrias  in  particular  had 
done  him  right  good  service.  lUit.  in  accordance  with 
the  peace,  he  was  ungenerously  abandoned  by  Athens, 
and  the  whole  seafaring  population  of  the  Asiatic  coast 
could  be  used  against  him.     liy  extraordinary  exertions 


CH.  X. 


Results  of  Corinthian    War. 


151 


he  raised  a  fleet  of  200  triremes,  but  was  out-numbered 
and  defeated  by  the  Persians.  Slill  for  some  time  he 
sustained  the  unequal  contest,  and  after  a  struggle  of  ten 
years  obtained  an  honourable  peace,  refusing,  it  is  said,  to 
give  tribute  '  like  a  slave  to  his  master,'  but  demanding  that 
it  should  be  recognised  as  paid  by  one  king  to  another. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   SUPPRESSION   OF   OLYNTHOS,    AND   THE 
LIBERATION   OF   THEBES. 

The  war  which  was  formally  closed  by  the   Peace  of 
Antalkidas  had  been  in  every  sense  miserable  and  de- 
grading.    Its  beginning  was  due  to  Persian       jy,i,erable 
subsidies;  its  end  to  Persian  dictation.     For      [^^^"[J;;^^ 
eight  years  it  had  dragged  its  weary  length, 
bringing  not  a  single   blessing,  but  fraught  with   many 
curses  which    permanently   injured    tlie    life  of  Greece. 
From  it  may  be  dated  that  systematic  use 
of  mercenaries  which  encouraged   a  selfish      .V^^rie'sT"* 
inertness  among  the  masses  at   home   and 
dangerous  licentiousness  in  the  free  companies  abroad, 
and   diverted   the   energies   of  the  ablest  citizens   from 
patriotic  objects  to  the  baser  pursuit  of  plun- 
der and  military  fame.    Besides  this,  the  rav-      J^.I^d^.l-^'' 
ages  of  Spartan  marauders  in  Corinth  and 
Akarnania  were   marked  by  a  ruthless  ferocity  and  a 
permanence  of  ruin  which  was  a  new  feature  in  Greek 
warfiire,  and  was  probably  learnt  in  their 
Asiatic  campaigns  against   the  barbarians ;      biitered 
and,  further,  the  revengeful  hatred  of  party      \^^l  ^*^^^- 
feuds  and  political  dissensions  had  become 
more  intense,  while  the  national  honour  had  grown  so 


^'maji-gwv-f 


KS 


T/i^  Sitppression  of  Olyntho^.         B.C.  385. 


CH.  X. 


Restoration  of  Plitaia, 


153 


Sparta  as 
executor  of 
the  peace. 


callous  that  it  seemed  quite  natural  for  Greeks  to  submit  to 

the  behests  of  the  Ocat  King,  and  the  glory  of  Sparta 

gained  fresh  lustre  in  their  eyes  by  her  dis- 

4.  Blunted         tin«niished position  ashisconfidential  servant. 

patriotism.  '^  .        ^  r   i      i 

She  was   m    fact  more    powerful  than  ever, 
though  her  policy  towards  Athens  had  been  weak  and 
vacillating,  marked  sometimes  by  unscrupulous  tyranny, 
and  at  others  by  a  lenity  exercised  so  ungracioubly  as  to 
inspire  no  friendliness.    Though  her  schemes 
of  Asiatic  conquest  had  been  thwarted  by  the 
inevitable  results  of  her  arrogance  in  Greece, 
yet  again  she  stood  forth  without  a  rival.     The  destinies 
of  the  Hellenic  race  were  again  in  her  hands ;  but  she 
had  learnt  nothing,  and  she  had  forgotten  nothing.     Her 
policy  was  still  the  narrowest   Lakonism  ;  to  wipe  out  in 
blood  all  slights  and  insults  was  her  chief  object.     Her 
duties  as  interpreter  and  executor  of  the  Ocat  King's 
peace  were  discharged  solely  with  reference  to  her  own 
interests.    Some  of  the  Peloponnesian  cities  thought  fondly 
that  the  word  'autonomy  '  would  allow  them  to  expel  their 
oliuarchs  and  set  up  a  constitution  more   in  conformity 
with  their  own  wishes  ;  but  they  soon  learnt  their  mistake, 
when  Sparta  intervened  to  re-establish  the  deposed  gov- 
ernment. 

Of  her  opponents.  Athens  had  perhaps  gained  a  little. 

By  the  terms  of  the  peace  she  was  acknowledged  to  be 

no  longer  a  mere  subject  of  Sparta,  but  an 

Results  to  independent  state,  whose  views  and  wishes 

Athens,  '  ,  •  i  •  i      .  i         u 

were  worth  some  consideration  ;  r)ut  her  hon- 
our was  deeply  stained  by  the  al^andonment  not  only  of 
the  Asiatic  Greeks,  but  of  the  heroic  and  enlightened  Kua- 
goras.  The  jealousy  of  Thebes  had  been  aroused  by  the 
deference  shown  to  the  interests  of  Athens,  and  the  real 
object  of  the  whole  war— to  check  the  power  of  Sparta  to 


*^ 


interfere  in  the  affairs  of  all  Greece-had  been  entirely 
forgotten   in   the   conditions   of   the   peace.       ,„  Thebes. 
Thebes  had  probably  gained  more,  not  indeed 

in  material  aggrandisement,  but  '"  "-[^^^  "'^^s'l^^.j;^ 
was  degraded  fron.  her  posit.on  as  head  of  the  15o.ot.an 
confederacy,   or  r.-ither    the    confederacy   was   entirely 
broken  i     she  was  surrounded  by  I'hoUis,  Thesp.a.. 
Orchomenos,  and  other  implacable  foes.    The  subord.- 
nation  of  Corinth  to  Spartan  dictation  had  robbed  her  of 
her  best  protection  against  attack.    On  the  other  hand  the 
sprit  whL  she  had  displayed  in  her  ind.gnant  rejection 
of  the  Spartan  decree  forbidding  the  states  of  Creece  to 
harbour  the  exiles  f.om  Athens,  had  developed  .nto  a 
resolute  bravery,   against  which  not  even      ^^^^_^_^ 
Spartans  could  stand  their  ground  ;  and  the      .e,™res  in 
terrific  struggle  of  Koroncia  dimly  forcshad- 
^d  the  rTsistless  onset  of   Leuktra.     Co.,seqtjent  y 
was   a-ainst  Thebes  that  Sparta   m  her  day  of  power 
^irecied  her  most  vigorous  treasures.     >--  ^-<- 
towns,  all  of  which,  except  Orchomenos  and  The  P-  ■^^'l 
been  willing  adherents  of  the  confederacy,  oligarchical 
eo  ernments  were  established,   and  Spartan  harn^osts 
Stat  oned.    Nor  did  the  efforts  of  Sparta  to  secure  Bo.otia 
end  here     As  she  could  unmake  cities,  so  she  could  make 
them.    The  fiat  went  forth  that  the  name  of      ^^^^^^^^^^ 
I'htaia  which  by  Spartan  injustice  had  been      „f  pi^,^ia. 
rruellv'erased  from  the  map  of  Greece  forty 
years  before,  should  live  again,  that  the  walls  and  town 
Ihould  be  rebuilt,  and  that  the  descendants  of  the  old 
nh.:lnts  should  return.     They  had  been  ousted  Irom 
their  homes  by  Archidamos,  and  dr.ven  to  Athcis ,  tl  ey 
Sbeen  hunted  by  Lysandros  ^^'^^  ^^^^^^^^^ 
Athenians  had  assigned  them  as  a  refuge,  '-^"^  drnen  to 
Athens  again ;  and  now  at  last  they  were  restored  to  thc.r 


_     "I     !»    l"*!.*'-* 


FajBiwiafttifeMiaaiia 


'54  The  Supprrsshm  of  O/ynlhos.         n.c.  383. 

ancient  home  high  on  tlie  rugged  slopes  of  Mount  Kithai- 
ron,  not  indeed  because  Sparta  bhishcd  for  her  cruelty  in 
destroying  a  city  so  brave  and  gloricnis.  but  that  the  new 
Plataia  might  l)e  hckl  as  a  stronghold  against  her  tra- 
ditional enemy,  m.l  embitter  still  further  the  growing 
jealousy  between  Thebes  and  Athens. 

Soon  there  came  to  the  Spartans  from  an  entirely  fresh 
quarter  an  appeal,  that  they,  as  the  champions  of  the 
Appeal  of  pnnciple  of  autonomous  isolation,  and  the 

the  Akan-  swom  foes  of  all  confederacies,  should  inter- 

against  fere  to  repress  the  dangerous  growth  of  a  new 

power.  Consider,  cries  the  envoy,  '  whether 
It  is  reasonable  for  you  to  take  such  care  to  prevent  the 
union  of  lioiotia.  and  yet  to  overlook  entirely  the  com- 
bination of  a  far  greater  power— a  p..wer  which  is  gain- 
ing strength,  not  only  by  land  but  also  In-  sea.  rich  in 
timber  for  ship-building,  in  tribute  from  many  ports  and 
seats  of  commerce,  in  a  teeming  population,  and  a  fertile 
soil.'     Such  is  the  language  in  which  the  envoy  sent  by 

Growth  of         ^^^^  ^'^'^'"^  of  Akanthos  and  Ap<.llonia  describes 
the  oiyn-  the  young  confederacy  of  Olynthos.     Of  its 

fcderacy"'  '"'^^^  1'^^'^  is  kuown.     Tho   King  of  Maced(jn 

had  been  driven  from  his  kingdom  by  the  at- 
tacks of  the  Illyrian  and  other  neighbouring  tribes.  The 
cities  on  the  sea-coast  tlew  to  Olynthos  for  protection; 
liberal  terms  were  granted  to  the  suppliants— common 
laws,  and  equal  rights  of  citizenshij).  intermarriage,  pro- 
prietorship, and  commerce.  The  condition  of  the 
Makedonian  cities  under  their  bloody  and  unscrupulous 
monarchs  could  not  have  been  enviable;  and  it  was 
natural  enough  that  the  confederacy  thus  formed  should 
spread  rapidly,  even  as  far  as  the  great  town  of  Pella. 
But  its  development  was  checked  by  two  large  and 
important  cities,  and  the  Olynthians  threatened  to  force 


CFI.  X, 


Expnfif/otis  (ij^amsf  Olynthos. 


155 


' 


upon  them  the  blessings  of  their  alliance  in  spite  of  their 
old-fashioned  wish  to  keep  entirely  to  themselves  and 
manage  their  own  affairs.     These  recalcitrant 
neighbours  did  not  deny  that  their  admission       cVf^SXs 
to  the  confederacv  would  probablv  jrain  for      f*"^  ^poU 
them  mcreased  prosperity  and  security;  and 
they  even  confessed  that  if  they  once  tried   the  experi- 
ment, the  citizens  would  be  won  over  to  the  advantages 
of  federation.     Hut  tlioir  envoy  states  frankly  their  one 
objection  :  *  We  uish  to  use  our  hereditary  laws  and  to  be 
a  city  by   ourselves;*  and  he  works  skilfully  upon  the 
fears   of    Si)arta,    with    hints   about    an    Athenian    and 
Boiotian  alliance,  and  the  divine  law  by  which  increasing 
power   produces   always   a    corresjjonding    increase    of 
ambition.     The  j^rayer  of  the  envoy  was  seconded  by  an 
embassy    from    the    Makedonian    monarch;     and    the 
Spartans   resolved   to  suppress   Olynthos— a    resolution 
consistent  with  the  narrow  and  short-sighted  terms  of  the 
Peace  of  Antalkidas,  but  fatal  to  the  generous  and  states- 
manlike scheme  which  would  have   proved  in  years  to 

come  the  most  effective  obstacle  to  Makedonian  aggression. 
By  the  special  request  of  the  Akanthians,  who  urged 
that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Eudamidas  was  sent^'off 
at   once   with    2.000   men.      lie   won    over 
Potidaia,  and  garrisoned  some  towns,  but  his       ^Sh  ^"  ^''' 


tions 


force  was  too  small  for  any  great  results.    His       against 
brother,  I'hoibidas,  was  tr)  follow  with  the  rest  ^"*  °^' 

of  the  army  as  soon  as  was  convenient,  and  his  march 
would  take  him  close  to  Thebes.  Though  Xcnophon.  to 
screen  the  Spartans  from  the  black  guilt  of  the  perfidy 
which  followed,  describes  Phoibidas  as  a  man  who  loved  a 
brilliant  exploit  better  than  life  itself,  and  not  blessed  with 
great  reasoning  powers,  or  even  with  common  prudence, 
there  can  belittle  doubt  that  the  encampment  of  Phoibidas 

M 


I 


156 


TV/c  Sii/ipn-ssion  of  0/ynt/ws.        B.C.  383. 


v-S 


CH.  X. 


Arrest  of  Ismcttms. 


157 


near  the  gymnasium  outside  Thebes  was  not  a  pure  acci- 
dent, and  that  the  story  is  well  founded,  accordino^  to 
which  he  received  before  he  started  secret  orders  from 
Agesilaos  and  the  ephors  to  take  any  opportunity  for  the 
seizure  of  Thebes  which  might  present  itself.  In  Thebes 
itself  the  strife  of  factions  ran  high,  and  each 
IxlTot  party  had  its  representative  as  polcmarch.  or 

Thebes.  vvar-officer,  in  the  highest   official  position. 

Ismenias  was  the  leader  of  the  democrats  ;  he  regarded 
the  Spartan  encampment  outside  the  walls  as  no  business 
of  his.  and  kept  away  from   it.     Not  so  his 
Ismenias.  colleague,  Lcontiadcs.  who  was  the  most  in- 

fluential member  of  the  oligarchical  faction.     I  le  became 
a  frequent  visitor  to  the   Lakedaimonian  camp,  and  ex- 
plained to  Phoibidas  the  scheme  of  the  philo-Lakonian 
party  inside  the  town.     The  plot  was  simple 
TangeTby         enough.     On  the  great  festival  of  Demcter, 
Leoniiades,        ^^^  Kadmeia,  or  citadel,  was  given  up  to  the 
sole  use  of  the  Theban  women,  the  gates  were  closed,  and 
the  key  would  be  given  into  the  custody  of  himself  as 
polemarch  ;  and  he  accordingly  offered  to  introduce  Phoi- 
bidas and  his  hoplites  into  the  citadel  without  bloodshed 
or  difficulty.     He  assured  the  Si^artan  general  that  when 
this  was  done  the  whole  town  would  at  once  submit  to 
the  oligarchical  party;  and  that  he  would  thus  gain  not 
only  a^aluable  reinforcement  for  his  army,  but  become 
master  of  a  city  far  more  important  than  Olynthos  itself. 
Phoibidas  could   not  and  did    not  hesitate.      If  Spartan 
troops  were  to  act  with  safety  against  Olynthos.  it  was 
fatal  to  leave  directly  on  the  line  of  march  an  important 
position  in  the  hands  of  a  hostile  population.     It  must  be 
secured  at  all  risks,  and  might  possibly,  if  the  present  op- 
portunitv  were  lost,  cost  Sparta  a  bloody  and  protracted  war. 
In  Thebes  it  was  a  day  of  high  festival.     The  hearts 


«'w» 


of  the  democrats  were  relieved,  for  it  was  known  that  the 
Spartans  had   received  orders  to  break  up      Kidmeia 
their  camp   and   march   northwards.      The      seized  by 

,  11-1         IMioibidus 

sultry  glare  of  a  summer  s  noon  had  emptied 
the  streets,  and  the  senators,  having  resigned  the 
Kadmeia  to  the  devotions  or  the  orgies  of  the  women, 
were  transacting  their  business  in  a  portico  near  the 
market-place.  Such  was  the  moment  skilfully  chosen  by 
Leontiadcs  for  the  e.xccution  of  his  impious  and  perfidious 
design.  The  traitor  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  after 
Phoibidas,  who  ordered  his  troops  to  face  about,  and  fol- 
lowed his  guide  through  the  deserted  streets  and  up  the 
slope  of  the  seven-gated  citadel.  Lcontiades  then  gave 
the  keys  to  the  Spartan  general,  and  hastened  to  the 
Senate.  Here,  according  to  the  plan  previously  concerted 
with  his  supporters,  he  announced  that  the  Spartans  were 
in  possession  of  the  Kadmeia,  and  bade  the  senators  not 
to  be  alarmed.  '  lUit  1,'  he  continued,  'who  am,  as  pole- 
march,  allowed  by  the  law  to  arrest  anyone  who  seems  to 
be  guilty  of  crimes  worthy  of  death,  arrest  this  man, 
Ismenias,  as  a  stirrer  up  of  war.  And  do  you,  guards, 
rise  and  seize  him,  and  take  him  off  to  the  place  ap- 
pointed.' Surprised  by  the  suddenness  of 
the  attack,  intimidated  by  the  presence  of  ismenias. 
the  Spartans  in  the  citadel,  and  conscious  that 
their  wives  and  daughters  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy, 
the  democrats  made  no  attempt  to  rescue  Ismenias.  Ar- 
chias.an  oligarch,  was  chosen  polemarch  in  his  place,  and 
300  of  the  leading  democrats  made  their  escape  to  Athens. 
Having  so  easily  accomplished  his  design,  Lcontiades 
set  off  at  once  to  take  the  news  to  Sparta.  ^^^^^  ^^  . 
Here,  as  in  the  whole  of  Greece,  the  event      this  news  at 

.,  ,       ,         Sparta. 

created  the  utmost  excitement.     Sparta  had 

for  some  years  been  split  into  two  opposing  parties,  each 


158 


The  Siifipression  of  Olynthos.         n.c.  383. 


iS 


CH.  X. 


Execution  of  Ismcnias. 


159 


headed  by  one  of  the  kinjijs.  AgesipoHs  and  his  friends 
were  the  advocates  of  legality  and  moderation  :  they  had 
tried  to  secure  some  respect  for  the  ri;j;hts  of  the  subject 
states,  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  Spartan  supremacy,  and 
to  avoid  the  perils  to  which  a  policy  of  terrorism  ami 
coercion  must  inevitably  lead.  At^esilaos,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  the  leader  of  the  war  party  :  with  them  the 
sword  was  the  short  and  sharp  remedy  for  all  opposition  ; 
and  as  they  had  made  the  peace,  so  they  would  use  it,  for 
the  interests  of  Sparta  alone.  This  division  of  feelini;  may 
account  for  the  verdict  which,  according  to  I'lularch,  made 
all  Greece  marvel  at  the  inconsistency  which  punished  the 
doer  but  approved  the  deed.  Agesilaos,  when  Thoibi- 
das  was  brought  to  trial,  came  forward  in  his  defence, 
and  stated  plainly  that  the  sole  point  worthy  of  consider- 
ation was  whether  the  act  of  l*hoibidas  was  advantageous 
to  Sparta  or  not  ;  if  it  was  hurtful  he  deserved  to  be 
punished,  but  if  it  w:is  for  the  benefit  of  Sparta,  it  was  an 
established  principle  that  a  man  might  act  on  his  own 

responsibility.  This  trenchant  argument  was 
^•i"^^""  '^"       seconded  by  Leontiades,  with  the  most  abject 

professions  of  subservience  to  Spartan  advan- 
tage. Phoibidas  was,  nominally  at  any  rate,  tined  and 
removed  from  his  command  ;  but  three  harmosts  and  a 
strong  garrison  were  sent  to  hold  the  Kadmeia  for  Sparta. 
The  pious  Xenophon  regards  the  mingled  profanity 
and  injustice  of  this  act  as  so  flagrant  that  the  gods  could 

not  overlook  it  but  made  Thebes  the  scourge 
thr;?ct'of"^  for  the  chastisement  of  Spartan  wirkedness, 
Phoihi.las  because  it  had  been  the  scene  of  their  most 

dibcusscd. 

heinous  crime.  Yet.  by  the  recognised  prin- 
ciples of  Spartan  policy,  the  act  was  a  necessity,  capable 
of  considerable  palliation.  She  had  never  regarded  the 
democratic  party  in  the  cities  of  Greece  as  worthy  of  any 


•«^. 


consideration.  The  only  real  citizens  were  the  loyal 
oligarchs,  and  the  pestilent  demagogues  were  treated  as 
in  a  chronic  stabe  of  rebellion.  The  Kadmeia  had  been 
seized  in  the  interests  and  by  the  contrivance  of  the  only 
class  who  had  a  right  to  have  any  voice  in  the  matter. 
Nay,  more,  the  deed  had  been  done  not  only  with  the 
sanction,  but  under  the  actual  leadership  of  the  highest 
civic  authority.  There  had  been  no  theft  or  violence  in 
the  seizure  of  the  keys  of  the  citadel ;  they  had  been 
voluntarily  handed  over  to  Phoibidas  by  the  official  who 
rightfully  had  them  in  his  custody.  Again,  it  might  be 
urged  that  Thebes,  having  refused  her  contingent  to  the 
forces  raised  against  Olynthos,  and  being  actually  in 
treaty  with  the  enemy,  was  virtually  at  war  with  Sparta, 
and  that  the  act,  even  if  a  little  treacherous  against  bel- 
ligerents of  equal  rank,  was  justifiable  enough  against 
contumacious  rebels.  Viewed  in  the  light  of  these  plausible 
arguments,  the  verdict  against  Phoibidas  was  sufficiently 
severe  ;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  ever 
enforced. 

The  subsequent  execution  of  Ismenias  is  capable  of 
far  less  defence.  He  was  dragged  to  Sparta,  and  tried 
before  a  novel  tribunal,  consisting  of  three 
commissioners  from  Sparta  and  one  from  execution  of 
every  city  in  alliance  with  her.  The  definite  l^memas. 
charges  brought  against  him  were,  that  he  had  allied  him- 
self with  and  received  money  from  the  Great  King  to  do 
harm  to  (ireece,  and  that  he  had  been  a  prime  mover  m 
all  the  late  disturbances.  '  Against  these  charges,'  says 
Xenophon,  *  he  defended  himself;'  and  indeed  it  was  no 
difficult  matter  to  fling  them  back  in  the  teeth  of  his  accusers. 
'  He  could  not,  however,  make  it  believed  that  he  was  not 
a  man  of  great  and  dangerous  designs,  so  he  was  con- 
demned  and  executed ;   but  the  faction  of   Leontiades 


ta»jM>^'.»'i«Matj<i.jafa«a..ViL.f:T . 


«LJ^ClSttik^fmurMll*    ■  '     -.^  '  - 


uaufttMWMKttWi'J'-tSg^tfi" 


i6o 


The  Suppression  of  Olynthos.         B.C.  382. 


kept  possession  of  the  city,  and  continued  to  serve  the 
Spartans  even  more  zealously  than  their  orders  required.' 
But  the  Spartans  had  no  right  to  try  Ismcnias  at  all  as  a 
criminal.  It  was  a  mere  mockery  to  summon  a  bigoted 
oligarch  from  each  city  to  try  a  man  whose  only  crime 
was  that  he  was  a  democrat.  The  charges  against  the 
defendant  completely  broke  down,  and  he  was  executed 
without  even  a  show  of  justice.  To  the  Spartans,  how- 
ever, the  end  justified  the  means.  The  city  of  Thebes 
was  no  longer  a  bitter  foe,  but  a  slave  submissively  antici- 
pating the  master's  orders ;  and  the  war  against  the 
Olynthian  confederacy  could  be  prosecuted  without  fear 
of  intercepted  communications. 

But,  in  spite  of  this  important  advantage,  the  Spartans 

found  that  they  had  undertaken  no  easy  task.     An  army 

of  10,000  men  was  despatched  to  reinforce 

operations         Eudamidas,  and  was  increased  by  very  con- 

against  sidcrable  accessions  on  its  march.    Telcutias, 

Olynthos. 

the  brother  of  Agesilaos,  who  had  proved 
himself  a  naval  commander  of  great  ability  and  courage, 
was  appointed  to  lead  the  expedition  ;  for  it  was  thought 
that  his  remarkal)le  popularity  would  conciliate  half- 
hearted or  reluctant  allies.  But  the  Olynthians  kept  up  a 
vigorous  resistance,  especially  by  the  efficiency  of  their 
cavalry  ;  and  though  at  first  they  suffered  considerable 
reverses  and  could  scarcely  shew  themselves  outside  the 
walls,  later  in  the  season  they  succeeded  in  attacking  the 

Spartans  at  a  disadvantage,  killing  Teleutias, 
Tekutias.  ^nd   Utterly  dispersing  his  army.     But  the 

Spartans  had  now  no  other  enemy  on  their 
hands;  and,  far  from  being  disheartened  or  giving  up 
their  purpose,  they  resolved  the  more  earnestly  to  recover 
their  lost  honour.  Agesipolis  was  sent  at  the  head  of  a 
third  army,  but,  after  some  small  successes,  he  fell  a  vic- 


CH.  X. 


Submission  of  Olynthos. 


161 


tim  to  fever,  brought  on  by  the  extreme  heat.     Polybiades, 

who  took  his  place,  drew  the  blockade  closer  round  the 

doomed  city,  and  reduced  the  inhabitants  to 

such  straits  that  they  were  forced  to  sue  for      ^^J^l^^^fis. 

peace.     They  were  obliged  to  dissolve  their 

own   confederacy,    and    to   join    the    Spartan    alliance, 

swearing  to  have  the  same  friends  and  foes  as  the  Lake- 

daimonians,  and  to  follow  them  whithersoever      ^  ,    .    . 

Submission 

they  should  lead.     In  suppressmgthis  gener-      of  olynthos. 
ous  and  attractive  league,  the  Spartans  could 
not  foresee  that  they  were  only  playing  the  game  of  the 
Makcdonian  monarchy,  and  paving  the  way  for  the  sub- 
jection of  Hellas  to  the  northern  aggressor. 

At  this   moment  the  power  of   Sparta   by  land  had 
reached  its  height.     The  last  remnant  of  opposition  in 
the  Peloponnese  had  just  died  away  with      The  mo- 
the  surrender  of  Phlious.     The  impregnable      "^^^^.^ 
height  of  the  Akrokorinthos  and  the  strong      ^'^^^^^^ 
fortress  of  the  Kadmeia  were  held  in  strict 
obedience  to  her  will.     From  Athens  she  had  nothing  to 
fear.      The  Athenians  were  still  exhausted  by  the  war, 
isolated  from  all  allies,  and  devoting  their  slowly  reviving 
energies  to  the  formation  of  a  new  maritime  confederacy. 
The  skilful  and  conciliatory  behaviour  of  Agesilaos  had 
healed  the  old  feud  between  kings  and  ephors,  and  under  I 
his  guidance  Spartan  pohcy  was  effective,  vigorous,  and 
consistent.     The  allied  army  had  been  reorganized.     In 
every  city  Sparta  could  count   on  the  aid  of   devoted 
adherents;    and   she  was  supported  by   alliances   with 
powerful  tyrants  as  far  apart  as  Sousa,  Aigai,  and  Syra- 
cuse.    But  the  vengeance  of  heaven  was  hanging  over 
her ;  the  thunderbolt  of  the  wrath  of  the  gods  was  soon 

to  fall. 

For  four  long  years  the  Theban  exiles  at  Athens  had 


1 62 


Thi'  Suppression  of  Olynthos.         B.C.  379- 


waited   till   the   day   of   reckoning   should  come.      The 
Spartans  had  sent  letters  to  the  Athenians 

Theban  ^ 


exiles  ;it 
Athens. 


forbidding  them  to  receive  the  fugitives,  and 
ordering   the   expulsion   of   those  who   had 
already  sought  refuge  among  them.     lUii.  remembering 
tlie  conduct  of  the  Thebans  toward  themselves  in  pre- 
cisely similar  circumstances,  the  Athenians  treated  them 
both  publicly  and  privately  with  generous  kindness  and 
hospitality.     From  time  to  Mme  news  was  brought  to  tlie 
exiles  of  the  gross   tyranny   under  which  their  fellow- 
citizens  were   groaning.      Leontiades,    chief  of  the  oli- 
garchs, was  an   able   politician,   active,  devoted   to   his 
principles,  vigilant  in  detecting  and  repressing  opposition 
and  disaffection.     Archias.  his  most  important  colleague, 
was  of  a  different  stamp,  unscrupulous  and  ambitious,  but 
greedy  of  power  chietly   as  a  means  of  gratifying  his 
passions.     Of  the  actual  condition  of  the  city  under  the 
oligarchs  we  have  no  positive  details ;  but  that  the  gov- 
ernment rested  on   terrorism  may  be  inferred  from  the 
willingness  of  the  people  to  revolt,  and  the  large  number 
of  prisoners  found  in  the  gaol.     Hut  not  even  the  vigi- 
lance of  Leontiades  could  prevent  the  Theban  youth  from 
training  themselves  for  the  coming  struggle.     Devoted  to 
athletic  exercises,  and  inordinately  proud  of  their  muscu- 
lar strength,  they  were  taught  by  Kpameinondas  to  try 
conclusions  with  the  Spartans  in  the  wrestling  ring,  that 
they  might  learn  to  face  them  with  a  bold  front  in  more 
serious  contests.     But  the  time  for  warfare  and  open  in- 
vasion seemed  still  far  distant,  and  the  patience  of  the 
exiles  was  exhausted.     One  of  the  most  distinguir,hed 
among  them  had  been   assassinated  at  Athens  by  the 
hired  agents  of  the  Theban  oligarchs ;  one  of  their  most 
devoted  friends  in  Thebes  had  been  arrested,  and  lay 
in  danger  of  his  life.     I'elopidas  told  them  openly  that 


CH.  X. 


Assassination  of  Archias. 


163 


it  was  impious  and  shameful  to  forget  their  country's  suf- 
ferings, and  live  lazily  at  Athens,  dependent      pj^^  against 
on  the  fiivour  of  the  populace ;  and  he  exhort-      the  1  i.cban 
ed  them  to  take  the  bold  Thrasyboulos  for 
their  pattern.     As  his  enemies  had  set  the  example  of 
assassination,  he  probably  had  the  less  hesitation  in  using 
an  expedient  from  which  modern  consciences  recoil,  but 
which  was  in  this  case,  if  ever  in  any,  justifiable. 

The  enterprise  seemed  desperate  indeed.     On  an  in- 
clement December  day,  Telopidas,  Mellon,  and  five  (or, 
according  to  Plutarch,  ten)  other  confederates       ^^^^^  .^_^^ 
left  Athens  in  the  dress  of  hunters,  and  made      and  his 

.  ,_,  ,  companions 

their  way  to  Mount   kithairon.      1  here  they       enter 
remained  while   they  sent  a  messenger  to      i'»ebes. 
Thebes  to  inform  their  accomplices  of  their  approach, 
and  to  wait  for  instructions.     Among  their  friends  inside 
the  town,  the  two  from  whom  they  looked  for  most  assist- 
ance were  Phyllidas  and  Charon  :  the  former,  the  con- 
fidential secretary  of  the  polemarchs  themselves,  who  had 
been  won  over  to  their  cause  on  an  official  visit  to  Athens; 
the  latter,  a  citizen  of  wealth,  whose  house  was  to  be  their 
hiding-place  till  the  moment  of  action  should  arrive.     All 
the  arrangements  were  perfect.      Phyllidas  had  invited 
Archias  and  some  other  leading  oligarchs  to  a  banquet, 
and  had  promised  to  introduce  after  the  feast  some  of  the 
finest  ladies  in  Thebes  as  company  for  them ;  and  Charon 
had  ordered  a  few  of  the  most  resolute  and  trustworthy 
democrats  to  meet  at  his  house.     On  hearing  this,  the 
exiles  came  on  from   Kithairon  by  different  roads,  and 
under  cover  of  the  darkness  and  a  timely  snow-storm 
entered  the  city  unobserved. 

Forty-eight  conspirators  were  assembled  in  the  house 
of  Charon,  and  were  in  the  act  of  girding  on  their  armour, 
when  a  messenger  came  to  summon  him  into  the  presence 


164 


The  Liberation  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  379. 


of  Archias.     Thinking  that  all  was  discovered,  Charon 

obeyed  the  summons  and  brought  forth  his 

Assassina-         \\\x\q.  son  from  the  women's  apartment  to  the 

tion  01  \ 

Archias  and  conspirators  as  a  pledge  of  his  own  fidelity. 
But  the  oligarchs  were  already  healed  with 
wine ;  only  the  vaguest  rumours  of  danger  had  reached 
them,  and  Charon,  seconded  by  I'hyllidas,  was  easily 
able  to  quiet  their  suspicions.  Very  soon  afterwards  a 
despatch  was  brought  into  the  banqueting  chamber  from 
an  Athenian  oligarch,  giving  full  particulars  of  the  whole 
plot.  The  messenger  told  Archias,  as  he  delivered  it, 
that  it  was  about  most  urgent  business;  but  the  half- 
drunken  polemarch  thrust  it  under  his  pillow  unopened, 
saying  '  Urgent  business  may  wait  till  to-morrow.*  Had 
the  letter  been  addressed  to  Leontiades,  whose  character 
was  far  too  respectable  to  allow  him  to  be  asked  to 
such  an  orgie,  the  whole  plot  must  have  been  frustrated. 
Phyllidas  had  zealously  plied  his  guests  with  wine,  and 
they  were  clamouring  for  their  promised  companions. 
Mellon  and  his  party  were  meanwhile  waiting  in  an  ante- 
room, disguised,  some  as  ladies,  some  as  ladies'  maids, 
with  thick  wreaths  and  veils  to  shade  their  faces :  and 
Phyllidas  returned  with  the  answer  that  the  women  would 
not  come  in  while  the  servants  were  in  the  room.  The 
attendants  were  dismissed  with  a  bountiful  supply  of  wine 
to  keep  them  employed;  and  at  once,  amid  the  clapping 
of  hands,  the  conspirators  entered  and  took  their  seats, 
each  next  to  an  oligarch.  The  agreement  was  that  as 
soon  as  they  were  seated,  they  should  raise  their  veils, 
and  kill  each  his  man.     So  died  the  Theban  tyrants. 

One  of  them,  however,  as  we  have  mentioned  above, 
had  not  been  invited  to  the  scene  of  debauchery,  and 
Pelopidas  and  his  companions  had  a  more  dangerous, 
if  not  a  more  difficult,  task  than  the  party  of  Mellon. 


i 


^* 


CH.  X.        Assassination  of  Tliehan  Oligarchs. 


165 


Leontiades. 


Leontiades  was  reclining  in  his  house  after  the  evening 
meal,  and  his  wife  sat  spinning  by  his  side  ;      ^ssassina- 
when  a  servant,  roused  bv  the  knocking  at      tion  of 
the  door,  went  out  and  enquired  the  busmess 
of  the  nocturnal  visitor.     On  hearing  the  reply,  that  he 
was  the  bearer  of  a  message  from  the  polemarchs,  Leon- 
tiades ordered  the  door  to  be  opened  to  admit  him  ;  and 
the  three  assassins    entered.     Seizing  a  weapon  in  self- 
defence,   he  slew  one  of  his  assailants  ;  but  he  was  at 
length  slain  by  Pelopidas.     Meanwhile  Phyllidas  had  led 
the  way  to  the  public  prison ;  and,  obtaining  admission  by 
a   pretended   order  from   the  government,  he   slew  the 
gaoler  and  set  free  the  astonished  prisoners.     These,  150 
in  number,  were  armed  at  once,  and  drawn  up  in  military 
order,  as  a  nucleus  round  which  the  growing  forces  of  the 
democrats  might  gather.     Messengers  were  sent  to  hasten 
the  march  of  the  main  body  of  exiles  who  were  on  their 
road  from  Athens ;  and  proclamation  was  made  through 
the  streets  that  the  citizens,  horse  and  foot,  should  come 
forth  in  full  force,  as  the  tyrants  were  dead.    Epameinondas 
and  Gorgidas  were  soon  on  the  spot  with  a  strong  force  of 
soldiers,  young  and  old;  but  as  the  confusion  in  the  city 
made    it    impossible   to  obtain  trustworthy    information, 
most  of  the  citizens  remained  in  their  houses,  and  waited 
for  the  day.     The  same  reason    prevented  the  Spartan 
harmosts  in  the  Kadmeia  from  resorting  to  any  measure 
more  vigorous  than  the  despatch  of  messengers  to  summon 
help  from  Thespiai  and  Plataia,  and  tjie  reception  of  the 
more  prominent  oligarchs  who  hastened  to  the  citadel  for 

refuge. 

With  the  first  dawn  of  day  the  exiles  marched  into  the 
town  from  Attica  ;  the  Theban  troops  who  had  been  organ- 
ised secretly  by  Epameinondas  shewed  themselves  in  full 
array,  and  a  general  assembly  of  the  people  was  held. 


and  liiv. 
friends 
made 
Boiotarchs. 


•66      •  The  Uknition  of  Tlubvs.  B.C.  379. 

Epameinondas  ,hou,M,  he  c.uld  no,  persuade  himself  ,0 
Mus.er  of  '''kc  any  personal  share  in  the  work  of  assas- 

.he  .w  smation,  ,ntroduced  IVlopidas  and  his  party 

r.,     >    >    u  ■"■  f^""«-ci'i^ens,  while  the  priests  sur- 

ro  nded  then,  w,th  ..trlands,  and  adjured  the  people  ,0 
...ht  for  the,r  country  and  their  «ods.  The  whole  aLxtbl! 

Gen..,,  '"'"  '"  ''"  "'^•■"  '"'""ur ;  and  wuh  shouts  of 

assembly.  applause  and  rin.;in-  cheers,  hailed  them  as 

YV  ,.  „      .      '.    '  '''■''^'^'■vers  and   benefactors  of  Ihebes 
y  .  h  hedeathoftheirtyrantsd,edalsotheirnarrow  ,     i^; 
Thebes  was  no,  only  to  be  free  herself,  but  the  he  ul  of  n 

rSed't:;^^'"'''^''''''''-'-^'^''--'''^^^^^^^ 

called  by  the  enthu^astic  acclamations  of  the  as- 
iVL.pijas  scmbly  ,0  form  the  jjovernment,  received  the 

revved  tide  of  lioiotarchs  instead  of  pole- 
marchs.      tner^-y   and   darin-   j;„ided   die 
counsels  of  the  new  rulers.      Ihe  reinforce 
ments  comm,  f.ou.   Pla.aia  to  the  garrison  were  b  ^I" 
back     the  assault  on  the  citadel  was  con,mcnced  with  the 
utmost  ardour,  and  the  coura.-e  of  the  assiil,„,c 
s^muhtted  by  the  o.er  of  pn^es  of  ^S::^^ ::, 
daung.     How  far  the  .Athenians  co-operated  with  their 
a  l,c.  ,s  not  accurately  known  ;  but  it  is  certain  ,   a,  one 
o     he,r  generals  suffered   death  and  another   tied  into 
eule,  on  account  of  their  forwardness  in  the  support  If 
Thebes  wlnle  .V.hens  was  still  at  peace  with  Spar^    n:e 
Spartan  har,r,osts,   intimidated  by  the  bold  .issiults  of 

The  Spar.  '""Cased   numbers,  offered  to  capitulate   if 

tans  evacu-  thcv  Were    allf>u-.-rI    f.^    r.,         1  . 

ate  the  '  aiKmccl  to  march  out  with  their 

Kadmeia.  arm..     The  terms  were  gladly  accepted,  and 

rh.  ,  Spartans  witlidrew.  meetin,^  at  Me-nra 

the  army  destined  to  relieve  them      Tn  .1.  r       ^^'^'^^ 

excitement  of  tK«  "^'^'  confusion  and 

excitement  of  the  surrender,  some  of  the  ohgarchs,  and 


I 


CH.  XI. 


Charaitif  of  Ptlopidiu. 


167 


I 


even  of  their  children,  were  slain  by  the  more  furious  of 
the  democrats ;  but  order  was  soon  restored,  possibly  by 
Athenian  help. 

Thebes  was  now  free ;  and  the  work  of  divine  venge- 
ance thus  begun  was  not  to  cease  without  fuller  and 
more  serious  accomplishment.  Throughout  all  Greece 
the  tidings  awakened  sympathetic  rejoicing,  and  Plutarch 
tells  us  that  the  exploit  was  called  by  the  Greeks  twin- 
sister  to  the  deed  of  Thrasyboulos ;  equal  in  its  daring, 
and  even  greater  in  its  results,  as  it  broke  the  chains  of 
the  Spartan  domination,  which  before  seemed  forged  of 
adamant.  Though  much  was  done,  more  yet  remained  ; 
and  it  was  fortunate  indeed  for  the  renovated  city  that 
she  numbered  among  her  sons  Pelopidas,  Pammenes, 
Gorgidas.  and  the  greatest  Greek  of  that  or  perhaps  of 
any  age,  Epameinondas. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


THE   RISE   OF   THEBES. 


Of  all  the  great   citizens  whom  Thebes  produced  at  this 
crisis,  the  two  most  eminent,  Pelopidas  and  Epameinondas, 
were  united  in  a  friendship,  so  constant  and      (Character 
so  elevated   as  to  become  the  admiration  of      of  Pdo- 

pulas. 

antic[U  ly.  'Amongst  a  thousand  i)oints  for 
praise  in  both.'  says  Plutarch,  'the  judicious  esteem 
nothing  equal  to  that  firm  friendship  which  they  preserved 
from  first  to  last.'  It  began  in  their  youth,  was  riveted 
by  the  devotion  with  which  TLpameinondas  defended  the 
life  of  his  wounded  friend  when  fighting  for  Sparta  in  the 
Peloponnese,  and  was  never  weakened  by  jealousy  or 
rivalry  during  their  public  life.  Pelopidas  was  noble  by 
birth,  rich  by  inheritance,  and  richer  still  by  marriage  \ 


ssssa^sss 


i68 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  379. 


CH.  XI. 


Character  of  Epameinondas. 


169 


but  he  was  the  lord  and  not  the  slave  of  his  money.  In 
all  the  externals  of  life  he  aimed  at  simplicity.  His 
fare  was  plain  ;  his  dress  no  costlier  than  that  of  the 
meanest  Thcban  ;  his  pleasures  were  inexpensive — the 
exercises  of  the  gymnasium  and  the  excitement  of  the 
chase.  And  yet  he  was  no  nig^jard,  but  em[)loyed  his 
wealth  to  relieve  the  necessities  of  the  most  deservinji 
among  his  poorer  countrymen.  Honour  and  glory  were 
the  objects  that  aroused  his  cupidity  ;  yet  his  was  a 
generous  ambition,  not  centred  in  self  alone,  but  tempered 
with  patriotism.  He  would  rise,  as  his  country  rose,  or 
would  not  rise  at  all.  Without  much  tincture  of  in- 
tellectual training,  he  had  been  too  long  associated  with 
Epameinondas,  and  had  drunk  too  deeply  of  the  new 
spirit  which  was  then  agitating  the  minds  of  the  nobler 
Thebans,  to  be  Boiotian  in  the  worse  sense  of  the  word ; 
and  no  mere  boor  could  have  won  such  distinguished  re- 
spect at  the  court  of  the  Great  King.  As  a  general,  he 
was  marked  by  a  daring  which  was  often  little  better  than 
imprudence.  But  the  same  reckless  audacity  which  cost 
him  his  life,  had  before  restored  to  Thebes  her  liberty. 
How  highly  these  qualities  were  esteemed  by  his  country- 
men, is  sufficiently  proved  by  his  fifteen  years  of  uninter- 
rupted command,  and  the  heartfelt  grief  which  his  soldiers 
manifested  at  his  death. 

Like  Pelopidas,  Epameinondas  was  sprung  of  a  noble 
race,  and  even  of  the  ancient  stock  of  the  Spartoi,  the 
...       .  sons  of  the  dragon's  teeth  ;  but  unlike  him, 

of  F.pi-  he  was  born  and  reared,  as  he   lived  and 

meinundas.  i-     1     •  •     •    1  • 

died,  m  poverty;  not  shrmkmg  even  from 
wounding  his  friend's  feelings  by  being  the  only  poor  man 
in  Thebes  who  would  not  be  his  pensioner.  Distinguished 
for  an  utter  contempt  for  wealth  and  pleasure,  he  gave 
himself  up  heart  and  soul  to  the  pursuit  of  philosoph>. 


.« 


1 


and  listened  eagerly  to  the  teaching  both  of  the  Sokratic 
and  the  Pythagorean  schools.     The  latter  had  the  more 
powerful  and  permanent  influence  on  him.     Ionia  was  its 
birthplace,  Magna  Graecia  the  home  of  its  maturity,  and 
from  it  Epameinondas  learnt  that  he  owed  a  patriotic 
allegiance  to  something  wider  than  Thebes  or  Boiotia; 
and'^he  resolved  to  be  true  in  all  his  life  and  in  all  his 
aims  first  to  Thebes,  but  above  all  to  Hellas.    In  Pelopidas 
there  was  something  of  provincialism;    Epameinondas 
may  be  taken  as  the  type  of  perfect  Hellenism.     He  was 
a  musician,  but  not  merely  in  the  Boiotian  sense.     He 
was  a  skilful  player  on  the  flute,  which  was  formed  from 
the  reeds  of  the  Kopaic  lake  ;  but  he  could  play  the  lyre  as 
well,  and  as  a  philosopher,  had  grasped  the  Hellenic  idea 
of  music  as  the  grand  rhythm  and  harmony  of  a  well- 
regulated   life.      So   in   the   gymnasium,  he  aimed   not 
merely  at  the  swollen  muscles  which  were  a  Boiotian's 
pride,  but  at  activity  and   suppleness,   that  his   bodily 
frame  might  be  perfectly  trained  for  the  service  of  his 
country  and  the  use  of  his  mind.     Oratory,  again,  was  a 
Hellenic  not  a  Boiotian  accomplishment ;  and  in  this  he 
was  pre-eminent,  for  though  it  was  said  of  him  that  no 
man  ever  understood  more  and  talked  less,  yet  he  deemed 
it  only  right  that  a  man  should  be  able  to  say  the  right 
thing  at  the  right  time,  to  expose  the  false  and  to  uphold 
the  true.     In  his  public  life,  when  he  resided  in  Thebes 
unmolested  by  the  oligarchs  as  a  man  too  poor  and  too 
speculative  to  be  dangerous,  he  was  elevating  his  fellow- 
citizens  by  his  personal  influence  and  teaching,  that  he 
might  make  them  worthy  of  their  future  freedom  and 
the  new  position  of  their  country.      As  a   general,  he 
broke  loose  from  the  narrow  systems  of  antiquated  tacti- 
cians, and  inspiring  his  own   immediate   division  with 
the  courage  that  glowed  in  his  own  breast,  he  made  the 


I70 


The  Rise  of  Tlicbcs. 


B.C.  379. 


CH.  XI.        spartan  Expedition  against  Boiotia. 


T7I 


physical  weight  of  its  onset  so  tremendous  as  to  be  well- 
nigh  irresistible.  Lastly  when  the  victorious  general  was 
merged  in  the  statesman,  his  policy  was  marked  by  the 
complete  absence  of  harshness  or  cruelty  to  his  conquered 
enemies,  for  he  remembered  that  they  were  (Greeks  like 
himself.  His  sympathies  were  so  wide  and  deep  that 
his  antipathies  were  weak.  He  came  to  quicken  and 
stimulate  politicnl  life,  not  to  repress  all  signs  of  inde- 
pendence :  he  loved  not  to  destroy  but  to  construct,  not 
to  isolate  but  to  combine  not  to  sunder  but  to  solder. 

The  work  which  lay  before  these  great  citizens  was 
one  which  would  task  to  the  utmost  their  powers  of  over- 
coming difticuhies,  overriding  o|)position,  and  concili- 
ating the  jeahnisies  of  rivals  and  the  prejudices  of  factions. 
Thebes  was  indeed  free;  but  she  could  not  stand  alone. 
The  key-note  of  the  new  jwlicy  was  struck  on  the  very 
Difficiiitio  ^^'^>'  "^  ^^^'''  I'l^cration.  when  her  magistrates 
if  Thebes  ^'^'^^  saluted  no  longer  as  polemarchs,  but 

Boiotarchs  as  of  yore.  All  Boiotia  was  to 
share  the  blessings  of  freedom,  for  it  was  necessary  that 
all  Boiotia  should  share  the  dangers  of  defence.  The 
reunion  of  Boiotia,  which  it  had  long  been  the  main 
object  of  Sparta  to  prevent,  now  became  the  essential 
condition  of  Theban  independence.  Though  in  every 
town  there  was  probably  an  influential  faction  which 
sympathised  with  this  object  and  exulted  in  the  expulsion 
of  the  Spartans,  yet  local  rivalry  and  oligarchic  selfish- 
ness would  die  hard;  and  the  necessity  for  a 
BanJ]'*'"^'''^  ^"^b'  «f  trustworthy  supporters  caused  I-.pa- 
meinondas  and  (iorgidas  to  revive  the  old 
Boiotian  institution  of  the  Sacred  Band,  which  hail  nearly 
half  a  century  before  won  renown  in  the  fight  at  Delion. 
Raised  especially  for  the  defence  of  the  Kadmcia,  this 
regiment,  300  strong,  was  armed  and  trained  at  the  public 


expense.  None  were  admitted  to  its  ranks  but  youths  of 
muscular  prowess,  tried  valour,  and  single-hearted  patri- 
otism ;  and  each  man  fought  by  the  side  of  the  friend 
whom  he  loved  best.  The  enthusiasm  of  such  a  corps 
was  contagious,  the  value  of  its  example  unspeakable ; 
courage  had  always  been  a  Theban  characteristic,  and 
willingness  to  submit  to  discipline  and  drill  was  all  that 
was  required  to  make  the  Boiotian  troops  second  to  none 
in  Hellas. 

The    news   of    the    insurrection    at   Thebes    naturally 
aroused  at  Sparta  the  deepest  anger  and  vex- 
ation.   Of  the  three  hannosts  who  had  so  pu-      expccTuion 
sillanimously  surrendered  the  Kadmeia,  two      '7^=!'"^* 

•'  b(MoUa 

were  slain  before  they  could  reach  Sparta,       under  Kle- 

,111  1  1      i-         1  1  •  oinbrotos. 

and  the  third  was  heavily  lined  and  sent  into 
exile.  In  spite  of  the  wintry  season,  the  Ephors  des- 
patched without  delay  an  expedition  against  the  rebel 
city.  Agesilaos  declined  the  command  on  the  plea  of  his 
advanced  age,  and  it  devolved  upon  Klcombrotos,  who  had 
succeeded  to  the  throne  on  the  death  of  Agesipolis,  and 
who  now  commanded  for  the  first  time.  The  campaign 
began  with  a  slight  success.  The  Lakedaimonian  light 
troops  cut  to  pieces  the  150  liberated  prisoners,  who  were 
guarding  the  passes  near  Plataia ;  but  the  conduct  of 
Klcombrotos,  who  had  seemingly  little  sympathy  with 
the  high-handed  policy  of  his  countrymen,  was  so  half- 
hearted that  his  men,  so  Xcnophon  tells  us,  were  sorely 
puzzled  to  know  whether  they  were  really  at  war  or  at 
peace  with  the  Thebans.  After  a  sixteen  days'  occupa- 
tion of  Boiotian  territory,  where  he  did  but  little  damage, 
he  led  home  his  army,  leaving  Sphodrias  at  Thespiai  in 
command  of  a  third  part  of  his  forces. 

This    ofificer,   whom    Plutarch   calls   a   man   of    more 
courage  than  wisdom,  fired  by  the  fame  gained  by  Phoi- 

N 


i 


n 


172 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  379- 


CH.  XI. 


New  Athenian   Confederaey. 


'73 


bidas  from  his  successful  seizure  of  the  Kadmeia.  and 
,,  ^   ,  .  rememberinir  how  nearly  Tcleutias  had  suc- 

attempts  to        cecdcd  in  surprising  the  Peiraieus  by  sea,  re- 
t'KeT  solved  to  try  to  effect  the  same  exploit  by  land : 

raieus ;  ^^^^  ^^^  assertions  of  Plutarch  and  Xenophon, 

that  he  was  stimulated  to  his  attempt  by  Theban  guile  or 
gold,    seem    improbable.      After    an    early    supper,    he 
marched    from   Thespiai,  intending   to   reach    Peiraieus 
before  sunrise  ;  but  when  the  rays  of  light  flashing  from  the 
temples  of  Eleusis  proclaimed  the  dawn,  the  soldiers  were 
still  in  the  Thriasian  plain,  and  their  hearts  failed  them. 
Ravaging  the  country  as  he  went,  Sphodrias  returned  to 
Thespiai.  ashamed  of  his  failure  in  a  deed  of  perfidy  which 
nothing  but  success  could  have  justified  even  to  Spartan 
consciences.   Unbounded  was  the  indignation  of  the  Athe- 
nians when  they  heard  of  the  peril  which  they  had  just 
escaped.     But  the  Spartan  ambassadors,  who  happened  to 
be  in  the  city,  disclaimed  any  complicity  with  the  attempt, 
and  assured  them  that  they  would  soon  hear  that  Sphodrias 
had  atoned  for  his  treachery  by  suffering  death  at  the 
hands  of  his  indignant  countrymen.     In  this  the  ambas- 
sadors spoke  what  they  believed  to  be  the  truth  ;  even 
Sphodrias  felt  that  his  fate  was  sealed.     To  fail  in  such 
an  enterprise  was  death  ;  and  the  strong  claims  of  policy 
which  urged  that  the  just  anger  of  the  Athenians  must 
be  appeased,  strengthened  the  weaker  considerations  of 
justice.    Hut  private  friendship  saved  the  cul- 
prit.    Archidamos,  the  son  of  Agesilaos,  was 
intimate  with  the  son  of  Si)hodrias,  and  by 
his  intercession  the  king  was  induced  to  spare  Sphodrias, 
asserting  that  it  would  be  hard  indeed  to  put  to  death  a 
man  of  so  honourable  a  character,  for  Sparta  was  sorely 
in  need  of  gallant  men  like  him. 

When  this  gross  miscarriage  of  justice  became  known 


is  tried 
and  ac- 
quitted. 


i 


1 


at  Athens,  the  Athenians  at  once  prepared  for  war.     Not 
only  was  the  Peiraieus  fortified  against  attack 

111  11  1  •  r  Formation 

by  land  or  sea,  while  new  ships  of  war  were      of  a  new 
built  with  all  speed,  and  a  new  system  of      amfede" 
taxation  was  imposed  upon  the  citizens,  but      ^^^^'^ 
envoys  were  sent   round    to  the    ii,Iands   and   maritime 
cities  of  the  Kgean,  inviting  them  to  form  a  new  con- 
federacy.    The   old  duties  and  claims  which  had  bred 
disaffection   in  the  confederation  of  Delos  were  kept  as 
far  as  possible  in   the  background  ;  the  most  unpopular 
privileges  of  the  presiding  State  were  formally  renounced. 
The  envoys  chosen  for  this  mission  of  conciliation  were 
Timotheos.  the  son  of  Konon  and  heir  to  his  popularity, 
Chabrias,  the  famous  general,  and  Kallistratos,  the  most 
noted  orator  of  his  time  ;  and  so   successful  were  they  in 
their  expedition  that  more  than    seventy  cities,   discon- 
tented with  the  rule    of  Spartan    harmosts   or    Persian 
satraps,   were   soon   enrolled     under  the   leadership   of 
Athens.     In  the  first  congress  of  the  new  confederacy,  an 
armament   was   voted   which    should   consist   of  20,000 
hoplites.  500  cavalry,  and   200  triremes.     But  this  enthu- 
siasm could  not  and  did  not  last  long.     To 
enforce  the  equipment  of  contingents  and  the      thuSllm*^"" 
payment  of  contributions  was  a  difficult  task  ;       and  real 

weakness. 

and  the  league,  which  promised  so  well  and 
seemed  so  hearty,  failed  in  actual  performance,  though 
its  moral  support  was  doubtless  of  great  value  to  Athens. 
Of  all  the  allies  which  the  Athenians  gained  at  this  time, 
none  was  so  important  as  Thebes.  Her  army  was  becom- 
ing every  dav  more  formidable  ;  her  jxcnerals      ^ .  , 

1  '    1  r  ^  nebes, 

were  the  equals  even  of  a  Chabrias  and  an      pressed  by 
Iphikrates  ;  and  her  devotion  to  the  cause  was       joShT' 
unquestioned.     Nor  is  it  matter  for  surprise      new  league. 
that  Thebes,  destined  so  soon  to  be  supreme  in  Greece, 


174 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


H.  c.  379. 


submitted  even  now  to  the  hegemony  of  Athens. 
Epamcinondas,  whose  spirit  inspired  her  counsels,  was 
not  a  man  to  wei^di  petty  and  provincial  jealousies  against 
the  liberty  of  Ilellas  ;  and  the  rh«.ban  position  was  most 
precarious.  Plataia,  Thcspiai,  .md  Orchomenos  were  held 
as  outposts  against  her,  to  cripi)le  her  defensive  opera- 
tions ;  and  though  at  the  hand  the  i)eace-loving 
Kleombrotos  she  had  suffered  but  little,  it  was  not  to  be 
expected  that,  if  in  the  coming  campaign  the  rancorous 
and  relentless  Agesilaos  took  the  field  against  her,  bhe 
would  escape  so  easily  again. 

The  Spartans  had  been,  doubtic^-,  discontented  with 
the  forbearing  spirit  which  Kleombrotos  had  shown  in  the 
previous  winter,  and  felt  also  that  since  Athens  and 
Thebes  had  joined  hands,  and  the  acquittal  of  Sphodrias 
had  made  Spartan  justice  a  byword  throughout  C.reece, 
the  occasion  demanded  their  utmost  efforts.  Hence,  for 
the  campaign  of  378  n.c.  Agesilaos  was  induceil  to  take 
command  of  the  army,  which  consisted  of  the  full  force  of 
the  Lakedaimonian  confederacy.  The  results,  however,  of 
the  expedition  were  but  small.  Having  traversed  the 
passes  of  Kithairon  without  difficulty.  Agesilaos  reached 
Thespiai,  but  found  that  the  Thebans  had 
secured  with  trench  and  palisade  the  most 
takes  the  Valuable  portions  of  their  territory.     After  a 

Thfhes'biit  g^^^'^  ^^^^^  o^  desultory  fighting,  he  penetrat<;d 
cfTects  ti^ig   obstacle,   ravaged    the   countrv    up   to 

little;  '^  1      '  '     ,1 

the  very  gates  of  Thebes,  and  tmallv  re- 
tired,  leaving  Phoibidas  in  command  at  Thespiai.  Such 
is  th^  account  of  the  campaign  given  by  Xenophon,  who 
characteristically  omits  its  most  noteworthy  feature.  To 
check  the  Spartan  advance,  the  Athenians  under  Chabrias, 
and  the  Thebans  under  Gorgidas  were  posted  on  a  range 
of  hills.     Agesilaos  began  the  attack  with  his  light  troops, 


B.C.    373 

Agesilaos 


CH.  XI. 


Campaigns  against  Thebes. 


175 


and  after  their  repulse  charged  up  with  his  hoplites.    But 
the  men  of  Chabrias  stood  firm,  with  their 
shields  resting  on  one  knee,  and  their  spears      tTen^age^ 
outstretched  to  meet   the  enemy ;    and   the      *.'\*^  V"''^**  . 

,  •'  1  liebaii  and 

troops  of  Gorgidas  followed  their  example.  Athenian 
Upon  this,  Agesilaos,  fearing  the  effect  of  this  ^'''"*^'"- 
novel  attitude  and  the  unshaken  courage  of  his  opponents, 
ordered  a  retreat  without  waiting  even  to  cross  spears. 
Such  an  incident  must  have  had  powerful  moral  results, 
not  only  on  the  troops  engaged,  but  also  throughout  all 
Boiotia  ;  and  the  effect  was  increased  soon  after  by  the 
success  of  the  Thebans  in  avenging  the  frequent  inroads 
of  the  active  Phoibidas,  by  slaying  the  captor  of  their 
citadel,  and  driving  back  his  troops  in  headlong  flight  to 
Thespiai. 

Nor  did  the  campaigns  of  the  next  two  years  bring  to 
the  Spartans  any  more  decided  advantage.     In  377  b.  c. 
Agesilaos,  by  a  skilful  stratagem,  succeeded 
in  penetrating  the  palisade  and  ravaging  the      JaignTS' 
country,  but  no  decisive  action  was  foudit  •       377  and  376 

•  *  '  B.  C. 

while  this  persistent,  though  desultory,  war- 
fare increased  the  efficiency  of  the  Theban  army  so  de- 
cidedly  that   the   shrewd    Antalkidas   seeing   Agesilaos 
wounded  in  a  skirmish,  exclaimed,  'Verily,  the  Thebans 
make  thee  a  good  requital  for  thy  kindness  in  giving  them 
lessons  in  war  against  their  wills.'     On  his  journey  home 
his  sound  leg — for  one  was  always   lame — received  an 
injury  which  caused  him  a  long  and  serious 
illness,  and  incapacitated  him  for  active  ser-      AgesUaos. 
vice  during  many  years.     Kleombrotos,  ac- 
cordingly, was  called  to  the  command  of  the  expedition 
of  376  B.C.     The  allies  were  weary  of  the  war,  the  general 
had   little   sympathy  with   it  ;  and  when   his  light-armed 
troops  suffered  a  reverse  from  the  Athenians  and  Thebans 


176 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  376. 


i 


who  had  occupied  Kithairon.  he  abandoned  the  expedi- 
tion  and  led  his  army  home. 

So  urgent  were  the  remonstrances  of  the  aUics.  who.  in 
a  congress  at  Sparta,  complained  that  the  spiritless  con- 
Thc  Spar-         ^uct  of  the  War  was  wasting  their  strength  and 
fl^eet.  Uuire      t'^crgies,  that  the  ephors  determined  to  raise 
net'Naxos.       ^l^^'^'^  ^^"^   ^^'"''^^   ^   ^\^c\sxKi,  blow  by  sea. 
Sixty  ships  were  quickly  manned,  and  placed 
under  the  command  of  Pollis  as  admiral.     The  Athenians 
were  at  once  reduced  to  great   straits   by  the  stoppage  of 
their  corn-ships.     They,  however,  soon   raised  a   fleet  of 
eighty  triremes,  and  gave   Chabrias   the  command  of  it. 
A  sharp  battle  ensued  near  Naxos.  in  which  the  Athenians 
were  completely  victorious.     More  than   half  the   Pelo- 
ponnesian  ships  were  taken  or  destroyed  ;  and  Chabrias. 
according  to  Diodoros,  might  have  inflicted  a  far  greater 
loss  had  he  not  been  warned  by  the  consequences  of  the 
fight  of  Arginousai  to  make  the  safety  of  the  crews  of 
the  eighteen  Athenian  wrecks  his  first  consideration. 

By  this  victory,  the  first  wliich  an  Athenian  fleet  had 
Athens  in-  ^^^'i^ed  since  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian 
creases  her        War,  Athens  was   relieved  from  the   peril  of 

naval  r        •  111 

power.  lamine;  and  with  enlarged  aml)ition.  she  fol- 

lowed up  her  success  by  sending  Chabrias 
and  the  young  Phokion  to  cruise  in  triumph  round  the 
Egean.  while  Timotheos.  after  the  fashion  of  old  time, 
sailed  round  the  Peloponnese,  strengthening  the  influ- 
ence of  Athens  in  the  western  islands,  and  diverting  the 
Spartans  from  attacking  Uoiotia  by  land.  This  interval 
Thebes  of  rest  was  utilised  by  the  Thebans  in  tight- 

h«au'  ^"'       ^'"'"K  their  grasp  over  the  lioiotian  towns. 
BoTcS;!"  ^^^  those  which   still  stood   firm    to  Spartan 

alliance,  the  proud  and  ancient  city  of  Orcho- 
menos  was  the  most  important.     The  garrison  of  this 


CH.  XI. 


I'ietory  of  Thebans  at  Tegyra. 


^77 


stronghold  consisted  mainly  of  two  Spartan  juorat,  or 
divisions  of  from  five  to  nine  hundred  men,  and  the  dar- 
ing Pelopidas  had  been  long  watching  his  opportunity  for 
a  surprise.     When,  however,  the  long-expected  moment 
of  attack  arrived,  Pelopidas,  who  had  with  him  only  the 
Sacred   Band  and  a   few  cavalry,  failed  in  his  attempt 
upon  the  town,   and.  while  retreating,  fell   in  with  the 
Spartan  garrison  near  Tegyra.     The  handful 
of  Thebans,  when  they  saw  the  numbers  of      T^fhe^'de- 
their  redoubtable  foes,  were  at  first  dismayed,      ^^-^^  ^^  ^^e 
and  one  of  them  exclaimed,  '  We  have  fallen       near"''"' 
into  the  hands  of  our  enemies.'     'Why  not       '^"'^eyra. 
say  that  they  have  fallen   into  ours?'  was  the  undaunted 
answer  of  Pelopidas.    Then,  forming  his  men  into  a  close 
body,  he  charged  with  a  vigour  so  irresistible  that  the 
Spartans  wavered,  and  their  two  generals  fell  in  the  first 
onset.     Supposing  that  after  all  the  Thebans  would  be 
content  to  be  allowed  to  escape  unharmed,  the  Spartan 
troops,  dividing  into  two  bodies,  made  a  lane  to  let  them 
pass  through  ;  but  Pelopidas,  attacking  each  of  the  divi- 
sions   in   turn,   put  the   whole    army  to  rout  with  great 
slaughter.     Though  the  numbers  engaged  on  either  side 
in  this  encounter  were  insignificant,  yet  it  was  none  the 
less  important.     Plutarch  calls  it  the  prelude  to  Leuktra, 
and,  with  the  pride   natural  to  a  Boiotian,  remarks  that 
this  battle   first  taught  the    rest  of   Hellas  that  men  of 
courage  and  resolution  were  not  bred  onlv  on  the  banks 
of  the  Eurotas.     The  Thebans  were  justly  elated  with 
their  success.    With  a  vastly  inferior  force  they  had  routed 
a  Spartan  army,  and  the  terror  of  their    name  brought 
beneath  their   sway  all   Boiotia.  except  Orchomenos  alid 
Its  dependency.  Chaironeia.     So  also  they  became  more 
aggressive  and   less  conciliatory;  they  refused   to  con- 
tribute their  quota  to  the  joint  expenses  of  the  Athenian 


OS  ^  •'^('.Si^^a*a36S8".SiS-.-«l«« 


178 


The  Rise  of  T/ifiu!^. 


B.C.  375. 


confederacy,  perhaps  rescnlinj;  some  sij^^ns  of  the  jealuu.^) 

which  Athens  undoubtedlv  felt  at  her  nei'di- 
«  *    374-  1  .  •  , 

hour  s  rai)id  rise  ;   and  to  punish  their  old 

tans  send  an  enemies,  the  Phukians,  for  their  Hiithful  ad- 
kicuni'brotus  hcsion  to  Sparta,  they  invaded  their  country, 
J.  help  the  ^j^^j  pressed  them  so  hard  that  Kleombrotos 
aj;ainst  was  Sent  to  their  aid  with  four  Lakedaimonian 

moral,  and  a  contmgent  of  allies. 
Meanwhile,  far  to  the  north,  almost  beyond  the  border 
of  Hellas,  a  power  was  rising  which  seemed  at  one  time 
likely  to  eclipse  both  Thebes  and  Sparta,  and  to  steal  the 
prize  of  Hellenic  supremacy  from  the  grasp  of  these  con- 
tending rivals.  Jason  of  I'herai,  daring,  energetic,  crafty, 
and  aspiring,  had  made  himself  already  master  of  all 
Thessaly  except  the  town  of  Tharsalos.  llut  Thessaly 
was  by  no  means  the  extreme  limit  of  his  ambitious 
hopes.  To  rise  from  tyrant  of  Pherai  to  Tagos  of  Thes- 
salv,  to  train  an  armv  and  build  a  fleet  with  which  not 
even  united  Greece  could  co{)e  successfully,  to  extend  his 
conquests  beyond  the  Kgean  and  hurl  the  Great  King 
from  his  throne — these  were  the  wide  designs  which  were 
said  to  fire  the  genius  of  this  would-be  Alexander.  At 
this  juncture,  the  most  powerful  and  respected  citizen  of 
Pharsalos  came  as  an  envoy  to  Sparta  to  solicit  some 
protection  for  his  native  city  against  its  aggressive  neigh- 
bour. But  Sparta,  tottering  already  in  her  proud  dic- 
tatorship, felt  that  nearer  home  she  had  work  enough 

upon  her  hands  ;    and  her  government  w.is 

but  refuse  t  i-        1  -  t  '         1      • 

help  to  obliged   to   contess  that,   though   it   sympa- 

fg^lnlf"^  thised  with  their  suit,  it  could  give  no  i:i\<:c- 

Jason  of  ^j^i  jjj^i  tQ  ijj^  Pharsalian  petitioners.     Phar- 

salos accordingly  submitted,  and  Jason  was 
soon  after  acknowledged  Tagos  of  Thessalv. 

Yet    just  at  this  time    Sparta   was  relieved   from  the 


cii.  XI.  Miuisi'/i/)os  Dcft'iitt'd  and  Killed. 


179 


hostility  of  one  of  her  foes.  Jealous  of  the  revival  of 
Theban  ascendency  in  Boiotia,  disquieted  at 

the  building  of  a  Theban   fleet  at    Kreusis,  makes* 

an^rrv  at  the  refusal  of  Thebes  to  pav  her  peace  with 

^   '  '      -  Sparta, 

share  towards  the  war  expenses  of  the  con- 
federacy, harassed  by  the  incursions  of  Aiginetan  priva- 
teers, and  weary  of  a  conflict  which  was  exhausting  her 
resources   for  the  advantage  of  Thebes   rather   than  of 
herself,  Athens  concluded  a  separate  peace  with  Sparta. 

But  this  new  peace  was  not  destined  to  endure  for  long. 
Timotheos  was  still  in  the  Ionic  Sea,  where  the  purity, 
moderation,  and    maLrnanimitv   of  his    per-         , .  ,  . 

'^  -  *  which  IS 

sonal  character  had  compensated  for  small       broken  by 

,  ,.  111         'limotheos 

resources    and    scanty    supplies,    and    had      at  Zakyn- 
enabled  him   to   maintain  the  supremacy  of  ''■ 

Athens  in  those  regions.  He  now  received  orders  to 
return  ;  and  on  his  homeward  voyage  he  touched  at  Zakyn- 
thos  to  land  a  small  body  of  exiles,  and  helped  them  to 
establish  themselves  in  a  fortified  position.  The  Zakyn- 
thian  government  reported  the  outrage  to  Sparta,  and  the 
ephors,  indignant  at  this  breach  of  the  peace,  demanded 
redress  from  Athens.  Their  demands  being  refused,  one 
Sjxirtan  fleet  was  sent  to  help  Zakynthos,  and  another  to 
take  Korkyra,  which  was  then  under  Athenian  protec- 
tion. On  his  arrival  Mnasippos,  the  Spartan  commander, 
defeated  the  Korkyraian  fleet,  blockaded  the  town,  rav- 
aged the  rich  and  carefuUv-tilled  fields,  and  soon  reduced 
the  citizens  to  the  direst  straits.  A  small  Athenian  rein- 
forcement, which    declared   itself   the    pre- 

11  .    1  J         Mnasippos 

cursor  of  a  much  larger  armament,  buoyed       lays  siege  to 
up  their  failing  courage  ;  while  Mnasippos,       buris^de-' 
from  the  signs  of  extreme  distress  which  met      {Jj^^ed  ^"^ 
his  eyes,  felt  his  success  assured,  grew  over- 
confident, and  treated  his  mercenaries  with  harshness  and 


rs-ss 


i8o 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  373. 


CH.  XI. 


Acquittal  of  Timotheos. 


181 


injustice.  Seizing  their  opportunity,  the  Athenian  pchasts 
and  Korkyraian  hophtcs  made  a  sudden  sally,  slew 
Mnasippos,  and  completely  routed  his  mutinous  and  half- 
hearted troops.  After  this,  the  general  who  succeeded 
Mnasippos  in  command,  fearing  the  near  approach  of 
the  long-expected  reinforcement  from  Athens,  evacuated 
the  island  in  such  haste  that  a  great  amount  of  booty,  and 
even  some  of  his  sick  and  wounded,  had  to  be  left 
behind. 

At  length,  though  tardily,  the  Athenian   fleet  arrived. 

Timotheos  had  been  at  first  appointed  to  command  it ; 

but   he  found  great  difficulty  in  completing 

Operations  ^,  r  1  •      ,i  '1  1  . 

of  Iphjkru-  the  equipment  of  his  fleet,  and  si)ent,  though 
tes  in  com-         j^^  ^jjj  ^^^  waste.  Considerable  time  in  a  pre- 


mand  of 
the  Athe 
nian  fleet. 


the  Athe-  liminary  cruise  round  the  Egean.    Discontent 


and  disorganisation  became  prevalent  among 
the  allies,  who  were  waiting  for  him  near  Kalaureia,  and 
the  Athenians,  who  were  anxious  to  save  Korkvra.  srrew 
dissatisfied.  During  his  absence,  his  command  was 
taken  from  him  and  given  to  Iphikrates,  who  obtained 
the  appointment  of  Kallistratos  and  Chabrias  as  his  col- 
leagues. The  new  admiral  showed  the  greatest  energy 
in  the  work  of  equipment,  and  the  most  consummate 
skill  in  the  management  of  the  voyage.  At  Kephallenia, 
where  he  halted  to  reduce  some  towns  and  to  refresh  his 
men,  he  heard  that  the  Spartans  had  raised  the  siege  of 
Korkyra  ;  but,  pressing  onwards,  he  surprised  and  cap- 
tured ten  triremes  which  Dionysios.  the  tyrant  of  Syra- 
cuse, had  sent  to  the  help  of  Mnasippos.  lUit  he  was 
soon  in  need  of  money,  and,  while  he  sujiported  his  men 
by  farm-work  in  Korkyra  and  military  service  in  Akar- 
nania,  he  sent  home  Kallistratos  to  demand  either  an 
adequate  supply  of  pay  or  a  real  and  definite  peace. 
Meanwhile    the    dissatisfaction   which   the   Athenians 


'^T 


had  felt  against  Timotheos  had  cooled  down.     His  expe- 
dition in  the  Egean  was  seen  to  have  borne      Timotheos 
irood  fruit,  and  their  friends  in  Korkvra  were      tried  and 

.  i-,t'ii'  J         acquitted: 

safe.  The  accusation  which  Kallistratos  and 
Iphikrates  had  lodged  against  him,  had  of  course  been 
postponed  during  their  absence;  and  though  it  was  re- 
newed on  the  return  of  Kallistratos,  the  Athenian  dikasts, 
who  were  willing  to  deem  all  well  that  ended  well,  re- 
turned a  verdict  of  acquittal.  Jason  of  Phcrai  and  his 
ally,  the  king  of  Kpeiros,  appeared  as  witnesses  in  his  fa- 
vour. Timotheos  gave  them  lodgings  in  his  house,  but  so 
poor  was  this  distinguished  son  of  a  father  even  more 
noble,  that  he  was  obliged  to  borrow  from  a  neighbouring 
banker  all  the  ordinary  luxuries  for  their  entertainment — 
bedding,  and  raiment,  and  two  silver  drinking-bowls.  As 
to  the  cause  of  his  trial,  his  delay  after  being  appointed  for 
a  special  and  pressing  object  can  scarcely  be  justified; 
but  his  chief  fault,  if  fault  it  was,  seems  to  have  been  that 
his  spirit  was  too  mild  and  his  conscience  too  scrupulous  to 
make  him  an  efficient  leader  of  a  press-gang  or  a  plunder- 
ing foray.  Feeling,  perhaps,  that  in  spite  of 
his  acquittal  some  slur  still  attached  to  his  Jhl^'servicc 
character,  or  thinking  that  he  could  serve  of  the 
his  country  best  by  looking  after  her  inter- 
ests at  the  court  of  Persia,  he  left  Athens  and  entered 
the  Great  King's  service. 

Nor,  during  this  time,  had  the  government  of  Thebes 
relaxed  their  efforts  towards  their  own  aggrandisement 
and  Boiotian  consolidation.      Thespiai  and 

11        11  The  The- 

Plataia  had   acknowledged  her  supremacy  ;       bans  dis- 
but  it  was  felt  that  their  fidelity  was  more  than      xhespiai, 
dubious,  even  if  thev  were  not,  as  Diodoros      a"d  destroy 

'  rlataia. 

says,  actually  intriguing  against  her.  Accord- 
ingly, to  make  matters  sure,  the  fortifications  of  Thespiai 


Great  King. 


I82 


The  Risf  of  Thibes. 


B.C.  372. 

were  dismantled,  nn.l  Pla.aia  was  surprised  by  one  of 

he  Lo,o.archs  at  an  hour  when  most  of  the  male  nopu- 

l.|  .on  were  absent  on  their  faru.s.     The  inhabitants'vere 

movable  property  with  theu, ;   but  the  hapless  little  city 
as  a^am  ra^ed  to  the  «round.  and  its  territory  anne  ed 

a  sore  thorn  m  the  sule  of  its  ,n.,re  pouxrful   nei.^hbour 

vhoilh  ;'    "\  ''^  '""""'""  -^'""'•^'  "  ~-  "'     .e 

•I'clf.      I  ,  destruction  was.   therefore,   an  act   not  only 

most  luely  resentment.     S„,ouldering  jealousy  gaye 

Athens  and        "l''-''  '°  ""'^-P-'ken  indij^nation  ;  and  thou-h 

cCr.'o"  '-'"'"l-in-'n'la^*  with  the   utmost  ability  d°e- 

pea«.  lended  his  countrymen  a-ainst  the  eloquent 

accusations  of  K.dlistralos  and  the  rhetorical 

gradually  breakinj;  away  from  the  Theban  cause    and 

Wun   '",'  '^'""   ""'•-•^'-'''"«  -•'    Sparta.      The 
Spartans  also  were  alanned  no  less  In   the  renewal  of 

Athenian  .maritime  yictories,  than  by  th'e  stri  Jn"  enir! y 

an.l  ability  shown  in  the  policy  of  Thebes,  while  their 

st-perstitious  fears  were  aroused  by  earthqu.;kes  a n  I     . 

bene  Th'    V?", '"  T  'T""  ''""''  -"  ">  ">^  -• 
beneath,      for   the   last    few   years  the  tide  of  success 

had  run  steadily  a-ainst  them,  and  they  too 
began  to  be  an.xious  for  peace.  I'ursuin-  ,he 
same  cotirse  as  fifteen  years  before,  they  sent 
Antalkidas  to  Persia  to  implore  the  aid  and 
m  enention  of  the  Great  Kin,  ;  and  .-Vr'ta.xer.xes,  who  " 
the  Greek  states  were  at  war.  found  a  difficulty  in  obtain! 


CH.  XI. 


Pract'  of  k'(i//ias. 


183 


Antalkidas 
obtains  a 
rescript  from 
the  Great 

King. 


t 


B.C.   371. 

Peace-con- 
gress at 
Sparta. 


ing  mercenaries  to  act  against  Egypt,  granted  their  peti- 
tion, and  despatched  envoys  to  Greece,  requiring  that  the 
belhgercnt  states  should  come  to  terms  on  the  principles 
of  the  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 

In  May  or  June,  371,  a  congress  was  held  at  Sparta, 
at  which  the  members  of  the  Athenian  and  the  Spartan 
confederacies  were  present.     The  principal 
envoy  on  the  part  of  Thebes  was  Epamei- 
nondas,  while  Kallistratos  was  the  most  able 
of  the  Athenian  representatives,  although  the 
peace  has  taken   its   name  in    history  from  the  feebler 
Kallias.       Kallistratos    in    a    thoroughly    statesmanlike 
speech  pr()j)osed  that  the  hegemony  of  Greece  should 
be  divided— that  Athens  should  rule  by  sea,  and  Sparta 
by  land.     'If,'  said  he,  'a  firm   peace  were  established 
between  these  states,  peace  would  be  secured   in  all  the 
rest  of  Greece ;  for  that  was  divided,  city  by  city,  into 
two  parties,  one  of  which  supported  Sparta,  and  the  other 
Athens.     It  was  foolish  for  them  to  act  like  athletes,  who, 
after  a  career  of  victory,  will  not  retire  from  the  arena  till 
they  have  been  defeated  ;  or  like  gamblers  who,  after  one 
stroke  of  luck,  go  on  staking  double  or  quits 
till  they  are  ruined.'    At  the  same  time  it  was      ^Jf^Ka^ar 
stipulated  that  the  universal  autonomy  guaran- 
teed by  the   peace  should  be  real,  and  no  mere  sham 
in  the  interests  of  Sparta.     The  Spartan  harmosts  were  to 
be  everywhere  withdrawn,  and  the  armaments  on  both 
sides  to  be  disbanded. 

To  these  terms  the   Spartans  swore   in    the  name  of 
Sparta  and  of  her  confederate  allies  ;   and      c^p^^j^  ^,,j 
Athens  and  the  cities  of  her  confederacy  took       Athens 

.  ,  swear  tu  the 

the  oaths  separately.     When,  however,  the       terms  of 
turn   of  the  Thcbans  came,   Epameinondas        ^^  peace, 
declared  that  he  must  swear  in  the  name  not  of  Thebes 


184 


The  Rise  o/^  Thebes. 


B.C. 


J/ 


alone,  but  of  the  whole  Boiotian  confcdcracv.     This  A^c- 
silaos  and  the  rest  of  the  Spartans  refused.  askin<r  why 
the  Boiotian  cities  had   not  as  much   ri-ht  to  take  the 
oaths   independently   as   Thebes   herself.      The   natural 
answer  to  this  question  would  have  been  to  retort  that 
but  with  the       Thebes  mi<,rht  swear  in  the  name  of  her  allies 
hhctlr^Je:       -""'^  ^'  ^P'^'"^''^  ^-"^^^  ^^^'^n  allowed  to  do  :  but 
Epamcinondas  with  startlin-  audacity  took  a 
much  bolder  position.      Me  told  the  Spartans  that  the 
position  of  Thebes  with  reference  to  the   Boiotian  cities 
was  exactly  parallel  to  the  supremacy  of  Sparta  over  the 
Lakonian  townships  ;  that  by  all  legal  and  historical  anru- 
ments  the  ri-,^hts  of  Thebes  were  certainly  as  old  and^'as 
valid  as  those  of  Sparta,  whose  authority  was  founded 
solely  on  the  sword.     Filled  with  ra^^^e  at  such   unprece- 
dented presumption.  Agesilaos  spran:.^  from  his  seat,  and 
cut  the  discussion  short  by  one  brief  question.  'Will  vou 
orwi  1  you  not  grant  independence  toeach  Boiotian  citV  >' 
'Will  you.' rejoined  Epameinondas.  'leave  each  of  Ihe 
and  they  Lakonian  townships  independent.' '  The  only 

the  treaty.         ^he  name  of  Thebes  from  the  treatv.  and  to 
proclaim  her  exclusion  from  it :  whereupon 
says  Xenophon.  the  Thebans  departed  in  the  deepest  de- 
jection.     Epameinondas.    however,    before    he  took  so 
decided  a  line,  must  have  calculated  the  consequences 
and   counted  the  cost.     It  was  not  dejection  which  filled 
the  hearts  of  the   Thebans   as   they  left  the  con<rress 
but  the  solemn  anxiety  of  men  who   have  risked  all  to 
defend  a  principle,  and  who,  not  in  confident  expectation 
but  in  anxious  hope,  arc  awaiting  the  result.     What  this 
result  would  be,  no  one  but  a  Theban   could  doubt  •  the 
only  subject  for  speculation  was  the  exact  form  of  punish- 
ment which  it  would  please  the  Spartans  to  inflict 


CH.  XI. 


Kleotnbrotos  in  Boiotia. 


185 


in- 
vaded 
Hoiotia; 


Kleombrotos,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  still  in 
Phokis  with  a  large  army  of  Spartans  and  allies.  Just  as 
the  Athenians  had  at  once  ordered  Iphikrates  to  return 
and  to  disband  his  forces,  so.  if  Sparta  was  ever  to  be 
able  to  claim  that  she  too  had  fulfilled  her  share  of  the 
treaty.  Kleombrotos  also  ought,  of  course,  to  be  recalled. 
But  the  temptation  of  smiting  down  the  inso- 
lent Thebans  by  one  sudden  well-directed      Kieom 

-'  hrotos 

blow  was  too  much  for  Spartan  scruples. 
Already,  as  Xenophon  thinks,  some  super- 
natural power  was  leading  them  on  to  their  doom  ;  and 
though  one  man  in  the  assembly  upheld  the  cause  of 
justice  and  religion,  the  majority  stigmatised  him  as  a 
sentimental  prater,  and  ordered  Kleombrotos  to  march  at 
once  against  the  Thebans.  The  Spartan  king,  by  a  march 
which  evinced  considerable  strategical  skill,  eluded  the 
vigilance  of  Epameinondas.  who  was  guarding  the  direct 
route  from  Phokis ;  and.  leading  his  troops  by  an  almost 
inaccessible  path  among  the  mountains,  he  descended 
upon  Kreusis,  and,  after  seizing  twelve  triremes  in  the 
harbour,  passed   on  to   the    neighbourhood  of  Leuktra. 

Here,  with  Thebes  in  front   of    him  at  the 

and  en- 
distance  of  an  easy  march,  and  the  fort  of      camped  near 

__  ....  ...  .  Leuktra. 

Kreusis  in  his  rear  securing  his  communica- 
tions with  Sparta,  he  encamped  on  a  ridge  to  the  west  of 
Plataia,  which  formed  the  north-western  extremity  of 
Mount  Kithairon.  The  Thebans,  when  they  heard  of  his 
march,  united  the  troops  of  Epameinondas  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army,  and  took  up  their  position  on  high 
ground  near  the  little  town  of  Leuktra.  Between  the  two 
armies  stretched  a  plain  rather  more  than  a  mile  in  breadth, 
where  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Spartan  army  would 
be  able  to  have  full  play.  W^hat  these  numbers  actually 
were,  cannot  be  accurately  determined.     A  reasonable 


■i 


a »» 'ieJwasBiiwaAWjaaK^Maufci'.'aii^'i 


1 86 


Thr  Rise  of  TJubrs. 


H.C.  371. 


estimate  of  the  Lakedaimonian  force  makes  it  to  have 
consisted  of    10,000  ht)plitcs,  1,000  cavahv 

Numbers  of         „_,i     ,u  .  ,  ^     ..    .  "^  * 

the  armies.        ^^"^*    ^"^    w^\\a\    proportion    of   hght-amicd 
troops;  while  the  Thebans  are  said  to  liave 
mustered    only    6,000    men.  a    total    v.hich    is    perhaps 
exclusive  of  their  cavalrv. 

As  the  two  armies  lay  facin-  one  another  before  the 
battle,  the  Thebans  saw  th;it  they  were  outnumbered,  and 
Discou  ^^^^'  probably,  th.it  they   had  been   already 

minTKe'       out--eneralled   ])y  the  brilliant   march   with 
Theban  ^hieh    Kleombrotos   had   opened   the  cam- 

pai;,rn.  So  deep  was  their  dismay  and  dis- 
couragement, that  all  the  wisdom  of  Kpameinondas  and 
all  the  fire  of  IVlopidas  were  scarcely  enou-h  to  gain  a 
bare  majority  of  Hoiotarchs  in  favour  of  battle.  '  Rather  ' 
cried  their  timorous  colleagues.  '  let  us  take  shelter  within 
our  walls,  send  our  wives  and  little  ones  to  Athens  and 
abide  the  results  of  a  siege.*  Kpameinondas.  however, 
alleviated  Convinced    them  that   the  only   alternative,' 

spiJilV  besides  a  battle,  was  a  revolt  of  B(»iotia,  a  re- 

Ep^amei-  volutiou   in  Thebes.   and  a   miserable  exile, 

which  was  far  worse  than  a  glorious  death. 
The  portents,  which  had  terrified  them  on  the  march,  were 
invested  with  a  more  encouraging  interpretation,  and  others 
were  circulated  to  inspire  them  with  confidence.  From  the 
shrine  of  Trophonios  at  Lebadeia.  from  the  temple  of 
Herakles  at  Thebes,  omens  of  happy  presage  were 
and  by  reported.     Near  at  hand,  as  if  to  stimulate 

fav..,r..ble  them  to  vengcance.  stood  a  monument 
of  Spartan  outrage.  In  bvgone  davs  foully 
wronged  by  the  invader's  lust,  the  two  daughters  of 
Skedasos  had  slain  themselves.  Their  father^  went  to 
Sparta  to  seek  redress  ;  but  the  rulers  were  deaf  to  the 
old  man's  cries,  and  he  returned  and  slew  himself  also. 


CH.  XI. 


Tactics  of  Epanuinondas. 


187 


The  tomb  stood  close  by  ;  and  a  Spartan  exile  quoted  an 
ancient  prophecy  that  Sparta  should  be  defeated  near 
the  tomb  of  the  virgins.  The  Theban  troops  gladly  ac- 
cepted the  omen,  and  enwreathed  the  tomb  with  garlands 
vowing  vengeance  in  their  hearts.  As  the  story  ran  in 
later  tmies.  Skedasos  himself  appeared  to  Pelopidas  in  a 
vision  of  the  night,  and  ordered  that  an  auburn  virgin 


I  *^«„....^#  "•  \ns^H" 


'^^^^ 


Thespial 


^O 
"0> 


\#%/V^^Mi>^ 


V 


c 

a.  Theban'infantrx-.  u    '^TA  ^^^^.^nder  Pelopidas. 

*.    1  halunxof  Lpameinondas.       e.   Infantrv 
'•  ^^^^'^y-  /.  Cavalry." 

Should  be  offered  at  the  tomb ;  and.  as  the  generals  and 
prophets  in  the  morning  stood  debating  how  best  to  do 
the  ghostly  bidding,  a  chestnut  filly  cantered 
up,  and  was  hailed  at  once  as  the  victim  sent      E^?n"°^ 

by  the  gods.  no^ndas!' 

But  the  tactics  of   Kpameinondas  in  drawing   up  his 
troops  were  no  less  skilful  than  his  means  for  inspiring 

O 


i88 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  371. 


CII.  XI. 


Battle  of  Leuktra, 


189 


them  with  courage.  Xenophon,  in  his  grossly  unfair  narra- 
tive of  the  battle,  which  is  httle  better  tiian  a  tissue  of  friv- 
olous excuses  for  the  Spartan  defeat,  does  not  even  mention 
the  name  of  the  great  Theban  ;  but  it  is  nevertheless  certain 
that  the  tactics  adopted  were  due  to  him  alone.  He  first,  like 
Gideon  of  old,  weeded  his  ranks  of 'all  who  were  fearful 
and  afraid,'  by  a  proclamation  that  all  those  who  wished 
might  depart,  and  the  Thespian  contingent  at  once  left 
the  camp.  Next  he  formed  his  line  of  battle  in  a  novel 
order  to  suit  the  special  emergencies  of  the  case.  A 
philosophical  tactician,  he  had  studied  all  the  recent  im- 
provements in  the  art  of  war,  and  had  noted  the  weak 
points  of  the  old  system.  He  knew  also  that  if  he  could 
once  overpower  the  solid  mass  of  the  Spartan  hoplites, 
the  resistance  of  the  allied  contingent  would  be  incon- 
siderable. The  strength  of  the  Spartan  phalanx  lay  in 
its  disciplined  cohesion,  its  weakness  in  its  incapacity  to 
meet  new  combinations  by  opening,  closing,  and  re-form- 
ing its  ranks  with  readiness.  According  to  acknowledged 
principles,  a  Greek  b.ittle  began  by  a  simultaneous  attack 
along  the  whole  line ;  but  Epameinondas  had  exercised 
the  Thebans  in  the  manttuvre  of  throwinij  forward  a 
heavy  column  of  attack,  and  advancing  in  echelon  or 
obliquely.  Now  he  formed  on  the  left  wing,  unobserved 
by  the  enemy,  a  compact  column,  fifty  deep,  and  near 
this  he  stationed  the  Sacred  Band  under  Pelopidas,  in 
readiness  for  rapid  and  independent  ac- 
ThcSpar-  tion.     The  centre  and  right  were  kept  back 

tans  were  '^  » 

eager  to  for  the  prcscnt,  and  ordered  to  support  the 

engage. 

onset  of  the  left. 
In  the  Spartan  camp  there  reigned  an  arrogant  and 
overweening  confidence,  which  shewed  itself  in   an  im- 
patient eagerness  to  begin  the  conflict  and  secure  the  vic- 
tory.   Yet  Kleombrotos  seems  to  have  hung  back,  perhaps 


secretly  wishing  to  give  the  Thebans  a  chance  of  escaping 
by  surrender  the  worst  consequences  of  their  temerity.  Rut 
friends  and  enemies  alike  urged  him  to  battle,  the  latter 
with  taunts,  and  the  former  with  entreaties  not  to  let 
slip  this  opportunity  of  clearing  himself  from  the  imputa- 
tion of  sympathy  with  Thebes.  Accordingly,  after  the 
noonday  meal,  in  which  Xenophon  would  have  us  believe 
that  the  soldiers  drank  to  excess,  Kleombrotos  drew  up  his 
army  twelve  deep,  posting  himself  and  most  of  the 
Lakedaimonians,  according  to  custom,  on  the  right. 

The  battle  began  on  each  side  with  a  cavalry  charge ; 
and  theLakedaimonian  squadrons,  notoriously  inefficient, 
were  swept  back  in  confusion  upon  their  main 

.       ,  ,       ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  The  Spartan 

body.     Such  a  result  could  not  have  been      Hgiu  wing 
unexpected,  and  Kleombrotos  at  once  ordered        *^  ^'***^   ' 
his  infantry  to  advance.     As  they  met  the  mass  of  the 
Theban  left,  the  shock  was  terrible.     The  Theban  column 
wedged  itself  into  every  opening  in  the  enemy's  ranks, 
which  the    recoil   of  the   cavalry  had    perhaps   thrown 
into   some  disorder.     The    Spartan  king  had  originally 
purposed  to  use  his  superiority  in   numbers  to  surround 
Epamcinondas,  or  at   least    to  turn  his   flank  ;  but   the 
movements    of    Pelopidas   and    the   Sacred    l^and    had 
been  so  rapid  that  they  were  upon  him  before  he  could 
deploy  his  troops.     Nothing  therefore  remained  but   to 
bear  up,  shield  to  shield,  and  man  to  man,  against  the 
mass  that  bore  down  upon  them.     In  the  fierce  hand-to- 
hand  combat  which  ensued,  the  king  was  struck  with  a 
mortal  wound  ;  and  around  him.  where  the 
fight  was  hottest,  fell  Sphodrias  and  his  son,       ^'^""'i  • 
and  one  of  the  polemarchs.     As  the  S])artans 
were  able  to  carry  off  the  wounded  monarch   yet  living 
from  the   field,  Xenophon   argues  that  they  were  at  first 
successful.     It  was  probably  long  before  fortune  declared 


JT^v^tajMBeif  .Jwa8.iai»»i«a 


190 


The  Rise  of  Thebes. 


B.C.  371. 


CH.  XI. 


for  either  side.  At  Icn^nh,  Epameinondas  urged  on  his 
men  to  a  crowning  effort,  animating  them  by  brave  words 
and  by  the  example  of  gallant  deeds.  Borne  down  by 
the  sheer  weight  of  the  advancing  column,  the  weaker 
line  of  wearied  Spartans  broke,  and  in  heatllong  rout 
made  for  their  entrenched  camp.  On  no  other  part  of 
the  line  had  there  been,  aj)parently,  any  real  fighting,  for 
the  Theban  centre  and  right  had  been  pur- 
w"hofcariny        poscly    kept     back,    and    the   cavalry    had 

driven  back  probalilv  hindered  the  St)artans  from  succour- 
to  ♦he  camp.       .  '  . 

ing  their  own  right  wing.     lUit,   seeing  Llie 

discomfiture  of  their  friends,  the  whole  line  fell  back,  and 
formed  in  good  order  behind  the  entrenchment  of  their 
camp,  and  the  Thebans  did  not  attempt  to  press  the 
pursuit. 

But  the  Lakedaimonian  forces  were  still  numerically 
superinr  to  their  victorious  opponents ;  and  a  few  of  the 
The  Spar-  surviviug  Spartans,   feehng  keenly  the  dis- 

grace of  their  position,  and  deeming  death 
preferable  to  a  confession  of  defeat,  wished 
to  strike  another  blow  for  the  honours  of  the 
field  and  to  fight  for  the  possession  of  the 
slain,  liut  the  jjolcmarchs,  seeing  how  large  a  proportion 
of  the  Spartans  had  fallen,  and  observing  the  lukewarm 
and  spiritless  temper  of  some  of  their  allies  and  the  total 
unconcern  of  others,  despatched  a  herald  to  ask  for  the 
burial-truce.  The  request  was  of  course  granted  ;  but 
Epameinondas  stipulated  that  the  corpses  of  the  allies 
should  be  buried  before  those  of  the  Spartans.  This 
made  it  impossible  for  the  Spartans  to  conceal  the 
severity  of  their  own  loss.  Xenophon  admits  that  1,000 
Lakedaimonians  had  fillen.  and  that  of  700  Spartan 
citizens  who  took  the  field,  400  were  left  dead  upon  it. 
How  the  tale  of  woe  was  received  at  Sparta  may  be 


tans  ac- 
knowledtjeti 
their  defeat 
by  asking; 
the  hiirial 
truce. 


Mediation  of  Jason. 


191 


told  in  the  words  of  Xenophon.  '  After  this,  the  messenger 
charged  with  bearing  the  news  of  the  disaster 

.  .  Reception 

to  Sparta  arrives  on  the  last  day  of  the  festival  of  the  news 
of  the  ( iymnopaidia,  when  the  chorus  of  men  ^  '  ^'^"^  ^' 
was  within  upon  the  stage.  And  the  ephors,  when  they 
heard  the  disaster,  were  grieved,  as  I  trow  they  could  not 
help  being ;  yet  tliey  did  not  order  the  chorus  to  with- 
draw, but  suffered  them  to  act  out  the  performance. 
They  told  also  the  names  of  the  slain  to  the  kinsfolk  of 
each,  cautioning  the  women  not  to  raise  lamentations,  but 
to  bear  their  sorrow  in  silence.  And  on  the  morrow  you 
might  see  those  whose  relatives  had  been  slain  parading 
in  public  with  bright  and  cheerful  faces  ;  but  of  those 
whose  kinsmen  were  said  to  survive,  you  would  have  seen 
but  few,  and  those  going  about  with  gloomy  and  down- 
cast looks.'  Such  a  description  needs  no  comment.  The 
reception  of  the  news  at  Athens  was  equally  character- 
istic. The  laurel-crowned  messenger  arrived 
when  the  Council  happened  to  be  sitting  in  Athens. 
the  Akropolis.  He  told  his  glorious  tale  of 
victory,  and  bade  the  Athenians  haste  to  reinforce  the 
Thebans,  for  now  was  their  time  for  avenging  all  the 
wrongs  which  they  had  suffered.  'But,'  adds  the  same 
historian,  '  it  was  obvious  to  all  that  the  council  were  pro- 
foundly vexed ;  for  they  offered  no  hospitality  to  the 
herald,  and  said  not  a  word  about  reinforcements.  And 
so  the  herald  departed  from  Athens.'  Though  the  ruin 
of  Sparta  meant  now  the  freedom  of  Hellas,  the  Athenians 
grudged  that  the  despised  Boiotians  should  win  the  glory 
of  its  accomplishment. 

At  Leuktra  itself  the  intense  energy  of  conflict  was 
followed  by  a  prolonged  pause.  For  some  time  the  viC' 
torious  Thebans  blockaded  the  hostile  camp,  till,  at  length, 
a  mediator  appeared  on  the  scene.    Jason  of  Pherai,  being 


i 


192 


The   Thehan  SitprthiULs . 


B.C.  371, 


I 


CH.  XII. 


Consequences  of  Leuktra. 


193 


summoned  bv  the  Thcbans  to  their  aid,  arrived  bv  forced 
marches  with  an  army  of  1,500  infantry  and  500  horse. 

The  Thebans  urged  him  to  make  a  joint  at- 
Phe'rarar-  tack  w'ith  them  upon  the  enemy's  camp.  But 
arnfi^fic'e"  J^son  dissuadcd  tliem  from  the  enterprise,  re- 

mindinir  them  how  stubbornly  thcv  them- 
selves  had  fou<;ht  when  driven  to  despair,  and  warning 
them  that  the  deity  delights  to  exalt  the  lowly,  and  bring 
down  the  high  looks  of  the  proud.  An  armistice  was  ac- 
cordingly agreed  upon  through  his  mediation,  and  the  Spar- 
tan generals  were  so  eager  to  quit  the  scene  of  their  calamity, 

that  they  broke  up  their  camp  by  night,  and, 
and  the  fearing  lest  the  Thebans  should  prove  treach- 

Spartans  °  • 

departed  by       crous,  marched  on  by  a  byroad  in  disorder 

night.  -Ill  '      1       1    »  •  1 

and  terror,  till  they  reached  Aigosthena,  and 
there  met  Archidamos  advancing  with  an  army  to  their  aid. 
Thus  the  curtain  falls  upon  the  last  act  of  the  tragedy 
of  Spartan  misrule.  Few  events  in  history  are  more  dra- 
matic than  the  short  campaign  of  Leuktra.  Twenty  days 
since,  Sparta  was  the  arrogant  interpreter  of  the  rescripts  of 
an  alien  despot ;  now  her  troops  were  slinking  away  in  dark- 
ness and  by  bypaths  from  foes  whom  they  then  despised. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE    THEB.XN    SL'PRFMArV. 

The  system  of  Spartan  supremacy  had  been  the  creation 
of   Lysandros  ;    like  him,  it  was  cruel,  narrow,    selfish. 

The  system  of  Theban  supremacy  was  the 
tendencies  Creation  of  Epamciuondas,  and,  like  its 
pohcy*^^^"         author,    was   characterised   by   moderation, 

breadth  of  sympathy,  and  devotion  to  the 
general  welfare  of  Greece.     '  Divide  et  impera'  had  been 


f 


th.^  motto  of  Sparta  ;  she  had  aimed  at  absolute  sway  over 
an  incoherent  mass  of  enfeebled  cities.    The  noble  object 
of  Thebes  was  to  strengthen   and   unite,  and  to  work  in 
friendly  alliance  for  the  protection  of  Hellenic  independ- 
ence.     This  was  not   only  the  worthier,  but  the  more 
difficuh  task.     Cities  and  tribes  which  for  years  had  been 
kept  in  thraldom,  and  whose  jealousies  had  been  sedu- 
lously fomented  in  the  interests  of  the  tyrant  state,  were 
accustomed  to  follow,  but  could  not  be  taught  to  combine. 
The  nine  years  of  Theban  ascendency  were  all  too  short 
for  the  unlearning  of  the  evil  lessons  and  the  undoing  of 
iniquities  which  a  generation  of  bitter  warfare  and  a  sub- 
sequent generation  of  oppressive  misgovernment  had  left 
behind  them.     Epameinondas  saw  clearly  enough  that, 
in  dealing  with  a  system  so  unscrupulous  and  selfish  as 
that    of    Sparta,    no   half-measures  were   possible.      No 
reform,  no  limitation  could    be    considered;  the  truest 
statesmanship  and  the  truest  patriotism  alike  demanded 
its  complete  suppression.     To  effect  this  object  he  worked 
steadily  through  all  his  career.     As  a  general,  he  stripped 
the  Spartan   name  of   its  terrors;  and  even  Arcadians 
became  bold  enough  to  defy  their  once  dreaded  neigh- 
bours.    By  the  foundation  of  Megalopolis  and  the  restor- 
ation of  Mcssene  he  hoped  to  establish  two  permanent 
bulwarks  against  Spartan  aggression  ;  and  the  plan  in 
itself  was  wise  and  statesmanlike.     But  those  for  whom 
he  laboured  were  unworthy  and  ungrateful.     The  old  flaw 
showed  itself  again.     Any  union  seemed  too  unnatural 
to  last ;  the  fatal  tendency  to  autonomy  was  too  strong, 
and  the  scheme,  so  far  as  it  failed,  failed  not  through  any 
fault  of  Epameinondas,  but  through  the  inherent  defects 
of  the  Greek  character. 

The  effects  of  the  great  battle  were  felt  immediately 
throughout  the  whole  of  Greece.     In  Thebes  itself  the  first 


VaJbAJsArjiSL,  »».it».:.  j— -  • 


etTects  of 
Lcuktra. 


destroy 
Thespiai, 


'94  The   Tht'ban  Supn'niacy.  b.c.  ^71. 

impulse  was  to  stamp  out  the  last  remnants  of  opposition 
Immediate         '"  ^^"^   Boiotian  Confederacy.     Orchomenos. 
which  had  remained  firm  to  the  last  in  the 
Spartan  alliance,  was  onlv  saved  from  a  ter- 
rible punishment  by  the  intercession  of  Ej)ameinondas 
in  this  case,  as  always,  an   advocate  of  mercy  ;  and  the 
The  Thespians,  who  had  turned  themselves  back 

Thebans  in  the  day  of   battle,    were   expelled    from 

Boiotia,    and  found,    like   the    IMataians.   a 
refuge  at  Athens.     The  position  of  Thebes 
was  thus  made  politically  secure  ;  her  policv  next  received 
a   religious  sanction.     Sparta  was    arraigned  before  the 
Amphiktyonic    Council-ihe     time-honoured     assembly 
and  obtain         "^^^^^   function    it    Was   10  watch    over    the 
tToniTS;'*       ^^^^^P^'^  '^'"P^^  '"  particular,  and  the  religion 
of  Sparta"         ^^  ^^^^^'^^ '"  general— ♦"■  -•  '.r  impious  seizure 
of  the  Kadmeia.     A  .  .-le  of  condemnation 
was  secured;  a  fine  of  500  talents  was   inflicted,  which 
though  doubled,  was  never  paid.     The  object  of  'I  hebes' 
however,  was  gained;  she  was  herself  justified  by  the 
open  humiliation  of  her  enemy. 

But  Athens  did  not  intend  to  let  the  downfall  of  Sparta 
pass  without  one  more  attempt  to  regain  her  old  position 
Athens  be-         "^^  ^^^  impcHal  city.     Summoning  to  a  con- 
comes  the  gress  all  the  states  who  were  willing  to  abide 
nei^league.        ^>'  ^^^  Conditions  of  the  Peace  of  Antalkidas. 
she  made  herself  the  head  of  a  fresh  league.' 
which  bound  itself  by  an   oath  of  mutual   defence  and 
universal  independence.     Many  of  the  members  of  the 
Peloponncsian  confederacy  joined  it.  though  Klis  stood 
aloof.      The    movement    was    well    planned   and   well 
timed  ;  but  the  hands  of  Athens  were  no  longer  strong 
enough  for  the  work  of  empire. 
At  Sparta,  the   most  pressing  question  was  the  treat- 


CH.  XII. 


Disturbixuccs  in  Pcloponnesos. 


195 


At  Sparta 
the  penal- 
ties of  the 
law  are  re- 
mitted in  the 
case  of  the 
survivors  of 
Leuktra. 


ment  of  the  '  runaways,'  as  those  who  survived  defeat 
were  styled  by  the  stern  voice  of  Lykourgean 
discipline.  The  scant  number  of  genuine 
Spartans  had  long  been  a  source  of  weakness 
to  the  state ;  and  the  conspiracy  of  Kina- 
don  had  shown  the  reality  of  the  danger.  The 
number  and  intlucnce  of  those  now  affected 
made  it  probable  that  they  would  not  submit  without 
a  struggle  to  the  abject  indignities  prescribed  by  the  law  ; 
and  in  spite  of  the  unpopularity  caused  by  the  failure  of 
his  anti-Thcban  policy,  and  by  the  revival  of  the  prophecy 
that  foretold  the  calamities  of  a  *  lame  reign,'  (p.  93) 
Agesilaos  was  entrusted  with  the  settlement  of  the  question. 
He  decided  that  the  law  should  lie  dormant  for  this  occa- 
sion only.  Forty  years  after,  when  Agis  was  defeated 
and  slain  by  Antipatros,  a  like  exemption  was  decreed. 

In  many  of  the   Peloponncsian  cities,  when  the  power 
of  Sparta  seemed  visibly  on  the  wane,  internal  commo- 
tions had  arisen,  and  much  blood  had  been 
shed  on  both  sides.     But  now  Argos  displayed      ancerin  the 
the  most  fearful  example  of  popular  furv  re-      f  ei'>pon- 
corded  in  Greek  annals,  red  as  they  are  with 
tales  of  civil  bloodshed.     The  democratic  populace  de- 
tected a  conspiracy  among  the  oligarchs,  and  thirty  of 
the  chief  citizens  were  at  once  put  to  death. 
The  excitement  of  the  people  was  inflamed      It^A^gos!*"' 
by  the  harangues  of  demagogues,   and  the 
mob,  arming  itself  with  cudgels,  commenced  a  general 
massacre.     When  1.200  citizens  had  fallen,  the  popular 
orators  interfered  to  check  the  atrocities,  but  met  with  the 
same  fate ;  and,  sated  at  length  with  bloodshed,  the  mul- 
titude staved  the  deadlv  work. 

But  where  the   pressure  of  Spartan  interference  had 
been  heaviest  and  most  constant,  there  the  reaction  was 


196 


The   T/irhan  Supremacy. 


B.C.  371. 


naturally  most  striking.   The  popular  impulses  which  were 
„  ^  ., ,.  at  work  in  Arkadia  found  their  first  oudet  in 

Rebuildmg  ,  1        1  i- 

of  M.iiui-  the  rebuildmg  of  Mantineia.  The  convenient 
proximity  of  their  farms  had  seemed  to  the 
citizens  but  a  poor  compensation  for  political  effacement 
(p.  149);  and,  aided  by  contributions  from  the  neigh- 
bouring towns,  and  even  from  the  more  distant  Elis,  they 
began  at  once  to  build  and  fortify  a  new  city.  The  Spar- 
tans felt  it  a  grievous  slight  that  their  permission  had  not 
been  asked  ;  but,  far  from  attempting  to  stop  the  work  by 
force,  they  humbled  themselves  to  send  their  venerable 
king  in  person  to  ask  the  Mantineians  to  desist  till  the 
consent  of  Sparta  should  be  formally  granted.  On  his 
arrival  though  Agesilaos  assured  the  magistrates  of  Man- 
tineia that  this  consent  would  not  be  withheld,  and  pro- 
mised, further,  that  the  Spartans  would  help  to  defray  the 
expenses,  they  refused  to  let  him  address  the  people,  and 
told  him  that  the  decree  of  the  city  ordered  the  wall  to 
be  built  without  delay.  The  Sprrtans  could  only  pocket 
the  insult,  and  stand  idly  by  while  the  work  of  Arkadian 
revival  went  merrily  forward. 

This  country  has  often  been  called  the  Switzerland  of 
Greece.  Both  are  mountainous  districts,  peopled  by  a 
Movement  *'''^^>'  ^^  J^'irtly  and  warlike  peasants,  hunts- 
for  Arku-  men,  and  shepherds,  who,  finding  little  scope 

dian  union.  r         \     • 

for  their  energies  in  the  petty  republics  of 
various  forms  which  existed  in  their  own  cantons,  ven- 
tured forth  in  quest  of  higher  pay  and  keener  excitement 
as  mercenary  soldiers.      Among  the  Arkadians,  Lyko- 

medes  of  Mantineia,  a  man  of  high  birth, 

Influence  of  111  ... 

Lykomedes        great  wealth,  and  greater  ambition,  became 

nei'a.^"*'  ^^^  spokesman  of  the  popular  movement. 

He  stimulated  the  pride  of  his  countrymen 

by  telling  them  that  they  were  the  primitive  inhabitants  of 


CH.  XII. 


Invasion  of  Arkadia. 


197 


i 


the  Peloponnese,  and  the  most  numerous  and  warlike  of  all 
Hellenic  races  ;  and  he  exhorted  them  not  to  allow  them- 
selves any  longer  to  be  the  mere  tools  of  other  powers, 
but  to  make  for  themselves  a  free  and  united  Arkadia. 

But  owing  to  the   mutual  jealousies  of  the  . 

^  .       .       ,T-  y    r\     \  Difficulties 

chief  towns — Mantmeia,  legea,  and  Orcho-      from  the 

menos — the  task  was  one  of  great  difficulty.      "f  Orlhome- 

The  governing  families  of  Orchomenos  were      J"^^  ^^^ 

heartily  attached  to  the  Spartan  alliance,  on 

which,  probably,  their  power  to  a  great  extent  depended  ; 

and  they  would  not  easily  sympathise  with  a  movement 

which  seemed  to  originate  with  Mantineia.     Hence  they 

consistently  shewed  the  most  uncompromising  opposition 

to  the  policy  of  innovation.     In  Tegea,  however,  public 

opinion  was  divided.    The  city  had  been  treated  by  Sparta 

with  special  consideration,  and  had  for  centuries  been  her 

faithful  ally ;  hence  the  oligarchical  government  looked 

with  disfavour  upon  the  project  of  union.     But  the  demo- 

cratical  party  was  powerful  and  unscrupulous ;  and,  with 

the  help  of  the  Mantineians,  they  effected  a  revolution, 

in  which  many  were  killed,  and  800  exiles  fled  to  Sparta. 

The  Spartans,  fallen  as  they  were,  could  not  allow  the 

Mantineians  to  infringe  their  monopoly  of  intermeddling 

with  the  internal  affairs  of  Arkadian  cities, 

without  attempting  to  chastise  their  presump-      J^YgesUaos 

tion.     Agesilaos   took    the    field;  and,  after      •JfJ^'J^^^j^ 

some  minor  operations,  remained  three  days 

in  the  face  of  the  Arkadian  army,  ravaging  the  plain  in 

front   of    Mantineia.     'This   he   did,'    says   Xenophon, 

'  though  it  was  mid-winter,  that  he  might  not   seem  to 

hasten  his  departure  through  fear  ;'    he  then   withdrew 

with  the  utmost  haste,  but  with  such  precautions,  '  that  no 

one  could  say  that  his  retreat  was  a  flight,'  so  sensitive  to 

reproach  was  Spartan  honour  now.     Yet  the  historian 


198 


The   Thchan  Supri-macy. 


K.C.  370 


His  designs. 


assures  us  that  the  exploits  of  Agcsilaos  in  this  campaign 
went  far  to  revive  his  countrymen  from  their  previous 
dejection. 

This  invasion  of  Arkadia  is  chiefly  important  for  the 
pretext  which  it  furnished  for  Theban  intervention.  The 
Mantineians  applied  for  help  at  first  to  Athens,  and, 
meeting  with  a  refusal,  went  on  to  Thebes.  For  this 
request  Epameinondas  must  have  been  thoroughly  pre- 
First  expe.  P^'^J'ed  beforehand  ;  and  he  was  soon  on  the 
ditiun  J  march  with  a  powerful  armv.    Dut  his  desi«'ns 

Epanieinon-         •       •  j-  i  1,    1  '  '^ 

das tu  the  in  invaamg    the    reloponnesc  were   by   no 

Pdupun-  means  limited  to  the  expulsion  of  Agesilaos 

from  Mantineian  soil.  He  had  watched 
with  deep  interest  and  keen  sympathy  the  progress  of 
the  Pan-Arkadian  movement;  and  he  was  determined 
not  only  to  lend  every  assistance  in  his  power 
to  the  consolidation  of  that  country,  but  also 
to  re-establish  the  ancient  Messenian  race  in  possession 
of  their  long-lost  territories.  In  this  he  designed  not  only 
to  annoy  Sparta  for  the  time  being,  but  to  furnish  two 
permanent  bulwarks  against  any  possible  revival  of  her 
pernicious  predominance. 

On  his  arrival  in  the  Peloponnese,  he  found  that  Agesi- 
laos had  already  retired ;  and  some  of  the  Theban  gene- 
rals, considenng  the  season  of  the  year, 
"n^spaJtar  ^^^^^^^  ^^  ^ncc  to  rctum.  lUit  their  allies 
from  Arkadia,  Argos,  and  Klis,  as  they  looked 
at  this  magnificent  array  of  40,000  (or  j)crhaps  even 
70.000)  soldiers,  marvelling  at  the  numerous  contingents 
from  Northern  (^.reecc,  and  admiring,  above  all.  the 
smartness  of  the  Theban  troops,  thought  that  such  a 
force  was  equal  to  the  cajiture  of  Spartn  itself  Won 
over  by  their  entreaties,  or,  if  we  credit  Plutarch,  accord- 
ing t?o  his  own  preconcerted  plan,  Epameinondas   con- 


CH.  XII. 


Agesilaos  Saves  the  City, 


199 


scnted  to  the  daring  enterprise.  The  small  detachments, 
which  were  guarding  the  passes  leading  from  Arkadia 
into  Lakonia.  were  easily  overpowered  ;  and  in  four  divi- 
sions the  invading  host  streamed  into  the  land,  which 
accordin-  to  the  proudest  boast  of  its  inhabitants,  had 
felt  no  hostile  tread  for  600  years.  At  Sellasia.  not  ten 
miles  distant  from  Sparta,  the  army  re-united  ;  and.  hav- 
m- plundered  and  burnt  the  town,  swept  down  into  the 
vaUey  of  the  Eurotas.  and  marched  along  the  left  bank 
till  it'reached  the  bridge  opposite  the  city. 

Within    Sparta    itself,  though  a  universal  terror   pre- 
vailed, one  man  rose  equal  to  the  emergency.     W  hile  the 
men  fainted  in  spirit  as  they  thought  how  few      ^^^^^  ^^^ 
they  were,  and  how  wide  their  unwalled  city  ;      e,-xy^of 
while  the  women,  who  had  never  before  seen      saves  the 
the  camp-fires  of  an  enemy,  filled  the  streets      '''^- 
with  lamentation  ;  Agesilaos  accepted,  not  without  mis- 
trust  the   services  of  6.000   helots,  collected    reinforce- 
ments, preserved  order,  suppressed  conspnacy.  stampea 
out  mutiny,  posted  guards  on  every  vantage-ground,  and 
refused  to  be  tempted  to  a  battle  by  the  taunts  of  foes  or 
the  clamours  of  over-eager  friends.    Meanwhile,  Epamei- 
nondas had  crossed  the  river  lower  down,  and  taken  up 
his  position  at  Amvklai ;  but.  after  one  unsuccessful  cav- 
alry skirmish,  the  Theban  general,  who.  in  a  campaign 
undertaken  on  his  sole  responsibility,  dared  not  risk  the 
chance  of  defeat,  decided  to  leave  the  '  wasps'  nest    (p. 
I -4)  untaken.     He  completed  his  work  of  devastation  by 
rava<^in-  the  whole  of  southern  Lakonia  down  to  Helos 
andV^^heion.  and  then  turned  back  into  Arkadia  to 
devote' himself  to  the  more   permanent   objects  of  his 

expedition.  ,    . 

It  had  been  plain  from  the  first  that  no  existing  city 
could  become  the  centre  of  the  Arkadian  confederacy  ; 


200 


The  Theban  Supremacy.  b.c.  369. 


local  jealousies  made  it  necessary  to  found  a  new  capital 

Megalopolis         ,He'  ^!""  "^  ^'^"^f  ^""''^^y ^  ^"  '^^^  ^^^^^^  oi 

is  founded         ^"^  ""^^'  I'l^'t-T  Hclisson,  and  at  the  intersection 
If  aXI.        ^^  ^^'^  "^^^i»  »-oads  from  Lakonia  and  Messe- 
ma.  rose  'the  -reat  city  '  (Mr-aiopoli.)   of 
Arkadia.      Forty  townships  were  combined  to  form  its 
territory  and  people  its  habitations.     On  each  side  of  the 
stream  stretched  the  circuit  of  its  walls,  tiftv  stadia  in  cir- 
cumference.     Everythinj^-theatre.  markei-place.  parlia- 
ment-house-was desi^^ned  on  a  scale  of  gorgeous  splen- 
dour, and  a  national  assembly  was  organised  under  the 
title  of  the  Ten  Thousand.     Kven  more  magniticcnt  was    ' 
Messene  ^^^^  ^'^>'  ^^  Mcssene.  whose  walls  encircled 

"he'ki^rsl        '''"^  ^"^^^'^  ""''^^^^  crowned  the  famed  height 
nbns^re-  of  Mount  Ithome.  3.500  feet  above  the  sea. 

W  hen.  by  the  far-seeing  wisdom  of  Epamei- 
nondas.  the  descendants  of  the  old  Messenian  stock  were 
gathered  to  form  a  new  nation  from   Rhegion  and   Mes- 
sene and  from  the  parts  of  Lybia  round  Kviene.  no  one 
could  have  hesitated  for  an  instant  about  the  site  of  the 
capital.    The  peak  of  Ithome— hallowed  bv  tales  of  Ie<^en- 
dary  glory,  when  Messene  four  centuries  before   resitted 
the  encroachments  of  Sparta,  and  not  so  verv  Ion-  a-o  a 
mount  of  refuge,  where  a  handful  of  rebel  Heh.ts  for  years 
defied  the  armies  of  their  oppressors-attracted  to  itself 
not  only  Messenians  of  pure  blood,  but  crowds  of  Perioikoi 
and  Helots,  who  gladly  threw  off  the  Spartan  yoke      By 
thus  restoring  the   Messenians  to  their  ancient  territorv' 
Epameinondas  deprived  Sparta  at  one  blow  of  nearly 
half  her  possessions;  and  the  best  proof  of  the  success 
of  h.s   sagacious   policy  is   seen  in   the  bitterness  and 
the  frequency  with  which  the   Spartans  mourned  their 
loss. 

At  last  Epameinondas  had  done  his  work  ;  and,  leaving 


CH.  XII.     Alliance  bctiueen  Athens  and  Sparta.  201 

Pammenes  with  a  garrison  in  Tegea,  he  hastened  to  lead 
his  soldiers  home.     At  the  isthmus  he  found      p^tjig 
a  hostile  army  from  Athens,  under  the  com-       bmu|ht 
mand  of  Iphikrates  ;  for  envoys  had  been      against 

'  I-  1  J-  hpameinon- 

sent  by  Sparta  in  the  hour  of  her  distress  to      das  on  his 
her  hereditary  foe  ;  and  the  Athenians,  being      '"''''"■"• 
reminded  how,  in  their  day  of  doom,  the  Thebans  had 
urged  that  their  city  should  be  razed  and  Attica  turned 
into  a  sheep-walk  (p.  i).  had,  amid  general  enthusiasm, 
girded  on  their  arms  for  the  rescue  of  Sparta.     But  Iphi- 
krates did  not  dare  and  did  not  care  to  oppose  the  home- 
ward march  of  the  conquering  Thebans  ;  and   Epamei- 
nondas passed  on  without  serious  molestation.     On  his 
arrival  at  Thebes,  the  leaders  of  a  petty  faction  threatened 
to  bring  him  and  his  colleagues  to  trial  for  retaining  their 
command   for  four  months  beyond  the   legal   term   of 
office.      liUt  Epameinondas  stood  up  in  the  assembly, 
and  told  his  simple  tale  of  victorious  generalship  and  still 
more  triumphant  statesmanship  ;  and  the  invidious  cavils 
of  snarling  intriguers  were  at  once  forgotten. 

Sparta  was  indeed  humiliated.  Her  territory  was 
torn  from  her.  her  allies  were  weak  and  few,  her  prestige 
was  gone,  discontent  threatened  her  at  home,  and  her 
bitterest  foes  were  firmly  established  on  her  frontiers.  To 
one  quarter  only,  however  reluctantly,  could  she  look  for 
support.  Athens  had  generously  forgotten  past  enmities, 
and  responded  prompdy  to  her  cry  for  help  ; 
and  it  would  be  well  for  her  if  the  alliance      between 

,  .,      ,  111  i  Athens  and 

thus  hastily  begun  could  be  put  on  a  perma-      sparta. 
nent  footing.   With  this  object,  deputies  were 
sent  to  Athens  by  the  Spartans  and  those  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  states  which  still  adhered  to  them.     The  proposal 
for  a  divided  hegemony,  by  which  Sparta  should  take 
the  lead  by  land  and  Athens  by  sea,  seemed  to  recom- 


202 


The   T/it'lhvt  Supremacy. 


B.C.  368. 


mend  itself  thorouLjhly  to  the  common  sense  of  all ;  but 
Kephisodotos,  iin  Athenian  onitor  of  eminence,  pointed  out 
that  by  this  aiTan;^^ement  the  best  of  the  citizens  of  Athens — 
the  horsemen  and  the  hopliles— would  be  placed  under 
the  command  of  Sparta,  while  the  Lakedaimonian  sailors, 
who  would  be  put  under  Athenian  orders,  would  be  not 
onlv  few  in  number,  but.  for  the  m(jst  part,  mere  Helots 
or  hirelings.  Such  an  arrangement  he  stigmatised  as 
grossly  unfair,  and  he  proposed  instead  of  it  that  the 
command  both  by  sea  and  by  land  should  be  given  alter- 
nately to  each  state  for  five  days.  This  absurd  amend- 
ment was  then  adopted  as  the  basis  of  the  new  alliance. 
The  first  aim  of  the  confederates  was  to  occupy  the 
passes  of  the  isthmus  with  a  powerful  force,  so  as  to  cut 
off  all  chance  of  Theban  support  from  the  Argives  and 
Arkadians,  who  were  still  keeping  u|)  the  war  in  the 
Peloponne^.e.     Chabrias,  therefore,  collected 

Chabrias  '    .  ^  .    ,  , , 

occupies  the  at  Cormth  10.000  men  from  Athens.  Megara, 
isthmus.  ^^^  I'cUene;  and.  being  joined  by  an  army 

of  equal  strength  raised  In-  tlie  Spartans  and  their  allies, 
he  began  at  once  to  fortify  the  isthmus.  Nor  was  it  less 
important  to  the  Thebans  that  these  measures  should  be 
checked,  for  her  friends  in  the  IVloponncse  could  not 
yet  stand  alone.  Epameinondas  was  soon  again  on  the 
march.  Arriving  at  the  isthmus,  though  his  forces  were 
far  inferior  in  number,  he  in  vain  challenged  the  enemy 
but  E  .1-  ^^  ^  pitched  battle,  and  then  proceeded  to  force 

meinondas  their  lines.  The  Spartan  troops  were  stationed 
wajT''    '  where  the  defences  were  weakest.     TheThe- 

through.  ^^^^  ^^^^j  ^^^^^  ^i^^j^^  jj^  ^1^^,  p.^j.|y  j.^^^.,-j    ^^1^^^.^ 

they  were  totally  unprepared  ;  and.  without  a  show  of 
resistance,  their  commander  fell  back,  leaving  open  to 
the  Theban  advance  the  difficuU  passage,  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  many,  he  might  still  have  defended.      The 


c  11.  XII. 


Epameinondas  Dismissed. 


203 


capture  of  Sikyon  was  the  immediate  consequence  of 
this  brilliant  exploit.  The  devastation  of  the  territory 
of  Epidauros  and  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  surprise 
Corinth  followed  ;  and  on  the  arrival  of  reinforcements 
sent  by  Dionysios  to  the  Spartans,  Epameinondas  re- 
turned to  Thebes,  feeling,  doubtless,  that  in  forcing  the 
passage  of  the  isthmus  he  had  accomplished  the  main 
object  of  the  campaign.  Hut  this  was  not  his  country- 
men's opinion.  Spoilt  by  prosperity,  they  demanded 
from  their  brilliant  general  an  unbroken  series  of  sensa- 
tional successes,  and  in  comparative  failure 
saw  onlv  the  wilful  neglect  of  their  interests.      Epamemon- 

'  ^  das  dis- 

They    therefore    dismissed     Epameinondas      missed  from 
from  the  office  of  general. 

It  was  not  long,  however,  before  he  reinstated  himself 
in  the  public  confidence.      Jason  of   Pherai  had    been 
assassinated  in  370  B.C.     Me  had  given  notice  of   his 
purpose  to  attend  the  Pythian   festival  at  Delphoi,  and 
rumour  went  wildly  to  work  on  the  preparations  and  in- 
tentions of  the  great  northern  chief.     He  would  come 
escorted  by  the  flower  of  his  perfectly  trained  battalions, 
and  followed  bv  a  monster  hecatomb  of  1,000  bulls  and 
10.000  other  cattle.     No  position  lower  than  that  of  pre- 
sident of  the  games  would   satisfy  him,  and  it  was  feared 
that  he    might  lay   violent   hands  even    on   the   sacred 
treasures.     But  the  oracle  reassured  its   timorous  ques- 
tioners by  declaring  that  the  god  would  take  care  of  his 
own.     After  a  review  of  his  cavalry,  the  prince  took  his 
seat  in  public  to  give  audience  to  all  who  wished  to  ap- 
proach   him  ;    and  seven   young   men,  who 
pretended  to  ask  him  to  settle  a  dispute,  drew      ^oiTof*"* 
near  and  stabbed  him.  Two  of  the  assassins      Jason  of 
were  slain,  but  five  escaped,  to  be  received 
with   honour  in   many  of  the  cities  of  Greece,    as  men 

P 


ips 


204 


The  Thcban  Supremacy.  B.C.  368. 


who  had  rid  the  world  of  a  tyrant.  The  anarchy  that 
ensued  is  the  best  proof  of  the  genius  of  Jason.  The 
first  brother  who  succeeded  him  was  assassinated  by  a 
second,  but  found  an  avenger  in  the  person  of  his  kins- 

Aiexandros  "^'^"'  ''^^<-"^^^"<^^''<^^.  '^^ho  thus  became  Tagos  of 
becomes  Thessaly,     This  tyrant,  at  once  brutal  and 

''^''^-  incapable,  drove  the  Thcssalian  cities  to  re- 

volt, and  when  they  appealed  to  Thebes  for  assistance, 
Pelopidas  volunteered  his  services,  and  was  despatched 
into  Thessaly  with  a  powerful  army.  After  liberating 
Lanssa,  he  obtained  a  personal  interview  with  Alexandros'^ 
but,  as  it  led  to  no  good  results,  he  himself  settled  the' 
affairs  of  the  Thessalian  cities  in  an  apparently  satisfactory 
manner,  and  left  the  country.  Soon  after  his  return  to 
Thebes  fresh  complaints  arose,  and  he  set  out  again  ;  he 
had  now  so  much  confidence  in  himself  and  in  the  respect 
mspired  by  the  Theban  name  that,  accompanied  bv  his 
friend  Ismenias,  he  went  in  the  guise  of  an  ambassador, 
and  without  military  escort.    The  unscrupulous  tyrant  met 

Seizure  and       ^^^'"^  ^^'^'^  *^  ^^xim^g  army,  seized  them,  and 
iini.ri>on-  threw  them  into  prison.     In  anticipation  of 

ment  of  i  .  • 

Pelopidas.  ^^^  vengeance  ol  I  hebes,  Alexandros  sent  to 
ask  aid  from  the  Athenians,  who  were  not 
ashamed  to  send  30  triremes  and  1,000  hoplites  to  his 
assistance.  Thus  reinforced,  he  completely  foiled  the 
efforts  of  the  Theban  generals  who  were  sent  against 
him.  They  were  forced  to  beat  a  retreat,  and.  hartissed 
by  the  Pheraian  cavalry,  the  whole  army  was  in  imminent 
danger  of  destruction.  But  the  soldiers  indignantly  rose 
The  first  against  their  incompetent  leaders,  and  sum- 

sem 'to''""         moned  Kpameinondas,  who  was  serving  as  a 
rescue  him         private  soldicr   in  their  ranks,  to  take   the 
lead.     He  accepted  the  task,  and  conducted 
them   safely    home.     Thus  the  disgraced   general    was 


rn.  xir. 


Success  of  the  Arkadians. 


205 


restored  to  popularity,  and  a  second  force  was  despatched 
under  his  command  against  the  tyrant  of  Pherai.  Epam- 
cinondas  had  no  wish  to  inflict  upon  him  a 

1    r  1  •  1   •        ,  •  ,  .  ^^  second, 

defeat  so  crushing  as  to  drive  him  to  despair      under 
(for  that  would  probably  have  sacrificed  the      Ji'sTb  luc"" 
life  of  his  friend) ;  but,  by  his  consummate      cessful. 
generalship,  he  terrified  Alexandros  so  completely  that  he 
was  glad  to  purchase  a  month's  truce  by  the  surrender  of 
his  prisoners. 

Hut  while  the  attention  of  Thebes  had  thus  been  directed 
to  another  ([iiarter,  her  Peloponnesian  allies  had  been 
striving  to  shew  that,  though  so  lately  added  to  the  roll  of 
Greek  nations,  thcv  had  at  least  outjxrown  her  leadinjr- 
strings.  The  new  state  of  Messene  had 
received  at  Olympia  her  ])ublic  recognition  vicU)ry"at" 
from  assembled  Hellas,  for  a  Messenian  lad      ^'ympic 

games. 

had  gained  a  wreath  as  victor  in  the  boys' 
foot-race,  and  thus  after  an  interval  of  300  years  a  Mes- 
senian name  was  again  placed  on  the  list  of  successful 
athletes.  The  Arkadians,  too.  were  stimulated  by  the 
elocpiencc  of  Lykomedes  to  assert  their  independence  of 
their  patrons.  '  otherwise,'  said  he,  '  you  will  find,  perhaps, 
that  the  Thebans  arc  only  Spartans  under  another  name.' 
They   placed    themselves   and    their   affairs 

u      1         1      •       1  •      1  1  1   /•  Energy  and 

absolutely  in  his  hands,  and  for  a  time  met  success  of 
with  marvellous  success.  From  end  to  end  of  ^'■'''''^■^"'^• 
the  Peloponnese  they  pushed  their  triumphant  arms.  Near 
Epidauros  they  rescued  the  Argive  troops  from  an  Athen- 
ian and  Corinthian  army  under  Chabrias.  They  pene- 
trated again  to  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas,  and  put  to  the 
sword  the  Lakedaimonian  garrison  at  Pellene  only  a  few 
miles  north  of  Sparta.  In  the  extreme  south-west,  at 
Asine.  they  defeated  a  Spartan  force  and  slew  its  com- 
mander.    In  short,  as  Xenophon  tells  us,  'neither  night, 


2o6 


The   Thcban  Suprrmaty.  B.C.  368. 


nor  winter,  nor  distance,  nor  inaccessible  mountains 
could  stop  their  march,  so  that  at  that  time  tliey  thought 
themselves  by  far  the  most  valiant  soldiers  in  the  worfd.* 
The  Spartans,  stung  by  the  insolent  audacity  of  the 
Arkadians.  again  took  the  field.  The  young  and  daring 
Ancxped.  Archidamos  led  his  trooi)s.  reinforced  bv 
AX'ia''  ^"-'^^'"-^  mercenaries  from  Dionysios,  against 
mosinto  the  town  of  Karyai  ;  he  stormed  it.  and  nut 

every  man  in  it  to  the  sword.  lUit  as  he  pressed 
on  into  Arkadia.  the   Kelts  declared  that  their  term  of 
service  had  expired,  and  hastened  back  towards  Sparta. 
Their  march  was  intercepted  by  a  body  of  Messenians  ; 
Archidamos  rejoined  them  to  free  their  course,  and  the 
retreat  of  the  whole  army  was  cut  off  by  the  main  body 
of  Argives  and  Arkadians.     To  prevent  the  return  of  the 
Keltic  contingent,  and  then  to  force  the  united  army  to  a 
desperate   contest,   seems   little  short   of   presumptuous 
folly,  the  natural  result  of  the  overweening  self-conceit 
which  Xenophon  hints   at.     A  few  stirring    words  from 
their  general,  aided  by  the  presence  of  favourable  omens, 
aroused  in   the  Spartan   soldiers  an   irresistible  ardour:' 
they  swept  all  before  them.     Of  the  panic-stricken  Arka- 
rcsults  in  ^'^'^"^'  ^^■^^'  ^^'^^itcd  to  rcceive  the  charge  ;  the 

v?ctof;''or       '^^^'^'''  .^"^^^^^  ''''''"''  ^^'"'^^  '"  pursuit,  and  10.000 
the  •  Tear-         Arkadians  fell  without,  as  is  said   the  loss  of 

less  Battle'  .,  „;.      i      c-         .  t         <  .      .  * 

a  single  Spartan.  In  old  times,  the  news  of 
a  victory  excited  at  Sparta  little  emotion;  but  when  the 
story  of  the  'Tearless  Battle"  was  told  in  the  city,  'they 
were  not,'  in  the  words  of  Plutarch,  'able  to  'contain 
themselves  ;  but  the  old  king  went  out,  in  stately  proces- 
sion, with  tears  of  joy  in  his  eyes,  to  meet  and  emlirace 
his  son  ;  and  all  the  council  attended  him.  The  old  men 
and  the  women  marched  out  in  a  body  as  far  as  the  river 
Kurotas,  lifting  up   their  hands    and  'thanking  the  gods 


J 


CH.  XII.       Third  Expedition  of  Epameinondas,  zqT] 

that  they  had  washed  off  the  stain  that  had  kitely  clung 
to  Sparta,  and  saying  that  those  men  now  could  boldly 
appear  in  the  face  of  the  sun  who  before,  for  very  shame 
and  confusion,  could  not  shew  themselves  to  their  own 
wives.* 

This  defeat  probably  caused  little  grief  at  Thebes,  for 
it  would  prove  to  the  arrogant  Arkadians  that  they  could 
not    yet  dispense  with  Theban  aid ;  and  it      ,^,, .  , 

I  hird  expe- 

decided   Epameinondas    to   make    a    third      dition  of 

,.  .         .    ^        ,        1,    1  T^u  Epanicinon- 

expedition  into  the  Teloponnese.      1  he  sup-      das  into  the 
port  of    Arkadia    was  so   uncertain  that    it      J,,f|e^""" 
seemed  highly  desirable  for  Thebes  to  secure 
other  allies  in  southern  Greece ;    and,  with  this  object, 
Epameinondas,  after  traversing  without  difficulty  the  care- 
lessly guarded  passes  of  the  isthmus,  turned  his  attention 
to  the  cities  of  Achaia,  most  of  which  had  hitherto  been 
neutral  in  the  struggle.    The  prevalent  form  of  constitution 
among  them  was  oligarchical ;   but  since  they  willingly 
enrolled  themselves  as  Theban  allies,  and  gave  security  for 
their  obedience,  he  used  his  influence  to  prevent  any  vio- 
lent changes  in  their  governments  ;  and  having  thus  gained 
for  Thebes  the  control  of  the  coast-line  of  the  Corinthian 
Gulf,  he  returned  home.     But  the  democratic 

.  His  tre.at- 

factions  in  the  Achaian  cities,  disappointed  of      mciu  of 
their  expected  ascendency,  pursued  him  with       ^iUes  re-*'^" 
comi)laints,  in  which  the  Arkadians  joined ;       xhebes^^ 
and  the  Thebans,  incapable  of  appreciating 
the  large-hearted  and  moderate  policy  which  would  have 
kept  the  grateful  cities  faithful  to  their  new  ally,  proved 
themselves,  as  Lykomedes  had  said,  '  Spartans  in  all  but 
the  name.'  by  despatching  harmosts  and  forming  govern- 
ments which  they  fancied  more  devoted  to  their  interests. 
Yet  the  event  proved  that  the  measures  of  Epameinondas 
were  not  only  more  generous,  but  more  advantageous ; 


-^^  Thf   Tlukin  Supremacy.  B.C.  366. 

for  the  exiles  from  these  cities,  were  so  numerous  and 
powerful,  that  neither  Theban  h.irmosts  nor  democratic 
rulers  could  stand  a-ainst  them,  and  Achaia  was  thus 
converted  from  a  lukewarm  neutral  into  an  enthusiastic 
supporter  of  Sparta. 

In  this  unsettled  state  of  (ireek  politics  the  Thebans 
resolved  to  have  recourse,  like  the  Spartans  before  them, 
Embassies  to  the  authority  of  the  Great  Kin-.  Existinc^ 
desp:uch.d  treaties,  for  which  they  were  not  "responsible*' 
st'.a:'to  acknowled.^^ed  his  ri:,dit    to  interfere  in  the 

thej>crsian        internal  atlairs  of  Greece;    and  Thebes,  at 
any   rate,  as    her    enemies    were    fond    of 
remmdmg  her,  was  doin-  no  violence  to  her  earlier  his- 
tory m  seekin-  his  support.     Even  if  the  intluence  of 
Epamemondas  was  not  at  this   moment  comparatively 
small,  he   may  have  thought   that   anything  was  better 
than  a  state  of  perpetual  jealousy,  suspicion,  warfare,  and 
revolution.      He  could  secure  to   Thebes   brilliant   suc- 
cesses, but  could  not  secure  to  Greece  a  fixed  settlement 
of  her  difficulties.      Again,  two   years    previously,    the 
satrap  of  Phrygia  had  sent  over  a  worthless  adventurer 
as  his  agent,  furnished  with  money,  to  endeavour  to  nego- 
tiate a  general  peace.     In  the  fruitless  congress  convoked 
at  Delpho.  in  the  Great  King's  name,  little  progress  was 
made,  not  for  the  reason  assigned  by  the  pious  Xenophon 
--that  the  god  was  not  consulted  as  to  the  conditions-but 
because    the  independence   of  Messcne  proved    an  in- 
superable obstacle.     The  Spartans  at  once  despatched  an 
envoy  to    the    Persian    court ;    and    to   counteract    his 
machinations  and  prevent  themselves  being  represented 
as  the  obstinate  disturbers  of  Hellenic  peace,  the  Thebans 
called  upon  their  allies  to  join  them  in  sending  ambassa- 
dors   to   Sousa.      At  the  (ireat   King's  court  the  manly 
Pelopidas   and   the  adroit    Ismenias  carried    evervthing 


CH.  XII. 


Success  of  Pelopidas. 


209 


before  them.     Artaxerxes  paid  them  the  utmost  honour, 
and  granted  them  a  rescript  which  recognised      ^^^^^^^  ^^ 
the  independence  of  Messene  and  ordered      J^elopi^^^^^^ 
the  Athenians  to  dismantle  their  fleet.     Of      decree  in 
the  other  envoys  present,  Antalkidas  is  said       i^hSes, 
to  have   been  so   deeply   chagrined  at   the 
coldness  of  his   reception,  that  he   committed  suicide; 
the  two  Athenians  quarrelled,  so  that  one  was  put  to  death 
on  his  return  ;  while  the  sturdy  athlete  who  represented 
Arkadia.  vexed  at  the  slights  put  upon  his  country  and 
himself,  declared  that  the  Great  King  had  bakers,  cooks, 
and  cup-bearers  innumerable,  but  that  no  soldiers  capable 
of  facing  the  Greeks  were  anywhere  to  be  seen,  and  that 
all  his  parade  of  wealth  was  nothing  better  than  a  sham. 
On  the  return  of  the  envoys  the  Thebans  summoned 
their  allies  to  hear  the  royal  rescript.     The  deputies  who 
were  sent  were  willing  to  listen,  but  nothing      ^^^  ^^^  ^ 
more.     When  they  were  asked  to  swear  to  its      -^^-^^^ 
conditions,  they  replied  that  their  instructions 
would  not  allow  them.     Lykomedes  and  the  Arkadian 
deputies  went  further.     As  an  indirect  protest  against  the 
supremacy  of  Thebes,  they  declared  that  the  congress 
ou-ht  to  be  held  not  always  in  that  city,  but  at  the  actual 
seat  of  war;  and.  after  some  angry  discussion,  they  left 
the  synod.     The  whole  project  was  a  dead  failure,  and 
the  attempts  of  Thebes  to  force  the  decree  on  the  cities 
separately  were  not  a  whit  more  successful. 

After  this  the  confusion  in  Greece  grew  infinitely  worse. 
An  accident  transferred  the  town  of  Oropos-always  a  bone 
of  contention— from  the  hands  of  Athens  to      ^^^.^^^^ 
those  of  Thebes  ;  and  as  the  Pcloponnesian      between 
allies  of  the  Athenians  refused  to  help  them      J^  Athens. 
to  regain  it,  they  broke  with  them.  and.  in 
spite  of  the  efforts  of  Epameinondas,  formed  an  alliance 


2IO  The   Theban  Supremacy.  b.c.  366. 

with  Arkadia.     Lykomedes.  who  negotiated  the  treaty  on 

behalf  of  his  countrymen,  as  he  returned  from  Athens, 

by  some  dl  hap  disembarked  in  the  very  midst  of  a  band 

of  Arkadian  exiles,  and  was  slain.    The  Athenians  made 

soon  after  a   vain  attempt  to  seize  the   friendly  city  of 

Cormth,  and  the  disgusted  Corinthians,  together  with  the 

Peace  made       citizens  of  Epidauros  antl  I'hlious,  who  were 

and^Phiious      ^^'^^'^O'  of  the  war.  diregarding  the  bitter  re- 

Thebe..  Proaches  and  eloquent  appeals  of  Archida- 

mos.  obtained  the  grudging  consent  of  Sparta, 

and  made  a  separate  peace  with  Thebes. 

As  soon  as  tranquillity  was  restored  in  one  qu.irter,  in 
another   the  tlame  of  war  would  again   burst  forth.     Six 

War  be-  ^^^^^  ^°^  ^^^'  Kleians  had  been  the  fust  to 

tween  lend  a  helping  hand  to  the  oppressed  Arka- 

and  Eiis.  aians  ;  but  no  Greek  state  could  ever  grow 

prosperous   without   arrogance    being   bred 
among  its  citizens  and  jealousy  among  its   neighbours. 
Causes  of   ill-will   multiplied   apace.     The  chief  among 
them   was   the   position  of  the   Triphylian    cities:    Elis 
claimed  them  of  old  as  her  subjects,  while  they  had  now 
voluntarily  joined  the  Arkadian  confederacy,  which   re- 
fused to  give  them  up.     Furthermore,  oligarchs  ruled  in 
Elis,  democrats  in   Arkadia;  and  this  circumstance  was 
enough  of  itself  to  produce  dissension.     The  desultory 
operations  of  365  b.c.  resulted  in  the  occupation  of  Lasion 
and  Pylos  (in  Elis)  by  the  Arkadians  and  the  Eleian  exiles. 
In  the  following  spring  Elis  received  reinforcements  from 
Sparta  and  her  Achaian  allies— for  Sparta's  best  chance 
of  security  lay  in  her  encouragement  of  Peloponnesian 
disunion.     But  the  cause  of  Elis  was  not  advanced  either 
by  the  general  whom  Sparta  sent  to  help  her,  or  by  a 
diversion  which  Archidamos  made  in  her  favoiir  by  in- 
vading Arkadia.     Her  own  troops  were  defeated  ;  .\rchi- 


CH.  XII. 


Dissensions  among  Arkadians . 


211 


damos,  after  some  loss  both  of  officers  and  men,  was 
driven  wounded  from  the  country,  and  100  Lakedaimo- 
nian  prisoners  subsequently  fell  into  the  hands      ^^^^^^  ^^ 
of  the  enemy.     The  Arkadians  pressed  on      Archidamos 
to  Olympia,  and  proceeded  to  instal  the  citi-      A^ikadians. 
zens   of    Pisa — who   cherished    an   ancient 
claim  to  the  position— as  presidents  of  the  Olympic  festi- 
val.    But  in  the  midst  of  the  games  the  insulted  Eleians, 
accompanied  by  the  Achaian  reinforcements,       B-^ttie  of 
charged  down  upon  them.     Fighting  with  a      Ji^^^'b^J'^ry 
heroism  unparalleled  in  their  national  history,      of  jhe^^ 
and  which  Xenophon  holds  to  have  been  the 
special  inspiration  of  some  favouring  deity,  they  put  their 
enemies  to  flight ;  but  the  position  occupied  by  the  Arka- 
dians was  strong  enough  to   prevent   the  Eleians  from 
driving  them  completely  out  of  the  city. 

The  expenses  of  the  war  now  pressed  heavily  on  the 
Arkadian  ruler.  Being  somewhat  suspicious  of  the 
wealthier  classes,  who  might  have  served  without  pay, 
they  preferred  to  recruit  the  army  from  the  poorer  citi- 
zen's, and,  in  their  need,  they  obtained  the  sanction  of  the 
Pisatans  to  appropriate  to  their  own  use  the  treasures  of 
the  Olympian  temple.  Since  the  death  of  Lykomedes,  no 
citizen  had  risen  among  the  Arkadians  capable  of  holding 
together  the  ill-fused  elements  of  the  confederacy.  Raising 
the  cry  of  sacrilege,  the  Mantineians,  who 

"  ,  ,.  Dissensions 

were  jealous  both  of  Tegea  and  IVIegalopolis,      among  the 
at  once  broke  loose,  and  shut  their  gates  in      (^^^^^J;^"' 
the  f:ice  of  the  troops  who  were  sent  to  enforce      PfiJ^^j.^^ 
the  fiat  of  the  government  against  them.  The 
spirit  of  disunion  spread ;  and  when  the  Ten  Thousand 
passed  a  vote  that  no  more  of  the  sacred  treasure  should 
be  used,  the  poorer  soldiers  were  driven  from  the  army 
by  want  of  pay,  and  richer  men  took  their  places.     The 


-  T-v*  "J^n-"  "^  W?- 


"■*-f  ^A-  ^l»/T*  "•  ""       -i 


"^  '^''^   Theban  Supremacy.  B.C.  364. 

national  policy  was  thus  somewhat  modified ;  and,  im- 
pelled by  the  fear  of  Theban  intervention,  the  govern, 
ment  hastened  to  conclude  a  peace  with  Elis,  and  restored 
the  Olympian  temple  to  her  care. 

It  is,  however,  perhaps  incorrect  to  speak  of  any  national 
pohcyat  all  in   Arlcadia;  for  the  confederacv'was  no'w 
hopelessly  divded.      The    mass   of  the  Arkadians  still 
remamed  fauhful  to  their  union  and  to  the  Theban  alli- 
ance ;  m  Tegea  the  cause  of  Thebes  was  supported  by  a 
Boiotian  garrison,  and  Megalopolis  owed  to  her  her  very 
ex,s_,ence.     Mantineia.  on  the  other  hand,  was  fast  drifting 
to  the  s,de  of  Sparta.     Nevertheless,  all  parties  seem  to 
have  met  together  at  Tegea  to  celebrate  the  peace.    Late 
Sti^urt  of         '"  ""^  evening  the  festivities  were  suddenly 
o1l'^r,'i'hs"  '^'^'"^'^^d.     The  city  gates  were  shut,  and  the 

«  Tegca.  democratic  section  of  the  Arkadian  troops 

,h»  •  .  "'T^f  ^^  "'^  '^'''=''^"  Sarrison,  arrested  all 
the  aristocratic  leaders  as  they  sat  carousing  at  the  feast- 
and  so  numerous  were  the  prisoners  that  both  gaol  and 
town_  ha  1  were  soon  full.  Most  of  the  Man.inehns  had 
ef  the  town  to  return  home  earlier  in  thedav;  so  that 
o  the  disappointment  of  the  perpetrators  of  the  outrage' 
there  were  but  few  of  them  among  the  prisoners.  On  th^ 
Ma„ti„da„        '°""«'ni,'  niorning  the  Mantineian  authorities 

reTer«  af      f.^"'  ^"'^^^^ "'"'  ^"^  '"'li^iant  protest  against 
Thebes,  'he  gross  illegality  of  the  arrest,  and  a  per- 

emptory  demand  that  any  imprisoned  Man- 
t^neians  should  be  at  once  set  at  liberty.  Upon  this  the 
Theban  harmost  released  all  his  prisoners,  excusing  his 
conduct  by  stating  that  he  had  acted  on  a  false  report  of 
an  intended  surrender  of  the  city  to  the  Spartans-an 
explanation  which  was  temporarily  accepted  by  the  ex- 
cited assembly  though,  as  Xenophon  says,  universally 
d-sbeheved.      Envoys  were  at  once  sent  ,0  Thebes    o 


CH.  XII. 


Reply  of  Epameinondas. 


213 


, 


demand  the  execution  of  the  treacherous  officer ;  but,  far 
from   obtaining   satisfaction,  were  met  only  with  bitter 
reproaches  and  terrifying  threats.     They  were  told  by 
Epameinondas,  formerly  their  generous  champion,  that 
the  Thebans  regarded  the  explanation  of  the  accused 
harmost  as  entirely  satisfactory ;  that  if  he  had      ^^^^^  ^^ 
done  wrong  at  all,  it  was  in  releasing  his      Epameinon- 
prisoncrs.  not  in  arresting  them.      Against 
the  Arkadians  themselves,  he   continued,  a  charge   of 
treachery  might  be  brought  with  better  reason  ;  for  though 
the  Thebans  had,  at  the  request  and  in  the  interests  of 
Arkadia,  undertaken  the  most  arduous  wars,  they  had  not 
scrupled  to  make  peace  with  the  enemies  of  Thebes  with- 
out her  consent.     But  be  assured,  he  added,  that  we  will 
soon  march  into  Arkadia,  and  unite  our  friends  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war. 

Such  a  rebuff,  expressed  in  language  so  severe,  and 
coming  from  the  lips  of  a  statesman  at  once  so  moderate 
and  yet  so  resolute,  could  not  fail  to  excite      ^jjj^^^^ 
the  gravest  alarm  in  the  Pcloponnese ;  and  the      between 
Mantineians  hastened  to  ally  themselves  with      Ifaiufneik. 
the   Spartans,   who    noted   with  delight   the 
failure  of  the  principle  of  federal  union,  and  the  disinte- 
gration of  the  confederacy.     But  in  thus  renewing  their 
political  connexion  with  the  Spartans,  they  would  have  it 
clearly  understood  that  they  joined  them  not  as  inferiors, 
but   as   equals;   and,  accordingly,  the   novel   condition 
was  laid  down,  that  the  state  in  whose  territory  the  war 
was  being  carried  on  should  control  the  military  opera- 
tions. 

Five  years  had  elapsed  since  Epameinondas  had  last 
led  a  Theban  force  into  the  Peloponnese — years  not  un- 
eventful m  the  history  of  the  city,  though  the  order  and  the 
details  of  the  events  are  involved  in  considerable  obscurity. 


2'4  The  Tluban  Supn-macy.  b.c.  363. 

First  of  all,  by  the  death  of  Pelopidas,  Thebes  had  lost  a 
Pr^ir,  ^'"''  S""^'^^'  ^"'l  'W^'neinondas  a  devoted 

-'•.■'"tlc^'"-      Thebes  to  Tl  "°f  •  '"'''''''''"''    """"^   '° 
toriQusover       ""-""  to  dbk  protection  against  the  mon- 

Ale,a„j,o»        strous  tyranny  of  Alexandres,  and  especially 

assistance      A  T     """  ''"°P'''^''  '"'°'"  '^^'  ^^"' '"  '^eir 

o    ntrchin        ;"■'"  """'■■  '•°°°  ^'™"S'  ^^-^'^  °"  "•«  point 
of  marchmg,  when  an  eclipse  of  the  sun  spread  general 

dismay  through  the  city.    In  spite  of  the  ev.l  foreboding 

reK  "/on^h       •  '""-'""f"  ^'^^  ""'  ""'>  ^oo  volunteer! 
hi  tv^ant  '^'Vr"  7P:.'''"'>-''  "-'  hatred  felt  towards 
the  tyrant.     The  inhabitants  (locked  to  join  him  and 
parsing  on    rom  Pharsalos,  he  marched\,pon   I'h  ^ali 
But   Alcxandros,    hearing   that    l-elopidas   had   but   few 
Thebans  wuh  h,m,  took  heart  to  fice  his  old  enemy  and 
encamped  wuh  an  army  twice  as  nu„,erous  inT  t'ron^ 
posmon  on  the  heights  of  Kynoskephalai.     The  ZZ 
was  stubbornly  contested;   numbers  and  position   we  e 
pitted  against  valour  and  enthusiasm :  and  just  as  the 
enemy  was  beginning  to  waver,  Pelopidas  caught  si"  h   of 
his  detested  and  perfidious  foe.    In.lamed  by  blind  ^r  th 
he  rushed  forth  from  the  ranks,  and  challenged  him  tj 
combat.     As  the  tyrant  tied  back  and  hid  .^mong  h  s 
body-guard   Pelopidas  followed  in  reckless  pursuit,  and 
seling  his  hfe  dearly,  fell  by  ,„e  hands  of  the  mercenaries' 
Eager  to  avenge  their  bekned  leader,  his  troops  pressed 
on  till  the  wavering  battle  became  a  hopeless  ro  it  anj 
he  rout  a  ruthless  carnage.    Alexandros  himself  escaped 
to  be  assassinated  some  years  later,  when  drunk   by  the 
contrivance  of  his  wife,  in  revenge  for  an  act  .if    o M- 

death  of  their  liberator  Pelopidas  knew  no  bounds-  h.s 
solders  paid  the  most  extrav.agant  honours  to  his  corpse 
the  Thessahaus  earnestly  begged  that  his  remains  n^fh; 


CH.  XII.  Destruction  of  Orchomenos.  215 

rest  among  them,  and  buried  him  with  the  most  splendid 
obsequies  ;  while  his  countrymen  avenged  him  by  reduc- 
ing the  tyrant  to  the  position  of  a  subject,  bound  to  follow 
their  lead  both  by  land  and  sea. 

Secondly,  Thebes  assumed  an  entirely  new  position 
as  a  naval' power.  Not  only  was  the  clause  in  the  royal 
rescript  which  ordered  the  disarmament  of  the  Athenian 
fleet  wholly  a  dead  letter,  like  all  the  rest  of  that  hapless 
document,  but  the  conquest  of  Samos  and  acquisition  of 
Sestos  by  Timotheos,  who  had  returned  to  his  _^^^ 

country's  service,  had  materially  increased      ^y'^^i-hebel 
the  naval  power  of  Athens.     Epameinondas, 
accordingly,  with  marvellous  energy,  raised  a  fleet,  and 
determined  to  cope  with  his  rivals  on  their  own  element. 
He  had  little  liking  for  a  sailor's  life;    yet  he  took  the 
command  himself,  and  defied  the  Athenian  navy  by  sail- 
ing as  far  as  Byzantion.    Though,  on  this  its  first  voyage, 
the  fleet  achieved  no  marked  successes,  some  of  the  most 
important  maritime  allies  of  Athens  felt  that  a  new  naval 
power  had  arisen,  and  came  over  to  the  side  of  Thebes. 
Thirdly,  the  destruction  of  Orchomenos  may.  with  the 
greatest  probability,  be  referred  to  the  period  when  Epa- 
meinondas was  absent  on  his  only  cruise.       ^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
After  the  victory  at  Leuktra,  this  ancient  city      of  Orcho- 
had  been  spared  only  by  the  personal  inHu- 
ence  and  intercession  of  Epameinondas ;  now,  during  his 
absence,  a  report,  whether  true  or  false  is  uncertain,  was 
brou-ht  to  the  Theban  government  that  the  Orchomenian 
oligarchs  were   plotting   to   overthrow   their   democratic 
rulers.     The  accused  persons  were  arrested  ;  and.  after 
a  hurried  trial,  they  were  condemned  to  death,  and  their 
town   to   destruction,    a   sentence   which   was    executed 
with  pitiless  rigour.      Epameinondas,  on  his  return,  did 
not  disguise  his  grief  or  his  abhorrence  of  the  deed ;  and 


2^6  The   Thcban  Sitpremacy.  b.c.  363. 

surely,  as  it  has  been  well  remarked,  no  higher  homage 
was  ever  paid  to  the  virtue  of  a  citizen,  than  that  his 
countrymen  found  in  his  absence  their  only  occasion  for 
gratifying  their  evil  passions. 

The  armies  of  Cireece  were  now  gathering  from  all 
quarters  for  the  great  struggle.  On  the  one  side  stood 
Sparta,  Athens,  Elis,  Achaia,  and  a  part  of  Arkadia,  led 
by  Mantineia:  on  the  other  side  were  ranged  Hoiotia, 
Argos,  Messenia,  and  the  rest  of  Arkadia.  while  a  few  of 
the  smaller  states— as  Phokis,  Phlious.  and  Corinth- 
Position  of        remained  neutral.     Epamcinondas,  who  felt 

Sut^  whh  ^^""^  ^"'>'  ^^.     "^  C''"^J^'"i.^    l^lf^^V  could    he    sup- 

reference  to  press  the  disunion  of  Arkadia  and  secure  the 
*  '''*'"•  independence  of  Messenia  against   Sparta, 

summoned  to  his  standard  the  full  forces  of  Thebes  and 
her  allies,  including  even  a  contingent  from  Alexandros 
Fourth  ex-  °^  '^'^^^^^-  With  these  he  passed  the  isthmus, 
peditionof        and  halted  at  Nemea  in  the  hope  of  cuttimr 

tpameinon-  «•  ^u       /\    u        •  i  v.  wi    v-mnuj^ 

dus  into  the  O"  the  Athenian  troops,  who  were  hastening 
^eopon-  jQ  JQjj^  j^jg  enej^jpg  .  i^^jj   tricked  by  a  report 

that  they  were  coming  by  sea,  he  hastened  on 
to  Tegea.  Here  he  was  joined  by  his  Teloponnesian 
alhes.  The  head-quarters  of  the  enemy  were  at  Manti- 
neia, where  the  Spartans  had  not  yet  joined  them  :  so  he 
made  his  whole  army— 3o.cx)o  infantry  and  3.CXX)  cavalry 
—encamp  within  the  city  walls,  where  their  movements 
could  not  be  observed. 

Xenophon,  in  his  account  of  this  campaign,  seems,  as 
Xenophon's  ^.^  ^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^f  his  task  approaching',  to 
irth?""^  "^^  ^^  ^  certain    dignity  of  style  which    is, 

generalship        Unfortunately,   wanting    in   the   rest  of   the 
non^as!"*'"        '  Hellenika.'    Perhaps  it  is  that,  with  a  father's 
pardonable  pride,  he  lingers  over  scenes  in 
which  his  sons  won  honourable  distinction,  and  he  tries 


CH.  XII. 


Attempts  to  surprise  Sparta. 


217 


also  to  do  tardy  justice  to  the  genius  of  Epameinondas. 
The  hardy  veteran  was,  after  all,  too  true  a  soldier  to 
refuse  some  tribute  of  praise  to  the  strategy  and  valour 
of  one  who  was  so  consummate  a  master  of  his  own  craft ; 
and  while  singling  out  some  points  for  special  commen- 
dation, he  acknowledges  that,  though  the  campaign  ended 
unfortunately  for  him,  he  lost  no  opportunity  of  shewing 
the  forethought  and  bravery  of  a  great  general. 

The  difficulty  of  supporting  so  large  an  army,  the  near 
approach  of  harvest,  and,  possibly,  also  his  limited  term 
of  office,  made  it  necessary  for  Epameinondas      ^p^^^j. 
to  lose  no  time  in  striking  a  decisive  blow.      ^^^^^^^ 
Hearing  that  Agesilaos— now  eighty  years  old      surprise 
—was  marching  with  all  the  forces  of  Sparta        P^''^' 
to  join  the  Mantineians,  he  marched  out  of  Tegea  at  the 
first  twilight  of  a  summer  evening,  and,  pushing  on  all 
through  the  night,  arrived  at  Sparta  the  next  morning, 
certain  of  finding  the  city  wholly  undefended.      But  the 
well-planned  scheme  fliilcd.     He  would  have  taken  the 
city,  to  use  the  phrase  of  Xenophon,  with  as  little  resist- 
ance as  boys  take  a  bird's  nest,  had  not  a  Kretan— per- 
haps a  deserter  from  the  Theban  army— hastened  across 
the  country  and  warned  Agesilaos  of  Sparta's  peril.    The 
indomitable  old  king  at  once  countermarched,  and  sent 
a  swift  courier  to  warn  Archidamos.  who  was  left  at  home, 
of  the  impending  danger.     Hence  Epameinondas,  as  he 
marched  over  the  bridge  into  the  city,  found 
the  streets  barricaded,  the  housetops  lined  with      ^^^'|j 
enemies,  and  the  whole  town  in  a  posture  of 
defence.     To  protect  their  wives  and  children,  their  altars 
and  their  homes,  the  Spartans  fought  with  more  than 
human  courage ;  and  unwilling  to  waste  time  and  lives, 
Epameinondas  called  back  his   men    from  the  assauh. 
The   scheme  was  ably  designed  and  daringly  executed. 


f 


2i8  The   T/it'bapt  Supremacy.  b.c.  362. 

and  would,  if  successful,  have  ended  the  war  at  one  blow. 
It  was  thwarted  by  the  merest  accident. 

Foiled  in  his  first  plan,  Kpameinondas  did  not  lose 
heart;  though  disappointed,  he  was  not  cast  down. 
He  attempts      -^^u^iHy  swift  to  design  and  to  perform,  he  was 

mSST         ^'  ^^^>'  ^"  ^'^  ^^^"'■"  "^^^'■ch.  while  the  Spar- 
tans, who  saw  his  watch-fires  still  burnin*- 
were  expecting  a  renewal  of  the  attack.     }Ie  knew  th^t 
when  the  forces  of  the  enemy  which  were  encamped  at 
Mantmeia  heard  of  the  danger  of  Sparta,  they  would  lose 
not   an  mstant  in  marching  in  a  body  to    her  rescue 
Here.  then,  he  saw  an  opening  for  a  second  surprise 
Mantmeia  would  be  left  unprotected ;  the  old  men  and 
the  slaves  would  be  unsuspectingly  at  work  outside  the 
walls  :  the  flocks,  and  herds,  and  crops  could  be  easily 
carried  off;  and  even  if  by  some  mischance  the  attempt 
on  the  town  should  be  baffled,  he  could  not  fail  to  secure 
plentiful  plunder  and  provisions,  which,  to  a  general  hard 
pressed  for  supplies,  was  in  itself  no  slight  object      With 
this  end  in  view,  by  another  forced  march,  he  hastened 
back  to   Tegea.      On  his  arrival  there,  he  allowed  his 
inflmtry  to  enjoy  the  rest  which  they  so  much  needed  •  but 
he  urged  his  cavalry  to  press  on  yet  ten  miles  further  to 
Mantmeia.  pointing  out  the  certaintv  of  success  and  en- 
treating them  to  bear   up  under  the   fatigue.     Man  and 
horse  were  alike  tired  out ;  but  at  the  biddin-  of  Epa 
mcinondas  they  pursued  their  march.     Here.  a<rain   the 
well-laid  design  was  accidentally  frustrated.    The'' cavalry 

!hw?rted  bv      °u  '^^  ^^^""'^"  auxiliaries  had  just  entered 
the  Athe-  ^^e  town,  so  recently,  indeed,  that  neither 

cTairy.  ^^^>'  "«^  ^^^'^  ^orscs  had  yet  had  time  to  get 

refreshment.  The  Mantineians,  panic-strick- 
en at  the  approach  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  besou-ht  them 
to  sally  forth  to  the  rescue-a  request  which  they  could 


CH.  XII. 


Enthusiasm  of  the   Thebans. 


219 


not  refuse  since  their  own  safety  depended  upon  it.  The 
reputation  of  the  Theban  and  Thessalian  cavalry  stood  de- 
servedly high,  and  they  were  probably  superior  in  number 
to  the  Athenians.  Both  sides  fought  bravely,  but  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  Thebans  lost  them  the  day,  even  when  op- 
posed to  troops  who  were  themselves  tired  with  marching; 
and  wearied  out  and  disappointed,  they  returned  to  Tegea. 

Epamcinondas,  we  may  suppose,  would  willingly  have 
avoided  all  the  misery  and  bloodshed  of  a  pitched  battle, 
which  would  surely  be  as  fiercely  fought  as  any  in  the 
annals  of  his  country  ;  but  both  his  skilful  plans  had 
been  thwarted  by  the  strangest  of  mischances,  and  it  was 
the  only  resource  left  to  him.  Nor  was  there  any  occa- 
sion for  disquietude  about  the  probable  result.  His 
forces  were  numerically  stronger,  and  nothing  could  ex- 
ceed their  devotion  to,  and  confidence  in, 
their  general.  '  Marvellous,  indeed,  it  seems 
to  me,'  writes  Xenophon  enthusiastically,'  that 
he  had  trained  his  men  to  such  perfection 
that  they  sank  under  no  toil  by  night  or  by 
day,  shrank  from  no  danger,  and,  though  their  rations  ran 
short,  were  yet  eager  to  obey.'  Nor  were  the  Arkadians 
less  zealous  in  his  service  ;  they,  too,  received  the  order 
to  prepare  for  battle  with  a  joyous  alacrity  ;  and,  to  shew 
their  personal  loyalty  to  their  leader,  painted  upon  their 
shields  the  Boiotian  crest,  the  club  of  Herakles. 

The  plain,  at  the  two  extremities  of  which  stand 
Mantineia  and  Tegea,  narrows  itself  about  half  way 
between  the  two  cities, until  it  becomes  scarcely  r^^^  g  ^^^ 
a  mile  in  breadth.  Here  ran  the  boundary- 
line  of  the  two  domains ;  and  just  to  the  north 
of  the  narrowest  part  the  Spartans  and  their 
allies  were  drawn  up  to  receive  the  Theban 
attack.    Who  was  in  command  of  their  army  is  not  known  ; 

Q 


Enthusiasm 
of  '1  hebans 
and  Arka- 
dians for 
Epanieinon- 
das. 


tans  and 
their  allies 
take  up  a 
position 
south  of 
Mantineia. 


>.aiwsftaiE..j'-..  ' 


I.  *  I '  J" 


■*a.4-.V 


ito— .A£»«fe, 


fejifcwWa»te'ji.wa.-J-a«t<gi'f  .iwa  ':faj-M 


220 


The   Tht'bati  Supremacy. 


B.C.  362. 


Tactics  of 

Epameinon 

das. 


possibly  either,  possibly  both,  of  the  Spartan  kings ;  pos- 
sibly, according  to  the  condition  of  the  alliance,  some 
obscure  Arkadian.  They  watched  the  advance  of  Epa- 
meinondas  from  Tegea;  and  as  they  saw  that  he  was 
marching  straight  towards  them  they  at  once  prepared 
for  battle.  But,  changing  his  course,  he  turned  to  the 
left  up  the  slopes  of  Mount  Mainalos ;  and 
they  began  to  doubt  if  the  battle  would  take 
place  on  that  day.  He  at  last  took  up  a  posi- 
tion not  far  from  their  right  think,  and  ordered  his  troops 
to  pile  their  arms,  as  if  making  preparations  to  encamp. 
This  proceeding  convinced  the  confederates  that  the 
fight  was  to  be  postponed.  They  broke  up  their  ranks ; 
the  cavalry  dismounted  and  unbridled  their  horses;  and 
their  spirits,  which  had  been  strung  up  by  intense  excite- 
ment, resumed  their  ordinary  tone. 

At  this  instant  the  Theban  army  began  to  bear  down 
upon  them.  The  tactics  of  Epameinondas  were  identical 
with  those  which  had  given  him  the  victory  at  Leuktra. 
The  flower  of  the  Thcbans  and  Arkadians  were  formed 
on  his  left  into  a  column  of  immense  depth  ;  the  Argives 
held  the  right,  and  his  less  trustworthy  allies  occupied 
the  centre.  As  before,  the  left  was  thrown  forward,  and 
on  this  occasion  cavalry  were  posted  to  protect  the  right 
or  unshielded  side  of  the  soldiers  against  a  flank  attack. 
The  space  between  the  two  armies  was  sufficient  to  allow 
the  disorganised  troops  of  the  enemy  to  form  their  ranks 
in  fair  order;  but  all,  according  to  Xenophon.  resembled 
men  who  were  going  to  suffer  rather  than  inflict  defeat. 
As  at  Leuktra,  a  cavalry  skirmish  began  the 

fh"e"Tebins.     ^^"^^^ '  ^^^  ^'^  ^^^  Thcban  horsemen  drove 
back  their  opponents  the  massive  column  ad- 
vanced.    The  Spartans  and  Mantineians  received  the  tre- 
mendous shock  with  unwavering  firmness,  but  the  issue 


\ 


CH.  XII. 


Battle  of  Mantincia. 


221 


was  not  long  doubtful.  Like  the  prow  of  a  trireme,  to  quote 
the  simile  of  Xenophon,  it  pierced  the  opposing  line; 
and  the  whole  body  of  the  enemy  gave  way. 

But  suddenly  the  aspect  of  the  battle  changed.     Ex- 


vMantlnela 


A.  Thebans. 

a.  Argives 

b.  Boiotians  and  Achaians. 

c.  Thebans  and  Arkadians. 


B.  Confederates. 

d.  Athenians. 

e.  Eleians. 

f.  Lakedaimonians, 

g.  Arkadians. 


cept  among  the  light  troops  on  the  extreme  right,  the 
advance  was  everywhere  stayed.     The  Spar-      ^^^    ^^ 
tan  hoplites  were  in  full  flight,  but  the  con- 
querors did  not  stir  a  step  in  the  pursuit. 
The  cavalry  of  the  enemy  fled  before  the 
squadrons  whom  they  had  recently  defeated,  but  not  a 


suddenly  by 
the  fall  of 
Epameinon- 
das. 


222 


The   Thcban  Supremacy. 


B.C.  362. 


man  rode  on  to  have  his  revenge.  The  fury  of  the  battle 
had  instantly  ceased  ;  the  hot  blood  even  of  victorious 
pursuers  was  chilled. 

Epamcinondas  had  fallen  wounded  to  death,  and  this 
was  the  result.     Like  electric  fire,  the  tidings  flew  through 
the  whole  arm\  ;  and  every  heart  was  broken, 
moments.  every  arm  paralysed.     Exposing  himself,  as 

was  the  wont  of  Greek  generals,  in  the 
thickest  of  the  fray,  he  had  been  struck  in  the  breast  by  a 
spear,  and  the  head  broke  off  and  remained  in  the  wound. 
The  stricken  leader  was  carried  out  of  the  battle  to  a  knoll 
that  overlooked  the  field.  He  knew  that  he  must  die 
when  the  spear-head  was  drawn  out.  He  asked  first  if 
his  shield  was  safe,  and  his  shield-bearer  held  it  up  before 
him ;  next,  how  the  day  had  gone,  and  he  was  assured  of 
victory.  Then  he  wished  to  see  the  two  generals  who 
were  to  succeed  him  in  command  ;  he  was  told  that  they 
had  fallen.  '  Then,'  he  replied,  '  you  must  make  peace.' 
Lastly,  with  tranquil  voice  he  ordered  the 
weapon  to  be  drawn  forth  :  and  the  patriot's 
life  was  crowned  by  a  hero's  death. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  victory  in  the  battle,  and 
erected  the  usual  trophies,  but  the  real  advantage  re- 
mained with  the  Thebans.  Striking  beyond 
Se^battie^  all  example  is  the  instance  just  narrated  of 
the  influence  which  one  man  can  gain  over 
the  minds  of  others  ;  but  it  does  not  raise  the  credit  of 
the  Theban  soldiers  and  no  one  would  have  been  more 
grieved  than  Epameinondas  himself,  if  he  could  have 
foreseen  such  results  of  his  personal  ascendency.  Yet 
the  victory,  though  far  from  decisive,  as  it  might  have 
been,  was  not  wholly  lost.  Doubtless,  as  Xenophon  says, 
Thebes  gained  nothing  in  territory  or  in  authority  by  the 
battle,  yet  it  is  not  true  that  the  confusion  and  disorder  in 


and  death. 


CH.  XII.  Death  of  Agesilaos  in  Egypt. 


223 


Hellas  was  even  greater  than  before.     By  the  peace  that 
ensued,  the  independence  of  Messenia  was  secured,  and 
Megalopolis   and    the    Pan-Arkadian   constitution   were 
preserved  from  destruction.    The  work  of  Epameinondas, 
though  cut  short,  was  thus  not  thrown  away  ;    and   the 
power  of  Sparta  was  confined  within  the  limits  which  he 
had  assigned.     Agesilaos  soon  after,  angry  and  disgusted 
at  the  position  of  aff"airs  in  the  Peloponnese      ^^^^^  ^^ 
which  he  had  lived  to  see,  went  to  Egypt  to      Agesilaos 
help  its   king   against   Persia.     The  energy      '"  ^^^P'" 
of  the  old  monarch  never  failed  him,  and  he  died  near 
Kyrene,  resolute  and  vigorous  to  the  last. 

Four  generations  had  scarcely  passed  away  since  the 
l^ersian  hordes  had  been  driven  from  Greece  ;  and  yet 
this  brief  space  had  been  long  enough  for  three  cities  to 
rise  to  supremacy  in  Hellas  and  to  be  hurled  again  from 
their  proud  pre-eminence.    Athens,  with  the  widest  empire 
and  the  highest  aims,  had  tried  to  thwart  the  disintegrat- 
ing tendency  of  Hellenic  city  life  ;  and  in  spite  of  genius, 
bravery,  and    justice,  she  had  failed  and    fallen.     The 
supremacy  of  Sparta  was  gained  by  fair  promises  and 
Persian  aid,  was  founded  on  broken  oaths  and  narrow 
tyranny,  and  was  carried  on  in  an  oppressive  and  selfish 
spirit.     Sparta  for  a  time  was  more  absolute  than  Athens 
had  ever  been  ;    she  misused    her   power  for  the  worst 
purposes,  and  such  an  empire  lasted,  as  it  deserved,  but 
a  short  time.     Within  ten  years  its  maritime  ascendency 
was  overthrown  by  the  victory  of  Konon  at  Knidos  ;  and 
though  Sparta  was  supreme  on  land  till  B.C.  371,  yet  the 
sulky  discontent  of  many  of  her  allies  and  the  open  dis- 
affection of  others  made  hergraspof  power  very  uncertain, 
and  forced  her  to  truckle  more  basely  than  ever  to  the 
Great  King,  that  she  might  obtain  from  him  a  formal  rati- 
fication of  her  pretensions.     Briefer  still— and  all  too  brief 


224  The   Tluban  Supremacy.  b.c.  362. 

for  the  ripening  of  the  liberal  policy  of  Epamcinondas- 
was  the  period  of  Theban  supremacy.  Even  in  nine 
years  substantial  results  were  obtained  ;  and.  if  the  ere"! 
genera,  had  not  fallen  on  .he  field  of  victory,  stiuCe 
miyht  have  been  done:  but  even  for  him  it  would  have 
been  uphdl  work.     The  centrifugal  forces  of  Greek  policic! 

00  weak,  for  any  lasting  union  ;  and  when  he  was  gone 
there  was  no  one  to  carry  on  his  work.     Thebes  had  per^ 
haps  a  good  general  left  in  I'ammenes,  but  no  statesman  • 
genius,  indeed,  of  any  sort   was  a   plant  which  rTrely' 
sprang  from  lioiotian  soil ;  and  she  soon  had  enou.^h  to 
do  m  the  north  of  Greece  without  troubling  herself  „i  h 
I'eloponnesian  politics.     It  seemed  for  a  time  as  if  A  hens 
n>.ght  resume  her  former  position.     Her  naval  empire 
was   reviving    and   she   had  still   an    able    general'" 
Chabrias,  and  a  noble  citizen  in  Timotheos.     but  the  citv 
was  rotten  at  the  core.     Slothful  and  discontented,   he 
Athenians  delegated   all  active  service   ,0  mercenaries 
and  remained  at  home  to  grumble  at  and  prosecute  those 
commanders  who   failed    to    fulfil    their    unreasonabe 
expectations    Her  naval  powerwas  obtained  chiefly  a,  the 
expense  of  the  Olyn.hians,  who  once  again  strove  hard 
to  unite  their  neighbours  in  a  league  of  mutual  advanta-^e 
andamity.     But   just  as  Sparta  previously  had  crushed 
the  brave  cty  of  Olynthos,  so  now  Athens  put  forth  all 
her  strength  against  its  young  confederacy.      The    last 
bulwark  against  foreign  aggression  was  removed  •    and 
Greece  lay,  a  defenceless  mass  of  incoherent  atoms  at 
the  mercy  of  the  first  invader. 


INDEX. 


ABY 

A  BYDOS,  102,  129,  131,  142 
■'*•     Achaians,    the,    88,    125,    138, 

207,208,211,216,221 
Acharnai,  36  I 

Adeimantos,  2  i 

^  n,  107  _  ' 

,\  ,  5;  opposes  Leotych ides, 

^o ;     character    of,  90 ;     becomes 
i"g.  93;    conciliates    the  cphors, 
94 ;    represses    the    conspiracy    of 
Kinadon,97;  causes  of  expedition 
of,  105  ;    large    ideas  of,  107  ;    hu- 
miliates Lysandros,  108;  plunders 
the  satrapy  of  Fharnabazos,  109  ; 
defeats  Tissaphcrnes,  110;    again 
attacks    the   territory  of    Fharna- 
bazos,   112;     interview    of,    with 
Fharnabazos,  H2  ;  recalled  by  the  \ 
ephcrs,   114;    returns   by    way   ot 
Amphipolis.Thessaly,  Chaironeia, 
125,  126;     wins  a  battle  at   Koro- 
neia,  127  ;    welcomed   home,  128  ; 
takes    Feiraion,    135 ;     retires    to 
Sparta,    138;    attacks    Akarnania, 
138  ;  enforces  the  peace  of  Antal- 
kidas,    147;    supports    Fhoibidas, 
158 :     declines    command    against 
Thebes,    171  ;     spares    Sphodrias, 
172;    commands   at^ainst    Thebes, 
»74»  '75:    wounded    and    ill,  175; 
opposes    Epameinondas  about  the 
Peace  of  Kallias,   184:    excludes 
the  Thebans  from  it,  184:   settles 
the  treatment  of  the  '  runaways,' 
195  ;    rebuffed  at  Mantineia,  197  ; 
saves  Sparta,  199  ;  takes  the  field 
against  Epameinondas,  217;  death 
of,  in  Egypt,  223 


APO 

Agesipolis,  125,  138,  149,  158,  161 

Agis  11.,  IX,  13,  42,  87,  88,92 

Agis  III.,  195 

Aigai,  161 

Aigaleos,  Mt.,  32 

Aigina, 143 

Aiginetans,  the,  10,  143,  179 

Aigospotamoi,  2,  99,  105,  116 

Aigosthena,  192 

Akanthos,  3,  154,  155 

Akarnania,  123,  138,  151,  180 

Akrokorinthos,  161 

Akropolis,    17,   20,   32,   36,    45,    52, 

191 
Alexander  the  Great,  65 
Alexandros  of  Pherai,  204,  205,  214, 

216 
Alkibiades,  11,  29,  52,  56,  92 
Alpheios,  the,  88 
Amanos,  Mt.,  69 
Ambrakia,  123 
Amoun,  85 

Amphiktyonic  Council,  the,  194 

Amphipolis,  60,  126 

Amyklai,  136,  199 

'Anabasis,'  the,  65 

Anarchy,  the  year  of,  46 

Anaxibios,  77-80,  142 

Antalkidas,  139,  140,  144,  145,   175, 
182,  209 

Antalkidas,  the   Peace   of,  144,  145, 
ISO.  i!^5,  183,  194 

Antandros,  142 

Antipatros,  195 

Anytos,  18,  31,  60 

Apollo,  89,  90 

Apollodoros,  56,  63 

ApoUonia,  154,  155 

225 


^a^j^gg^^^'sgg^^ff'wwiniwii'wwg  immiimi  u-w 


226 


Index, 


ARA 


Arakos,  103 
Archias,  157,  162-165 
Archidamos  II.,  3,  153 
Archidamos,  son  of  Agesilaos,  17.., 

206,  210,  211,  217 
Archinos,  31,32,49.  5o 
Artiinousai,  12,  21,  176 
Argivcs,  the.  31.  127,   132,   134,  ,35, 
Mf.  147.  M9,  202,  205,  206,  220,  221 
Argos,  27,  118,  123,  124,  132,  139,  140, 

'47.  195,  198,  216 
Ariaios,  70,  71,  72 
Aristarchos,  8,  80 
Aristodemos,  8,  125,  126 
Aristophanes,  59 
Aristotle,  4,  04 

Arkadians,  the,  8,  134,  ,38,  193,  196- 
199,  202,  205-207,  209-213,  21Q- 
221  ^ 

Arkadia,  89,  96,  193,  194,  206,  207, 

209,  210,  212,  213,  216 
Armenia,  76 
Artaxerxes    (Mnemon),    66,   69     71 

106,  116,  146,  150,  182,  209 
Asine,  205 
Asklepios,  64 
Asopos,  the,  187 
Aspendos,  142 
Atarneiis,  104 

Athenian  culture  displayed  in  Xeno- 
phon,    75  ;    rule    contrasted    with 
bpartan,  82;  envoys  in  Asia.  ng.  i 
140  ^^'  1 

Athenians  forced  to  follow  Spartans  i 
against    Elis.   87;    refuse    to   join 
Agesilaos,     106.      send     help     to 
1  hebes    120;  join  the  confederacv 
against   Sparta,  123;    defeated   at 
Corinth,  125:    defeated    at    Koro-  . 
neia,  127;    defeated   outside   Cor-  I 
inth,    132:     restore    the    Wall    of 
Corinth.  134  ;  consent  to  the  Peace 
of   Antalkidas,     144-146;     try    to 
form  a  new  confederacy.  161.  170  • 
receive   the    Theban   exiles,    ife  • 
help  them  to  drive  out  the  Sparl 
tans,  166;    indignation   of   at  the 
attempt   of  Sphodrias,  17..  •    sup- 
port   I  hebes,   173-175:    victorious 
at  Naxos,  176;  join  the  Spartans 
m    making    peace.    ,82  ;      accept 
the  Peace  of  kallias.  ,83:    vexed 
at  the  news  of  Leuktra,  191  ;  assist 
Sparta  against  Thebes.  20T    202  • 
assist  Alexandros  of  Phcrai.  204  • 
make  an  alliance  with  the  Arka- 
dians, 209,  210,  2i6;  save  Manli- 


COR 


neia,  218;  fail  in  their  attempt  to 
regain  supremacy,  224 
Athens  c;*pture  of,  1  ;  terms  im- 
posed upon,  I  ;  return  of  oligarch- 
ical exiles  to.  10  ;  p<,luical  dubs 
at,  12;  Ihirty  Tyrants  at,  15 
grievances  of  the  rich  at.  25  enl 
tcred  by  'I  hrasyl.uulos.  45  ;  toler- 
ationat  59;  results  of  the  Pe.-ice 
of  Antalkidas  to,  152,  153;  head 
of  new  league,  194 

'^4i''l8l'.^'V'';''^^'^''*3.45. 

40,  40,  1^3.  MJ,  J65,  201 
Aulis,  107,  127,  146 
Aulon,  98 
Autolykos,  18 


I    f5Al;VI.OMA,68,  70 
Mciiia,  the,  27 
Bithynia,  83,  102 

'"''isT'''^'''   '''*''    '°^'   '^'  '7°.  '8». 

Boiotia,    31,   40,    107,    122,    126-130 

'^'    '53,    »54.    166,    ,69,    170,   ,7s, 

176-179.  «8i, 183-185,  191,194,2,6, 
219,  221  ^  ' 

Bosporos,  the,  79 

Hrasidas,  3,  5,  95 

Byzantion,  8,  9,  67,  77-80,  ,42,  2,^ 


:  C"^f''^'^S     ,38.    143,    145.    150, 

/'L       .   '7.^-176.     180,    202,    205,    224 

Cnairephon,  56 

Chaironeia,  126,  177 

Chalkedon,  9,  142 

Chalkis,  31 

Charikles,  2 

Charon,  163,  164,  166 

Chersonese,  the,  79,  104 

Cnrj'sopolis,  70 

Cicero,  24 

Corey ra,  v.  Korkyra 

Corinth.  118,  124,  125,  130-140,  147, 
'51,  '53.  20?,  201,  210 

Corinthian  (iulf,  t>ie.  134,  ,42,  207 
Corinthians  claim  a  share  in  the 
Spartan  spoil.  30;  refuse  to  join 
the  Spartan  army,  42,  86,  106;  join 
the  anti-Spartan  confederacy,  121  • 
defeated  at  Koroneia,  127:  polil 
tical  feuds  among.  n2  ;  closely  al- 
lied with  Argives,  132;    betrAycd 

'Vur ""***'  ^^^'  "'**^*^  peace  with 
i  hebes,  210:  neutral  in  the  last 
struggle,  216 


Index. 


227 


GYP 


HER 


Cyprus,  V.  Kypros 

Cyreians,  8,  65-81,  100-105,  114,  127 

Cyrus  the  Elder,  70 

Cyrus,  friend  to  Lysandros,  6,  29  ; 
collects  Greek  troops,  66  ;  marches 
from  Sardeis,  67  ;  reaches  IJaby- 
lonia,  68  ;  prepares  for  battle,  69  ; 
death  of,  71,  73,  77,  90,  100 


pvAIMOMON,  the,  of  Sokrates, 

^     53.61 

Daskyleion,  102,  109,  112 

Dekarchies,  nature  of  their  rule,  8, 

30,  83  ;  fall  of  the,  85 
Dekclcia,  11,  88 
Del  ion,  60,  170 
Delos,  63,  173 
Delphoi,  56,  89,  90,  96,  128,  194,  203, 

20S 
Demosthenes  (generaU,  137 
Demosthenes  (orator),  32 
Derkyllidas,   102-105,  126,  129,  139, 

141,  142 
Diodoros,  8,  116,  176,  181 
Dionysios,  203,  206 
Diopeithes,  93 
Dodona,  89 
Dorieus,  115 
Drakon,  49 


EGEAN   SEA,  the,  128,  173,  176, 
178,  180,  181 
Egypt,  91,  145,  150,  183,  223 
Eleusinian  mysteries,  the,  38 
Eleusis,  35,  39,  41,  43,  45,  4^,  172 
Eleven,  the,  15,  23,  35, 45 
Eli>,  31,  40,  86,  87,  88,  98,  117,  194, 

196,  198,  210-212,  216,  221 
Epameiiiondas  trains  the  youth  of 
Thebes,  162  ;  supports  Pelopidas 
in  expelling  the  Spartans,  166  ; 
friendship  of,  with  Pelopidas,  167; 
character  of,  168,  169  ;  revives  the 
Sacred  Band,  170;  supports  the 
Athenian  alliance,  173;  defends 
the  policy  of  Theijcs,  182  ;  refuses 
to  withdraw  the  Theban  claims 
over  Boiotia,  183;  excluded  from 
the  Peace  of  Kallias,  184;  at 
Leuktra,  185  ;  spirit  and  tactics  of, 
186-188;  victorious,  18^;  policy 
of,  192,  193  ;  first  invasion  of  the 
Peloponnese  by,  198 ;  marches  on 
Sparta,  198,  i'>9  ;  founds  Mcgalo- 
polis,and  restores  Mcsscuc,:^oo ,  ac- 


cused of  his  return  to  Thebes,  201  ; 
second  invasion  of  the  Peloponnese 
by,  202  ;  dismissed  from  olfice,  203  ; 
rescues  Pelopidas  in  Thessaly,  205; 
third  invasion  of  the  Peloponnese 
by,  207  ;  repulses  the  Mantineian 
envoys,  213;  commands  the  The- 
ban fleet,  215;  fourth  invasion  of 
the  Peloponnese  by,  216  ;  fails  to 
surprise  Sparta,  217;  fails  to  sur- 
prise Maniineia,  218;  tactics  of, 
at  Mantineia,  220,  221 ;  wounded, 
222  ;  death  of,  322 

Epeiros,  181 

Ephesos,  7,  102,  104,  107, 109,  129 

F.phoros,  89 

Epidauros,  133,  203,  205,  210 

Epicikia,  133 

Euagoras,    106,    116,    141,    145,    148, 

15*^.  15 -' 
Euboia,  8,  123 
Eudamidas,  155,  160 
Eukleides.  46,  50 
Euphrates,  the,  69 
Euripides,  64 

Eurotas,  the,  96,  177,  199,  205,  206 
Eutresis,  187 
Euxine,  the,  76,  78,  142 


rOUR  HUNDRED,  the,  3, 12,21, 
22,  31,  47 


r^  ERAISTOS,  107 

^-^     Gergis,  102 

Gideon, 188 

Gorgidas,  165,  167,  170,  174,  175 

Gylippos,  5 

Gymnopaidia,  the,  191 

Gytheion,  199 


HALIARTOS,  120 
Harmosts,  nature  of  the   rule 

of.  7,  83,  85  ;   expelled  by  Konon, 

128  ;    withdrawn  by  the  Peace  of 

Kallias,  183 
Helikon,  Mt.,  121,  127 
Helisson,  the,  200 
'  Hellenika,'  the,  216 
Hellespont,  the,  83,  84,  86,  99,  104, 

108,  114,  130,  142,  145 
Helos,  199 
Heraia,  89 

Heraion,  the,  136,  137 
Hcrakleia,  8,  112,  119,  124 


issm 


228 


Index. 


HER 

Herakleia  (Pontica).  tq 
Herakles,  6,  ,86.  ^19  '^ 
Her.pp.das,  8.  112,  110    ,2^,  i„ 
Hernial,  mutilation  of  the    n 
Hermos,  the,  no 
Hetairiai,  12 
Homuioi,  the,  94,  95 
Hypomcmnes,  the,  94,  98 

JDA,  Mt..  loa 

Illyrians,  the,  154 
Imbros,  140,  146 
Ionia,  ijy-141,  ,69 

100,  I8l,  185,  201 

Ismenias,    ,23,    156.    157,    ,59,    ,^^ 

Isokrates,  9,  182 
Isthmian  (lames,  the,  135 


J 


ASON  of  Pherai,  65. 178,  ,81.  ,92. 
203,  204  '  '       »   y-. 


KAI>MElA.the,x5^,59.i6,,i65, 
160,  ,70.  ,7,,  ,9^       ^  5. 

Kalatireia,  180 

Kallihios    8.  17.  18,20 

Ka  l.krat.das.  5,  42 

l^a  listratos,  173,  180-182 

l^'ilpe.  7'^,  83 

ivardoMchoi,  the,  76 

Karia.  101,  104,  jq^    „^, 

Karyai,  206 

Kaunos,  114 

Kebren,  102 

Kelts,  the,  206 

Kephalienia,  180 

Kephisodotos,  202 

Kephissos,  the,  127 

Ceramic  Gulf,  the,  116 

Kerasous,  78 

K-ilikia,  68,  150 

Kiliki^an  Gates,  the,  68,  60 

K.nadon,  97,  08,195        ^ 

K.tha.ron,    Aft.,    ,54,  ,63.  174,  176, 

Klazomenai,  146 

Klearchos.  8.  67   60    -m    ■,,    -™ 
Kleisthenes.V' ^'^'7*'7=''73 

Kleokritos.  38 

KleombroKs.  171    17^    r,-    ,,0      o 
186.  ,83,  ,89  ^  '  ^^'  '75.  »78.  185, 

Kleomenes,  96 
Kleon.  32,  137 

Klerouchies,  49 


LYS 

Knidos,  ri6,  ia6,  128,  223 

Kolossai,  III 

Konon,  ,05,  ,06.  114,  „5,  „6    ,^ 

»3i,  140.  141.  173.223 
Kopaic  l^ke,  the,  169 
Korkyra,  ,79,  180,  181 
Korunc.a,  ,27,  146,  153 
Kotyora,  78 
Krannon,  123 
Kretan,  85,  217 
Kreusis,  ,79,  ,85 
!  Kntias      returns     from     exile      a  • 
I      character    of,    1,  ;     in    power    at 
Athens.   13  ;    .sends  for  a   Spartan 
garnson,  17;    overthrows   fhera- 
menes,   20     21.  22,  23;    effects  of 
personal  chai;acter  of,  26 ;    seizes 
'       Keusi>,  35;    ,s  killed,  38,50-    his 
relations  with  Sokrales,  56.60  6i 
J^nton,  52,  63,  64  .  5  .00,  01 

Krummyon.  133,  ,37 
Kunaxa,  70.  77,  90 
Kyllcne,  88 
Kyme.  ,00,  in 
Kyi       '       ■   ilai.  214 
KVi  yprus),  106.  ,45,  ,46.  X50 

Kyrcne,  200,  223  ^ 

Kythera,  130 
Kyzikos,  H2 


LAKOXIA,  .30,  ,3,.  ,^8,  ,84,  199. 

Lampsakos.  81,  103 
Larissa  (Asiai,  jo, 

Larissa(Thessaly),  123,204 
A^sion,  210 

Lebadeia,  ,86 

Lc..mia,,e..  .56.  .57.  ,58,  ,5,.  ,6,, 

Leotychidcs,  91,  92 
I  eprcon,  86 
Lesbos,  142 
Lcukas,  123 

I  '"'"'iTi'"'  *"■  "'■  '«'■  '9'-'9S. 
Libya,  89,  200 

I       "uT'.y^.  »23.  128 

Long  \Va  Is,  destruction  of  the    a  • 

re.torat.on  of  the.  ,30,13,         ''• 
Lydia,  ,,0  '    J  »    j» 

Lyko„,edes,  196.  205,  207,  209,  aio, 

Lykon,  60 

Lykourcos,  84,  96,  195 
Lysandru,  29 


Index, 


229 


LYS 

Lysandros  enters  Peiraieus,  2  ;  in- 
fluence a!id  character  of,  5  ;  neces- 
sary to  Sparta,  7 ;  establishes  the 
Thirty,  14  ;  subdues  Samos,  29  ; 
returns  to  Sparta,  29  ;  his  power 
and  arrogance,  29,  30  ;  starts  to  the 
support  of  the  Thirty,  4,  ;  jealousy 
against,  41  ;  superseded  by  Pausa- 
nias,  43  ;  weakened  power  of,  83  ; 
recalled,  84  ;  leaves  Sparta,  85  ; 
schemes  for  royal  power,  S9  ;  sup- 
ports the  claims  of  Agesilaos,  90  ; 
urges  Agesilaos  to  assume  the 
command  in  Asia,  ,06  ;  his  motives, 
106  ;  devotion  of  Asiatics  to,  107  ; 
humiliated  by  Agesilaos,  ,08  ;  ap- 
pointed to  command  in  Boiotia, 
119;  killed  in  attacking  Haliartos, 
12,-123,  128,  139,  153,  192 

Lysias,  40 


AT  AC  F.DON,  154.  155.  i6» 
^  *■     Magna  Graecia,  169 
Maiandros  (Maeander),  104 
Mainalos,  Mount,  220,  221 
Malians,  the,  ,20,  ,23 
Mantineia,    86,    ,49,    196,    197,    198, 

21J,  212,  213,  2,6,  217,  218,  220 
Mardonios,  ,48 
Marsyas,  51 
Medes,  ,47 
Media.  Wall  of,  72 
Megalopolis,     193,     200,     211,    212, 

223 
Megara,  31,  ,66,  202 
Meletos,  60,  62 
Melians,  the,  10 
Mellon,  ,63,  164,  166 
Menelaos.  107 
Menon,  67,  68,  73 
Messene  (city).  193,  200 
Messene  (Sicily),  200 
Messenia,  98,  130,  200,  205,  208,  209, 

2,6,  223 
Messenians,  the,   ,0,   148,   198,  200, 

205,  206 
Metoikoi  (resident  aliens),  20,  22,  27 
Miletos,  66 
Miltiades,  104 
Mitylene,  9 
Mnasippos,  179,  180 
Mounychia,  36,  44 
Mysia,  113 

AJAUARCHY,  the,94 
•'■^     Naxos,  176 


PHA 

Nemea,  125,  216 
Neodamodes,  ,01,  106 
Noiiioihelai,  50 


(-ADYSSEUS,  77 

^^     Oinoe,  136,  137 

Olympia,  87,  205,  2,1 

Olynthos,  ,54,  ,55.  ,56,  ,59,  160,  324 

Opountian  Lokrians,  the,  119 

Orchomenos  (Arkadia),  ,97 

Urchomenos  (boiotia),  121,  ,26,  127, 

153.  174,  176,  177.  '94,  215 
Oreos,  8 
Oropos,  209 


pAKTOLOS,  the,  no 

^      '  Palamedes,'  the,  64 

Pammenes,  167,  201,  224 

Pamphylia,  142 

Paphlagonia,  112 

Parnes,  Mount,  32 

Parthenon,  the,  45 

Parysatis,  66,  106,  in 

Paul,  St.,  25 

Pausanias,     42-45,     120,     122,    123, 

125 
Peiraieus,  the,  ,5,  27,  36,  39-41,  56, 

87.  i3».  M3,  M4,  172,  173 

Peiraion,  13,,  135,  136 

Peisandros,  ,n,  116,  126,  128 

Pella,  154 

Pellene  (Achaia),  202 

Pellene  (Lakonia),  205 

Pelopidas,  plots  against  the  oli- 
garchs, ,62,  ,6 ,  ;  assassinates 
Leontiades,  165  ;  made  Boiotarch, 
,66;  character  of,  ,67;  wins  vic- 
tory near  Tegyra,  177;  at  Leuk- 
tra,  ,86-, 90;  in  Thessaly,  204; 
at  Sousa,  208  ;  killed  in  Thessaly, 
2,4 

Penestai,  the,  ,2 

Pergamos,  81,  loi 

Perikles,  27,  49.  104,  143 

Perioikoi,  the,  7,  87,  9^ ,  98,  200 

Persepolis,  65 

Persia,  causes  of  war  between  Sparta 
and, 99 

Persian  aid  to  Sparta,  3  ;  weakness 
of,  Empire,  65, 100  ;  policy  towards 
Greece,  139 

'  Phaidon,'  the,  63 

Phaleric  Wall,  the,  131 

Pharax,  104,  114,  115 


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230 


Index, 


PHA 


Pharnabazos,    79,   84.    102,   104-106. 

108,  109,  I,, -I, 3,  ,,6,129,  ,30,,, X 

135.  139.  142  ^     ^  '    ^  ' 

l^harsalos,  1,9,  ,23,  ,78,214 
*  neiJias,  45  •    »      t 

"""^^t:!'-  "■'  '"•  =°3-  ^°*- 

I'hliasians,  the,  133 
{'hlioiis,  161,  210,  216 
i'Mceiiicia,  105 

Phok,,,  „,,  „3, .,,_  „,^  ,^^^  ,^,_ 

Phryyia,  109,  112,  208 
pt^  r'.32,  33.  36 
Phyllulas,  163,  164 
P'sa,  88,  2JI 
Pisitlia,  67,  68 

y^:^!ii^^^''  •""■  ■'■• "- 

Plato,  11,52,  6.',  63 
iTt'R^'  9-  »7.  29.  3,.  84.  89,  ,08, 
4l'J^'   ''''   '^''    '7'.    »7^.    »77. 

E"y^  'he.  27.  45 
i'ollis,  176 
Polybiades.  161 
Polyjjnotos,  45 
Pontiis,  89,  90 
Poseidon,  92 
Potidaia,  60,  155 
Praxitas,  133,  134 
Propylaia,  the,  45 
Proxenos,  67,  73.  7^    7, 

Pythajioreanism,  169 


P  HFXiroX.  200 

Rhodes,  114,  14, 


3ACRED  Band,  the,  170.  177.  ,88. 

Salamis.  27,  35.  ,^6 
^alamis  (Kypros),  106 
bamos,  13^28.  29.  31.84,  215 
Sarde.s.66.67.69.77.„o,x39,  141. 

Saronic  Gulf,  the    32 
Sa tyros,  15,  23 
beilenos,  51 
Sellasia,  199 
Sestos,  84.  114.  129,215 
Seuthes,  81 


THE 

§!,^o"s  133,  137 

,  Sisyphus,  I02 

Skedasos.  186 

Skepsis,  102 

Skione,  153 
I  Skope.  221 

Skotoussa.  123 

Skyros,  140,  146 
1  iskytalism,  ,95 

gokrates,  ,,,,8,32,  50^4 

Sophists,  the,  56,  59 
Sousa.  lo.s.  14,,  ,45,  ,61,  208 
Sparta     unpopularity    of,    30      tit- 
t'er'r;'''"^'^'^^3:'disco'n: 

lersia  and.  99;   saved   from   Epa- 
memondas.  ,y9.  217  ^ 

Spartan  tyranny.  4.  notions  of 
nncrty,  4 ;  rule  contrasted  with 
Athe^n.an.  82  ;    character,  change 

^^Ablt- /'^'''-''"l  P*^-''^*  through 
Am.  k.das.  ,46;    as  executors   of 

the  Peace  of  Antalki.las.  ,48    ,„ 
accept  the   Peace  of  Kallias.'    8^  •' 
at  TenLr'"''^  «""=••  ^76:    defeated 
at    leuktra.    ,85.    t8o.    ,90;    quit 

hZtlT-  '^^'  •■  rP  '^he  TeaHess 
Battle  206:  defeated  at  Manti- 
neia,  210.  220,  221 

Spartoi,  the,  168 

Sphakteria,  137 

gPj^^'^rV'".  '71,  172.  174,  189 
Spithridates,  108,  112 
Struuthas,  14, 

Switzerland,  196 
Sycophants.  16,  22,  26 
Syracuse.  161.  180 
Syssitia,  the,  95 

^ARSOS.  68 

Tegea,   ,23,  ,46.  197,  201,  2,1.  2,,. 
210-221  '        ' 

Tepra.  177 
ieleut.as,    .34,    ,4,,    ,^3^    ,^^^    ^^^ 

Thapsakos,  69 
I  hasos,  10 

1  hehan  exiles  at  Athens,   ,61     162  • 
P^t   against    the    cligaVchs,'   163: 

'IW  ■   '"'  V.  short-lived,  223 

Ihebans,  ._   ^f^  ,^  Athens,  1; 


Index. 


231 


THE 


claim  a  share  of  the  Spartan  spoil, 
30;  change  feelings  and  support 
the  Athenian  exiles,  31  ;  refuse  to 
join  the  Spartan  army,  42,  87, 106  : 
causes  of  hostility  between  the 
Spartans  and  the,  118,  11^;  send 
to  Athens  for  help,  120;  join  the 
anti-Spartan  confederacy,  123; 
prowess  of,  at  Koroneia,  127 ; 
send  to  ask  peace  from  the  Spar- 
tans, 135:  object  to  the  Peace  of 
Antalkidas,  147;  results  of  the 
Peace  of  Antalkidas  to  the,  152; 
difficulties  of  the,  170  ;  attacked  by 
Kleonibrotos,  171  ;  join  the  Athe- 
nian league,  173;  strengthen  their 
position  in  Buiutia,  176,  182  ;  ex- 
cluded from  the  Peace  of  Kallias, 
184;  drawn  up  near  Leuktra,  185: 
manoeuvres  and  victory  of  the, 
188-190;  general  policy  of  the, 
192 :  results  of  their  victory  at 
Leuktra  to  the,  194 ;  assist  Man- 
tineia,  198 :  attack  Sparta,  198  ; 
victory  of  the,  at  the  Isthmus,  202  ; 
send  envoys  to  Sousa,  208  ;  obtain 
a  favourable  rescript,  209 ;  make 
peace  with  Corinth  and  Phlious, 
210;  raise  a  fleet,  215  ;  devotion 
of  the,  to  Epameinondas,  219  ; 
victorious  at  Mantineia,  221 

Thebes,  48,  119, 140,  M9,  '55  ad /in. 

Theches,  Mount,  76 

Theramenes,  12,  13,  14,  19,  20,  21-24 

Thespiai,  153,  165,  172,  174,  181,  187, 

'94 
Thespios,  the,  187 

Thessaly,  12,  21,  119,  123,  126,  128, 

178,  204,  219 

Thimbron,  lox,  141 


ZEU 


Thorax,  29,  84 
Thourian  soldier,  a,  77 
Thrasyboulos,  18,  22,  31,  32,  34,  36, 

37.  39.  40,  41,  43-45,  47,  5o,  »2o, 
122,142,  163,  167 
Three  Thousand,  the,  19,  24,  33,  35, 

39.  40.  47 
Thriasian  Plain,  the,  172 

Tigris,  the,  72,  76 

Timokrates,  118 

Timolaos,  124 

Timotheos,  173,  179-181,  215,  224 

Tiribazos,  139-141,  145,  146 

Tissaphernes,  66,  69,  72,80, 100,  102, 

103-105,  107,  108-111,  113 
Tithraustes,  111.  118,  124,  139 
Trapezous  (Trebizond),  77,  78 
Triphylian  cities,  the,  210 
Trophonios,  186 
Tyre,  150 


y  ENOPHON  (history),  14, 16. 18, 

-^     23,24,29,31,33,36,38,46,55, 

56,  59.  65,  66,  71,  74,  83,  88,  91,  97, 

101,   103,  108,   no,    113,    116,    118, 

119,  128,    133,   136,    137,    143,    149, 

155,  158,  159,  »7»,  »72.  174,  184, 
185,  188-191,  197,  205,  206,  208, 
211,  212,  216,  217,  219-222 

Xenophon  (life),  55,  74-76,  78-82, 103, 
114,  127,216 

Xerxes,  66 


7ABATOS,  the  (the  Greater  Zab), 
^     72 


Zakynthos,  179 
Zeus  the  Kindly,  81 
Zeus  the  King,  81 


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Noah  Porter,  President  of  Yale  College. 

"The  *  Epochs  of  History'  have  been  prepared  with  knowl- 
edge and  artistic  skill  to  meet  the  wants  of  a  large  number  of 
readers.  To  the  young  they  furnish  an  outline  or  compendium. 
To  those  who  are  older  they  present  a  convenient  sketch  of  the 
hearls  of  the  knowledge  which  they  have  already  acquired.  The 
outlines  are  by  no  means  destitute  of  spirit,  and  may  be  used  with 
great  profit  for  family  reading,  and  in  select  classes  or  reading  clubs." 

Chari.ks  Kendall  Adams,  President  of  Cornell  University. 

"A  series  of  concise  and  carefully  prepared  volumes  on  special 
eras  of  history.  Each  is  also  complete  in  itself,  and  has  no  especial 
connection  with  the  other  members  of  the  series.  The  works  are 
all  written  by  authors  selected  by  the  editor  on  account  of  some 
especial  qualifications  for  a  portrayal  of  the  period  they  respectively 
describe.  The  volumes  form  an  excellent  collection,  especially 
adapted  to  the  wants  of  a  general  reader." 

TAe  Publishers  will  supply  these  volumes  to  teachers  at  SPECIAL 

NE  T  RA  TES,  and  would  solicit  correspondence  concerning 

terms  for  examination  and  introduction  copies. 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S  SONS,    Publishers 

153-157  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York. 


5..rtaaiditeaaffla!iMiiaii»!i&«gawi^^ 


THE    GREAT    SUCCESS    OF 
THE    SERIES 

is  the  best  proof  of  its  general  popularity,  and  the  excellence  of 
the  various  volumes  is  further  attested  by  their  having  been 
adopted  as  text-books  in  many  of  our  leading  educational  institu- 
tions. The  publishers  beg  to  call  attention  to  the  following;  list 
comprising  some  of  the  most  prominent  institutions  using  volumes 
of  the  series : 


Smith  College,  Northampton,  Mass. 

Univ.  of  Vermont,  Burlington,  Vt. 

Yale  Univ.,  New  Haven,  Conn. 

Harvard  Univ.,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

Bellewood  Sem.,  Anchorage,  Ky. 

Vanderbilt  Univ.,  Nashville,  Tenn. 
State  Univ.,  Minneapolis,  Minn, 
Christian  Coll.,  Columbia,  Mo. 
Adelphi  Acad.,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 
Earlham  Coll.,  Richmond,  Ind. 
Granger  Place  School,  Canandaigna, 

N.  Y. 
Salt  Lake  Acad., Salt  Lake  City,  Utah. 
Beloit  Col.,  Beloit.  Wis. 
Logan  FemalcCoII.,  Russellville,  Ky. 
No.  West  Univ.,  Evanston,  111. 
State  Normal  School,  Baltimore,  Md. 
Hamilton  Coll.,  Clinton,  N.  Y. 
Doanc  Coll.,  Crete,  Neb. 
Princeton  College,  Princeton,  N.J. 
Williams  Coll.,  Williamstowii,  Ma>s. 
Cornell  Univ.,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
Illinois  Coll.,  Jacksonville,  III. 


Univ.  of  South,  Scwaunee,  Tenn. 

Weslcyan  Univ..  Mt.  Pleasant,  la. 

Univ.  of  Cal..  Berkeley.  Cal. 

So.  Car.  Coll.,  Columbia,  S.  C. 

Amsterdam       Acad.,       Amsterdam, 
N.  Y. 

Carleton  Coll..  Northfield,  Minn. 

Wesleyan  Univ.,  Middletown,  Mass. 

Albion  Coll.,  Albion,  Mich. 

Dartmouth  Coll  ,  Hanover.  N.  H. 

Wilmington  Coll.,  Wilmington,  O. 

Madi>on  Univ.,  Hamilton,  N.  Y. 

Syracuse  Univ.,  Syracuse,  N.  Y. 

Univ.  of  Wis.,  Madison,  Wis. 

Union  Coll..  Schenectady,  N.  Y. 
Norwich  Free  Acad.,  Norwich.  Conn. 
Greenwich  Acad.,  Greenwich,  Conn. 
Univ.  of  Neb,.  Lincoln,  Neb. 
Kalamazoo  Coll.,  Kalamazoo,  Mich. 
01:vet  Coll..  Olivet,  Mich. 
Amher>t  Coll..  Amherst,  Mass. 
Ohio  Stale  Univ.,  Columbus,  O. 
Free  Schools,  Oswego,  N.  Y. 


Bishop  J.  F.  Hurst,  ex- President  of  Drew  Theol.  Sem. 
"  It  appears  to  me  that  the  idea  of  Morris  in  his  Epochs  is 
stnctly  in  harmony  with  the  philosophy  of  history— namely,  that 
great  movements  should  be  treated  not  according  to  narrow 
geographical  and  national  limits  and  di.^tinction,  but  universally, 
accordmg  to  their  place  in  the  general  life  of  the  world  The 
historical  Maps  and  the  copious  Indices  are  welcome  additions 
to  the  volumes." 


EPOCHS    OF    ANCIENT 
HISTORY. 

A    SER/ES    OF    BOOKS   NARRATING    THE    HISTORY   OF 

GREECE  AND  ROME,  AND  OF  THEIR  RELA  TIONS  TO 

OTHER   COUNTRIES  AT  SUCCESSIVE  EPOCHS 

Edited  by 

Rev.  G.  W.  Cox  and  Charles  Sankey,  M.A. 

Eleven  volumes,  i6mo,  with  41  Maps  and  Plans. 

Sold  separately.     Price  per  vol.,  $1.00. 

The  Set,  Roxburgh  style,  gfilt  top,  in  box,  $11.00. 


TROY-ITS      LEGEND,      HISTORY,     AND 
LITERATURE.     By  S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 

**  The  task  of  the  author  has  been  to  gather  into  a  clear 
and  very  readable  narrative  all  that  is  known  of  legendary, 
historical,  and  geographical  Troy,  and  to  tell  the  story  of 
Homer,  and  weigh  and  compare  the  different  theories  in  the 
Homeric  controversy.  The  work  is  well  done.  His  book  is 
altogether  candid,  and  is  a  very  valuable  and  entertaining 
compendium. " — I/art/ord  Courant. 

*'As  a  monograph  on  Troy,  covering  all  sides  of  the  ques- 
tion, it  is  of  great  value,  and  supplies  a  long  vacant  place  in 
our  fund  of  classical  knowledge." — N,  V.  Christian  Advocate. 

THE    GREEKS    AND    THE     PERSIANS.      By 
Rev  G.  W.  Cox. 

"It  covers  the  ground  in  a  perfectly  satisfactory  wav. 
The  work  is  clear,  succinct,  and  readable."— AVw;  York 
Independent. 

*'  Marked  by  thorough  and  comprehensive  scholarship  and 
by  a  skillful  style." — Congregationalist. 

"It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  more  creditable  book.  The 
author's  prefatory  remarks  upon  the  origin  and  growth  of 
Greek  civilization  are  alone  worth  the  price  of  the  volume.' 
— Christian  Union, 


EPOCHS   OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 


THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE-From  the  Flight 
of  Xerxes  to  the  Fall  of  Athens.  By  Rev. 
G.  VV.  Cox. 

•*  Mr.  Cox  writes  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  before  the 
reader  everything  which  is  important  to  be  known  or  learned; 
and  his  narrative  cannot  fail  to  give  a  good  idea  of  the  men 
and  deeds  with  which  he  is  concerned."— r^^-  Churchman. 

"Mr.  Cox  has  done  his  work  with  the  honesty  of  a  true 
student.  It  shows  persevering  scholarship  and  a  c'esire  to 
get  at  the  truth."— AVw  York  Herald. 

THE  SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN  SUPREMA- 
CIES.    By  Charles  Sankey,  M.A. 

*'  This  volume  covers  the  period  between  the  disasters  of 
Athens  at  the  close  of  the  Pelopenesian  war  and  the  rise  of 
Macedon.  It  is  a  very  striking  and  instructive  picture  of  the 
political  life  of  the  Grecian  commonwealth  at  that  time." — 
The  Churchman. 

"It  is  singularly  interesting  to  read,  and  in  respect  to 
arrangement,  maps,  etc.,  is  all  that  can  be  desired."— i9^j/i?« 
Congregational  St. 

THE  MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE-Its  Rise  and 
Culmination  to  Death  of  Alexander  the 
Great.     By  A.  M.  Curteis,  M.A. 

"A  good  and  satisfactory  history  of  a  very  important  period. 
The  maps  are  excellent,  and  the  story  is  lucidly  and  vigor- 
ously \.o\^."—The  Nation. 

••  The  same  compressive  style  and  yet  completeness  of 
detail  that  have  characterized  the  previous  issues  in  this 
delightful  series,  are  found  in  this  volume.  Certainly  the  art 
of  conciseness  in  writing  was  never  carried  to  a  higher  or 
more  effective  point."— /,Vj/<7«  Saturday  Evening  Gatette. 

♦*♦  ^^^  above  Jive  Vuiumes  give  a  connected  and  complete 
history  of  Greece  from  the  earliest  timts  to  th^  death  of 
Alexander. 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 


EARLY  ROME— From  the  Foundation  of  the 
City  to  its  Destruction  by  the  Gauls.  By 
W.  Ihne,  Ph.D. 

"  Those  who  want  to  know  the  truth  instead  of  the  tra- 
ditions that  used  to  be  learned  of  our  fathers,  will  find  in  ^e 
work  entertainment,  careful  scholarship,  and  sound  sense.'  ^  - 
Cincinnati  Times. 

"  The  book  is  excellently  well  done.  The  views  are  those 
of  a  learned  and  able  man,  and  they  are  presented  in  this 
volume  with  great  force  and  clearness." — The  Nation. 

ROME  AND  CARTHAGE-The  Punic  Wars. 
By  R.  BoswoRTH  Smith. 

"  By  blending  the  account  of  Rome  and  Carthage  the  ac- 
complished author  presents  a  succinct  and  vivid  picture  of 
two  great  cities  and  people  which  leaves  a  deep  impression. 
The  story  is  full  of  intrinsic  interest,  and  was  never  better 
told." — Christian  Union. 

**  The  volume  is  one  of  rare  interest  and  value." — Chicago 
Interior. 

"An  admirably  condensed  history  of  Carthage,  from  its 
establishment  by  the  adventurous  Phoenician  traders  to  its 
sad  and  disastrous  fall." — N'ew  York  Herald. 

THE  GRACCHI,  MARIUS,  AND  SULLA.  By 
A    H.  Beesley. 

"  A  concise  and  scholarly  historical  sketch,  descriptive  of 
the  decay  of  the  Roman  Republic,  and  the  events  which  paved 
the  way  for  the  advent  of  the  conquering  Caesar.  It  is  an 
excellent  account  of  the  leaders  and  legislation  of  the  repub- 
lic. "—/?^j/t7«  Post. 

"  It  is  prepared  in  succinct  but  comprehtT-Nive  style,  and  is 
an  excellent  book  for  reading  and  reference." — N'ew  York 
Observer. 

"  No  better  condensed  account  of  the  two  Gracchi  and  the 
turbulent  careers  of  Marius  and  Sulla  has  yet  appeared." — ■ 
A'ew  York  Independent. 


EPOCHS  OF  A.VC/E.VT  iriSTOJiY 


THE  ROMAN  TRIUMVIRATES.    By  the  \^^, 
Charles  Merivale,   D.D.  '"^veryKeT. 

••  In  brevity,  clear  and  scholarly  treatment  of  the  subject 
.n.i    the  conventcnce   of  ,„ap.    index,  and   side   notes    the 
volume  IS  a  model.  "-AVj,,  York   Trihum. 

"An   admirable  presentation,  and  in  style  vigorous  and 
picturesque.  ■■-//„r//WC««ra„,.  »'l.orous  and 

THE  EARLY  EMPIRE-From  the  Assasslna 
t.on  Of  Julius  C^sar  to  the  Assas^nl  ?on 
of  Domittan.     liy  kev.  W.  Wolfe  Capes,  MA 

•■  It  is  written  with  great  clearness  and  simplicity  of  style 
«.d  .s  as  attractive  an  account  as  has  ever  been  le„  in 

Hilrt-^l:'     wT    '"'"«•'"«  P-io'lsof Vol 
History.   — Boston   '^•'tur./aylCvtningCaHlf 

"It  >s  a  clear,  well-proportioned,  and  trustworthy  perfor 
-n«,   and   well    deserves    to  be  studied."-C.ir   : 

THE  AGE  OF  THE  ANTONINES-The  Roman 
Empire  of  the  Second  Century  By^t 
W.  Wolfe  Capfs,  M.A. 

••  The  Roman  Empire  during  the  second  century  is  the 
broad  subject  discussed  in  this  book,  and  discus^d  with 
learning  and  intelligence."-AV.  ,V,  /^.^.^y^I 

The  writers  diction  is  clear  and  elegant,  and  his  narra- 

US  prolific  and  interest.ng  theme,  and  in  its  general  plan,  the 
book  IS  a  model  of  works  of  its  class. --.V  J  Vor,  Ljt 
We  are  glad  to  commend  it.  It  is  written  clearly  and 
with  care  and  accuracy.  It  is  also  in  such  nea,  and  conipi t 
form  as  to  be  the  more  at,ractive."-a»^.,^,,„„,^,r' 

«\*  ^v'  "'*'""  "'  ""''"""  ^''"  ""  ^'"""y  0/  Xom,  fro„ 


EPOCHS     OF    MODERN 
HISTORY. 

A    SERIES    OF   BOOK'S  NARRATING    THE  HISTORY   OF 

ENGLAND  AND  EUROPE  AT  SUCCESSIVE  EPOCHS 

SUBSEQUENT  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  ERA. 

Edited  by 

Edward  E.  Morris. 

Eighteen  volumes,  i6mo,  with  74  Maps,  Plans,  and  Tables, 

Sold  separately.     Price  per  vol.,  $i.oo. 

The  Set,  Roxburgh  style,  gilt  top,  in  box,  $18.00. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE   MIDDLE  AGES- 
England  and  Europe  in  the  Ninth  Century. 

By  the  Very  Rev.  R.  W.  Church.  M.A. 

"A  remarkably  thoughtful  and  satisfactory  discussion  of 
the  causes  and  results  of  the  vast  changes  which  came  upon 
Europe  during  the  period  discussed.  The  book  is  adapted  to 
be  e.vceedingly  .serviceable."— C///Va^<?  Standard. 

"At  once  readable  and  valuable.  It  is  comprehensive  and 
yet  gives  the  details  of  a  period  most  interesting  to  the  student 
of  history." — Herald  and  Presbyter. 

"  It  is  written  with  a  clearness  and  vividness  of  statement 
which  make  it  the  pleasantest  reading.  It  represents  a  great 
deal  of  patient  research,  and  is  careful  and  scholarly."-^ 
Boston  Journal. 

THE  NORMANS  IN  EUROPE-The  Feudal 
System  and  England  under  the  Norman 
Kings.     By  Rev.  A.  H.  Johnson,  M.A. 

"  Its  pictures  of  the  Normans  in  their  home,  of  the  Scan- 
dinavian exodus,  the  conquest  of  England,  and  Norman 
administration,  are  full  of  vigor  and  cannot  fail  of  holding  the 
reader's  2i{\.cr\\\on."— Episcopal  /Register. 

"  The  style  of  the  author  is  vigorous  and  animated,  and  he 
has  given  a  valuable  sketch  of  the  origin  and  progress  of  the 
great  Northern  movement  that  has  shaped  the  history  ol 
modern  Europe." — Boston  Transcript. 


h 


EPOCHS  OF  MODERy  HISTORY 


THE   CRUSADES.     By  Rev.  (;.  W.  Cox. 

'•To  be  warmly  commended  for  important  qualities  The 
author  shows  conscientious  fidelity  to  the  material.,  and  such 
skill  ,n  the  use  of  them,  that,  as  a  result,  the  reader  has 
before  h.m  a  narrative  related  in  a  style  that  makes  it  tndy 
fasc.natmg.  "—Couirrei^atiomu'ist.  ^ 

-  It  is  written  in  a  pure  and  flowing  style,  and  its  arrange, 
men  and  treatment  of  subject  are  exceptional.  "~a^V/L 
Jnteiligencer. 

"^"rI  K^^'^h^  PLANTAGENETS-Their 
Relation  to  the  History  of  Europe;  The 
Foundation  and  Growth  of  Constitutional 
Government.    By  Rev.  w.  Stubbs,  M  A 

"Nolhini;  could  be  desired  more  clear,  succinct,  and  well 
arranged.  All  pans  of  the  book  are  well  done.  It  may  be 
pronounced  the  best  existing  brief  history  of  the  constitutioa 
lor  this,  Us  most  important  period."— 7V;,.  XatUm. 

"Prof  Slubbs  has  presente.l  loading  events  with  such  fair- 
ness and  wisdom  as  are  seldom  found.  He  is  remarkably 
clear  and  satisfactory. "—  Tlu  Churchma,,. 

EDWARD    III.     By  Rev.  W.  WARBtrRTON-,  M  A 

"  1  he  author  has  done  his  work  well,  and  we  commend  It 
as  containing  m  small  space  all  essential  matter. "-.Wa,  York 

Jndt'p.'nJcnt. 

'•Events  an.l  movements  are  admirably  condensed  by  the 
author,  and  presented  in  such  attractive  form  as  to  entertain 
as  well  as  instruct.  "_C/„V<,i.^  Inkrior. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK 

uirs!-       """^^^  and  Loss  of  France.     By 
James  Oairdner.  ^ 

"Pt-epared  :„  a  most  careful  and  thorough  manner,  and 
ought  to  be  read  by  every  student.  "-A>„  ,t*  TimJ 

■■  It  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired  as  regards  compactness 
JZilZ'  """'"''    "^   '"""^    execution.  "L^,Z 


EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY 


\\ 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  PROTESTANT  REVO- 
LUTION. By  Frederic  Seebohm.  With  Notes,  on 
Books  in  English  relating  to  the  Reformation,  by  Prof. 
George  P.  Fisher,  D.D. 

"For  an  impartial  record  of  the  civil  and  ecclesiastical 
changes  about  four  hundred  years  ago,  we  cannot  commend  a 
better  m^aww^X:'— Sunday- School  Times. 

"All  that  could  be  desired,  as  well  in  execution  as  in  plan. 
The  narrative  is  animated,  and  the  selection  and  grouping  of 
events  skillful  and  effect ive."—7^/J^  Xation. 

THE  EARLY  TUDORS-Henry  VII.,  Henry 
VIII.  By  Rev.  C.  E.  Moberley,  M.A.,  late  Master  in 
Rugby  School. 

"Isconcise,  scholarly,  and  accurate.  On  the  epoch  of  which 
it  treats,  we  know  of  no  work  which  equals  it."— ^V.  Y.  Observer. 

*'  A  marvel  of  clear  and  succinct  brevity  and  good  historical 
judgment.  There  is  hardly  a  better  boc  k  of  its  kind  to  be 
named."— A^^7f;  York  Independent. 

THE  AGE  OF  ELIZABETH.  By  Rev.  M. 
Creighton,  M.A. 

"Clear  and  compact  in  style  ;  careful  in  their  facts,  and 
just  in  interpretation  of  them.  It  sheds  much  light  on  the 
progress  of  the  Reformation  and  the  origin  of  the  Popish 
reaction  during  Queen  Elizabeth's  reign  ;  also,  the  relation  of 
Jesuitism  to  the  \2.\.\^x.''—Pusbyterian  Review. 

"  A  clear,  concise,  and  just  story  of  an  era  crowded  with 
events  of  interest  and  importance." — New  Ycrk  World. 

THE    THIRTY    YEARS'     WAR-161 8-1 648. 

By  Samuel  Ravvson  Gardiner. 

"  As  a  manual  it  will  prove  of  the  greatest  practical  value, 
while  to  the  general  reader  it  will  afford  a  clear  and  interesting 
account  of  events.  We  know  of  no  more  spirited  and  attractive 
recital  of  the  great  <tx^."— Boston  Saturday  Evening  Gazette. 

"  The  thrilling  story  of  those  times  has  never  been  told  so 
vividly  or  succinctly  as  in  this  \o\Mm^:'— Episcopal  Register. 


EPOCHS  OF  MODER.y  HISTORY. 


THE  PURITAN  REVOLUTION  ;  and  the  First 
Two  Stuarts,  1  603-  1  660.  By  Samull  Rawson 
Gardiner. 

''The  narrative  is  condensed  and  brief,  yet  sufficiently  com- 
prehensive to  give  an  adequate  view  of  the  events  related  " 
— Chicago  Standard. 

.lc\fj'  Gardiner  uses  his  researches  in  an  admirably  clear 
and  fair  way  "—Congregationalist.  ^ 

y  The -ketcn  ii  concise,  but  clear  and  perfectly  intelliLMble." 
—  Hartford  Couraut.  '  fe        • 

THE  ENGLISH  RESTORATION  AND  LOUIS 
XIV.,  from  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  to  the 
Peace  of  Nimwegen.    By  Osmunu  Airy,  M.A. 

n'  *inf  J'  ""'i-^'^^'  ^"'^  admirably  written.  An  immense  amount 
o.  mformation  is  conveye.l  and  with  great  clearness  the 
arrangement  of  the  subjects  showing  great  skill  and  a  thor! 
^.f^.^'Sl;:'  the  complicated  theme.  "-Z,'.....  Saturday 

''The  author  writes  with  fairness  and  discrimination,  and 
has  g.ven  a  clear  and  intelligible  presentation  of  the  tim;."- 
Aew  r ork  hxuiugelist. 

THE  FALL  OF  THE  STUARTS;  and  Western 
Europe.     By  Rev.  Edward  Hale,  M.a. 

•'A  valuable  compcnd  to  the  general  reader  and  scholar  " 
— /  rovuience  Journal. 

"It   will  be   found  of  great   value.     It  is  a  very  graphic 
account  of  the  history  of  Kurope  during  the  17th  cenUiry 
and  IS  admirably  adapted  for  the  use  of  students. "-S 
Saturday  Evening  Gazette.  ^vitun 

"An  admirable  handbook  for  the  student. "—  The  Churchman. 
THE  AGE  OF  ANNE.     By  Edward  E.  Morris,  M.A. 

clea^M^Tl^^'r'  ^'■'■''^"g'-^!"^"*  «f  the  material  is  remarkably 
clear,  his  selection  and  adjustment  of  the  facts  judicious  his 
historical  judgment  air  and  candid,  while  the  ityle  wins  by 
Its  simple  elegance."— C/iA-a-t;  Standard.  ^ 


EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HI  STORY. 


1 


THE  EARLY  HANOVERIANS-Europe  from 
the  Peace  of  Utrecht  to  the  Peace  of  Aix- 
ia-Chapelle.     By  Edward  E.  Morris.  M.A. 

"  Masterly,  condensed,  and  vigorous,  this  is  one  of  the 
books  which  it  is  a  delight  to  read  at  odil  moments  ;  which 
are  broad  and  suggestive,  and  at  the  same  time  condensed  in 
treatment. " — Christian  Advocate. 

*•  A  remarkably  clear  and  readable  summary  of  the  salient 
points  of  interest.  The  maps  and  tables,  no  less  than  the 
author's  style  and  treatment  of  the  subject,  entitle  the  volume 
to  the  highest  claims  of  recognition." — Boston  Daily  Ad- 
vertiser. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT,  AND  THE  SEVEN 
YEARS'  WAR.     By  F.  W.  Longman. 

"  The  subject  is  most  important,  and  the  author  has  treated 
it  in  a  way  which  is  both  scholarly  and  entertaining." — The 
Churchman. 

"Admirably  adapted  to  interest  school  boys,  and  older 
heads  will  find  it  pleasant  reading." — New  York  Tribune. 

THE   FRENCH    REVOLUTION,  AND    FIRST 

EMPIRE.  By  William  O'Connor  Morris.  With 
Appendix  by  Andrew  D.  White,  LL.D.,  ex-President  of 
Cornell  University. 

**  We  have  long  needed  a  simple  compendium  of  this  period, 
and  we  have  here  one  which  is  brief  enough  to  be  easily  run 
through  with,  and  yet  particular  enough  to  make  entertaining 
reading." — Ne7o  York  Evening  Post. 

*'  The  author  has  well  accomplished  his  difficult  task  of 
sketching  in  miniature  the  grand  and  crowded  drama  of  tlie 
French  Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic  Empire,  showing 
himself  to  be  no  servile  compiler,  but  capable  of  judicious 
and  independent  criticism." — Springfield  Republican. 

THE  EPOCH  OF   REFORM-1  830- 1  850.    By 

Justin  McCarthy. 

"  Mr.  McCarthy  knows  the  period  of  which  he  writes 
thoroughly,  and  the  result  is  a  narrative  that  is  at  once  enter- 
taining and  trustworthy." — New  York  Examiner. 

"  The  narrative  is  clear  and  comprehensive,  and  told  with 
abundant  knowledge  and  grasp  of  the  subject." — Boston 
Courier. 


IMPORTANT  HISTORICAL 

WORKS. 

CIVILIZATION  DURING  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 
Especially  in  Its  Relation  to  Modern  Civil- 
ization.    By  Ge-rge  K  Adams,  IVofes.or  of  llUtory  in 
Vale  University.     8vo,  $2.50. 

f„r''rh!"f  "i ^"^cT,  ^.^^  '■"'=  '"I'P"^''  "•«  need  of  a  text-l«ok 
for  the  study  of  Meduival    lli,tury  in  college  classes  a,  o^e 

llS",o'u  ''l?:".'"'  "'  -f  i-.g  hantlled  fn  the  time  u'sualy 
allowed  to  It.      He  has  aimed  to  treat  the  suLiect  in  a  manner 
which  us  place  in  the  college  curriculum  dema^nd     by  pTesem 
^rouM,     r''  ^  ^l^^r.^.P^^^'i'^Ie  of  the  underlying  and  ^organic 

S.:!n^  iiu;:^:;;::;.  '^^ '-  '"""^^^--  - -^  '^^^  ^^^ 

Trof.  KFN'nRic  C.  B.AncocK,  University  of  Minnesota— -  It 

s  one  of  the  best  books  of  the  kind  which  I  have  Sn      We 

shall  use  it  the  coming  term."  ^ 

Prof    Marshall   S.    Brow.n,    Michigan   University  •--- 1 
regard    the  >.-ork    as  a  very   valuable  treatmen^of  t  e  Tr.a 

HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.     By  E 

Benja.m,n    ANDREWS.    D.D.,   LL.D..    President    of   bLo 
Univer,„y,     %V ,th  maps.     Two  vols. .  crown  octavo,  S4.00. 
Boston  Advertiskr  :— ««  We  doubt  if  th^^^  \       u 

standard."  '    °  ""=  """"  'V""'     "  ""^'   becon>e  a 

Amerrcarif'^t'.'h?,::.'.;''"^  best  popular,  eene.,  histories  of 

Td'lhtilfer.^  ""'  ".oug'ufulness.     1,  is  the  wortoT'l'sctt 


IMPORTANT  HISTORICAL   WORKS. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  ROME,  from  the  Earliest 
Time  to  the  Period  of  Its  Decline.     By  Dr. 

Theodor  Mommsen.  Translated  by  \V.  P.  DiCKSON,  D.D., 
LL.D.  A  New  Edition,  Revised  throughout,  and  embodying 
recent  additions.     Five  vols.,  with  Map.     Trice  per  set,  $io.c». 

*'  A  work  of  the  very  highest  merit  ;  its  learning  is  exact 
and  profound  ;  its  narrative  full  of  genius  and  .skill ;  its 
descriptions  of  men  are  admirably  vivid." — London  Times. 

'*  Since  the  days  of  Niebuhr,  no  work  on  Roman  History 
has  appeared  that  combines  so  much  to  attract,  instruct,  and 
charm  the  reader.  Its  style — a  rare  quality  in  a  German 
author — is  vigorous,  spirited,  and  animated."— Dr.  Schmitz. 


THE  PROVINCES  OF  THE  ROMAN  EMPIRE. 
From    Caesar    to    Diocletian.      By    Theodor 

Mommsen.      Translated  by  William  P.  Dickson,  D.D., 
LL.D.     With  maps.     Two  vols.,  8 vo,  $6.00. 

'•  The  author  draws  the  wonderfully  rich  and  varied  picture 
of  the  conquest  and  administration  of  that  great  circle  of 
peoples  and  lands  which  formed  the  empire  of  Rome  outside 
of  Italy,  their  agriculture,  trade,  and  manufactures,  their 
artistic  and  scientific  life,  through  all  degrees  of  civilization, 
with  such  detail  and  completeness  as  could  have  come  from 
no  other  hand  than  that  of  this  great  master  of  historical  re- 
search."—-Prof.  W.  A.  Packard,  Princeton  College. 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROMAN  REPUBLIC. 

Abridged  from  the  History  by  Professor  Theodor  Mommsen, 
by  C.  Bryans  and  F.  J.  R.  Hendy.     i2mo,  $1.75. 

•'  It  is  a  genuine  boon  that  the  essential  parts  of  Mommsen's 
Rome  are  thus  brought  within  the  easy  reach  of  all,  and  the 
abridgment  seems  to  me  to  preserve  unu.sually  well  the  glow 
and  movement  of  the  original." — Prof.  Tracy  Peck,  Yale 
University. 

"The  condensation  has  been  accurately  and  judiciously 
effected.  I  heartily  commend  the  volume  as  the  most  adequate 
embo<liment,  in  a  single  volume,  of  the  main  results  of  modem 
hi.storical  research  in  the  field  of  Roman  affairs." — Prof. 
Henry  M.  Baird,  University  of  City  of  New  York. 


IMPORTANT  HISTOR/CAL    WORKS. 


"""to  Si^^^M^"  OF  HISTORY.    An  Introduction 

"        '^'^  ^-  ^-  I^f^ARY.       l2mo,  clolh,  $1.25. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  NATIONS.     By  Professor  Geohce 
Rawlinson,  M.A.     i2mo.  with  maps,  $.  oo 

ethnographical  science.  modern 

such  subiecfs"'ic:^4.;^:„x'"^'  ^"^'"'  '''"^"'-<'" 

MANUAL   OF    MYTHOLOGY.    For  the    Use 

^L!^*^°°'^'    ^--t    Students,    and    General 
Readers.    Founded  on  the  Works  of  Pet^ 

S.  Murray,  Department  of  Greek  and  Roman  Antiquities, 
Bnfsh    Museum.      With   45    Plates.      Reprinted   from   the 
Second  Revised  London  Edition.     Crown  8vo  $i  75 
tobi'foumHrf^  acknowledged  the  best  work  on  the  subject 

°f  ,t  ,t:;V::x:;dTco\l::  i'LTct^',^^ 

io  anTofth;  I7:l7'ri  E-era,  p~:l7han& 


4 


IMPORTANT  HISTORICAL    WORKS. 


THE     HISTORY     OF    GREECE.      By    Prof.     Dr. 

Ernst  Curtius.     Translated  by  Adolphus  William  Ward, 

M.A,,  Fellow  of  St.   Peter's  College,  Cambridge,  Prof,  of 

Mistory    in    Owen's   College,    Manchester.     Five    volumes, 

crown  8vo.     Price  per  set,  $10.00. 

*'  We  cannot  express  our  opinion  of  Dr.  Curtius'  book  bet- 
ter than  by  .saying  that  it  may  be  fitly  ranked  with  Theodor 
Mommsen's  great  work." — London  Spectator. 

"As  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  Grecian  history,  no 
previous  work  is  comparable  to  the  present  for  vivacity  and 
picturesque  beauty,  while  in  sound  learning  and  accuracy  of 
statement  it  is  not  inferior  to  the  elaborate  productions  which 
enrich  the  literature  of  the  age." — A'.  Y.  Daily  1  ribune. 

C/ESAR:  a  Sketch.  By  James  Anthony  Froude, 
M.A.     i2mo,  gilt  top,  $1.50. 

"This  book  is  a  most  fascinating  biography  and  is  by  far 
the  best  account  of  Julius  Coesar  to  be  found  in  the  English 
language." — I  he  London  Standard. 

"  He  combines  into  a  compact  and  nervous  narrative  all 
that  is  known  of  the  personal,  social,  political,  and  military 
life  of  Cajsar  ;  and  with  his  sketch  of  Ccesar  includes  other 
brilliant  sketches  of  the  great  man,  his  friends,  or  rivals, 
who  contemporaneously  with  him  foimed  the  principal  figures 
in  the  Roman  world." — Harper  s  Monthly. 

CICERO.  Life  of  Marcus  Tullius  Cicero.  By 
William  Forsyth,  M.A.,  Q.C.  20  Engravings.  New 
Edition.     2  vols.,  crown  8vo,  in  one,  gilt  top,  $2.50. 

The  author  has  not  only  given  us  the  most  complete  and 
well-balanced  account  of  the  life  of  Cicero  ever  published  ; 
he  has  drawn  an  accurate  and  graphic  picture  of  domestic  life 
among  the  best  classes  of  the  Romans,  one  which  the  reader 
of  general  literature,  as  well  as  the  student,  may  peruse  with 
pleasure  and  profit. 

"A  scholar  without  pedantry,  and  a  Christian  without  cant, 
Mr.  Forsyth  seems  to  have  seized  with  praiseworthy  tact  the 
precise  attitude  which  it  behooves  a  biographer  to  take  when 
narrating  the  life,  the  personal  life  of  Cicero.  Mr.  Forsyth 
produces  what  we  venture  to  say  will  become  one  of  the 
clfissics  of  English  biographical  literature,  and  will  be  wel- 
comed by  readers  of  all  ages  and  both  sexes,  of  all  professions 
and  of  no  profession  at  all." — London  Quarterly. 


VALUABLE  WORKS  ON 
CLASSICAL    LITERATURE. 

THE   HISTORY   OF   ROMAN  LITERATURE 
From  the  Earliest  Period  to  the  Dea^h  of 

Marcus  Aurelius.     With  Chronological  Tahfes   etc 
fonhe^use  of  S.u.len.s.    By  C.  T.  Ckuttwe...  M. A     C.^' ' 


UNIFORM    Wrril   THE  A  HOVE. 

A    HISTORY    OF    GREEK    LITERATURE 
From  the  Earliest  Period  of  Demosthenes 

By  FKA.K  BVKO.  J.VO.SS.  M.A.,  T„,or  i„  .he  UnTve^ 
of  Durham.     Crown  8vo.  $2.50. 

The  author  goes  into  detail  with  sufiicient  fullness  to  m^t^ 
the  history  complete,  but  he  never  loses  sigh    of  the  Tom 
manding  Imes  along  which  the  Greek  mind  moved    and  » 
clear  understanding  of  which  is  necessary  to  evT,^  fn/.n        ! 
student  of  universal  literature.         "^''^'^  '°  ^^^^  intelligent 

"  ^\}\  beyond  all  question  the  l.cst  history  of  Greek  lit^ra 
ture  that  has  hitherto  been  published. '•-Z.Li^^.'L/;^!: 


CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SON^ 

»53-i57  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York. 


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•34 


Epochs  of  Axcikxt  History 


EDITED    IJY 


REV.  G.  vV.  COX,  M.  A.  and  C.  SAXKP-T^',  M.  A. 


SPARTAN  ami   THE  BAN  SUPREMACIES 


C.   SANKEV,  M.A. 


EPOCHS   OF  ANCIENT   HISTORV. 
Edited   by  Rcy.  G.  VV.  Cox  tnd  Charles   Sankev    M     \ 
Heven  volumes,  i6mo,  with  41   Maps  and  Plans.     Prirr  per 
vol  ,  $x.oo.    The  set,  Roxburgh  style,  gilt  top,  in  box,  $11  00. 

TiiOY— Its   Legend,    History,  and  Literature.     By  S.  G.   W. 
Benjamin 

The  Greeks  and  the  Persians.     By  G.  W.  Cox. 

The  Athenian  Empire.     By  6.  VV.  Cox. 

The  Spartan  and  Theban  Supremacies.     By  Charles  Sankty. 

The  Macedonian  Evfire.     By  A.  M.  Curteis. 

Early  Rome.     By  W.  Ihne. 

Pome  and  Cartmaqe.     By  R.  Bosworth  Smith. 

The  Gracchi,  Marius,  ano  Sulla.     By  A.  H.  Uecsley. 

The  Roman  Triumvirates.     By  Charles  Merivale. 

The  Earl>  Empire      By  \V.  Wolfe  Capes. 

The  Aqe  of  the  Antomnes.     By  W.  \\  olfe  Capes. 

EPOCHS   OF    MODERN    HISTORY. 
Edited  by  Edward   E.    Morris.      Eighteen   volumes,   ,6mo. 
with    77    Maps.   Plans,  and    fables.     Price  per  vol.,   $,  <» 
Ihe  set,  Roxburgh  style,  gilt  top,  in  box,  $18.00. 

The  Beoinninq  of  the  Middle  Ages      By  R.  VV.  Church. 

The  Normans  in  Europe      By  A.  H.  Johnson. 

The  Crusades     By  G.  W.  (ox. 

The  Early  Plantaqinets.     By  Wm.  Stubbs. 

Edward  III.     By  W.  Warburton. 

The  Houses  of  Lancaster  and  York.     By  James  Gairdner. 

The  Era  of  the  Protestant  Revolution.     By  Frederic  Secbohm 

Thc  Early  Tuoors.     By  C.  E.  Moberly. 

The  Age  of  Elizabeth.     By  M.  Creighton 

The  Thirty  Years  War,  ni8-ie4s.     By  S    R.  Gardiner 

The  Puritan  Revolution.     By  S.  R.  Gardiner. 

The  Fall  of  the  Stuarts.     By  Rdw.ird  Hair. 

The  English  Restoration  and  Louis  XIV      By  Os.m  >nc!  Airy 

The  Age  of  Anne.      By  Edward  K.  Monis 

The  Early  Hanoverians.     By  Edward  E.  Monis. 

Frederick  the  Great     By  F.  W.  Longman. 

^he  French  Revolution  and  First  Empire.      Bv  W   (>*Cf 

^  M  -rris.     Appendix  by  Andrew  D.  White. 

••hc  f  ooch  of  Reform,  itjo-isso.     By  Justin  M».:arthv 


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